Rinaldi

It's a double feature!
Seeing as @Rinaldi is just Bizarro Miller (and vice versa), and after a lot of inspiration from Bil's excellent blog, I've decided to take a plunge into blogging as well. 
https://millerswargamingvault.blogspot.com/2022/03/visualized-in-combat-mission-key-terrain.html


 

https://rinaldiaars.blogspot.com/2022/03/combat-mission-as-visual-aid-bringing.html
Some of my personal favourites from my latest AAR. Learning to love SF2 again.

Some people here say, that you cant add Javelins, NLAWS, AT-4´s, Stingers, and all other juicy stuff. Becouse the Ukrainians didnt have them in 2017! But really? They didnt have them 12 month ago either! They got all these nice weapons, becouse Russia was building up on their borders! And most of it, after the invasion! 
 
Why could that not happen, in an 2017 scenario? Could a 2017 War, play out as the 2022 war. With the support of an unanomous west? Maybe not in the same way, before the invasion. But when the invasion ****, was a reality? Just asking?  

But they also have poor quality armour and manufacturing failures modelled. Much more in the vein of "provide the Russians with poor/previous gen sabots" than your example, I would think. 

Recently completed the "Operation Encore" campaign. Loved it. Here's some choice shots:




I compiled all my experiences into a very brief, very general overview for my blog. You can read about it here: https://rinaldiaars.blogspot.com/2022/02/combat-mission-fortress-italys.html. I've also included a link to the full gallery of all the screens. It should go without saying but, obviously, spoilers!

Great share, thanks George. 

Hers a link to uncut version with analysis. 
 

Isn't that kind of fatalistic shrugging what got us here, right now?  By that logic, we could say, "Well ya Russia invaded a sovereign state, happens all the time.  Someone will figure it out over there in Europe...where is Ukraine anyway.  Change the channel, those kids getting blown up is disturbing."
The world is a turbulent and dangerous place and I am not sure apathy about it is the best strategy.  It sure wasn't for global terrorism, and it really hasn't seemed to work in this case either.  At best this is kicking crisis down the road so our kids can deal with them, at worst we find ourselves in a mess and have no idea how we got here because we were to busy fighting over the deck chairs. 
Having read a fair amount of history and previous generations didn't seem to go "meh", not sure we should either.

Relax. The words "I disagree" aren't vitriol, and saying you've been looking at 8-10 hours of OSINT and think tank feedback is impressive, but pretty much what everyone else on these forums is doing (or attempting to) - not to disparage. Nothing I have said is hyperbolic, like you, it's based precisely on what I've been seeing, beamed directly into my skull 8-10 hours a day like everyone else. Perhaps I've reached a less cautious conclusion, but what I'm saying isn't without historical precedent.
I will cede that separating poor logistical planning from endemic, open corruption is going to need a post-mortem, likely more than a decade from now. However, given the very real historic precedents for shameless supply corruption and the active black market the Russian forces (and late-Soviet) partake in, is it really hyperbolic to ask if these issues we see are more reflective of the Russian forces as a whole than some wing-dinged plan?
So, yeah, an example of "it's going to require a post mortem on whether this is a result of poor planning or something far more endemic" - the ammo we've already discussed, how about active countermeasures for the RuAF? Chaff/Flares appear to be extremely limited - operational or systemic? If we could have a 200 page thread based on fever-dreams about how Russia is under-represented in BS, I think its fair game to have a 4-5 page thread on how the Russians may, in fact, be a paper tiger and not just having a bad war. 
I'm not demanding you ask how high when I say jump, just being tongue-in-cheek  

Battlefront needs to allow us more upvotes.  Consider this an upvote.

Relax. The words "I disagree" aren't vitriol, and saying you've been looking at 8-10 hours of OSINT and think tank feedback is impressive, but pretty much what everyone else on these forums is doing (or attempting to) - not to disparage. Nothing I have said is hyperbolic, like you, it's based precisely on what I've been seeing, beamed directly into my skull 8-10 hours a day like everyone else. Perhaps I've reached a less cautious conclusion, but what I'm saying isn't without historical precedent.
I will cede that separating poor logistical planning from endemic, open corruption is going to need a post-mortem, likely more than a decade from now. However, given the very real historic precedents for shameless supply corruption and the active black market the Russian forces (and late-Soviet) partake in, is it really hyperbolic to ask if these issues we see are more reflective of the Russian forces as a whole than some wing-dinged plan?
So, yeah, an example of "it's going to require a post mortem on whether this is a result of poor planning or something far more endemic" - the ammo we've already discussed, how about active countermeasures for the RuAF? Chaff/Flares appear to be extremely limited - operational or systemic? If we could have a 200 page thread based on fever-dreams about how Russia is under-represented in BS, I think its fair game to have a 4-5 page thread on how the Russians may, in fact, be a paper tiger and not just having a bad war. 
I'm not demanding you ask how high when I say jump, just being tongue-in-cheek  

But they also have poor quality armour and manufacturing failures modelled. Much more in the vein of "provide the Russians with poor/previous gen sabots" than your example, I would think. 

