Russian doctrine in CMRT

[fivefivesix]

I've just started the Russian campaign. I've had this game since release, and I must admit I've been reluctant to play this campaign  because of the lack of familiarity I have with Russian equipment and doctrine. 

 

So far I have approached the first mission the same way I might with U.S. forces - scout forward slowly, identify pockets of resistance, fix them, and then flank & assault (or bypass), and repeat. This is obviously a slow process.

 

How "wrong" is this approach? I am tempted by the need to rapidly advance to send wave after wave of infantry running towards the German lines until I have smashed through - at a huge cost in casualties. 

 

I understand the Russian priority during Bagration was up-tempo offensive, and that speed was key in breaking through and cutting off German units. So, I want to stay true to that mindset, however - if I have enough time given during a specific mission, doesn't it make sense to slow down and avoid unnecessary casualties? 

 

Thanks for any input.

[JasonC]

Don't spend lots of time scouting. Don't bother to fix and flank, except with tank forces, who can do it at speed. But also don't just run infantry at the enemy or ignore casualties. That isn't Russian doctrine or how it actually worked, it is just a cartoon slander of their methods spread by the Germans, whomthought it made them defending against it sound all clever and also heroic for braving it etc. (A rather incoherent set of spin objectives, incidentally, but that is an aside).

The first idea is that any definite plan pushed will be faster than slow recon pull. The next is that the process of destroying the enemy really isn't that complicated - it is a matter of laying your ship alongside the enemy, as Nelson put it before Trafalgar. Meaning close aggressively with the enemy, brave what he can dish out to dish out as much as you can yourself, and trust in your strength to destroy him before he destroys you.

But that isn't a headlong charge. Above all, it isn't about movement in the first place, it is about firepower and punishment dealt.

The first infantry wave is fixing, but doesn't have to do it everywhere, or care too much about finding the enemy. Walking over your chosen route of advance will either penetrate the enemy and break up his defense, or he'll find you, and reveal himself stopping that. Let him. Then blow the living crap out of everything that reveals itself, with all your firepower arms. Tanks, mortars, artillery support - call down the wrath of God to avenge the first wave. All the first wave itself needs to do in the meantime is hit the dirt, take what cover they can, and rally as best they can. They did their part drawing the enemy's fire. Don't press. It isn't a race. Save as many of them as possible, by blasting the guys shooting at them and skulking them out of sight.

Then send the second wave. Not a new idea. Not a fancy razzle dazzle end around head fake double reverse. Send them at the spots your artillery and other fire support just blasted into the lower atmosphere, while the dust is still moving upward. They may occupy the places so blasted. Or they may draw fire from a new set of shooters, and repeat the experience of the first wave. You don't really care which. There is no rushing. You have all week. Everyone will get a turn before you are done, every bit of fire support you have will chew on something, and the enemy will need to shoot you all down and still have something left. If they don't, it may be in the bottom half of the clock that they start crumbling. Waves that have been out of the leading role are rallying the while, shooting back. You don't care how long it takes, but not because any of it is tentative or any part of the clock is quiet. Reuse the rallied early waves as fourth and fifth attacks. The whole point is to outlast them, to have the last rallied wave standing. Inexorable is the watchword.

Each wave doesn't bunch up. It isn't trying to run the enemy off his feet in one go. You only expose what it takes to make a serious threat to enemy position if he doesn't open up with a major line of battle. The ideal size of one wave is a numerical match for the defenders on the same frontage. You don't want to give them denser targets that make all their weapons more effective. Instead you want them to face trying to hold off the third wave with empty magazines and surrounded by blasted friends, worked over repeatedly by all your fire support.

They won't stand. Lean hard enough into them, back off for nothing, make no mistakes, and use every weapon in your force for its proper target - and they will go down. Trust your combined strength, believe it, press home and make it so.

No captain can go far wrong who lays his ship alongside one of the enemy.

Edited August 6, 2015 by JasonC

[Bud Backer]

Thanks for that description, JasonC. Really interesting and entertaining read.

