BletchleyGeek

Great news! The bomb shelter under Drama Theater in Mariupol survived the hit of 500 kg bomb. Now the rubbles removing have started to reach the entrance of shelter. There is still unknow about possible casualties among people which were inside the buiding and out of shelter. 

one in which the moon is actually made of cheese.

In what world would a website called "anti 5g" be a remotely credible source.

LOL.   Really.   Pick your preferred answer from NATO, Soloviev.
1.  You mad, bro?  You mad?
2.  Come at me, bro!
3.  You cheeky monkey.  

I'm actually Chinese, and my observation of Chinese netizens' reaction is actually very much the opposite.  The great majority of ordinary Chinese citizens seem to buy into Russia's propaganda (b/c that's what they are fed on Chinese media) and many are very pro-Putin.  They lay the blame at Ukraine and the West's doorstep, and feel that Russia is helping China by checking the West's expansionism and disrupting their containment of China's own rise.  The strong nationalist sentiment that Xi Jinping has been cultivating through propaganda and autocratic leadership is very worrying...

So reference my long post on pauses and initiative…a lot of chatter of Ukr going on the offensive.  It will interesting to see what happens at negotiating table.

And that's Tiananmen Square level material (if real, ofc).

Heard this multiple times here and elsewhere so I think it is time for us to have a Pause talk.  We pretty much know the Russians have pretty much halted operational level offensives and are stalled, that is all over the place and even mainstream media has picked it up.  So the theories on what is happening to the Russian forces now are roughly assembling around 3 possibilities:
- Stopped, cannot start so digging in for a long haul, which will see broad operational defensive operations with limited tactical offensive actions designed to terrorize the population.
- Stopped, will never re-start and are heading towards total collapse.
- Stopped, conducting an operational pause to consolidate/re-org before re-starting the massive offensive to surround major cities and begin the Russian Grind strategy. 
I am going to leave off the first two and focus on that third one.  A military war machine is a really big system built in layers, we do this for both C2/span of control and sustainment reasons.  Normally a modern military will lay itself out in echelons of some shape or size in depth, the Soviets had a really organized system for this, the Wests was a bit more fluid but we all are set up to fight in what are essentially structures waves since the Roman legions (somebody google the opening of the HBO Rome series and you can see it in action).
For arguments sake let's go with the rule of three and say the Russians are setup in three tactical layers (the West kind of does it as well with "2 up, 1 back and the last one as "Reserve", bit more of a pyramid scheme).  The first tactical layer will be given main objectives and then some stretch ones, unless they are using mission-command then it gets a bit more opportunistic, but the concept is the same; whistle blows first wave into the breach. 
That echelon/wave is expected to be able to fight for a certain period of time based on a lot of factors like attrition, distance, logistical consumption; however, the old rule is that in human based systems you can get about 72-96 hours of action (i.e. little to no sleep) before people start to break down ("beware the 5th day" by Moltke (I think)).  So that first wave can theoretically do up to 4 days of intense action before it needs to be relieved by the second wave.  This can change based on conditions but it is important to understand that it can get shorter but not longer because we are still fighting with human beings as the basis of the system.  So no matter how tough the guys might think they are, or how many chin ups they can do, after 4 days without sleep their brains start to shut down (trust me, been there and done it).
Then the second wave is supposed to conduct some sort of passage of lines and process continues for another 72-96, and then the third wave (if you have one).  While the second and third are doing their thing the first wave is supposed to be going through a tactical consolidation which include resupply/reinforcements/replacements and reorganization.  This is also when things like vehicle and weapons systems maintenance happens because vehicles will break down like people.
Now that whole system, which for arguments sake we can call the "operational system" is designed to be able to keep this up for weeks to months.  However after a certain amount of time all the losses and wear & tear start to add up and you need...wait for it...an operational pause.  [Aside: eventually, all these operational pauses add up and you see a strategic pause but that can take much longer].  This pause is basically an entire system overhaul to do all sorts of things that look like refitting a ship.  Replacements, rotations and re-organization of tactical units.  Planning and boring stuff like orders.  A lot of logistical and ISR scene setting for the next phase, and lastly...don't let your opponent know you are doing an operational pause until it is over.  So you will still see tactical action such as feints, tactical offensives but with short small gains - more jabs than actual punches - are often employed to try and make it hard for an opponent to figure out that you are in fact pausing...why?  We will come back to that.
Ok, so how does that apply to the current situation.  Let's accept that this is an operational pause for a moment and the big nasty Russian Bear is just cleaning the blood out of its fur before going back to ravaging Ukrainian bunnies.  Well first off it was not a planned pause, it happened too quickly.  Based on the big maps and overall tempo, it appears like the Russians were really advancing hard for the first 3-4 days.  We did see a likely echelon flip on the next 3-4 days as they pushed depth forward but by about day 10 of this thing everyone was starting to notice that the big red blotches on the map had stopped moving.  So let's give the Russian the benefit of the doubt and say they actually managed to use all three echelons effectively, well what likely did not happen was that 1st wave reloaded while waves 2 and 3 continued.  Remember formations are designed to be able to do this for weeks and out to months if the situation allows. So having the whole operational system come to a stop in 10 days is a very good indication that this was not in the plan.
10 days into this war was 5 March, a week and half ago.  Even the most uninformed journalist (and here I cast a baleful eye at our own CBC because it is harder to find a more uninformed bunch when it comes to warfare) is getting the drift that the Russians are not moving.  Now remember when I said "don't let your opponent know you are pausing"?  The reason for this is that you do not what them to try and grab the operational initiative, it is bad if they do because you are now on the defensive pretty much by definition.  Now if you plan for this, you can do all sorts of clever things like pull you opponent into over reaching etc, not sure I see a masterful design on the Russian side here.  But the UA has shown more offensive actions and c-attacks.  We have all been talking about a big UA operational strike, not sure if it will happen but the Russians are leaving the door open to one because of this pregnant operational pause. 
So to summarize, the Russian operational pause: 1) came much earlier than it should have, why?, 2) has lasted the length of an Old Testament reading in modern warfare timelines, and 3) is handing initiative over to their opponent.
So what?  Well if this is a Russian operational pause (at this rate, and with rumors of those other 40 BTGs it could be strategic) it is not a good one.  The conditions that led to that are very likely really poor pre-planning, ample evidence of that, and systemic failures that happened very quickly.  This speaks to a brittle operational system that they are having to almost re-tool from the ground up.  I have serious doubts that the Russians, who have lost some of their best troops, can come out of this as a new "super-force" able to mass joint effects and cut through the UA in days.  The types of planning and quality organization/preparations, from logistics to C4ISR, that a military force needs to do in order to pull off what the Russians are attempting takes years to prepare and build.
So if this is an operational pause, it is probably a master class in "how not to do this" and I doubt it will solve much for the Russian forces who are now coming up on two weeks of time they have given their opponent to prepare, supply and continue to hit them as they are pausing.