I disagree. Evidence is beginning to emerge that these systemic issues are creating real issues in the minutiae; T72B3s and T90s entering battles with six or seven ammo types, many of them wildly outdated, etc. In CMBS, if modelled, that would translate into a real degradation of Russia's ability to kill hard threats. This is just one example, they're coming so hard and fast that it's dizzying. 
Ultimately, to declare all these issues as "operational" is hand-waving away real criticism. Having a ****ty plan conducted hastily doesn't ultimately speak to things like "do Russians have peer equipment" or "can a Russian motor rifleman actually conduct a reaction to fire and have faith in his NCO." These are systemic issues, as I said, and that does ultimately have visible knock-on effects in the tactical plane. 
At this rate, the SF2s Syrian OPFOR is better - and again, you can indeed help it. Crank those numbers down in future battlepacks - still time to change the incoming campaigns and standalones ;).

A bit of a tangent but relevant to this conversation: there's plenty of footage of helos dropping flares to evade MANPADS and being hit. We don't get to see or hear about the countermeasures that actually work. This inherent bias in the sampling of events needs to be kept in mind.
I tend to agree with your take on this matter, @Rinaldi. There are explanations of why we don't see say, a more even distribution of T-90s in the "semi-verified" attrition statistics such as "they keep the good stuff in reserve because of overoptimistic planning"  or "keeping them close to Moscow in case a Tiananmen happens", that just do not   cut it for me. Those would be like considering the notion that in 1991 the US Army marching into Kuwait with M60s mostly, that were "good enough" to deal with the export T-64 and T-72 of the Iraqis. There maybe something cultural in play here, as in the Western militaries being so averse to casualties that they tend to overestimate adversary capabilities, so rather than going for plans that require the minimal amount of resources that have positive probability of success, they go for plans that no matter the amount of resources do maximize the probability of success. But this also feels to me phony, like I am telling myself something I want to believe.
What it does cut it for me are explanations based on the sampling being biased. It could be that less T-90s have been lost by the Russian Armed Forces just because the "first class" BTGs using them are caught up in that traffic jam north of Kyiv, for instance. Or perhaps there just didn't happen to be nearby someone from the Ukrainian TDF with a phone to make a video for youtube. Perhaps there is some Russian commander doubting whether to commit them or not. Perhaps they're in Belarus, waiting for an order to cut Ukraine from Poland, too. Or they maybe do not exist at all, and existing figures that were used to make the assessment when CMBS was made stated overly optimistic projections of how efficiently and quickly those weapon systems became available and those readiness levels reached. Or they could well be deployed to counter a threat that does not exist (e.g. NATO forces with an offensive posture in the Baltics). I am listing these options in the order of their "likelihood" from my point of view.
Over the course of the last 2 or 3 days more "next gen" equipment has appeared on the attrition lists.
Also, have anybody seen any footage of Javelins in action? I haven't yet, but I do not think the Ukrainians are keeping them as a surprise. Probably it's just that it is super dumb to be fiddling with a smartphone while engaging enemy armor (and probably any NCOs around would kick your a**).
 

Relax. The words "I disagree" aren't vitriol, and saying you've been looking at 8-10 hours of OSINT and think tank feedback is impressive, but pretty much what everyone else on these forums is doing (or attempting to) - not to disparage. Nothing I have said is hyperbolic, like you, it's based precisely on what I've been seeing, beamed directly into my skull 8-10 hours a day like everyone else. Perhaps I've reached a less cautious conclusion, but what I'm saying isn't without historical precedent.
I will cede that separating poor logistical planning from endemic, open corruption is going to need a post-mortem, likely more than a decade from now. However, given the very real historic precedents for shameless supply corruption and the active black market the Russian forces (and late-Soviet) partake in, is it really hyperbolic to ask if these issues we see are more reflective of the Russian forces as a whole than some wing-dinged plan?
So, yeah, an example of "it's going to require a post mortem on whether this is a result of poor planning or something far more endemic" - the ammo we've already discussed, how about active countermeasures for the RuAF? Chaff/Flares appear to be extremely limited - operational or systemic? If we could have a 200 page thread based on fever-dreams about how Russia is under-represented in BS, I think its fair game to have a 4-5 page thread on how the Russians may, in fact, be a paper tiger and not just having a bad war. 
I'm not demanding you ask how high when I say jump, just being tongue-in-cheek  

