Bulletpoint

Because we (the ones in charge at least) don't really want Ukraine to win, at least not too much and too fast. So we are going to continue to drip-feed supplies little by little, just enough to keep them fighting.

Because we (the ones in charge at least) don't really want Ukraine to win, at least not too much and too fast. So we are going to continue to drip-feed supplies little by little, just enough to keep them fighting.

Just to clarify, I definitely think it would be possible to use a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons to vapourise a section of the front big enough to drive through, but I do not think it would be viable for the current Russian Army to then exploit that breakthrough in any meaningful way. And I do not think Putin is desperate.

"This does not mean that such an assault is impossible. It simply means that it would require weapons on the battlefield we have yet to see. In my opinion, the only weapons that Russia has which could achieve this in this time frame would be a tactical nuclear weapon or some sort of chemical or biological attack".
Funny how a guy who specialises in chemical and biological weapons predicts an attack by chemical or biological weapons. When you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
I think he's either a Cold War fossil who is unable to realise that the world has changed since he was in the army in the 1980s, or maybe he's paid or instructed by someone to play scaremonger in order to put pressure on the Western public and politicians to provide more aid to Ukraine. Because his scenario seems to make no sense to me.
His piece seems to rest on the assumption that just because some ultra-nationalists in Moscow want a grand offensive, Putin somehow has to deliver that. But Putin doesn't need to take the whole of Ukraine to declare victory. He just has to keep what he has taken.
Also, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon seems to think that you could just use a couple of tactical nukes to "blow a hole" in the front line and then "exploit by mechanised formations". That's Cold War stuff and not how it works now in an age of ATGMs and drones everywhere. You don't just pop a small hole in the front and then race to Kyiv. Especially not now that Russia's mechanised formations have been ground down.
If Putin wanted to use nukes, he would have to nuke the entire front line, burning up most of the Ukrainian Army. And even then, those Russian columns would get mauled by Nato conventional airstrikes inside Ukraine within a couple of days. And then what?

"This does not mean that such an assault is impossible. It simply means that it would require weapons on the battlefield we have yet to see. In my opinion, the only weapons that Russia has which could achieve this in this time frame would be a tactical nuclear weapon or some sort of chemical or biological attack".
Funny how a guy who specialises in chemical and biological weapons predicts an attack by chemical or biological weapons. When you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
I think he's either a Cold War fossil who is unable to realise that the world has changed since he was in the army in the 1980s, or maybe he's paid or instructed by someone to play scaremonger in order to put pressure on the Western public and politicians to provide more aid to Ukraine. Because his scenario seems to make no sense to me.
His piece seems to rest on the assumption that just because some ultra-nationalists in Moscow want a grand offensive, Putin somehow has to deliver that. But Putin doesn't need to take the whole of Ukraine to declare victory. He just has to keep what he has taken.
Also, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon seems to think that you could just use a couple of tactical nukes to "blow a hole" in the front line and then "exploit by mechanised formations". That's Cold War stuff and not how it works now in an age of ATGMs and drones everywhere. You don't just pop a small hole in the front and then race to Kyiv. Especially not now that Russia's mechanised formations have been ground down.
If Putin wanted to use nukes, he would have to nuke the entire front line, burning up most of the Ukrainian Army. And even then, those Russian columns would get mauled by Nato conventional airstrikes inside Ukraine within a couple of days. And then what?

By now, we all began thinking FPV drones are amazingly powerful weapons, and yes, against vehicles, they do seem to be making a big impact. But how many casualties do they actually cause against infantry?
Every day, there are about 7-10 new videos of drone attacks killing infantry on both sides - many more videos from the Ukrainian POV though. But since these attacks due to their nature are pretty much always filmed, what if those 7-10 videos are pretty much the whole story of all succesful drone attacks that day?
In that case, "only" maybe 20-30 casualties are caused by drone attacks. Bad if you're on the receiving end, but not a lot compared to the hundreds of thousands of troops killed in this war by all kinds of weapons.
So what I'm trying to get at here is that our perception of drones as game-changing weapons might be skewed by a strong selection bias.
Anyone here saw some credible estimates of the scale of casulties caused by drones (FPV kamikaze + grenade drops) compared to other weapons?
How many drone attacks fail and therefore never get shown?
 