This reminds me the PBEM games in WITP AE (War in the Pacific - Admiral's Edition), as IJN , you got to put USN's fleet oiler (AO) as high priority target at the early stage of the war. As USN, IJN's AO is always a high priority target from the day 1 to day 1000. 
100 fuel truck is a remarkable achievement if it is true. that is 1.25 of the Russian MTO brigade's tanker fleet.  It's going to really hurt, considering many of the Russian troops are >150km-200km ahead of their railhead / Army's main supply depot. under such circumstances, even assume a full strength , prefect condition MTO brigade is running the delivery 24/7,  they can barely make enough fuel delivery for one third of  Army's BTG to be operational.  

'Wali' is not a PMC nor a mercenary.  He left his computer programming job, a wife and a son about to turn one to go over to help the Ukrainian people.  He is a person with a conscience and the need to do something.  I get that because I wanted to volunteer myself but my age and my health are against that.  
Please don't infer that he and people like him are 'serial killers'   

and now we have Patch grogs...  I love this place 😝

I think the major problem is trying to find objective observations.  The Ukrainians are going to be skewed but I also give the steady stream of "broken Russians" on social as more valid because it is in their best interest to push out real untainted data right now.  Any mis/dis information coming from Ukraine is counter-productive and erodes the high ground they hold in the information war.  That, and to try and invent or doctor that many videos and photos, and not get caught out is a massive undertaking.  In short, the Ukrainians don't want to lie, nor does it look like they have to at this point.
Russia on the other had has been lying continuously both to its own people and the world, so trying to find valid data from that end is very hard.  Russia's best play is also the one they cannot exercise because of the box they have built - the truth.  If Russia came out and said, "yep Oryx is correct we have been taking it in the teeth but here is our honest Ukrainian data, undistorted evidence of large Ukrainian losses" then one could start to balance the picture.  However, Russia is not going to do that because it has already been lying to its own people.  
In the middle we have some open source sites that are trying to report on only what they see.  I can only go on what we know for sure:
- Russian lines have not really moved in almost 2 weeks, a few thin advances are not success.
- Open source evidence of Russian losses and the nature of those losses signal 1) the Russians are in the hurt and 2) the Ukrainians are putting on that hurt.
- Russian negotiation position has started to slide.  It went from "Steel Russian Bear will eat you and poop you out into better Ukraine/mini-Russia" to "Hey guys, let us keep Crimea and Donbas and stay out of NATO we will call it even".  By next week it will be "Ok, how about we just keep pre-conflict lines/status quo and you stay out of NATO, maybe "in a few more weeks it will be "Ok, just let us walk out without killing us all".
- As predicted, Russia calling out to China for help.  I mean seriously, we all saw it coming but this is crazy based on their history.
Beyond that, I guess all we can do is be aware of our own biases and be ready to be wrong.

