kluge

This. The point is to elicit a military reaction and force adjustment. It has already provoke nervous discussion on the Russian side.

I think crossing the river in force is probably just too hard. But if the Ukrainians are considerably stronger than I think, there are good paved roads from Kherson and Nova Kakhovka Straight to the choke points at the top of Crimea. If the Ukrainians could even credibly threaten along this axis, while also attacking towards Melitopol from the North, it could unhinge the entire western third of the land bridge . Of course if Ukraine strong enough to do this, then they are probably going to smash the Russians almost regardless of the plan.

They have been talking about this for years.  Beyond cooking one’s own soldiers in their own juices, its practical application on the battlefield is really limited.  SOF and elements of recon maybe, but large infantry units become unpractical very quickly and gain little advantage for the cost.  NVGs and radars still work to pick up large bodies of infantry and the logistics of keeping a bunch of soldiers in space suits is just crazy.
And it does nothing for the real targets of thermal, vehicles.

I've seen original tweet about this. In comments one soldier told this clothes doesn't prevent thermal spotting, but can blur figure outline from distance.
PS. it's good for not hot weather, when temperature will grow up to 20+ to move in this "thermos" will be a torture

not the 'evidence', but it also doesnt mean that it isnt true. RU doesnt make these kind of claims in a daily basis. 
the claim they made that UKR speciaal forces tried to take the nuclear power plant also turned out to be more true than some of us here expected.

The other thing strongly implied in todays ISW is that the ground is still bottomless bog, and we are therefore at least a week out from the Ukrainians kicking off for real.

Def Mon mentioned something about this a few days ago.
 

If only we had a good simulator to test some of these ideas in? Anybody have any leads?🤣

I agree with you and I am afraid that it is going far away from  the topic, but it reminds me of the Puerto Rico case as a short of American Crimea. When it was military conquered by the United States in 1898, there was almost no movement for independence. the island was politically calm, almost no Porto Ricans felt oppressed, and had had political representation in the Spanish parliament for almost a century (16 representatives from Puerto Rico and 30 from Cuba out of 401 representatives in the Spanish Parliament in 1898)  ( https://adelantereunificacionistas.com/2020/03/16/diputados-provincia-de-puerto-rico-1809-1898/ ). Puerto Rico remains today an Spanish-speaking country with more or less the same population mix they had in 1898. Less than 5% of the Porto Ricans speaks English as their main language, while 95% speaks Spanish. 
Thought things seem to move more to statehood (in 2020 52,5% of Puerto Ricans voted for statehood, but at the same time 47,5% voted against it), there are a small independence movement (AFAIK they have never been more than 5% of the population)  and there is even a small, residual group who defends integration in Spain as Spain's 18th "comunidad autónoma" (a comunidad autónoma is an autonomous region with their own government and parliament, not much different from and U.S. state or a German Land and obviously with full representation in the Spanish Congress and Senate) ( https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/30/puerto-rico-movement-pitches-solution-to-economic-woes-rejoin-spain )

Spain has never shown any interest in recovering the island or confront the US. but let's see an highly hypothetical scenario where Spain, this time with a very nationalist government, wants to recover past glories, and has strong political and military support from a more unified and aggressive EU who want to act in an independent way. The EU thinks that recovering Puerto Rico and getting a foothold in the Caribbean Sea is an strategic must and there is a window of opportunity for doing it, because the U.S. is in a persistent internal political crisis which makes USA politically and militarily weak for some time. Then they do cover moves for a decade or so that the States cannot counter. The hybrid action unfolds until a referendum is fully won in a legal and democratic way, so 75 or 80% of the Puerto Rico people vote to become an independent country in order to be free later to integrate in Spain and the EU. No need for the EU to send little green men.

