Der Zeitgeist

We shouldn't go overboard with the Putin health speculations. If one compares the pictures to previous meetings with his cabinet ministers in his office, he simply seems to have a habit of holding on to things with his hands, even many years ago.

It's either grabbing the table or their throats probably

After each of those photos the arm-wrestling began.  Holding onto the table was only allowed on one side 😉.

I assume at least one digit is always poised over the button for the trapdoor to the hungry bear pit.

We shouldn't go overboard with the Putin health speculations. If one compares the pictures to previous meetings with his cabinet ministers in his office, he simply seems to have a habit of holding on to things with his hands, even many years ago.

Whatever, I'm still very much looking forward to it! 😃

Whatever, I'm still very much looking forward to it! 😃

Remember the German tanks and IFVs that we don't want to send to Ukraine? We've now come up with a solution. Hold on to your butts, this will be the most German thing you'll read today. 😄
So, our government has now come up with the convoluted "Ringtausch" scheme. We will send Marders (which we supposedly don't have/can't spare because of NATO commitments) to Slovenia, and Slovenia in turn will send its own M-84A4 "Sniper" tanks to Ukraine.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/waffenlieferungen-an-ukraine-ringtausch-mit-oestlichen-nato-partnern-17972191.html

Remember the German tanks and IFVs that we don't want to send to Ukraine? We've now come up with a solution. Hold on to your butts, this will be the most German thing you'll read today. 😄
So, our government has now come up with the convoluted "Ringtausch" scheme. We will send Marders (which we supposedly don't have/can't spare because of NATO commitments) to Slovenia, and Slovenia in turn will send its own M-84A4 "Sniper" tanks to Ukraine.
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/waffenlieferungen-an-ukraine-ringtausch-mit-oestlichen-nato-partnern-17972191.html

If Russia pulls too many troops out to keep a secure cordon around Azovstal, this city could become a weeks-long nightmare of sniper fire and IED ambushes.

There are various interpretations about the bevhaviour of Scholz and the SPD on the issue of shipping heavy weapons. Like almost everything, you can of course pin it on Russian kompromat, but the real reasons are likely much more mundane.
For me, it's most likely a combination of:
Having a number of critical state elections that the SPD wants to win in the coming months, where they don't want to risk having their party base and aging electorate run scared with talks of German Panzers rolling east. A number of influential SPD officials (especially Rolf Mützenich &  Ralf Stegner) that are fundamentally opposed to any confrontational policy with Russia. The usual ****up of our bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense, where the leadership has no idea what's going on and the middle management is basically running their own policy. Just keep the pressure up, it's as simple as that.
The fundamental fear of German foreign policy is the concept of "Alleingänge", taking any risks by making decisions that aren't also taken by allied nations. If Germany appears isolated on the question of heavy weapons, it will align its policy to come back into the fold.

Positive (the question below specifically mentions heavy weapons), with some interesting differences along party lines.

There are various interpretations about the bevhaviour of Scholz and the SPD on the issue of shipping heavy weapons. Like almost everything, you can of course pin it on Russian kompromat, but the real reasons are likely much more mundane.
For me, it's most likely a combination of:
Having a number of critical state elections that the SPD wants to win in the coming months, where they don't want to risk having their party base and aging electorate run scared with talks of German Panzers rolling east. A number of influential SPD officials (especially Rolf Mützenich &  Ralf Stegner) that are fundamentally opposed to any confrontational policy with Russia. The usual ****up of our bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense, where the leadership has no idea what's going on and the middle management is basically running their own policy. Just keep the pressure up, it's as simple as that.
The fundamental fear of German foreign policy is the concept of "Alleingänge", taking any risks by making decisions that aren't also taken by allied nations. If Germany appears isolated on the question of heavy weapons, it will align its policy to come back into the fold.

There are various interpretations about the bevhaviour of Scholz and the SPD on the issue of shipping heavy weapons. Like almost everything, you can of course pin it on Russian kompromat, but the real reasons are likely much more mundane.
For me, it's most likely a combination of:
Having a number of critical state elections that the SPD wants to win in the coming months, where they don't want to risk having their party base and aging electorate run scared with talks of German Panzers rolling east. A number of influential SPD officials (especially Rolf Mützenich &  Ralf Stegner) that are fundamentally opposed to any confrontational policy with Russia. The usual ****up of our bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense, where the leadership has no idea what's going on and the middle management is basically running their own policy. Just keep the pressure up, it's as simple as that.
The fundamental fear of German foreign policy is the concept of "Alleingänge", taking any risks by making decisions that aren't also taken by allied nations. If Germany appears isolated on the question of heavy weapons, it will align its policy to come back into the fold.