Personally, I think this thread is one of the better places processing information.
Artist twitter/socialmedia is filled with people with bad takes, people ignoring the situation, or people screaming about WW3 and we're all going to die.  My favorite however, is people begging for the sanctions to be lifted, because pretty much every Russian contract artist is now out of a job. which is very pitiable until those same people then start screaming about how this is NATOs fault (most of these people don't know what NATO is) and going on about biolabs or whatever this weeks excuse for the invasion Russia has cooked up. 

So this is important, why are the Russians leaving high value assets in fields?  A few possibilities:
- Breakdown in logistical system - most likely cause given the wide spread reporting of fuel/supply shortages,  It would stand to reason that recovery assets are also no where to be found if the Russian logistical system is in trouble.
- The Russians think the CoGs are something else and logistics/mobility are not on their priority lists.  Or they are moving to another plan that does not include them.  I am at a loss for what that would look like beyond a total abandoning of offensive, or all operations for that matter. 
- They are being forced to as a result of UKR rear-area actions.  This means the backfield is not secure for the Russian LOCs, at least in these areas. 
- Completely broken C2.  Perhaps those assets just got lost or were left out of contact with higher.  Worse Russian C2 might not even know they have lost these assets in this case.  Morale plays a factor here as well.
Regardless, we have seen a few people ask "how do you know it is going bad for Russia?" "are we in an anti-Russian echo chamber".  Well maybe but none of those possibilities above are very good for the Russians at all, and all signs of things that should not be happening as widely as they are.  I would even be less concerned if we saw AVLBs blown up, that is bad but this is a dangerous business.  Simply abandoning them, in many cases without destroying them first, is a sign of a much deeper breakdown in the Russian system...and we are seeing it almost everywhere.  
And with every day, I am growing less and less convinced the Russians can recover to the point that they can wage effective offensive operations against an opponent who has had more and more time to prepare.

Yes you brainwashed NATO imperialist fool ... 😉 I'll let that one stand for the sake of harmony but the targeting issue that you raise is certainly one that merits discussion.
Starting simplistically and I know I'm preaching to the converted so this is for the wider caucus - targeting, when done properly, should attack the centre of gravity which doctrinally is the thing from which the enemy derives strength.  It can be targeted directly or indirectly by stripping away key capabilities.  Personally I dislike the methodologies used to analyze this that are found in many Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace pamphlets and Military Decision Making Process pamphlets so my analysis is not according to the accepted templates but informed by the fact that I am a qualified targeteer.
Taking our contested 😉 AVLB as an example, it is only going to be candidate for the HPTL, JPTL if the enemy needs to cross a gap or lots of gaps to get from where they are to where they need to go.  This then set me thinking as to what the HPTL/JPTL for the Ukrainians might look like now for the battles around Kiev.  This 'operational pause' which seems to be marked by the Russians stonking the city leads me to an HPTL with artillery at the top, followed by fuel associated logistics then artillery associated logistics with HQs bringing up the rear.  Mind you I'm not dying in a ditch over it, the logs could actually be right at the top.  Going back to centres of gravity and key capabilities, it seems that the Russians are now favouring the employment of artillery in order to shape the subsequent assault by manoeuvre assets on the city by attrition.  By stripping away the guns and their ammunition you are denying that shape effect.  By attacking fuel-related logistics you limit the freedom of action of the manoeuvre assets and cause general headaches all round for the whole force and by targeting HQs you are disrupting the ability of the Russians to come up with a 'Plan B' as well as all the other coordination stuff that goes on in HQs - albeit this has been fairly lacking to date without too much outside interference ... hence why I put HQs further down the list.

Better news on the nuclear power plant front. Power is restored to Chernobyl. IAEA's biggest concern seems to be the overworked and isolated staff, with some maintenance being neglected. On the good side, safeguards information is being sent to the IAEA from everywhere except Chernobyl (again, a reminder that the safeguards being mentioned here are not reactor operation but concerned with the safeguarding of nuclear materials from illicit diversion)
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-20-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
Dave

Incredible combat footage from inside a BTR-4. Close range street fighting against T-72 ? and BMP-1 + dismounts in Mariupol with autocannon.