[DMS]

JasonC, great desription! I would add "reccon in force" before assault. Small forces draw fire, spot MG nests, try to find safe routs before artillery barrage and main assault. In CM battles player ussually can't do reccon in force, as it takes a long time. Reccon in force could be skipped for greater surprise effect.

[Melchior]

As the Russians though you're not looking for a "safe route" though. That's a western thing. As the Russians you look for a fight. Then just pummel whatever is dumb enough to try shooting at you. Everything is purely about your own objectives and if you get lucky and the enemy happens to be somewhere else that's all well and good. His loss.  

[DougPhresh]

For a "typical" scenario, how much Division/Corps guns would a Regiment have?

A battery of 122?

[Combatintman]

DougPhresh - depends on your definition of 'typical'. The infantry regiment had its own organic howitzer/gun company typically with 4 x 76mm M1927 or M43. If you then work on the principle of threes - there are three rifle regiments in the division and three artillery battalions in the divisional artillery battalion - then each regiment 'typically' could expect to be supported by one artillery battalion. Each artillery battalion had two 76mm batteries ( 4 x 76mm guns each) and a 122mm howitzer battery of 4 x 122mm.

 

So to summarise:

 

4 x 76mm M1927/M1943

8 x 76mm ZIS-3

4 x 122mm

 

So slightly more than a 122mm battery, and don't forget that I've only included divisional artillery. Hope this helps.

[JasonC]

Combatinman has it right for a division slice, but the thing to remember about WW II Russians and their rifle armies ("combined arms armies", technically) was that they have twice as much overall fire support as the divisional slice itself.  Half the guns, and the bigger half, are up at army level, and get assigned to support this or that division for this or that operation, at any given stage.  

 

Every level has its organic fire support, for 82mm mortars at battalion, on up.  The commander at that level can count on having that much, it will never be "pulled" from him.  But the higher muckety mucks direct the overall battle precisely by handing out double that firepower to the bits they care about, for the missions they think need it.  Half the ATGs are independent AT regiments and brigades; half the mortar firepower (and the heavier half) are regiments of 120mm mortars, again independent; half the tube artillery, with 122mm guns and 152mm howitzers rather than 76s and 122s, respectively, is up at army level, too.   Independent SU regiments and tank regiments and brigades, likewise, are all in the army commander's kit bag.

 

The army commander is *not* expected to dole out all this extra stuff in even division slices.  The division that has a defensive role isn't given anything, or it is given an ATG formation because it is in good tank country.  The division that has the attack main effort gets a tank brigade, and a 120mm mortar regiment, and as much 122 and 152 gun formations as its organic div arty, on top of that div arty.

 

The organic "slice" is a minimum level, in other words.  The skies the limit on the high side, but triple the division slice amount, in throw weight, would be perfectly normal for an important part of the overall operation.

 

The Russians used this system because it put the combined arms mix decision in the hands of a few experienced general officers and their professionally competent staffs.  You only needed one professional and competent per army this way, instead of needing one in every one of its 6 to 9 component divisions.  The muckety muck in charge was responsible for giving the formations below him the tools they needed to accomplish their part of the overall plan, and for deciding on that plan.  The division commanders were responsible for using it effectively to accomplish their formation's mission.  And lower than that, the field grade guys were just responsible for "laying their ship alongside the enemy" and fighting hard enough.  

 

If they fought hard enough but failed, it was their superior's fault - they clearly hadn't been given a feasible mission or the right tools, in that case.  A long casualty roll was proof positive of trying hard - success, of course, was always welcome too.  To fail without a long casualty roll was a sign of not having tried hard enough and was the subordinate's fault.

 

PS CaptainHawkeye is exactly right about the focus being on the Russian's own plan, and pushing it forward, and not on where the enemy was, or recon, or avoiding them.  They were looking to execute their planned movement, and to kill anything that got in the way, and expected to only get places by such killing.  The mech forces would spend a little bit more effort on looking for a weak point and directing their main effort there.  But even in the mech arm, the following "echelons" mechanically followed that chosen "point of main effort", with a one two three of "first hits them to find and fix, second flanks them (close, one side only) to push them aside, third runs through the hole".  Those were to be delivered at speed, hard, not reacting much to where the enemy was found or what he was doing.  Instead force him around so that the rest of the friendly-side plan makes sense.

