Paulus

Sent campaign to you.  Enjoy...

If you can't find a link, I have the one dated January 30, 2019.  Send me your e-mail in PM and I can attach to the reply.

That covers the left sector, now for the right:
 

 
Attack and Support Companies will conduct a movement to contact down this right side of the map. The ultimate objective is to deny enemy traffic over the Road Bridge, and secure the Town. My Scout Team is selected to show Doug an example of my long-range Quick Move technique I alluded to in his DAR vs Bil Hardenberger. Quick Move 3 AS then Pause 5 seconds will get your guys to their destination without getting completely exhausted.
 

 
This shot shows how I maintain dispersion over a long distance without falling victim to the "Conga Line of Death". It is a lot slower than normal movement, but it increases the safety factor. Waypoints are plotted every 3 Action Spots, and it's surprisingly quick to do, by group selecting the Platoon, and using the outside forward team as the guidepost to plot the moves.
 

 
As I said before, I am now aware this is a Meeting Engagement, which means there is no overall force advantage to either side. Small-Unit Tactics, and control of the map will determine the winner. My overall intent is now to deny the enemy the ability to cross the river, and thus control the majority of the VL's and the map.
My supporting weapons will deploy as they did before, and my Attack Company will move as before also. My Objectives have changed from seizing the Road Bridge, to denying the enemy access to it. Once I have weapons posted, the remainder of the Attack Company will secure the town (in the USMC sense), then move to destroy any enemy forces that have crossed the Rail Bridge. The Solid lines on the image show my currently plotted orders, and the Dashed green lines show my movement plan for Attack Company.
 
There are a lot of unknowns going into this battle. I have never even seen a Polish OOB, so I don't know what to expect aside from probably British Equipment backed up with Sherman tanks, and Tank Destroyers.
There may be a lot of unknowns making me nervous, but there is absolutely one thing I am without a doubt completely confident in:
 

 

 

 
Whatever Armor Ithikial brings to the fight, I can smash it to bits, and sell it for scrap! (knock on wood)

Maybe some of you already saw these, but they were new to me. Many incredible shots here.
http://scalecombat.narod.ru/realwar/ww2photos.html

That's where it starts. "Why can't we have hit decals?" It's a simple question, and the answer is just as simple, "Because it's stupid."
Personally I never understood why we need vehicle hit decals either. What's the point of having black circle holes showing where your tank got shot? Your tank is already dead, and all the postmortem analysis in the world isn't going to change that fact. The same goes for infantry: why does it matter WHERE your Pixeltruppen get shot? Dead troops are dead troops, and all of the hit decals in the world won't change the fact that when you get hit by bullets, you usually die.
The origins for having a visual feedback when an entity gets hit with weapons traces all the way back to the original DOOM. Whether it be hit decals, or fully rendered 3D 'Blood and Guts', visual feedback has long been the domain of the first person shooter. This feedback is intended to be a reward to the player to congratulate them for nailing that 'Sweet Headshot', or landing a grenade perfectly at their opponents feet.
In tactics games however, there is no practical need for that type of feedback. The player is not personally shooting the enemy troops, he is commanding AI troops to do that for him. There are a few exceptions, such as the Men of War series, which allow the player to take direct control of vehicles and troops, but those games are hardly realistic.
Combat Mission is a tactical wargame, it's meant to exercise your brain to defeat your opponent. No one who takes this game seriously is asking for blood and gore to be added, because in the end, it doesn't matter that your sniper got a sweet headshot, it matters that he is effectively inflicting casualties. You might as well ask the guys playing the Silent Hunter series, "Why can't I see drowned, dismembered bodies when I sink a ship? It's more realistic!"
It's because that's not what the game is about.

Did you forget to log into your other account before complimenting your self?

Vehicles sink into snow.

Guys this is the same debate that has happened before many times here. I recall the answer from BF being they have no desire to add gore and blood to the game. I have to agree I don't think there is any need for it, and it will not add to the game play one bit. The game is not about showcasing the horrors of war, but to strategy and tactics of combat similar to chess on steroids. If you want some blood Vein has a "blood spot" mod that turns the base of a casualty into a pool of blood. At the very most IF hit decals are done it would be done in a subtle way like red dots. Don't expect limbs, blood and brains. There is no need for it here in adding entertainment value. The real world has enough of that people do not need to be reminded of when they are playing a game.
Again debating the issue is mute. There will be no blood and gore in Combat Mission. Advice is to not worry about it and to enjoy the strategy and tactics of combat simulation which is the intent of the game. 

Sorry, but i find this insulting. Yes i take this game seriously (but perhaps not to your level), yes i would like to see some blood and gore.
It's not gamebreaking the way it is, not at all. But it would be nice to add, immersion and overall mood in the game. 
As people who find it too offending (to see blood etc.) i've 2 arguments; 
-99% of games, model blood and gore (in combat), but almost none of the gamers complain. 
- Combat Mission models in great detail the psychological effects of combat (the fear, the panic, the cowering, the screaming when hit, 
the running away when broken etc..) and we love the game for it! But the physical effect are too shocking or sickening, or what? I find this
some what hypocritical. 
 
Perhaps somebody can correct me? 
 
 
Paul

Sorry, but i find this insulting. Yes i take this game seriously (but perhaps not to your level), yes i would like to see some blood and gore.
It's not gamebreaking the way it is, not at all. But it would be nice to add, immersion and overall mood in the game. 
As people who find it too offending (to see blood etc.) i've 2 arguments; 
-99% of games, model blood and gore (in combat), but almost none of the gamers complain. 
- Combat Mission models in great detail the psychological effects of combat (the fear, the panic, the cowering, the screaming when hit, 
the running away when broken etc..) and we love the game for it! But the physical effect are too shocking or sickening, or what? I find this
some what hypocritical. 
 
Perhaps somebody can correct me? 
 
 
Paul

By all means, be insulted, I stand by what I said. There is no practical reason for blood and gore in a war game of this type.
Now that just isn't true at all. Any game with depictions of blood, gore, or both automatically receives an 'M' or '18+' rating from the respective authorities. Receiving an 'M' rating is automatically losing half of your potential marketplace, because children under the age of 18 are the single largest demographic of video game consumers.
You find it hypocritical because you don't understand the video game marketplace. You can't shove blood, guts, and gore into any game you want without first making sure you target the correct demographic, and market your game effectively. Battlefront is a small developer who cannot afford to marshal the huge marketing and advertising forces large developers can muster, so they need to make sure their game is safe for the whole market, not just a piece of it.
It's a business decision first and foremost, when you occupy a small niche in the games market, you simply cannot afford to turn anyone away.

I know it may sound gruesome but as an option I'd like to see hit decals on Infantry similar to how it works on vehicles however this time leave a dark red decal. I'm fairly sure it could be done as I said along the same lines as hit decals for vehicles.
 
Sometimes I think CM is a touch to sanitised and I'm one of those who feel Warfare should be shown\portrayed in it's bloody entirety.

If you have artillery asset with both smoke and HE - if you use up all HE the smoke shells are lost. Which can be really annoying (but AFAIK realistic) if you first want to pummel a location, then put smoke on it and then advance.
 
It would be a great help if the UI could show how many shells the mission you're about to call will use, so that you don't overextend your resources.
Would it be difficult to program/implement?