In this case Puerto Rico plays Crimea, the United States plays Ukraine and the European Union plays the Russian Federation (a less military aggressive one, so there is no need for little green men)  

The questions for this absurd, crazy and highly hypothetical scenario would be:
The United States would accept the democratic decision of the Puerto Rican people? Would be OK for the U.S. that Puerto Rico became a part of the European Union?
AFAIK from an American point of view  and according to the Property Cause, it was the U.S. congress who should decide, no matter what Porto Ricans said and the EU wanted., so, would an American military intervention to avoid it be sound and politically OK? I think not.

OTOH, if the EU had forced things too much and had sent little green men to take Puerto Rico from the US, would be ok to send the US army to restore the status quo broken by an aggressive and unlawful move of the UE? I think in that case it would be OK, even if the population were mostly for the independence/annexation to the EU.
I think there are limits for everything, there is no universal rule for all cases, and every one is different from each other, so all cases must be taken one by one. No general rule works or is needed. It may sound a lot nihilistic, but I think that is how "Realpolitik" works. Every situation is different, so we should behave ourselves according to the circumstances, even is the situation seems the same.

The Iroquois nation appreciates your support.

Speaking of fighting in Crimea.... Robert Forczyk's WW2 crimea history, Where the Iron Crosses Grow, is free if you have audible.com membership.  Good book on the subject.  I read it some years ago.

Crimea will be fine without the water supply. Pre-2014, most of water usage in Crimea was agricultural in nature. Post-2014 Ukraine turned off the water supply but Russia was nonetheless able to keep the population supplied with water. And there's water stored in reservoirs so there will be minimal impact. So if the water gets turned off (again), the population will be fine.
Turning off the water is a key symbolic action that highlights the connection between Ukraine and Crimea. But it's unlikely to be operationally significant.

Part of ceding was hoping I could do my little part to make the discussion go away .  And I wasn't going to take the time to see if his data was any good, so was throwing in the towel because there's bigger hills for me to die upon.  
Meanwhile, I am wondering how the forum breaks down into UKR spring offensive camps.  I see two main camps in the world of internet opinion:
1.  UKR offensive will be big, sudden surprise attack on (mostly) one axis and we will know it's the real deal and will come late spring.
2.  UKR will conduct increasingly aggressive corrosion plus some attacks of small-ish depth, like 5-10 kms, in multiple areas to shape the battlefield and completely confuse Putin as to where to put his reserves.  Then will strike later in summer in a much bigger way and we will then know that's the real deal.
I am believer in #2

Now the problem with people constantly bringing writings of folks like Jefferson, Adams, Paine etc. is that they are only valid within American context. As much as I am fascinated by your Founding Fathers and their debates, please understand that around the globe they are not considered particulary relevant or inspiring political thinkers, nor is Declaration of Independence; at least not to the extent they are for Americans. Simply as that- American model of democracy, citizenship and political well-being is limited to US. Don't get me wrong, it's cool its there, USA is land of liberty, shield of freedom etc, but very few political entities (even most democratic ones) outside States were ever directly modelled by this system. Comparing it to political mentallity in Russia is material for a dark comedy in itself.
If you really need to support your claims, at least quote Monteskieu, Locke, Rousseau or Hegel- they did impacted political framework around the world in much more profound way. But of course none of them have anything to do with situation in Crimea either; it was simple, plain thugish land-grab by former imperial power modo mongolico.
Now extending your point, why not even Confederate States of America are  a thing anymore? They seem to enjoy rather popular acceptance. Except for slaves, of course.

So if I violently invade your house, kick you out, and when you try to get back, you get told "sorry, the people who live in the house decide", that is fine and dandy? Good to know, where do you live?
EDIT: the fact that the openly pro-Russia+pro-China commenter is actual Florida Man tickles my stereotyping brain in a funny way.