There are various interpretations about the bevhaviour of Scholz and the SPD on the issue of shipping heavy weapons. Like almost everything, you can of course pin it on Russian kompromat, but the real reasons are likely much more mundane.
For me, it's most likely a combination of:
Having a number of critical state elections that the SPD wants to win in the coming months, where they don't want to risk having their party base and aging electorate run scared with talks of German Panzers rolling east. A number of influential SPD officials (especially Rolf Mützenich &  Ralf Stegner) that are fundamentally opposed to any confrontational policy with Russia. The usual ****up of our bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense, where the leadership has no idea what's going on and the middle management is basically running their own policy. Just keep the pressure up, it's as simple as that.
The fundamental fear of German foreign policy is the concept of "Alleingänge", taking any risks by making decisions that aren't also taken by allied nations. If Germany appears isolated on the question of heavy weapons, it will align its policy to come back into the fold.

There are various interpretations about the bevhaviour of Scholz and the SPD on the issue of shipping heavy weapons. Like almost everything, you can of course pin it on Russian kompromat, but the real reasons are likely much more mundane.
For me, it's most likely a combination of:
Having a number of critical state elections that the SPD wants to win in the coming months, where they don't want to risk having their party base and aging electorate run scared with talks of German Panzers rolling east. A number of influential SPD officials (especially Rolf Mützenich &  Ralf Stegner) that are fundamentally opposed to any confrontational policy with Russia. The usual ****up of our bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense, where the leadership has no idea what's going on and the middle management is basically running their own policy. Just keep the pressure up, it's as simple as that.
The fundamental fear of German foreign policy is the concept of "Alleingänge", taking any risks by making decisions that aren't also taken by allied nations. If Germany appears isolated on the question of heavy weapons, it will align its policy to come back into the fold.

Positive (the question below specifically mentions heavy weapons), with some interesting differences along party lines.

Exports will be approved by the ministry of economic affairs, led by Robert Habeck, who is a strong proponent for sending heavy weapons. However, the chancellor has the final say of course. There's some speculation that Scholz made a fundamental decision not to send AFVs to Ukraine (for possible reasons, see what I wrote here: https://community.battlefront.com/topic/140931-how-hot-is-ukraine-gonna-get/?do=findComment&comment=1922904 ), this would explain the convoluted schemes with the Dutch PzH 2000 or Italian AFVs that were also mentioned yesterday. 
 

DW reporter crushes SPD MP about the heavy weapons for Ukraine. Rather sad spectacle:
Edit: this is example how free media should work - DW is a state owned company, but you really couldn't tell from the way this interview was done.

Now we're talking.
 

On top of that you get HESH against all the BMPs, BTRs etc, and that's just brutal.

You could test basically the same in CM:SF2 using canadian Leo1-CM2s or in CM:CW using M60s or the M1-Abrams with L7 gun. The 105mm-L7 is capable enough to wipe every russian tank at least up to 3000metres. Depending on T-modell even at 4 or 5 klicks.

Now we have our right-wing AfD applauding the chancellor for standing up to the warmongers. Nice work, Olaf. 🤮
 

I did that virtually for you^^
quick and dirty setup meeting engagement in Steel Beasts 4.0:
Leo1a5 with 105mm DM63 vs a T90S m2005 with 3BM42M (every 125mm APFSDS should be enough for the Leo1...)
visibility 3000m
first round frontal kill at 2940m with a DM63.
I achieved multiple frontal first round kills between 2500 and 2900m.
As soon as the T90 ist angled it gets easier + some terrain for an ambush and we can have a turret highjump contest.
So i think the Leo 1 could work but you need experienced crews. Maybe we can send some retired leo1 crews from all over europe on a vacation

This is such a f... disgrace. 😑
Ukrainians should just drive over to Rheinmetall with flatbed trucks and take the stuff.