 

The watchword in all of it was simplicity, as well as aggressiveness.  They wanted tactics that they could teach to any brave and reasonably competent officer, that were clear in the expectations and requirements of each level and role, that the average could execute - and that were robust enough to work and be effective if that average was supplied.  They weren't aiming at brilliancy and they didn't want the plan to fail if they didn't get brilliancy.  Too many plans would have failed too soon, if they had.

 

The downside of this approach is that it can become predictable.  The upside is that a mass army can actually learn and apply it.  

And that in practice, there is so much confusion and friction in war that simplicity is a very underrated military virtue, of the first importance.

Edited August 14, 2015 by JasonC

[Sgt Joch]

re: Russian artillery. For a lot of reasons, it was not as flexible as German/US/CW. Typically, most of the heavy stuff would only be used for prep barrages, while the "on call" artillery typically available during a CM battle would only be the units organic guns. That is why platoon-battalion HQs can only call in mortars/76 mm guns while a FO is needed to call in all the heavy stuff. The FO represents Corps/Army level artillery.

 

The Russians relied very much on direct fire support either from towed guns or tanks/SPGs. During Bagration, attacking infantry battalions were typically organized as "Storm Groups" with Sappers, Flamethrowers  and 2-3 companies of AFVs, usually SU-76s and/or T-34/76s attached. I designed the first mission of the Russian campaign and the attacking Russian force is structured this way.

 

As to Russian attacking tactics, it is basically the same as US/CW, basically scout where the enemy is, pound his forces until they retreat/surrender/die and move on. The difference is more one of emphasis, the Russians were not as worried about casualties and would typically continue the assault in a situation where US/CW forces would be more tempted to stop and use artillery. In game, that is typically handled by giving the Russian more points for seizing objectives and less points for minimizing casualties. As I recall, that is the case with 1st campaign mission.

[kevinkin]

Assuming the Soviets and attacking the Germans in some form of defensive positions (cover + concealment) what would be the force ratio? For years we have read 3 for the attacker to 1. But that does not mean raw troop numbers. In combined arms warfare it means firepower ratio ie lead given vs what is received over a certain space and time. And if we stick to a firepower ratios it is still critical to think in terms of a point of main effort and the destruction  any defense in depth at that point so the 2nd and subsequent waves don't have to cross open ground covered by automatic weapons. From the attacker's POV, the use of TRPs can model fires into the defense's depth. Local defensive counterattacks can restore the defense. But in '44, the Soviets had the resources and doctrine to poke too many holes in the dam. Spreading out your manpower on the attack must have the net effect on concentrating your firepower ratio vs the enemy. This is in part of the art of maneuver. 

 

Kevin

Edited August 15, 2015 by kevinkin

[Melchior]

There is much to be admired about the Red Army's manner of fighting I think. It is crude and it is ugly but it ruthless, a force of nature even. Tacit in the Russian manner of fighting is the admission that war is hell and many people will die in name of victory. The Russians are not intentionally cruel though. They just understand that war is horrible and the only right way to do it is to seek victory in the surest possible manner. 

 

It's not like western thinking that prioritizes force preservation and low casualty figures, even if the battle is a loss. The Russians use as you emphasize, the Trafalgar-esque mentality that stresses simply outfighting the enemy. Maneuver is only used as a means to an end, to eventually force the enemy to battle or see his advantages slowly and surely eroded away. 

 

Western Armies* are obsessed with "getting inside the enemy's head" so to speak. This is the nature of the recon pull and why battlefield intelligence is so important. It's to capitalize on an enemy's mistakes, or prevent your own forces from making one. The Russian concern is purely about their own force. They couldn't give a crap what Fritz is thinking. You'll know what he's thinking after you've parked your force where he doesn't want you to be. 