The Russians obviously aren't completely useless - they did manage to muster several hundred thousand folks at jump off points, get them across the border, and largely keep them there despite global sanctions, heavy heavy losses, and a pretty sustained Ukrainian offensive against their theatre logistics. If they were hopeless - or had become hopeless - then the Russian forces would already be back across the 2014 borders and Sevastopol's resorts would be taking summer bookings for Kyiv's great and good.
What the Russians don't seem especially good at is offensive operations. Much like the Germans from 1941 through to 1943, their offensive aspirations seems to be on a pretty sharp downslope^. Whether that's because they just no longer have the manpower, logistic support, materiel, and strategic surprise, or because all the folks who knew how to do that have had smoking accidents, been defenestrated, or afforded a close but brief inspection of the sharp end of a HIMARS I don't really know. I suspect, though, that is a combination of reduced materiel ability coupled with reduced cognitive ability. Which is predominant is a matter of taste in the absence of real data.
 
^ Compare Op Barbarossa to Op Blue to Op Citadel, then compare Feb 2022 to the dry humping now (still) going on around Bakhmut.

LOL a fake plebiscite would be most galling. Many in the west are pretty upset about the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the following faked plebiscite results. So, it is pretty rich listening to you imply the results of that faked plebiscite mean that Ukraine taking Crimea back would via a "war to compel" the inhabitants under the Ukrainian government. If there wasn't so many people dying I would find it funny.
 
Again seriously. I am fully aware there have been issues of governance in parts of Ukraine but come on you cannot seriously think that people following this thread believe that the plebiscite you refer to is legitimate.
We don't know how the people living in Crimea would like to be governed. I would be fine with them getting to decide but before a fair plebiscite can be conducted you have to get the occupiers out of there and then you have to decide if the imported people should really get a say or sent home - tricky question. Not to mention the people displaced by the occupying Russians need to have the choice to return. Only then could you have a free vote. Honestly I'm not sure how that should look and I would leave that up to the Ukrainians and the citizens living in Crimea to decide. None of that can happen while its under Russian occupation.

Interesting points, but I think you might've missed the context, namely "dropping the Kerch Bridge rail without destroying the road deck".
All the "other rail interdiction" targets can be nailed whether the bridge is in range or not, if you want to just degrade rail comms. A large chunk of the terminal effects of "dropping the Kerch bridge" are symbolic as much as anything, and if they have to repair that rail link again, under fire from UKR rocket artillery... Assuming that symbolic is any use at all, that is.
Mostly, though, Crimea's problem in a siege is water, and I don't imagine they can tanker in enough water (along with all the other feedstock of the war machine and fodder for the civilian population), even if the Kerch rail link remains up. Once the UKR have sealed off the peninsula's land approaches, that's the beginning of the end for the Crimea garrison.