In the thread on Russian doctrine in CM, we went through how the Russian attack, especially their Rifle formation branch.  That method applies the principles of attrition warfare, depth, firepower, relentlessness, last man standing stuff.  German doctrine on infantry attacks was entirely different.  SlowLarry asked about it in the previous thread, and rather than bury an answer there, I am moving that part of the discussion to its own thread, here.
 
Elements of German attack doctrine apply to panzer forces as well, but the focus here will be on infantry division attacks.  Which may include StuG support or similar, generally divisional artillery FOs, battalion and company mortars - and squad infantry up at the pointy end.  Obviously there are some requirements of overall odds, suitable terrain, fire support, and enemy strength that are needed for infantry formations to attack successfully.  But the German doctrine uses everything differently, because the focus of their attack doctrine is positioning and articulation of forces - maneuver warfare stuff  - not primarily force ratios and losses and attrition thinking.
 
In the German doctrine, the chief element of the offense is surprise.  The idea is always to hit where and when one isn't expected, to catch the enemy napping, unprepared, with the wrong dispositions to deal with your chosen point and method of attack.  To achieve that, the focus is on information on the one hand, and adaptation on the other.  Adaptation includes mobility, heightening your own safe, feasible shifts of forces and weights, and restricting those of the defender.  Those can then all be used to arrange many on few fights at chosen points, which once won, further disarticulate the enemy force.  His elements are supposed to become less able to help each other, to find their proper combined arms targets, or to have the conditions of terrain and range and such they need to fight effectively. Some local advantages may be "cashed in" for dead enemy to move the overall forces in your favor, but most will be focused instead on continually reducing the enemy's options and moves.
 
In the ideal case, this ends with a surrounded and trapped enemy unable to move an inch without taking murderous fire.  Fire lanes into open ground wrapped around an enemy position are like ropes binding his legs.  Once all sides are covered around a given enemy this way, his "movement allowance" has been reduced to zero.  His ability to pick what firefights he will engage in has therefore disappeared.  You can decide whether to engage him, and he can't make an equivalent decision.  By fire and movement principles, that is as good as a kill.  An artillery barrage can then be laid on that immobilized enemy to destroy him at leisure.
 
In short, the idea is to surprise the defender, hogtie him, and fight the remainder of the battle with him in that condition.  Needless to say, this places considerable greater demands on the attacking commander than the comparative straightforward methods described in the Russian doctrine thread, and it can readily be screwed up, and will fail if it is screwed up.  The German approach in the matter was to take risks and generate chances for lopsided wins, and expect enough of those to pay off, to defeat the overall enemy more efficiently than the attrition method. The Germans don't ever want to fight fair - meaning no even engagements of like arm vs like arm without a big edge in their favor from one factor or another.  If there isn't yet such an edge, maneuver for one before engaging too closely.
 
That difference in approach is easily stated, but what does it mean in practice for infantry attack methods?  Three ways, really, each with some variations and subject to mixing with the others, at different distance, time, and force scales.  The three ways are (1) broad front, recon pull, aiming at envelopment (envelopment for short), (2) the coup de main, which is effectively trench raid tactics on a grander scale, and (3) infiltration tactics proper, which stresses getting well into the enemy defended zone, by slow and stealthy processes, before the main engagement occurs.
 
Broad front recon pull means that a skirmish line of infantry sweeps forward like a single wave, and finds *all* the enemy positions.  Not just one or two of them to chew on, but locating the entire enemy front line.  Weak outposts are driven in by this wave to find the real enemy positions, the ones with enough strength to stop a single thin infantry wave.  Besides finding the enemy, this leading wave is expected to pin him in place, to "find and fix".  That works by not pressing hard anywhere, sitting down in the cover nearest the enemy but not physically held by him.  Then reaching out by fire - from the LMGs the squad infantry brings forward, first of all - to cut up the enemy side of the field with fire lanes, around each body of cover on his side of the field.  The goal is to freeze in place as much of the enemy force as possible, by making lateral movement far too risky, several hundreds yards deep into his own positions.
 
Then a reserve and assault group, which has been kept back out of that leading wave, picks targets found and isolated by it.  The goal is to find gaps in the defenses already, and to widen promising fissures by destroying specific bits of the defense, to get deeper into it.  The reserve maneuvers in the German "backfield", sheltered by the leading wave and the knowledge it has provided as to which locations are clear of the enemy, which routes already traversed drew no enemy fire, and the like. It sets up opposite its chosen targets.  It brings with it heavier weapons - StuGs, FOs, 81mm mortars - and infantry weight in numbers.  These supplement the fire of the elements of the scouting wave nearest the chosen target, and "escalate" the pressure on those chosen enemies.  Meanwhile the rest of the battlefield is being ignored.  The scouting wave is just waiting in the ground they took and preventing easy lateral movement by the enemy, to help the position chosen for the point of attack.
 
The overloaded point is thus destroyed.  Now a new wave spreads from that point, into the deeper parts of the enemy defense.  The scouts nearest follow in the wake of the now leading reserve, and form a new reserve behind the entry point.  The new spreading wave finds the new enemy positions, and the process is repeated.  The goal is to roll up the enemy defenses or break through them, always fighting only the new few that matter for the moves the attack is making next.  But the attacker lets enemy weakness dictate where those points of attack should be.  Always, hitting where they ain't, and trying to get into them before help can come from either side, or from the enemy rear and reserves.  
 
Speed matters in this, because the enemy learns where the main point of attack is, as it gets going, and he will try to adapt.  The attack wants to adapt too, faster, with better information.  The scouting wave is also a counter-recon screen blinding the enemy as to one's own deployments.  If a reserve is arriving at A, the point of main effort wants to already be over at B by the time they get to the front.  Think of a running back making the defensive linebackers miss - it requires anticipation of enemy moves, faster reaction to new information.  It helps if ranged weapons can also disrupt enemy movements - StuGs get missions like interdicting all movement across a certain road, pairs of HMGs put down fire lanes with a similar intent, an FO may plaster the only cover point that allows movement from the east side of the map to the west side.  In other words, the role of fire is as much or more to restrict enemy movements as it is to hurt him directly.  
 
Every area of open ground on the enemy side of the field is analyzed for its usefulness on cutting up enemy moves, and locations that can see each are determined, heavy weapons teams maneuvered to such positions long before the attacker knows he will need them.  Enemy moves are systematically taken off the board by firepower threats into such open ground areas.
 
Frequently the scouting wave may start with a bias or direction, too.  E.g. as a wing attack on the left 2/3rds of the field, with the intent of turning the enemy's left flank.  Such routes or plans are made with an eye to being the least expected and likely to be the least defended against, *not* on the principle of the most promising terrain or routes for the attacker.  Otherwise put, since the first principle of the attack is surprise, "most promising" normally equals "least expected" - even if it means crossing dangerous ground - as long as that can be done quickly.
 
The infiltration method can be thought of as a more extreme version of this on a wider scale and with less of an emphasis on fixing the enemy, and more on using stealth to find his gaps.  Night actions, fighting in fog, use of smoke sometimes, are used along with this approach.  The idea is to sneak into the enemy position.  As much as possible, as deep as possible into his whole defense scheme, before first trigger pull.  And after first trigger pull, the triggers are used as a distraction - look, look, over here, there are some Germans over here - while the haymaker is winding up from the other hand.  The same principle of removing enemy moves by a tactically defensive stance and fire lanes to cut up enemy positions, executed by advanced wedges, is used here too, just like the scouting wave did in the previous method, once it went to ground.  
 