 

A history of balanced rivalries between powers in Europe has led western forces into pursuit of the infamous "Decisive Battle"**. The go-for-broke engagement that allows you to triumph over an equal or superior opponent without a large investment in lives and time. Hard won victory is not really seen as victory in the west after all, it needs to be easy. Even defeat can be more rewarding than victory as long as the cost was low. The lead up to the battle usually requires western forces to disseminate much and operate with natural complexity. Intelligent and headstrong leaders are placed at low levels in the command chain and expected to capitalize on opportunities at their level. The advantage is a gamble, a good opportunity can lead to a cascade of victories that works its way up into better circumstances for the Great Battle. A bad or misread opportunity leads to infamous disasters like Kampfgruppe Pieper , or Pickett's Charge. 

 

The gamble is a major character of war in the west. Because the historically low populations and fragile political climate of Europe essentially required you to triumph over the odds. While the results from this can be spectacular they can also very easily lead to many wasted lives. 

 

I don't like everything about Deep Battle. It's predictable and it's unsophisticated. It doesn't seem to have answers for a direct encounter with an equal or better force. If the enemy can match you strategically and tactically it seems it won't work as well. If the war is distant it's just impractical. The Soviet Union was usually not successful in its overseas adventures. Where Deep Battle clearly does work is against the backdrop of a major conflict with a state that can take what it can dish out. 

 

The best thing about DB to me is that it clearly takes war seriously. Western thinking seems to think of war too much as adventure. A card game with the potential to yield big payouts. This thinking has too often been used by men of questionable morality and intention to sell bad wars and hurt many people. 

 

*It's not necessarily accurate to describe all of Europe's Armies as one kind of character. They aren't. 

**More appropriately known as the Decisive Campaign. Single pitched set piece battles have not characterized war since the end of the 19th century. 

Edited August 15, 2015 by CaptHawkeye

[DougPhresh]

That's a lot of tubes allotted! It should make scenarios much more interesting. Thanks!

 

I'm starting to see why the Russians were able to roll up Army Group Centre. With so many guns per km, digging in will only do you so much good!

 

e: Having that many moving pieces at different levels might explain the Russian reputation for excellent Staff work. I can imagine putting so much firepower in the hands of higher formations means a lot of planning and coordination, and having "experts" manage it makes a lot of sense.

 

e2: I'm a little out of my depth here, but David M Glantz' titles "Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria", "The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria", and "A History of Soviet Airborne Forces" all grace my shelves. I'm just having a very hard time applying the lessons contained therein to my CM games! I'd love to blame this on lack of Morskaya Pekhota and VDV, but that may not be it. I might have better luck against the Kwantung Army than the Wehrmacht!

 

 

Has anyone read Glantz' books on Soviet Doctrine? The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive and

Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle are supposed to be very good titles, but I'd love to know the key points if anyone has read them.

Edited August 15, 2015 by DougPhresh

[DougPhresh]

 

I know it's the wrong period, but I thought that this seems to be a pretty good illustration of what an attack in echelon would look like.

I'd love to figure out how to use this properly in RT/BS.

Edited August 15, 2015 by DougPhresh

[Sgt Joch]

I havent seen anything on actual late war Russian tactics, but I would suggest you download FM-100-2-1 on Soviet tactics. It's based on 60's Soviet documents, but seems to codify 43-45 experience and it pretty much matches up with what you posted if you substitute Trucks for BMPs.

Edited August 15, 2015 by Sgt Joch

[kevinkin]

Perhaps check out Soviet Tactical Doctrine in WWII as part of the US Handbook of Military Forces compiled after the war. Also search for the operation "koltov corridor" and a Google book should be found on Soviet Forward detachments. Jason had a nice write up on these in a thread here back in the Spring. I bring up forward detachments since they are appropriate to simulate on the CM scale and I think operated in a manner consistent with Soviet thinking at regiment and higher levels. Here is that thread with post 21.

 

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/119379-soviet-doctrine-in-ww2-1944/page-2?hl=jasonc

 

Kevin

 

PS I am sure the gang has any number of links as well. 