Just to clarify, I definitely think it would be possible to use a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons to vapourise a section of the front big enough to drive through, but I do not think it would be viable for the current Russian Army to then exploit that breakthrough in any meaningful way. And I do not think Putin is desperate.

Just to clarify, I definitely think it would be possible to use a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons to vapourise a section of the front big enough to drive through, but I do not think it would be viable for the current Russian Army to then exploit that breakthrough in any meaningful way. And I do not think Putin is desperate.

Just to clarify, I definitely think it would be possible to use a limited number of tactical nuclear weapons to vapourise a section of the front big enough to drive through, but I do not think it would be viable for the current Russian Army to then exploit that breakthrough in any meaningful way. And I do not think Putin is desperate.

I completely agree, and I'm not German.

I guess you did an actual poll, market research or similar about that?
So maybe this works with a mostly US based audience. For me personally Downfall and also to a lesser degree Fire & Rubble feels like the Allies get an extension of timeline so they can play around with their shiney toys. But that really feels like the only reason for me because contrary to, say, the Bulge, historically the whole fighting by that point was totally pointless. And tactically I don't see what it reall adds.
This is very subjective on my side and it may be because I'm German. Don't get me wrong, this is not about me being butthurt here.
I'd much rather see France 1940, not because Germany won this time but because it would add so many new tactical challenges (armor and gun wise inferior German tanks but with better mobility for example, instead of unicorn tanks for late war battles).

While I don't doubt that Russian conditions are appalling as described, I do want to point out that anything from Radio Free Europe(or Radio Free Asia, for that matter) should be taken with a grain of salt and independently corroborated. It's literally government media, CIA if I'm not mistaken.

I know all that.
What I'm saying is: Are the uploaded FPV / grenade drop videos just a few examples of many more such succesful attacks? Are several hundred troops on both sides really killed by drones each day? Or are the uploaded videos pretty much all there is?
In the latter case, the real drone casualty numbers would be just 10-20 a day. Nothing war changing.
Drones still have a big impact against vehicles and supply depots, and as artillery spotters, but that's a different thing.
My question is about the direct attacks on infantry. I am starting to think they are a bit like WW2 strafing runs. Scary, they do kill a few people, big impact on morale, but not really a factor in winning or losing the war.

By now, we all began thinking FPV drones are amazingly powerful weapons, and yes, against vehicles, they do seem to be making a big impact. But how many casualties do they actually cause against infantry?
Every day, there are about 7-10 new videos of drone attacks killing infantry on both sides - many more videos from the Ukrainian POV though. But since these attacks due to their nature are pretty much always filmed, what if those 7-10 videos are pretty much the whole story of all succesful drone attacks that day?
In that case, "only" maybe 20-30 casualties are caused by drone attacks. Bad if you're on the receiving end, but not a lot compared to the hundreds of thousands of troops killed in this war by all kinds of weapons.
So what I'm trying to get at here is that our perception of drones as game-changing weapons might be skewed by a strong selection bias.
Anyone here saw some credible estimates of the scale of casulties caused by drones (FPV kamikaze + grenade drops) compared to other weapons?
How many drone attacks fail and therefore never get shown?
 

By now, we all began thinking FPV drones are amazingly powerful weapons, and yes, against vehicles, they do seem to be making a big impact. But how many casualties do they actually cause against infantry?
Every day, there are about 7-10 new videos of drone attacks killing infantry on both sides - many more videos from the Ukrainian POV though. But since these attacks due to their nature are pretty much always filmed, what if those 7-10 videos are pretty much the whole story of all succesful drone attacks that day?
In that case, "only" maybe 20-30 casualties are caused by drone attacks. Bad if you're on the receiving end, but not a lot compared to the hundreds of thousands of troops killed in this war by all kinds of weapons.
So what I'm trying to get at here is that our perception of drones as game-changing weapons might be skewed by a strong selection bias.
Anyone here saw some credible estimates of the scale of casulties caused by drones (FPV kamikaze + grenade drops) compared to other weapons?
How many drone attacks fail and therefore never get shown?
 