There is a critical mental shift involved in this understanding of the value of positions pushed forward.  They do not need to assault straight onto enemy positions. They do not need the weight to do so.  They don't need the weight to shoot down enemies in good cover, nor do they need to press home to root him out of his holes.  All they need to do is prevent him from leaving his present positions, without being cut up by ranged fire into the open ground bits he has to cross, to leave that cover and get to some other body of it.  Anything isolated in this sense, by having all its useful safe moves taken away, is "hogtied".  No reason to run up against them or fight that at all.  They are already in a prison cell, and artillery can execute them later if need be.
 
There is also a new principle in true infiltration methods - to just bypass, wherever possible, rather than fight.  Any position that can be ignored should be ignored.  If there is a route that blocks LOS to that position, maybe someone watches it or at least prevents easy moves out of it, but for the rest, they might as well be on the far side of the moon.  Consider anything that can't see you already defeated by poor positioning.  Bypass and press deeper, all the way to the back of the defense.  German infiltration attackers do not expect to keep the enemy in front of them.  They expect to have enemies on all sides of them.  Then blind them and pin them in place, and move between them.  You can see how limited visibility conditions are critical to the full application of this method.
 
I passed over the coup de main.  It is about surprise in the purest sense.  Here, instead of waiting for recon pull to tell you everything about the defense, you need to guess it.  Rapid, more limited scouting may be used, and there are certainly leading half squads going first - the usual drill.  But you just guess where the enemy is and isn't going to be; you pick a key point you think you can get to that will put some portion of those enemies at a disadvantage, and then you drive like hell for that key point.  Faster than the enemy can react.  Others are trying to pin him where he is - heavy weapons from back at the start line, e.g., or a 105mm artillery barrage that discourages anyone from getting up and walking around from over on the right side of the field.  But the basic idea is just "get there first with the most", where you picked the "there".  Win at that point by weight of numbers and the right combined arms brought to that fight for the enemy faced, and do so before the enemy can adapt his positions to that new info about what you are doing.
 
The follow up can be another such adaptation, or just to exploit what was taken in more of the "fixed them, then pick the next spot to overload" method described in the first approach.
 
Coup de main differs from the broad front recon in that it is less driven by what the scouts first discover, more by your command push decision.  But you are trying to base that on a guess as to where the enemy will be weak and won't be expecting you.  If your guess is wrong, you back off and try something else, don't turn it in to an attrition attack on enemy strength.
 
The coup de main effort can be materially aided by having armor behind it, or as a second best, good approach terrain over a wide area (e.g. large continuous woods or city).  It expects to win at the chosen point by getting a many on few fight there and winning that fight before the enemy can even the local odds.  For that to work, it can't be the case that all the enemy weapons bear on the chosen point.  You need to pick both the concentration objective and a route, such that only a modest portion of the enemy force has any chance to contest your approach, at first.  Then you just want to go down that route so fast that "at first" equals "until the fight for that objective is over", because they only differ by 2 minutes (5 max, 2-3 a lot better).
 
Now, in all of this, you still have to pay attention to combined arms, meaning having 81mm mortars around and HQs to spot for them if there is going to be an enemy gun or HMG position, and a StuG or a panzerschreck up close if there is going to be an enemy tank, and 105mm or 150mm artillery fire if there is going to be a big block of woods full of Russian tommy gunners.  Or you can put HMGs on fire lanes on 3 sides of those woods and just go around them, never into or by them.  Remember, if they can't see your main force, and they can't safely move to change that, they are already dead (hogtied, same thing).  They just don't know it yet.
 
I hope that helps explain the very different way German infantry attacks.

Several questions... First to Doug.
 
Don't use "fast'.  Running troops are very vulnerable, and the problem is not one of minimizing exposure time.  Fast should only be used in your own "backfield", to reposition a reserve inside a friendly town, for example, or to route-march down a road out of LOS of the enemy until you near a jumping off point - with friendlies ahead to ensure there is nothing enemy along the route.
 
The normal move order for advancing troops is "quick", in short dashes, which they can complete in a minute or less.  Before firing starts you can even use "move to contact", to have them all stop and get down as soon as fire is opened.  Inside woods or similar cover, and for heavy weapons teams that can't keep up "quick" without becoming exhausted, just use "move". But don't use that command (or "fast") once under fire.  If they can't "quick" they should probably not be moving at all, but sometimes "slow" to crawl 20 meters to cover may be necessary. While under fire already, mind.
 
The big mental adjustment is to just completely drop the idea that the problem is one of movement in the first place.  You aren't trying to get somewhere.  You are trying to keep the company alive and in good order, and presenting firepower to the enemy.  The only reason you are moving is (1) you don't have spots yet and (2) infantry firepower is higher at closer range.  If you don't have fire superiority in small arms terms, you emphatically would not want to close - you would just be driving up enemy firepower faster than your own.  Only if reason (2) is going to operate in your favor by a large amount does reducing the range benefit you.  Because you are not trying to solve a problem of movement or get anywhere.  You are trying to win a war of attrition by killing the enemy, preferably before he kills you.  
 
The biggest reason to walk towards him, therefore, is (1).  If you don't have any targets where you are, either you are expecting a change on the enemy side to give you some presently (whether from a movement of his, or from hiding guys coming off hide to fire, or similar), or you have to move to get to locations that can see enemies.
 
Next, do you prep fire at a merely suspected treeline?  If you have artillery fire support to burn and not a lot of time, you can fire at likely enemy positions directly along your planned path of advance, and follow that barrage as it walks along your route.  But usually you won't have enough fire support for this.  Indirect FOs are commonly put on only the single most likely enemy held position, either the objective or a point with good cover near the clearly most important route to the objective.  There needs to be a very high chance of a significant number of enemy under the barrage footprint to justify firing off a full module of ammo at a map reference, with no known target.
 
Otherwise, you can have an FO of a "reactive" artillery module call for fire on such a treeline and have the minutes counting down, while you advance.  If you don't find enemy, then you adjust the aim point of the barrage farther on.  You hold the barrage in readiness, in other words, a few minutes out, ahead of the advance.  As soon as the enemy threat becomes actual, you just stop adjusting (or make one final, adaptive adjustment to where the enemy is thickest) and let it count the rest of the way down and land on him.
 
Faster response comes from the on map HE weapons - the 82mm mortars, SU-76s, T-34s.  They don't "area fire" without a target.  They get LOS to that suspected treeline before your infantry steps out.  They are "overwatch", you only advance the infantry at positions your overwatch can see.  When the infantry reach a body of cover, they clear it of any enemy and check it and occupy its forward positions and look out at whatever they can see.  Then the overwatch displaces forward to that body of cover, or to peek around it, at the next LOS blockage.  When the overwatch is in place again, the infantry steps out again - not before.
 
