Maciej Zwolinski

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

And on the Russian side, some (barely) mobile barns accompanied by bikers. Proper Mad Max style.

And on the Russian side, some (barely) mobile barns accompanied by bikers. Proper Mad Max style.

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

This sounds about right.  The reality though is that this is a poor strategy in many ways.  This is betting a lot on a single highly chaotic horse.  Not only does a Trump admin need to sign off on forcing Ukraine into a disadvantaged peace, it needs to begin renormalization with Russia under a Putin regime - this may or may not happen.  And even if it does, the EU still gets a vote.  The EU has already pulled away from Russian energy (at least directly) and no western company is going to be eager to jump back into Russia after watching what happened to companies stuck holding the bag back in ‘22.  And forget about loans to Russia from the West, or possibly anyone else for that matter.
So Russia’s military and economy are seriously degraded from ‘22 levels and they may very well remain isolated. That is not a good start point for planning a second invasion in 4-8 years.  An invasion would need to be after Trump leaves office otherwise Putin risks making him look like a weak chump who got duped, and Putin definitely does not want to do that.  So Russia winds up in an overall weaker and more vulnerable position post-war while gaining literally meters of blasted wasteland that have no real strategic significance.
This could very well be the beginning of a slow motion Russian collapse in the making…and this is Putin’s best scenario.  In reality Russia and Putin are the ones running out of time.  Most assessments put a 2026 best before date for Russia before things start to really fall apart.  So what happens if Biden wins?  What happens if Trump decides he can make a better deal elsewhere?  Basically this reduces Russian option spaces down to a singularity, which historically is never a good thing.

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

Lifting of these restrictions, while in themselves eggregious examples of political stupidity and well deserving to be scrapped ASAP, is not going to help much. The Ukraine is now waging a very conventional war (possibly paradigm-shattering drones excepted, but we are not there yet) with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army. It will not create a strategic bombing campaign via drones and ATACMS able to destroy Russian warmaking capability. This is an expensive way to wage war, and UKR will not get the funding for this. 
What they need is very simple, but they need a lot of it with guaranteed delivery without limitation in time. Artillery munitions (they cannot manufacture locally); SAM munitions;  funding for drone production, better still outsourcing the production itself to  the sanctuary countries (PL, Romania; in the future maybe Slovakia again); SPGs; HIMARS or equivalents; long- and mid-range SAM's; ECM/ECCM land-based equipment; ATACMS; some tanks, in numbers to replace losses; IFVs, in higher numbers than tanks; APCs more than tanks and IFVs; some ATGMs; small arms munitions; trucks and logistic vehicles; finally (and I have been convinced of this by the recent Russian successes with glide bombs) some fighter aircraft, with the understanding that they will all be shot down at some point. Also, the UKR need to have their stuff in order and find a way of mobilising soldiers for war, Zelenski's chances for reelection be damned.
The only theory of victory in this war that I can see is exactly the same as could be formulated in every conventional war  with a very big country capable of sustaining a big army, provided that the war has not been resolved via a France 1940 type offensive or a Nomonhan 1939 type counteroffensive in the first months: invest all resources you can and try to hang on in the war longer than the other guy, while always keeping an eye out for a potential technical paradigm shattering solution (Project Manhattan) or a potential opportunity to asymmetrically hamstring his economy (ref. bombing of ball bearing and synthetic fuel factories 1944).
Or, as the Duke of Wellington put it: "Hard pounding this, gentlemen. Let's see who pounds the longest"

If the FPV AT drones work, then the ATGM videos are going to be replaced mostly by FPV attack videos, basically for 2 reasons.
First, FPV drone is a non-LOS weapon and can engage significantly earlier than ATGMs, which in the ZSU are  of the LOS only variety. Before the vinea tanks (d)evolved, many videos were precisely about mechanised attacks being defeated during the approach march and Russians running away before they tanks could even engage. In all those cases there was neither need or opportunity for the Ukrainians to shoot ATGMs.
Second, all FPV attacks are coupled with a video feed ready to be saved and posted on Youtube if the operator wants to. In the case of ATGMs a separate camera (usually from a drone) needs to be used, not guaranteed.
BTW the comment under "First" shows in what way the vinea tanks are in my view useful and what they limitations are. They do seem to be good to the extent they are able to prevent/limit the loss of tanks from FPV drones on the approach march. Thus they are able to cross that zone, in which the normal tanks were extremely vulnerable while not being  able to engage themselves. However, when they actually attain the LOS to the enemy, they should be able to start firing, suppress the ATGM defense in the LOS fight and then start suppressing the antipersonnel weapons, whereupon the assault could start- and there is where the vinea construction becomes a huge liability. With their angle of fire worse than an Mk I Male of 1917, they are not likely to suppress AT defence and shoot the infantry in. So while this contraption allows the tanks to reach the battlefield in a safer way, it makes them almost useless once they get there - at the end of the day it does not help Russians in any meaningful way. That's my view of this.