Putin, in my opinion, is acting like any long-term dictator would when seeing that his country is faltering under his leadership.
1. Every member of the ruling class, down to about 3 levels (or more?) beneath him, is a potential threat or rival.
2. Foreign leaders and delegates are also enemies and need to be put at a psychological disadvantage.
For those two reasons, Putin likes the "strong man" image and uses distance to reinforce his superiority over both groups. As well, distance makes it much harder to kill him.
3. Flight attendants can sit at normal distances.
They are not a threat. In fact, he's trying to show "Papa Putin" image to them and the rest of the nation.
That, to me, explains why he chooses the various seat placements.

But they also have poor quality armour and manufacturing failures modelled. Much more in the vein of "provide the Russians with poor/previous gen sabots" than your example, I would think. 

I disagree. Evidence is beginning to emerge that these systemic issues are creating real issues in the minutiae; T72B3s and T90s entering battles with six or seven ammo types, many of them wildly outdated, etc. In CMBS, if modelled, that would translate into a real degradation of Russia's ability to kill hard threats. This is just one example, they're coming so hard and fast that it's dizzying. 
Ultimately, to declare all these issues as "operational" is hand-waving away real criticism. Having a ****ty plan conducted hastily doesn't ultimately speak to things like "do Russians have peer equipment" or "can a Russian motor rifleman actually conduct a reaction to fire and have faith in his NCO." These are systemic issues, as I said, and that does ultimately have visible knock-on effects in the tactical plane. 
At this rate, the SF2s Syrian OPFOR is better - and again, you can indeed help it. Crank those numbers down in future battlepacks - still time to change the incoming campaigns and standalones ;).

Gotta catch ‘em all:
 

I disagree. Evidence is beginning to emerge that these systemic issues are creating real issues in the minutiae; T72B3s and T90s entering battles with six or seven ammo types, many of them wildly outdated, etc. In CMBS, if modelled, that would translate into a real degradation of Russia's ability to kill hard threats. This is just one example, they're coming so hard and fast that it's dizzying. 
Ultimately, to declare all these issues as "operational" is hand-waving away real criticism. Having a ****ty plan conducted hastily doesn't ultimately speak to things like "do Russians have peer equipment" or "can a Russian motor rifleman actually conduct a reaction to fire and have faith in his NCO." These are systemic issues, as I said, and that does ultimately have visible knock-on effects in the tactical plane. 
At this rate, the SF2s Syrian OPFOR is better - and again, you can indeed help it. Crank those numbers down in future battlepacks - still time to change the incoming campaigns and standalones ;).

But they also have poor quality armour and manufacturing failures modelled. Much more in the vein of "provide the Russians with poor/previous gen sabots" than your example, I would think. 

I disagree. Evidence is beginning to emerge that these systemic issues are creating real issues in the minutiae; T72B3s and T90s entering battles with six or seven ammo types, many of them wildly outdated, etc. In CMBS, if modelled, that would translate into a real degradation of Russia's ability to kill hard threats. This is just one example, they're coming so hard and fast that it's dizzying. 
Ultimately, to declare all these issues as "operational" is hand-waving away real criticism. Having a ****ty plan conducted hastily doesn't ultimately speak to things like "do Russians have peer equipment" or "can a Russian motor rifleman actually conduct a reaction to fire and have faith in his NCO." These are systemic issues, as I said, and that does ultimately have visible knock-on effects in the tactical plane. 
At this rate, the SF2s Syrian OPFOR is better - and again, you can indeed help it. Crank those numbers down in future battlepacks - still time to change the incoming campaigns and standalones ;).

But they also have poor quality armour and manufacturing failures modelled. Much more in the vein of "provide the Russians with poor/previous gen sabots" than your example, I would think. 

You can be an American and care about both - in this case especially the fact that Russia has been acting like a criminal country for ever and ever. 
And, before you ask - US Army Vet, served in Iraq as a medic 04/05, saw plenty of death and suffering while I was there.