Note, this is not a matter of the overwatch HE shooters helping the infantry move.  The infantry is clearing LOS blockages the HE shooters can't see through.  If you could already see the enemy and he couldn't evade or get away by ducking, you'd sit right where you are and casually murder them all with HE fire, from range.  It is only because the enemy is hiding or behind LOS blockages that anybody needs to advance in the first place.  Then the threat of your infantry walking right over them forces them to reveal themselves and fire.  If they don't, then your infantry finds them anyway, at a point blank range with maximum firepower etc.
 
You say the trickiest thing is what to do with the infantry heavy weapons.  They are like the HE shooters above - overwatch, and the 82mm mortars in particular are the most important weapons in the whole battalion.  HMG teams, ATRs, and snipers are also part of the overwatch element, along with the mortars, FOs, supporting armor.  The difference with the infantry heavy weapons is just that they are cover-loving like the squad infantry, rather than cover-blocked like armor.
 
That just means the normal place for the infantry heavy weapons is the last place the squad infantry just cleared.  Squads check out that woods, no enemy.  OK, so the HMG and mortar can set up there.  What can they see from there?  Well, why did you pick it as a place to reach and clear, if it couldn't see stuff that mattered to the next step of your planned advance?  An avenue of advance is, precisely, a sequence of cover positions each of which covers the move to the next one, by having observation of that next step in the chain.
 
If the range to the next little step is 80 yards, no you don't need to fetch up your 82mm mortars.  At that range, the infantry squads are their own cover fire.  But at 300 or 400 yards, their rifles and LMGs aren't going to do diddly; the infantry heavy weapons need to come up and cover that move, instead.
 
Of course defenders try to separate you from your overwatch.  Meaning, pick spots that can see your leading infantry, but that every part of your side of the field can't easily see.  That's normal.  Take all the spots they can't cover that way first, the locations they could only see from that "up" position on the front treeline or a top the hill, or from the forward line of buildings.  Those spots your overwatch *does* sweep, so those are where you head *first*, with the squad infantry.
 
Once you "own" those, you pick next locations because the squads can cover themselves (short distances, good cover), or you bring up the heavy weapons.  So if the enemy is on a reverse slope, first take your own side of that slope.  Get squad infantry up into the first cover positions on the slope, to spot what is immediately beyond.  Plan your next "move" after you determine all that, with your heavy weapons safely in your dead ground but near the crest, so they can pick whether to engage.
 
Every move the enemy picks has a counter.  If he is "up" and can see everything, then you "counter" with overwatch firepower from range.  If he is "back" and hiding and can't see much, you advance to take the ground he thereby ceded to you, and then you pick just a few of him to "overload".  He usually can't pick *both* to be hidden and also to have all his weapons bear on any of yours.  So you either rely on full overwatch to take on the whole enemy position, or you set up a many on few, then another, and pick your way through only a few of the enemy positions, enough to open a route and dislocate his defense scheme.  You don't get to decide which of those approaches to use.  The enemy sets up one way or another, and you have to use the appropriate "counter" to his chosen mix of "up" and "back" positions (wide LOS and forward slope each, vs narrow LOS and reverse slope each).
 
The next point for Doug should go without saying, but don't rush onto the enemy position.  Movement doesn't take ground - fire takes ground.  You normally clear a position by plastering the enemy on that position and them abandoning it as too hot (or routing away, or dying where they stand) before you send anyone there yourself.  Send shells and bullets, not bodies.  Only send bodies yourself when there is nothing left by bodies in the other sense of the term, as defenders.  OK, occasionally you may "assault" when the remaining defenders are heads down and cowering, but when it doubt, wait and shoot some more.  Get someone into cover at grenade range, or at least good SMG range, first.  It is usually the 3rd unit that "assaults", while one is taking reply fire and occasionally pinned as a result, and the second is firing back continually and keeping the enemy head's down (and freeing the first to add its fire etc).  Never quick or walk at an equal number of enemy shooters - you are just giving them free kills and are not a danger to them at all.
 
It may help to visualize the later stages of the attack, that you are trying to set up.  Every covered position 400 to 500 yards from the enemy with any LOS to any of his positions has MG teams along its forward edge, and HQs spotting for 82mm mortars farther back, hiding behind that cover, and FOs and ATRs and snipers.  Every covered position within 200 yards of the enemy has squad infantry lining every forward spot, with rifles and LMGs at the ready, the men rallied, even if a few have been hit and are down etc.  Supporting armor is peeking around a few of those (either kind), ready able and willing to toss in direct fire HE at any MG that the forward infantry discover.  Then the nearest cover "emits" small teams that "bound" forward at "quick", to any shellhole or house or clump of trees they can find, 75 yards from that enemy.  Then 30 yards from that enemy, after any spots at the 75 have "filled up" with teams that made it.  Anybody shoots at and stops those teams, the whole company sentences to death by firing squad and executes said sentence immediately.  Then another few teams repeat the procedure - as many times as the enemy likes, until they are dead or shut up and go to ground.  It only ends when there are squads rallied with SMGs at the ready at 75, and a few grenade throwers get to 30, alive.  They throw, and throw a little more, and then enemy has stopped firing.  Now someone moves "quick" into the actual cover they used to be firing from.  Same procedure if those get shot.  Repeat until they don't.
 
It isn't fast, isn't meant to be, doesn't have to be.  There is no panicking.  No "oh no, someone is shooting at us, we must DO SOMETHINK!!!"
 It is combat, being shot at is normal.  The something one does about it is shoot back.
 
I hope that helps Doug...

QUESTION 6 CONTINUED
 
With the decision made it should be a matter of leaping straight into Question 7, but not quite. The wargame that I mentioned earlier is an opportunity to identify branches and sequels to a plan. A branch is defined as:
 
‘The contingency options built into the basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions’.
 
A sequel is defined as:
 
‘A major operation that follows the current major operation. Plans for a sequel are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation’.
 
For the purposes of CM, branching is the only thing we need to consider here.
 
So in my notional wargame activity I have identified a single branch:
 
Branch 1 What I will call ‘Left Hook’
 
The premise of this is that I get bogged down during my initial flanking manoeuvre leaving me insufficient time to get all the way around the back of Main Wood. The branch plan then envisages hooking into the wood on a broad front with all of my manoeuvre elements in line abreast.
 
The scheme of manoeuvre looks something like this:
 

 
 
Now strictly speaking I should fully resource this branch plan but I’m not going to mainly because I have shown you the techniques already (you apply the same steps) but also I’m guessing you’re itching to see me actually cross the start line and execute the plan.
 
I also need to refine my synch matrix (I’m not going to do this because the one I have is good enough for government work) and my Decision Support Overlay (DSO) and Decision Support Matrix (DSM). The only thing I’m going to do with the Synch Matrix is add a Decision to it. This is related to my Branch Plan identified above. It is marked as a star with the number ‘1’ in it. I will explain the mechanics of this in Question 7 (although it should be done here,I am explaining it later for reasons of clarity). So the refined Synch Matrix looks like this:
 

 
Although I should refine my DSO and DSM here, I’m not going to. There are two reasons for this, one is that there has been quite a lot to digest in Question 6 and two, the way I’m going to implement my control measures actually plugs into my DSO and DSM. I think it will be clearer to you all if I explain my control measures first and then show you the DSO and DSM.
 
Question 7 (and the tidying up of Question 6 as discussed above) will be coming soon ...