Edited August 15, 2015 by kevinkin

[slothropsez]

There is much to be admired about the Red Army's manner of fighting I think. It is crude and it is ugly but it ruthless, a force of nature even. Tacit in the Russian manner of fighting is the admission that war is hell and many people will die in name of victory. The Russians are not intentionally cruel though. They just understand that war is horrible and the only right way to do it is to seek victory in the surest possible manner. 

 

It's not like western thinking that prioritizes force preservation and low casualty figures, even if the battle is a loss. The Russians use as you emphasize, the Trafalgar-esque mentality that stresses simply outfighting the enemy. Maneuver is only used as a means to an end, to eventually force the enemy to battle or see his advantages slowly and surely eroded away. 

 

Western Armies* are obsessed with "getting inside the enemy's head" so to speak. This is the nature of the recon pull and why battlefield intelligence is so important. It's to capitalize on an enemy's mistakes, or prevent your own forces from making one. The Russian concern is purely about their own force. They couldn't give a crap what Fritz is thinking. You'll know what he's thinking after you've parked your force where he doesn't want you to be. 

 

A history of balanced rivalries between powers in Europe has led western forces into pursuit of the infamous "Decisive Battle"**. The go-for-broke engagement that allows you to triumph over an equal or superior opponent without a large investment in lives and time. Hard won victory is not really seen as victory in the west after all, it needs to be easy. Even defeat can be more rewarding than victory as long as the cost was low. The lead up to the battle usually requires western forces to disseminate much and operate with natural complexity. Intelligent and headstrong leaders are placed at low levels in the command chain and expected to capitalize on opportunities at their level. The advantage is a gamble, a good opportunity can lead to a cascade of victories that works its way up into better circumstances for the Great Battle. A bad or misread opportunity leads to infamous disasters like Kampfgruppe Pieper , or Pickett's Charge. 

 

The gamble is a major character of war in the west. Because the historically low populations and fragile political climate of Europe essentially required you to triumph over the odds. While the results from this can be spectacular they can also very easily lead to many wasted lives. 

 

I don't like everything about Deep Battle. It's predictable and it's unsophisticated. It doesn't seem to have answers for a direct encounter with an equal or better force. If the enemy can match you strategically and tactically it seems it won't work as well. If the war is distant it's just impractical. The Soviet Union was usually not successful in its overseas adventures. Where Deep Battle clearly does work is against the backdrop of a major conflict with a state that can take what it can dish out. 

 

The best thing about DB to me is that it clearly takes war seriously. Western thinking seems to think of war too much as adventure. A card game with the potential to yield big payouts. This thinking has too often been used by men of questionable morality and intention to sell bad wars and hurt many people. 

 

*It's not necessarily accurate to describe all of Europe's Armies as one kind of character. They aren't. 

**More appropriately known as the Decisive Campaign. Single pitched set piece battles have not characterized war since the end of the 19th century. 

 

I think it also has difficulty with the post-modern (post-WW2) mindset that military spending is more focused "desire creation" than replacing fought-out armored battalions. Basically, Deep Battle requires keeping around an enormously expensive conventional military force in good enough repair to be deployed with strategic surprise. But you (the political regime) get no side-benefit from armored battalions during peace time beyond the millenia-old benefit of crushing internal rebellion with an iron fist. Compare this to the US model of the post-modern military: it's really R&D for consumer goods!

 

Did any top NATO commander considered it realistic at the gut level to fight a conventional war with the Soviet Union? No, because the nuclear option was always on the table. Therefore, no US president was ever in a position to trade the voter's quality of life for more armored battalions. Compare US and Soviet policy on obsolete military equipment: the US couldn't scrap things fast enough because our economy for roughly 80 or 90 years has been based on absurd over-abundance and throwing out "perfectly good" strategic bombers or microwaves. The Soviet's kept 'em around because they just couldn't adopt the post-modern mindset that all politics is ultimately about creating new consumer demands (where even the military is a consumer).