By now, we all began thinking FPV drones are amazingly powerful weapons, and yes, against vehicles, they do seem to be making a big impact. But how many casualties do they actually cause against infantry?
Every day, there are about 7-10 new videos of drone attacks killing infantry on both sides - many more videos from the Ukrainian POV though. But since these attacks due to their nature are pretty much always filmed, what if those 7-10 videos are pretty much the whole story of all succesful drone attacks that day?
In that case, "only" maybe 20-30 casualties are caused by drone attacks. Bad if you're on the receiving end, but not a lot compared to the hundreds of thousands of troops killed in this war by all kinds of weapons.
So what I'm trying to get at here is that our perception of drones as game-changing weapons might be skewed by a strong selection bias.
Anyone here saw some credible estimates of the scale of casulties caused by drones (FPV kamikaze + grenade drops) compared to other weapons?
How many drone attacks fail and therefore never get shown?
 

If the last couple of years are anything to go by, the bones for 2024 will be very similar to the ones for 2023, which themselves were basically the ones for 2022.

Nice preview !  Thanks for getting CM games alive through the years ! My wishes :
1) don'n use to much acronysmes: what means "CMCW-BAOR" or "CMFB"  ?   I know it, but think to beginners... 
2) a REAL dream:  release "CMBK"  = Combat Mission BlitzKrieg. 1939-40 Poland, Belgium, France campaigns !  wow, what a dream, what a potential for battlepack, new tactics, upgrades, ...   Good stuff means good money, I'm pretty sure you'll get a lot of customers for that ! 

The comments about terrain are way over generalized as is the concept of battles in the Pacific and Korea.  Korea is mostly hilly open terrain, with a few areas of dense forests.  Korea was all about hills, rivers, and urban fighting.  The Pacific as a combat theater had a lot of non-jungle combat.  In fact, some of the largest US Army urban battles of WW2 were fought in more urban environments around Manila.  A large number of the island battles for the USMC were not in densely forested jungles.  The British fought large battles in Burma in urban and built up areas.  The Hurtgen forest and the Ardennes can be handled in CM so I would imagine it could handle jungles in a similar more abstracted fashion.
If we could just combine units from Downfall with Red Thunder, you could do the majority of Korean battles today.

https://www.technology.org/2023/01/05/how-much-do-155-mm-artillery-rounds-cost-now-and-how-many-are-fired-in-ukraine/
 
This short article calculated that an average "normal' 155 mm artillery round costs about 3300 Euro's. (3600 $)
And on average Ukraine fires about 4000 - 7000 of these per DAY(!) and the Russians about 20.000 per DAY(!). And that is just 155 mm shells.
(And one Excalibur-round costs about 103.000 Euro's (110.000 $).
 
Nothing new for most of our Forummembers, I reckon, but I did some math in order to have a better look at the ridiculous magnitude of the cost of war. (I am one of those simpletons that frequently asks himself if it wouldn't be much better if we used war-money for let's say climate-control.)
So.. in order to be sure not to exaggerate I use an average total number of 5.000 shells per day from the Ukrainians and 15.000 rounds from the Russians. That's 20.000 155mm rounds fired EVERY day, but let's say 300 days usage in stead of 365 in a year.
One round is 3300 euro's x 20.000 = 66.000.000 euro's per day.
66.000.000 x 300 days =19.800.000.000 euro's per year. (Had to check and double-check, because it blew my mind, couldn't believe it.) 1/4 is for Ukraine to pay, 3/4 for Russia.
But this is only the cost of 155 mm artillery-shells.
Not one 155mm gun, not one riflebullet, not one gallon of gas, not one drone, not one uniform, not one vehicle, not one bandage and well, you get the drift. I knew that a "cheap" missile is 20.000 euro's, that one Javelinlauncher costs more than 100.000 dollars and so on and so forth, but I never understood the bigger picture until this little 155mm round calculation. The cost of war is incomprehensible.
Now I understand the endless asking, pleading, bargaining and begging for support from Zelensky. He must.
 

On the topic of mobilization and Ukrainian civil society. 
 

This really minds me of the Father Ted episode when Ted is seen (mistakingly) doing a Hitler impression…

I couldn't help but imagine this as an episode of "Keeping up Appearances"

I couldn't help but imagine this as an episode of "Keeping up Appearances"

Worse than that George, at a comedy night in our village, the comedian asked if anyone had any Nazi books (whatever they are) and my wife shouted out that I did, based on such classics as Panzers in Normandy and The Battle of the Bulge Then and Now. 
I am now the 'Nazi in the village' 😂.
More oddly, I was approached afterwards by a lady I knew, who offered me a copy of Mein Kampf.  I refused, saying it is not a good read 🤪.