QUESTION 5 PART TWO – DRAFT COURSES OF ACTION
 
Draft COAs
 
I will be showing three COAs below and resourcing them broadly in accordance with my deductions from Question 5. I say broadly because I can throw more resources than were in Question 5 as the deductions there were my minimum assessed force requirements. The important thing is not to employ fewer resources than were identified in Question 5. I hope you can see that I could actually have come up with far more draft COAs than the three I am going to look at in detail but for reasons of brevity (relatively speaking of course!!!) I am sticking with three.
 
COA 1 – Left Flanking
 
So this is pretty much what it says on the tin (well they all are really). In this COA I am clearing the outposts first before tackling the main objective and I am trying to present the enemy with attacks from more than one direction. The COA sketch is shown below.
 

 
The draft resourcing document is the TASKORG (Task Organisation) which is a simple way of illustrating how units will be grouped and who will command them. In this TASKORG we have our three Platoons, 1 Zug, 2 Zug and 4 Zug as the column headers and the elements they command are below them in the respective column. Real TASKORGs are slightly more complex than this showing different states of command, but for the purposes of Combat Mission games this is not important. You will note that 1 Platoon has the most resources and this is because this is the element that I’m going to allocate to clearing TAIs 1, 3, 4 and 5 and by my reasoning it therefore has the most to do relative to the other elements.
 

 
COA 2 – Frontal
 
 
This one is not overly subtle but it is a perfectly viable way of achieving the mission. Again I am clearing the outposts first and then maximising my combat power by attacking from one direction simultaneously. The COA sketch is shown below:
 

 
The TASKORG for this COA is shown below:
 

 
As you can see I now have 4 Platoon and a ‘Mortars’ grouping. By using 4 Pl HQ and grouping my MGs and the Sdkz 251/17, I have a third manoeuvre element giving me more flexibility.
 
COA 3 – Unhinge
 
This COA is audacious and probably carries the most risk (this is a typical characteristic of audacious plans). Here the plan is to get behind the enemy and attack him from an unexpected direction. The COA sketch is shown below:
 

 
The TASKORG for this COA is shown below:
 

 
Apart from the title, the TASKORG is exactly the same as that for COA 2.
 
So we are done with Question 5 – a point to note before moving on is that the commander could have made a decision at this point as to which COA to adopt. For the purposes of illustration we will press on because doctrinally the commander can make a decision after Question 6 (and between you and me … he’s going to) and because I think it is more educational if you can see more than one attempt at synchronisation … which is next.
 
 

Having promised Threat Integration - here it is:
 
Step 3 – Threat Integration
 
Recall that in this step we combine our analysis from Step 1 (BAE) and Step 2 (TE) to come up with a likely enemy course of action. Also don't forget we are still in Question 1.
 
Likely Enemy Mission
 
This is pretty much stated in various bits of the briefing:
 
The enemy is an outpost line
The enemy is to deny the woods
The enemy is to inflict casualties (especially half-tracks)
 
So a likely mission statement would be:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
This is all very well but it is now time to return to the ground to work out what is feasible given the resources available to the enemy and his preferred tactics.
 
So some context about the ground and effects specific to the defender because my previous analysis, particularly that relating to Key Terrain, was focused on my mission.
 
Key terrain for the enemy I assess as follows:
 
Village A
 
Mainly for the same reasons I designated it a key terrain for myself – but most importantly because the enemy is reported to be there.
 
Entrances F, G and H
 
Designated because these are the most likely points of entry onto the wooded objective for any attacking force.
 
Track Crossroads I
 
This crossroads blocks avenues of approach from entrances F, G and H.
 
It is also worthy of note that Woods C and E and Complex D would be suitable outpost locations but are not significant enough to warrant the deployment of significant combat power given the Red Army commander’s limited resources.
 
So initially, on the basis of the above, I will throw the Doctrinal Overlay onto the map centred on Track Crossroads I just to give me an idea of how everything works in terms of ground and tactics. This will provide the basis for subsequent COA analysis which will take into account my terrain deductions and will involve some amendments to the doctrinal solution to make it best fit the terrain and the analysis of the enemy’s mission and tasks as previously described. The schematic below illustrates this step:
 

 
As you can see from the graphic, some manipulation is now required to turn this into a viable defensive COA on this particular piece of ground. Also on my initial laydown, I have not taken into account the probable scout team reported to be in Village A. So let’s do that now.
 

 
COA 1
 
The graphic above becomes COA 1 which I will call ‘Defend Forward’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO Complex D, Wood E and Entrance H. The main outpost line is linear and lies back from the forward edge of the main wood. In this laydown the eastern most squad can cover Entrance F and any advance along AAs 1 and 2. The centre squad can cover Crossroads I and AA3. The westernmost squad can cover Entrance H and approaches up AAs 4 and 5.
 
Note that there is nothing in Wood C but it is possible that the scout team in Complex D could equally be positioned there or Wood C could be a fall-back position for the scout team in Village A once it decides that remaining in Village A becomes untenable. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Also note that the westernmost scout team could also be located further forward at the western end of Wood E and achieve the same effect of covering Entrance H and AAs 4 and 5. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Each of the platoon scout teams in this COA I would see as being augmented by an LMG squad and an ATR squad to take advantage of their ranged capabilities. The role of these teams being to identify my avenue of approach and to disrupt my attack by engaging HVTs before falling back on to the main outpost line in the woods. The probable scout team in Village A will likely have an observer grouped with it and its role will be to identify my avenue of approach and disrupt my attack through indirect fires before falling back to an alternate position in either Wood C or Complex D.
 
COA 1 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Allows early identification of the German axis.
Allows early attrition of the German attacker.
Makes best use of ranged weapons.
Makes good use of concealment in the main wood.
 
COA 1 Disadvantages
 
Dispersion creates C2 problems.
Extraction of two platoon scout teams will be over open ground
Linear main outpost line lacks depth
Linear outpost line does not provide mutual support.
Defence can be outflanked and taken down from the rear.
 
So that is the first COA, on to COA 2 - illustrated below and derived using the same process:
 
COA 2
 

 
The graphic above becomes COA 2 which I will call ‘Defend Deep’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed  rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO the northern perimeter of the main wood. The main outpost position is constructed as a standard defensive position with two squads forward and one back with the killing area centred on Track Crossroads I. This laydown means that the probable scout team in Village A covers AAs 1 and 2. The easternmost platoon scout team provides very limited coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and good coverage of AA3. The centre platoon scout team provides coverage of AA3. The westernmost platoon scout team provides good coverage of AA4 within the main wood and limited coverage of AA5.
 
As with the previous COA, I would see each of the platoon scout teams having an LMG and ATR team grouped to permit best use of those weapons systems and the scout team in Village A having an observer grouped with it.
 
COA 2 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Excellent use of concealment in the main wood.
Excellent C2.
Good all round defence and mutual support.
Provides best defence of Track Crossroads I.
 
COA 2 Disadvantages
 
Limited observation and fields of fire over avenues of approach.
Limited ability to maximise use of ranged weapons.
Surrenders initiative to the attacker.
Allows easy break in to the main woods by the attacker via entrances F, H, K and L.
Scout team in village A is entirely dislocated from the main force.
 