 

I suppose this could all seem like over-simplification but really, the US was the only country post-WW2 to recognize that war is politics by other means, but politics itself is only a super-structure of production/consumption (to over-simplify Marx), so full-on war is only a reflection of the underlying economic conflict. Which capitalism (in its post-modern form) did indeed win, deep battle notwithstanding. Something tells me that the Soviets never did understand the long-term game that the US was playing during the Cold War, namely, that it had no interest in really fielding an effective conventional army in Central Europe or anywhere else. Ultimately the Fulda gap was maskirovka for the perfection of self-referential, full-on consumer capitalism.

Edited August 17, 2015 by slothropsez

[fivefivesix]

Just had a chance to really read through this thread again - thanks to everyone for their replies. I'll be sure to check out the references mentioned. So far the Russian campaign has been great - definitely a different flavor than anything else Combat Mission offers. 

[Melchior]

I suppose this could all seem like over-simplification but really, the US was the only country post-WW2 to recognize that war is politics by other means, but politics itself is only a super-structure of production/consumption (to over-simplify Marx), so full-on war is only a reflection of the underlying economic conflict. Which capitalism (in its post-modern form) did indeed win, deep battle notwithstanding. Something tells me that the Soviets never did understand the long-term game that the US was playing during the Cold War, namely, that it had no interest in really fielding an effective conventional army in Central Europe or anywhere else. Ultimately the Fulda gap was maskirovka for the perfection of self-referential, full-on consumer capitalism.

Yeah, one of the issue with Deep Battle is that it requires a high degree of readiness in order to function. Investments in upkeep are very high. This is part of the reason no one was lining up to buy the ex-Soviet Air Force in the 1990s even though the Russians were offering everything at clearance prices. Also why the the Soviet-client states of the Warsaw Pact have de-mobilized much of their Eastern weaponry in favor of western backed stuff. It hasn't performed very well without the customer support of the Soviet Union standing by on the hotline. Deep battle simply requires the spending party to make all or nothing investments with no in-between. This is a big weakness if the opposition can force your hand into picking that "All" option more often than you'd like. Weapon systems the Soviets could cheap out on in 1945, like anti-aircraft, had to become major investments by 1970 because ground forces couldn't just tough-out air attacks anymore.

Disastrously huge levels of military spending were a big factor of the Soviet Union's premature death. However i'm personally cautious of western-prime causes of the USSR's demise though. It's fraught with political convenience and confirmation bias. Reagan and his ilk loved to act like the Holy Dogma of the Free Market finally triumphed over Hippie Socialism. The Soviet Union was largely brought down by internal problems that its leadership was either unable or unwilling to solve. Like its unsustainable agricultural network and disastrous breakdown of relations with China.

Edited August 17, 2015 by CaptHawkeye

[kevinkin]

Not complaining at all...

But it always amazes me how quickly a tactical discussion elevates to the geopolitical but the geopolitical post never seems to evolve into a 

discussion of small unit tactics or AI movements. Human nature I wonder. But again no complaining here ... 

 

Kevin

[JasonC]

kevinkin - well you may not be complaining, but I will.  Barren, sterile, pointless, nothing to do with CM, always jumping in and trashing promising threads.  Not referring to any person, just to talking politics at the dinner table.  Give it rest, for the love of God.

[Sgt Joch]

kevinkin - well you may not be complaining, but I will.  Barren, sterile, pointless, nothing to do with CM, always jumping in and trashing promising threads.  Not referring to any person, just to talking politics at the dinner table.  Give it rest, for the love of God.

Agreed. Totally off topic.

[zinzan]

Absolutely, take it to another place, please.

 

Brilliant thread though, would be very interested in more - without politics, please.

[kevinkin]

Zinzan

 

There are many threads like the way this started but it will take a pretty good investment in time to find them. Bookmark them right away.

Copy and paste the good parts for safe keeping.

 

Kevin

[slothropsez]

I think it's fair to discuss the larger context of "Russian Doctrine." We are not (unless I am mistaken) actually sitting at somebody's prepared lecture and interrupting him with off-theme questions? Are we?

[JasonC]

slothropsez - there is nothing to interrupt.  Knock yourself out.