Ok so let's break this down then.
A. I know there are systems out there in development but hitting a small fast moving missile is incredibly hard and the next gen of smart AT systems will likely include stealth/spoofing, top-down EFP and PGM DPICM artillery.  This will likely continue to counter/counter-counter systems race that has in reality been going on for decades.  Problem is that explosive technology and miniaturization or on the side of the attacker and not the defender because the defender is attached to 70 tons of metal.  There also becomes a return on investment issue  as it will become so costly to keep a tank alive, one has to ask what the point of doing it becomes.  They basically become land ships that are impossible to hide and draw more fire than they are worth.
B.  Sure...obviously.  But again very hard to do as missile systems become cheaper and smaller.  We could not keep AT out of the hands of the Taliban, let alone the next crunch we get into where now China and Russia are supplying the next-gen ATGMs to our adversaries.
C.  Every western military has identified UAV as a major issue in the coming years.  The idea that we can sweep them from the skies is not realistic.  Particularly when we could be seeing hybrid UGV/UAV systems.  All military grade systems are going to be shielded from EMP/EW, or fully autonomous so the link between pilot and system need only be occasional (enter ethical issues but this will be a race to the bottom).  Wishing away UVs of all shapes and sizes with some sort of magic gun is right next to wishing away machine guns.  We will need to learn to live with them and exploit their strengths better than an opponent.
D.  Disagree.  What proof is there that connected light infantry need civilian populations to work?  That is how it is working in Ukraine but so what?  We have had light infantry operating all over the world without civilian support, we call them SOF. Western militaries are investing a lot into field networks so keeping small light groups linked in a hostile environment is already on the menu.  I think the questions are "how much and where?"
E.  Kinda runs counter to point C but I didn't think that one was accurate anyway.  This is not what we are seeing in Ukraine right now.  The basic reality is that light is still a thing because 1) it is fast to project, 2) it can go places mech cannot and 3) it is harder to find because it is not riding on thousands of tons of steel.  It main weakness was low payloads which restricted lethality and sustainment when separated, and survivability once it did get found (again offset by dispersion).   Lights ability to disperse and swarm could increase its survivability versus heavier forces in a totally illuminated battlefield whereas heavy is a relatively slow moving, very visible target.
The reality is that this is not going to happen over night but these are questions that need some serious re-think and we cannot box them up nicely in "well sure Ukraine but..."  Some of this has been a long time coming, we had the most powerful mechanized forces in the world and they largely proved less than decisive for the last 20 years in the unconventional fights we have been engaged in.  Now we are seeing a hybrid/conventional war and there are some weird things happening here too.  I have already heard army types going "ah ha, at last a real war, see we need tanks".  Then as I look at the list of Russian tank losses and the real lack of ground gained, I have to wonder if this is all "dumb Russians" or something else is not going on.  

Some folks figured out that you can get a reasonably good idea of military activity in Ukraine using NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System
On the thread a link is provided to the NASA web app, so you guys can take a look too.
 

I have decided to quit my job in order to devote myself full-time to reading this thread.

Great video showing the remote (25m?) location of the launcher vs. the control unit.

I didn't know The Guardian is now ran by our DoD.
How about checking actual official source?
https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2022/03/10/vtrati-rosijskih-okupantiv-stanovlyat-ponad-12-000-osib-znishheno-majzhe-2400-odinicz-vorozhogo-ozbroennya-i-vijskovoi-tehniki-–-generalnij-shtab-zs-ukraini/
Втрата translates to loss, not 'death'
Our DoD doesn't calculate dead or wounded because that's impossible. But press is uneducated in milspeak.
So again, check actual sources
 

Definitely fuzzy pictures but I am getting more confident by the day on some things:
- Russian forces have stalled operationally.  Will they get it back? Dunno
- Operational pre-conditions were not met in air, info or logistics.  Russians are likely trying for some of these but have little to show for it so far. 
- By all metrics and analysis the Russians have lost a significant amount of men and material.  Further the nature of those losses point to system failures in the Russian C2 and logistical system.
- The Ukrainians have exploited all three of those points above and continue to a level that is starting to lead to some questioning some of our fundamental theories of how war is supposed to work.  Early days but we will see.
A lot of these observations are not based, at least on my end, on what I am seeing through the heavily filtered lenses, it is what I am not seeing.  Or still seeing that should not be there.  These negatives tell as much as the positives on social media.

One more photo of more tall Serpent Ramparts in Bilohorodka area or some southern, which can be obstacle for enemy vehicles

Lotta lessons no doubt, but at the tactical level the one I am watching for is "are highly mobile and connected light infantry upscaling and able to effectively stop heavy mech through a combination of speed, range, lethality and self-synchronization?", has "Deep Battle" become "360 Battle" in conventional warfare?
For the historians in the group, one of the last times this happened the Mongols took over most of the known planet...so there is that.