One really useful product from the IPB process is the Event Overlay which is designed to show activities related to time and space. Doctrinally it would contain timelines or events, I have done this but in a very simplistic form. The purple dotted lines are my timelines (measured in minutes) and are based on dismounted ‘Move’ rates of movement (which in broad terms = 2 minutes per 100m). Of course I could make this more comprehensive by showing movement rates for ‘Quick’ and ‘Hunt’ etc and applying movement rates over different types of ground (woods dismounted ‘Move’ speed per 100m is about 2 minutes and 45 seconds) and also for my vehicles.  Clearly by doing so, you expend more time and sometimes make the product to complicated. By keeping it simple my event overlay is telling me the following already:
 
I can cover the AO in 20 minutes.
The earliest I can assault Village A is H+10 or 0710 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Village A may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest I can assault Wood E is H+12 or 0712 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Wood E may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest time I can start my clearance of the Main Wood is H+16 or 0716 hrs in the scenario.
The earliest time I can finish clearing the Main Wood is H+20 or 0720 hrs in the scenario.
 
These are all useful for planning and particularly any synchronising and phasing required. It also gives me a window (H+10 to H+12) to potentially acquire track and engage moving enemy targets.
 
So that was a very basic look at the timings, now I will focus on the Named Areas of Interest (NAI) part of this product. The NAIs show where you need to look in order to acquire the enemy and determine his likely COA. This product will later be refined but for the time being let’s look at NAIs.
 
NAIs are placed based on the previously derived enemy COAs. In simple terms, wherever an enemy is reported or wherever you assess an enemy grouping to be is the starting point. The process involves drawing a box around those areas and if required, refining those boxes or combining them. This is important to get right because ultimately each of those NAIs should be covered by a reconnaissance asset, and ideally for redundancy two assets. Clearly the more NAIs there are to cover, the more troops you have to allocate to the task.
 
Here is the Event Overlay for this mission
 

 
To complete the process and to add meaning to the above, an Event Matrix is produced and the combination of these two products drive the Collection Plan and ultimately the plan as a whole. In the Event Matrix you are basically defining, where you are looking, when you are looking, what you are looking for and what it all means. I will ignore the ‘when’ part of this for simplicity and because I don’t think it is a war-stopper given that the only moves I anticipate from the enemy will occur in the H+10 – H+12 window.
 
Here is the Event Matrix
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT) are another consideration, doctrinally these are the assets that are critical to the success of the Enemy Commander’s mission. This demonstrates why it is important to thoroughly analyse the likely enemy mission and tasks – if you don’t go through this process you end up targeting everything which is sometimes difficult to do and it is wasteful of time and resources. There are a number of ways of deriving these but I’m going to keep this simple. So if we refer back to assessed mission and tasks, I had them as these:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
From this my HVT list looks like this:
 
Platoon HQ – Destruction of this will affect enemy C2 and morale and reduce his ability to communicate back to higher HQ.
 
Forward Observer IVO Village A – Destruction of this limits the enemy’s ability to call in indirect fire.
Anti-Tank Rifle Squads – These are the only assets that can effectively defeat my light armoured vehicles.
 
I could go further with this but the more I add, the more I have to target which means allocating assets. The above list is the minimum needed to effectively limit the enemy’s ability to achieve his mission.
 
The above, although it is truncated, is about as far as we need to go with Question 1 so next time we will move on to Question 2 – What have I been told to do and why? This in effect is Mission Analysis and there are many ways of cracking this nut and again I will pare this down to what I consider to be essentials for this situation.

With the BAE done it is on to the next step of IPB (remembering that we are still in Question 1 - so a long way to go yet!!!)
 
Step 2 – Threat Evaluation
 
Recall that in this step we look at the enemy in isolation focusing on organisation and tactics.
 
The synopsis of the information about the enemy is as follows:
 
Comprised of an outpost line from a UI Rifle Regiment of approximately platoon strength located IVO the wooded grove and 1 x probable scout team IVO the village. Probably reinforced with ATR and MG teams. No armour expected.
 
Enemy Composition
 
So initially I will look at the likely enemy strength and from the above I assess the enemy ORBAT to be as shown in the graphic:
 

 
As context to these deductions I will discuss MGs, observers and mortars mainly because these were the things I had to think about.
 
I went for 3 x LMG teams as an assessment based on the statement that the enemy would be reinforced by MG teams. In TO&E terms, the natural choice would be HMG teams because they sit within the TO&E but in relation to the assessed enemy outpost mission, the imperative is to be able to extract back to the main defensive position and HMGs are less able to do that than LMGs.
 
Observers are not specifically mentioned but again by thinking about the outpost mission context, it is logical to assume that the outpost will be covered by some form of indirect fire assets and observers provide the best means of calling this support in.
 
I went for mortars in my assessed enemy grouping because these do sit within the TO&E and can be better employed in woods and forests than other forms of artillery.
 
Some quick deductions about strength and composition combined with previous ground and weather analysis are as follows:
 
The enemy cannot defend everywhere and must have a compact defence to maximise combat power and facilitate command and control.
 
The enemy has limited long range firepower and therefore is likely to prefer short range engagements.
 
The enemy’s anti-tank rifles and MGs are his only effective ranged weapons.
 
The enemy is limited to what he can carry and therefore lacks the ammunition to sustain lengthy engagements.
 
The enemy has few radios and can only call in indirect fire through HQ or dedicated observers
 
Enemy Tactics
 
Delving into this a little more because of the insights it provides, a rummage around Red Army tactics of the era tells me this:
 
A rifle platoon on outpost duty will act as a large picquet from an outpost battalion (or outpost company) or as a self-contained permanent large picquet directly from the regiment (or battalion).
 
The duties of a large picquet post are:
 
Not to allow enemy scouts to approach the rest of the forces.
To secure the resting troops (main body) against machine-gun or mortar bombardment, against attacks by enemy tanks, armoured vehicles and motorised infantry.
 
The large picquet post covers a front of 1-1.5 km at a distance of up to 4km from the resting troops.
 
In principle, the large picquet post is reinforced with HMG, mortars, cannons and anti-tank rifles, sappers and chemical defence troops and must be supported by artillery fire from the main positions.
 
Added to this and returning to doctrine we need to generate a doctrinal template. This is a graphic which shows how the enemy would deploy/manoeuvre according to his doctrine.
 
Doctrinally the platoon would have outposts about 100m forward of the main position over a frontage of about 250m. The main position would be about 150m in depth over the same 250m frontage.
 
Set up for defence, the standard two up one back layout is the preferred doctrine although in the case of an outpost there is the possibility that a linear formation could be employed. So here is the doctrinal template:
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT)
 
Doctrinally I should identify HVT at this stage … HVT are those that are important to the enemy commander’s mission. Personally I am not a fan of doing it at this stage, because if you identify them here you are just making work for yourself … we will return to this later.
 
So that is Threat Evaluation squared away ... next step is Threat Integration which predictably will be covered in the next post.
 
 
 
 
 
 

QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?
 
This is broken into the three steps of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ( IPB). I am aware that most armies go for four steps (including the one I currently work for) but I was brought up on three and as I am inherently lazy, I’m sticking with three. These steps are:
 
Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) which in simple terms is the ground and weather.
 
Threat Evaluation (TE) where you look at the enemy in isolation according to organisation and doctrine.
 