That’s true in a number of different ways, and I think it’s useful to think about those different ways, rather than just considering one explanation.
First off, and probably most superficial here, the equipment (especially) and organisation (to a degree) of US infantry divisions changed a lot over the course of those two years,* with increasing amounts of heavier and/or faster firing weapons the general direction of travel. In addition, by late 1944 divisions were routinely being augmented with semi-permanent attachments of units and sub-units of specialists – artillery, armor, anti-tank, AAA, engineers, heavy mortars, recce, logistics, etc – all of which significantly boosted the capabilities and resilience of the basic division.
For example, in December 1944, 1st US Infantry Division had the following attachments:
639th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)
18-31 Dec 44
745th Tk Bn
6 Jun 44-8 May 45
Cos A&B, 87th Cml Bn (4.2-in Mtr)
1 Oct-17 Dec 44
20th Engr C Bn
12 Jun 44-
957th FA Bn (155 How)
1 Aug-17 Dec 44
Btry A, 987th FA Bn (155 Gun)
1-17 Dec 44
60th FA Bn (9th Div) (105 How)
6-8 Dec 44
2d Bn, 36th Armd Inf (3d Armd Div)
4-7 Dec 44
634th TD Bn (SP) (- Co C)
1 Aug 44-6 May 45
703d TD Bn (SP)
18-31 Dec 44
3d Plat, Co C, 801st TD Bn (SP)
18-31 Dec 44
Source: https://history.army.mil/documents/ETO-OB/1ID-eto-ob.htm
That’s a significant increment of combat power, and the 1st wasn’t particularly favoured in that regard – those kinds of attachments were entirely normal in late 1944. They weren't so normal, though, in late 1942.
Secondly, it was a new division in that manpower turnover in combat units was pretty horrific. Over the course of the campaign in NWE the 1st lost just over 200% of its total nominal manpower, and those losses would naturally have been highly concentrated in the 27 rifle companies, which probably experienced turnover up around 4-500% given they collectively represent only a third of the Division’s total manpower. And those losses occurred over less than 300 days on the frontline. And before that there was the losses in North Africa and Sicily. Being a rifleman was not a role where longterm planning made a lot of sense. So yes, it was literally a different division. All the original guys were dead or wounded.
Finally, the division was made up of much more than just those 27 rifle companies, and learning how to ‘do’ combined arms with all the other units was another really notable difference between the division of 1942 and the one at the end of 1944. Turnover in the rifle companies was horrific, but that dropped off pretty steeply as you moved back from the frontlines and away from the ‘rifleman’ MOS. So, headquarters staffs at battalion and regiment and division, artillery, armor, engineer, air power – the blokes in those units all survived a lot longer and their corporate knowledge and skills improved on a pretty steep curve. Which, coincidentally, is exactly where combined arms happens – feeding the rifle companies into battle effectively supported by the other arms means those riflemen look a lot better at doing their jobs than their brethren from two years ago, even if the riflemen aren’t actually that flash at their particular role. They still need to close with the enemy, kill or capture him, and take and hold terrain regardless of season weather or terrain, but all that is MUCH more achievable when you have a lot of burly and really competent friends close at hand.
There is an anecdote from, IIRC, a US company commander writing about the second half of 1944  - after Normandy, and before the Bulge. I forget a lot of the details, but basically he said that he and his men could’ve been armed with pitchforks for all the use their rifles were. His primary and most useful role was to act as local protection for ‘his’ forward observer, escorting him forward from place to place and protecting him there while he blasted the Germans out of the next position to be taken, then rinse-repeat.
Taken together, all this means that Marshall wasn’t necessarily wrong, in an absolute sense, about 1:10 or whatever his ratio was**, but probably was about the reasons why. The vast majority of soldiers weren’t required to shoot directly at the enemy, because that just wasn’t their role. Of the ones who were - the guys in those 27 companies - most of the time they weren’t really required to either. Statistically the heavy fighting would be ‘somewhere else’, where the heavy lifting was often being done by someone else, usually their armored or artillery buddies. When the armor and artillery failed – due to circumstances or incompetence – then the infantry were in for a really bad day, and they might have to actually rely on their own Garands because everything else has failed. Examples of those bad days include Omaha and the Hürtgen.
None of this detracts from the efforts of individual riflemen and their individual experiences. But, taken in the round, those experiences were abnormal and that was by design because the Western Allies successfully implemented the kind of war they wanted to fight, one which did not depend overly much on the routine efforts of Rifleman #7, 2 Squad, 3 Platoon. That was very different to what was expected in November 1942 - it was a different division.
 
 
* And that’s just flat out amazing, right?! Only two years from the landings at Oran to the north shoulder of the Battle of the Bulge. The Western Allies really had their stuff in one sock when it came to military effectiveness in WWII. There is no other military that came even close.
** Interestingly, LtCol Wigram came to broadly the same conclusions as Marshall, based on his personal observations and experience commanding an infantry battalion in 1943/44 in Sicily and Italy. Coincidence?
 

The Russians use rail for the majority of their supply, so I'd say drop the rail right away and leave the road open for exodus. Also, leaving the road open so they can use wheeled supply will put a lot of friction into their already strained logistics. It would look better in the end as Ukraine would be seen as humanely leaving open a corridor for civilian supply and movement. 
Crimea is a possibility this year if the RA suffers some catastrophic collapses. I don't see it happening if the offensive is the slow and controlled type, but that could still result in a large collapse. If the RA runs and the UA pursues it could snowball and be a fairly bloodless conquest for the UA. As others have said, it usually goes slow until it goes fast. We'll just have to wait and see how it all plays out.

In 2014 real number of referendum participants were not more 30-35 %. Many of populaion in Crimea, like on Donbas were indifferent Ukraine or Russia. Many thought Russia would give them Moscow level of salary with Ukrainian level of prices. Naive.  New "masters of Crimea" for nine years completely killed medicine, barbarically destroyed unique Crimean nature in many places, gave many coastal territories under elite real estate building, closing access to the sea for locals. So many Crimeans maybe not enough like Ukraine, but obviously silently hate Russia and many of them in local chats recalled with nostalgia for Ukrianian times, when foreign cruise liners came to Yalta, many rich tourists visited Crimea etc. So, when UKR troops will come to Crimea, most of Crimeans will do nothing due to their conformism. Russians, who settled in Crimea after 2014 will flee in panic. Who will not do this will be deported. Of course, there will be some "idea fighters", who will try to make guerilla, but this will not be "total resistance"   
PS. Just NEVER judge by ethnicity in Ukrainian question. This is almost doesn't work here. 

My take after 6 months peacekeeping in Bosnia in '93 -  Savagery is baked into human beings.  Sorry, there is no 'better angels of our nature'  My time in Bosnia dispelled that myth real quick.  The 'better angels of our nature' happens because we employ the frontal cortex to govern ourselves.  But warfare is very primal and hits the primitive emotional centers of our brains first.   Once that happens, the excesses of violence humans are capable of know no bounds.  Which is why in the 22nd century in the future, historians and people will be examining the genocides of the 21st century and asking the same questions.

This ☝️, once armed these improvised FPV drones might be way too dangerous to bring back for recovery. Since they are improvised I am sure there are forty different ways a dozen different shell, rockets and grenades are fiddled with to ensure the go off when the drone hits its target, but I am guessing just about all of them make them less safe to handle. With drones you lose the ability to use the very high Gs of being launched/fired as the primary arming step for the fuse. Far better to send them after almost any Russian target, or even a suspected Russian target. Although both sides seem to employ the kamikaze drones with higher flying recon only drones when possible.

I thought the same, when it became clear that UKR were going to hold "indefinitely" and soak whatever the cost was. The bleeding of RUS troops strength doesn't seem to be "enough" to keep reinforcing the salient, but if they could suck enough Russian tubes into range of NATO long-barrelled 155s, and GMLRS and thin out the artillery park, that'd be a great strategic result.
I don't think we can necessarily decide that this hasn't happened, though, to at least some extent. We only have fragmentary accounts of the artillery duel, and it doesn't seem unreasonable to assume that these will tend towards the "OMG, we're getting pounded and our arty is doing nothing," end of the spectrum, since the times when CB is effective might be assumed to be down to the Russians just not throwing the same weight of iron into the target area, and won't be so memorable.
We probably won't know the effectiveness of any rope-a-dope approaches the UKR have tried until a while after the shooting stops, and even then it's going to be a patchy picture.

Looks like "Honor" company is withdrawing for rotation. 
Serhiy Filimonov, the commander announced big movie similar to that was issued two days ago. Also he told the company for 1,5 months of fight lost 5 KIA and 40 WIA. Also he told in average "Honor" had been killing per 10 Wagners for a day.
He regrets he hadn't time to award his soldier "Myron" for killing of 8 Wagners in one fight - he could buy AR-10 rifle for him, but "Myron" was badly wounded on 4th of April. He will award sqaud leader "Tykhyi" with AR-10 + sight Vortex Razor 10x for defending of position (that was on the last video)