Threat Integration (TI) where you combine steps 1 and 2 to determine enemy courses of action
 
Step 1 - BAE
 
To do this properly I’ve had to crack open the scenario editor to get some of the mission data, however rest assured I have not had a sneaky peek at the Russian forces or setup. So from a combination of information supplied to me from the map, orders and the data screen in the editor here is what I have come up with.
 
Weather
 
According to the data screen it is 250700Jun44, the ground is damp, temperature is cool with overcast skies. Wind source is from the West with heavy wind.
 
Deductions:
 
Wind direction will blow smoke from my setup zone up the map as I look at it, this could be an advantage when using smoke to masking any approach into the woods from the West but is negated by the wind speed. Overall judgement is that I should not rely on smoke and weapon accuracy over long range could be effected.
 
Ground conditions, when combined with terrain mean that all vehicles should manoeuvre carefully when off road.
 
Temperatures should have no adverse effect on dismounted troops.
 
Despite the overcast skies, visibility will be generally good.
 
Ground
 
The area of operations (AO) is approximately 1km x 1km and is best described as a mix of open and close terrain. The two principal features are the small village (Village A) and the large wooded feature to the South which is the form up objective specified in the mission orders. The remainder of the ground comprises open farmland and small wooded areas with a single road running generally West to SE. Elevation is best described as rolling countryside with low ground to the South rising to higher ground to the East.
 
The map again ...
 

 
The traditional method of looking at ground is under the OCOKA headings (shown below) so here is a brief description
 
O - Observation and Fields of Fire
 
Generally good throughout with the exception of the wooded features where visibility is limited to approximately 30m. In open areas, visibility and fields of fire can extend up to 600m but changes in elevation creating dead ground restrict this to an average of 200m to 300m
 
C - Cover and Concealment
 
The only readily identifiable features that provide true cover are the buildings, the majority of which are located in Village A. There are two additional small building complexes, complex D which lies between Village A and the wooded objective and a small complex at the NE exit of the woods near annotation L. Otherwise, all wooded areas provide good concealment with the best concealed positions located in the depths of the woods.
 
O - Obstacles
 
There are no significant natural obstacles with the exception of some small areas of heavy woods. Overall the natural environment would be rated as unrestricted with areas of restricted terrain around village A and all wooded areas. Although not a significant obstacle, I am aware that the boundary of the woods is delineated by a single strand low wire fence and this may expose my dismounts as they enter the woods.
 
K - Key Terrain
 
In relation to my mission, the entrances to the woods (marked F, G, H, K and L) are potential key terrain but I designate Village A, Wood C and Complex D as my key terrain. Here is why:
 
Village A
 
My intelligence briefing states that the enemy has a probable scout team deployed there. It is therefore important because the enemy has deemed it important and because it overlooks my initial deployment area. It is also important because it covers AA1 and AA2 and can disrupt manoeuvre along AA3. If I choose do so, once I get into Village A, it allows me overwatch and a base of fire into Wood C, Complex D and parts of Wood E.
 
Wood C
 
Although not apparent from the top down view, close analysis shows that Wood C is on high ground and forces on this position cover AAs 1, 2 and 3. In addition they have overwatch on to my start position. Most importantly, this position gives good observation and fields of fire across the northern boundary of the main woods, Complex D and the Eastern extent of Wood E.
 
Complex D
 
Comprises two buildings which offer both cover and concealment. It covers AAs 2 and 3 and to a limited extend, parts of AA1. Most importantly it again provides a potential good base of fire across the North of the main woods as well as Wood E.
 
A - Avenues of Approach
 
Are as marked on the schematic – in essence there are five broad avenues of approach with a number of branches designated AAs 1-5.
 
 
 
Finally just some other things to note about fighting in woods and forests
 
Other tactical points to note regarding ground in woods:
 
Command and control is extremely difficult due to close terrain and limited visibility.
Observation and fields of fire are limited.
Indirect fire is extremely difficult to employ effectively due to limited visibility and command and control issues.
 
We will look at Threat Evaluation next.
 

On with the planning then ...
 
For the planning process, I am going to use a number of planning models or tools that I’ve come across in my career – many of you board regulars will have seen some of these in other similar threads but some may be new to you. I’m not saying that these are the best tools or that this is the only way to skin the cat – it is just the way I have chosen to do it.
 
The framework MDMP (Military Decision Making Process) I am going to use is the UK Combat Estimate, which is also known as the 7 Questions. The main reason I am using this format is because I am very familiar with it (I was involved in the trials) and I find it very intuitive. The basic premise is that if you answer all of the 7 Questions you will have a plan at the end of it.
 
The 7 Questions are:
 
Q1 What is  the enemy doing and why?
Q2 What have I been told to do and why?
Q3 What effects do I want to have on the enemy; and what direction must I give to develop a plan?
Q4 Where can I best accomplish each action or effect?
Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?
Q6 When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
Q7 What control measures do I have to impose?
 
At this point it is probably worth adding a graphic to orientate you:
 

 
The blue lines are a 100m grid overlay.
 
Also required for context are the orders supplied for the mission:
 
Situation
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position.
 
Mission:
 
Secure the woods to your south west.
 
Execution:
 
Your 1st PLT is currently staged on the road leading into the village of Osinnik. 2nd PLT is not far behind and will arrive within the next 5 minutes. Your 2 company mortars are in trucks and will arrive within 10 minutes. Currently our friendly tanks are occupied in more important areas on the line, and the only support battalion has attached is in the form of a Sd.Kfz. 251/17, travelling with your 2nd PLT.
 
The enemy defense is not expected to be fairly strong. Their tanks are many kilometers to the west, and are using their regular rifle infantry to hold the corridor. The forces to your immediate front are an outpost line, delaying our advance to give their main defense on the reverse slope more time to dig in.
 
There should be no more then a platoon of dismounted infantry, though expect several machine guns and anti-tank teams. Friendly observers had been using Osinnik to direct fire, but were driven out by a small Russian patrol last night. Expect no more then a scout team in Osinnik itself, with the majority of their forces in small blocking positions south of the village among the treelines. Utilize your HMGs, halftracks and mortars to suppress the enemy and secure a foothold in the woods to your SE.
 
Your panzergrenadier company consists of:
 
-1x Company HQ
-1x Sd.Kfz. 251/17
 
-2x Panzergrenadier Platoons, each with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---3x Panzergrenadier Squads (90% manning)
---4x Sd.Kfz. 251/1
 
-1x Weapons PLT, with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---2x HMG42 Teams
---1x Mortars HQ Team
---2x 81mm Mortars
---2x Opel Blitz Trucks
 
Notes:
 
Scoring is as follows:
 
500 points for each objective, 500 for inflicting casualties, for a total of 1000 points. Russian side scores the same, weighted heavily towards vehicle kills. Preserve your halftracks, they are easily destroyed!
 
Orders End
 
I have attached these orders as a PDF for you to refer back to as we go through this process.
 
So that is the problem laid out – time to get on with solving it so here we go ….
 
 
Mission Briefing.pdf

There seem to be a few tutorials doing the rounds of late … so you’re going to get another one – on planning. So if you’re somebody who wondered how it is done, or are somebody who casts a rudimentary eye over the ground, skims through the orders and then just launches across the line of departure with the view to developing a plan on the hoof and wants to change this – then this is the thread for you.
 
The vehicle for the tutorial is SeinfeldRules Assault Position Mission.  The associated thread is here:
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/119212-seinfeldrules-scenario-thread/page-1
 
The mission can be downloaded from here:
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/d85cs6w3xeeg0oi/AD%20Assault%20Position.zip?dl=0
 
What do you get from this thread – simply put it will delve into the planning process and then roll into an AAR. I am playing this as designed so Axis attacker versus the AI. So without further ado, let’s crack on with it. Also I’d be grateful if people could refrain from posting spoilers on this mission if you’ve played it – I haven’t yet – which is kind of the point of stepping through the planning process first!!!!
 
I will warn you that I am no means an expert on military planning but have been around it enough to know how it works. I will cut corners with it here and there but this isn’t necessarily about military doctrine, it is about giving you guys an understanding of some techniques to help you plan your battles should you have a mind to do so.
 
Clearly questions (that do not contain spoilers) are welcome but many of my answers might be ‘I’ll come to that later’.

Thanks for the comments - there is an argument that too much planning is done these days which creates undue complexity. I think there is a certainly merit in that argument.
 
In the context of this scenario and the amount of planning a German company commander would have done in 1944 the effort expended would be far less than that I am showing here. That is mainly because he didn't have a massive staff to do the planning and he would probably be fairly experienced so would be able to plan intuitively.
 
As stated, the purpose is not to show you German company level command and control procedures, it is to show you a planning methodology for your education and to assist you in planning your missions and maybe apply them to scenario design too. What I certainly wouldn't advocate is planning to this extent every time you fire up the game ... believe me you'd hardly ever play and that is no fun at all!!!
 
Anyway - thanks again for following the thread and hope it is useful and interesting.

It may have seemed a marathon already but there is plenty more to do. We have now done the majority of the ground and enemy stuff so it is time to look at something else ....
 
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
 
Mission Analysis Step 1 – Review the situation.
 
Here you look at aspects such as time, how the IPB affects the battlespace and own forces. The time is a given – I have one hour. In reality, planning and rehearsal time would be considered and the amount of time required to get to the Area of Operations (AO) plus the time required to complete the mission. These are not factors in CM because the forces are in place and there is only one person planning and controlling all of the forces so we just need to be aware of the fact that we have an hour to do this. From my IPB event overlay I can see that it will take me about 20 minutes to move from my start point to the far end of the Main Wood objective.
 
Although I could do more with the IPB aspects for friendly forces, you have seen enough to see how it works so there’s not a huge amount of value in revisiting them.
 
So let us focus on own forces and again I want to keep this fairly simple …
 
First up there is an error in the briefing which states that 1 Platoon is on the map, 2 Platoon will arrive in 5 minutes and the mortars will arrive in 10 minutes (I think I'll allow SeinfeldRules the error because his missions are awesome  ). In reality 2 Platoon is on the map, 1 Platoon arrives in 5 minutes and the mortars in 10 minutes. For the purposes of Mission Analysis, this makes no real difference.
 
In basic terms then I command a Panzergrenadier Company Minus comprising:
 
Coy HQ
1 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
2 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
4 (Support Platoon) (2 x MG and 2 x Mortars)
1 x Sdkfz 251/17 20mm Half Track
 
Graphically shown in the next schematic:
 

 
So in essence I have one command element, two manoeuvre elements and a support element which is capable of protected mounted and dismounted manoeuvre and can bring direct and indirect fires on to the enemy. Force flow is such that I cannot bring all of my combat power to bear until 0710 hrs at the earliest and realistically (taking into account the time required to set up mortars and cue indirect fire) until 0720-0725 hrs.
 
I’ll now delve into some of the soft and hard factors which I have tabulated:
 

 
On top of that (ignoring the trucks) I have 8 x Sdkfz 251/1 half-tracks each armed with an LMG and I have 1 x Sdkfz 251/17 mounting a 20mm cannon and my two mortar teams each have 1 x 81mm mortar.
 
The reason for analysing own forces in detail is to establish things like force ratios and relative combat power as well as identifying those soft factors which could influence allocating units to task later on (eg I may prefer to allocate the more difficult tasks to those units with the most experience, best leadership and best morale while allocating easier tasks to those units that score lower in those factors).
 
So for the soft factors, some relevant factors might be:
 
My most experienced units are 1 Squad/1 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ
My most motivated unit is 2 Squad/2 Platoon
My best led units are Coy HQ, 1 Squad/1 Platoon, 2 Squad/1 Platoon, 1 Squad/2 Platoon, 3 Squad/2 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ.
 
The hard factors are:
 
2 Platoon is better optimised to take on buildings and vehicles due to the number of panzerschrecks
1 Platoon is better optimised for dismounted combat in the woods due to its larger number of small arms
I have 14 x LMG/HMG among my dismounted elements.
I have only 2 x mortars.
 
I will return to friendly forces later, but for now this is a good enough start because hopefully already you have seen that the hour that I’ve been given for this mission is suddenly looking less generous than it did at face value at the start.
 
Mission Analysis Step 2 – Analyse superior commander’s intent and own mission.
 
This is the core of the Mission Command or Manoeuvrist Approach style and in reality commanders and staffs will really pick this apart. In CM games, there is less value in doing so because what happens two up and one up, which in this mission’s context would be Regiment and Battalion has no effect on the mission. This means that we can skimp this step a bit.
 
But as a reminder – here is what we have been told:
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position. (Remember from my earlier posts that the town mentioned is not on the mission map - this caused a bit of confusion earlier)
 
So what to pick out of all of that, I know about my 2 up level of command (Regiment) but not too much about my 1 up level of command (Battalion). I also at this point bump up against another artificial situation. This is because it states that my overarching mission is to take a small town to protect the regiment’s flank. What this means is that in reality, this scenario is one small part of a plan to take the town and would therefore not have its own dedicated set of orders and detailed plans. However, we can move on from this, it is not a showstopper but I point it out for context. For the purposes of Mission Analysis though I deduce straight away that I have to take a small town later so I am going to need to conserve combat power. I also deduce that as my task is all about flank security, I am unlikely to be on the Regiment’s main effort which means I’m not going to be high on the list for support priorities.
 
The ‘Mission’ part of the briefing quite simply tells me to ‘Secure the woods to your SW’. So what does this mean? Doctrinally ‘Secure’ is defined as:
 
to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
 
As a reminder – this is where the Secure objective has been designated:
 

 
At this point I’m going to wordsmith the components of the briefing to come up with a mission statement so that we can move on:
 
1 Kompanie is to secure Main Wood NLT 250800Jun44 in order to provide a line of departure for the attack on the town.
 
Mission statements should state who is to do what, where at what time and then have a unifying purpose. The unifying purpose is the ‘in order to’ part of the statement. This is key to the manoeuvrist approach because it allows subordinates to understand the overall intent and put things into context. My in order to statement is not the best to be honest but it serves the purpose.
 
So that is all pretty simple then … next time we will finish off Mission Analysis by completing steps 3, 4 and 5 of that part of the process.
 
 
 
 
 

Yes it is! And theres a ****load of other stuff that makes boom, including a batallion of Panther and one of PIV. You are in for a great ride! Best ww2 campaign for me. My advice for you is: take it slow, really slow, the russians know their maskirovka. Once you found them, crush them swiftly with brute force.