Maciej Zwolinski

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

Provided that 1) the political decision to supply the Ukraine is still in force (if I am getting too optimistic about this, I remind myself of the time, when the US Wilson's administration was fundamental in setting up the League of Nations and then the next administration declined to join); 2) the Ukrainians themselves do not throw in the towel. 
In broadest of terms, the Russians have at least 3 ways to win this war: (1) political victory in the US; (2) political victory in Europe; (3) military victory in the Ukraine (UKR morale collapse & suing for peace included here, as it would be a consequence of military losses most likely). They will be working hard on all these fields simultaneously.

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

I am deeply dismayed that the US is not currently organising a round-the-clock airlift delivering CIA agents from all bull**** posts in the US and worldwide directly to Georgia and Armenia. Hell, Special Forces too. This is a golden opportunity to open a second front, such as the Russians were doing all over Africa and Middle East (I am firmly convinced that Hamas attacks in October 2023 were inspired by Russians). A lot of Georgians are actually up for it, I don't think the pro Russian party is that overwhelmingly strong.
In particular, Russia has a ready reserve pool of hundreds of thousands of people employed in their various security forces and even regular army units stationed in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. They can redirect them to the army in the Ukraine basically at will. Except if those security units are actually engaged where they are currently stationed in actual security tasks....

Królewiec is a huge military base. The ratio of soldiers and sailors to civilian population alone discourages any serious idea of an independence movement. Also, such movement would have no national or historical roots - practically no one living there nowadays had any antecedents in the area during the Prussian reign.I am afraid that if there is any pretense of separatist movement all its members are FSB provocators.

To avoid this mental trap it suffices to remember that the Russians will react, somehow. Their reaction will be better or worse, but they will not allow the line on the graph showing the number of remaining IFVs or artillery or ammunition to merrily continue on its current way and hit zero. They will do something to change the trajectory t e.g. by switching more to meat waves, or reducing tempo of operations, etc. The thing is, they will incur extra costs or lose opportunities by switching from their preferred action to the less preferred action.
So when thinking about what will happen next in a war one should not extrapolate the present into the future ad infinitum but try to anticipate the opponent's reaction and be prepared to explore the inefficiencies forced upon him- the sum of which is eventually going to lose him the war. At least that's the plan.
PS. This is basic stuff for any war or any opposed action, really. The mistakes like the Werhmacht General Staff thinking should not really happen. But they do happen, in particular to armies fighting the Russians. I think that Russian peacetime armies when they transition to war habitually look so incredibly and obstinately stupid, that their opponents start to believe they are permanently unable to adapt. But they do, just very slowly at the beginning. But after 2-3 years of war they hit their stride.

One reason could be if they were unable to provide support which cannot be substituted. Examples: 155 mm artillery ammunition and Patriot SAM missiles. Apparently Europe can manufacture more artillery shells than the USA but somehow it was sending to Ukraine much smaller numbers - which is evident because the absence of US support in the past 6 months soon caused a shell hunger. The Europeans could not close the gap. Assuming that the US withdraws support in January 2025 again, will European countries be able to deliver their own shells in the Americans' place in sufficient numbers?  I have no idea. The Czech deal is 152 mm ammunition scrounged from some secret place, Shangri-La or whatever. But re. delivering shells from actual domestic European production of 155 mm shells, something has been holding them up.Will that problem be overcome in the next 6 months? Again, no idea.
Re. Patriots. There does not seem to be anything comparable, S-300s ammunition is running out or has ran out, German and French systems have shorter range and will not provide equivalent coverage. F-16s or no F-16s, the  Ukrainians will not gain air superiority so they need their S-300 replacement. Can European countries get Patriots for the Ukraine somehow?
In the case of unsolvable shell hunger problem and Russians gaining the ability to bomb the entire Ukraine with reasonable impunity I can well see the European nations deciding the war is lost and good money should not be thrown after the bad.
Other than the arty shells and SAMs - which, as I described above, I think could be decisive factors - I am also wondering about the access to the US reconaissance and intelligence assets, in particular to satellites and signals intelligence. If the new president orders the heads of the CIA and the NSA to stop data sharing and all cooperation with the UKR immediately, can e.g. the UK take the same data via their NATO arrangements  and subsequently re-transfer it to the Ukraine? If not and the Ukraine actually loses access to the information it used to receive this could potentially be decisive.

To avoid this mental trap it suffices to remember that the Russians will react, somehow. Their reaction will be better or worse, but they will not allow the line on the graph showing the number of remaining IFVs or artillery or ammunition to merrily continue on its current way and hit zero. They will do something to change the trajectory t e.g. by switching more to meat waves, or reducing tempo of operations, etc. The thing is, they will incur extra costs or lose opportunities by switching from their preferred action to the less preferred action.
So when thinking about what will happen next in a war one should not extrapolate the present into the future ad infinitum but try to anticipate the opponent's reaction and be prepared to explore the inefficiencies forced upon him- the sum of which is eventually going to lose him the war. At least that's the plan.
PS. This is basic stuff for any war or any opposed action, really. The mistakes like the Werhmacht General Staff thinking should not really happen. But they do happen, in particular to armies fighting the Russians. I think that Russian peacetime armies when they transition to war habitually look so incredibly and obstinately stupid, that their opponents start to believe they are permanently unable to adapt. But they do, just very slowly at the beginning. But after 2-3 years of war they hit their stride.

One reason could be if they were unable to provide support which cannot be substituted. Examples: 155 mm artillery ammunition and Patriot SAM missiles. Apparently Europe can manufacture more artillery shells than the USA but somehow it was sending to Ukraine much smaller numbers - which is evident because the absence of US support in the past 6 months soon caused a shell hunger. The Europeans could not close the gap. Assuming that the US withdraws support in January 2025 again, will European countries be able to deliver their own shells in the Americans' place in sufficient numbers?  I have no idea. The Czech deal is 152 mm ammunition scrounged from some secret place, Shangri-La or whatever. But re. delivering shells from actual domestic European production of 155 mm shells, something has been holding them up.Will that problem be overcome in the next 6 months? Again, no idea.
Re. Patriots. There does not seem to be anything comparable, S-300s ammunition is running out or has ran out, German and French systems have shorter range and will not provide equivalent coverage. F-16s or no F-16s, the  Ukrainians will not gain air superiority so they need their S-300 replacement. Can European countries get Patriots for the Ukraine somehow?
In the case of unsolvable shell hunger problem and Russians gaining the ability to bomb the entire Ukraine with reasonable impunity I can well see the European nations deciding the war is lost and good money should not be thrown after the bad.
Other than the arty shells and SAMs - which, as I described above, I think could be decisive factors - I am also wondering about the access to the US reconaissance and intelligence assets, in particular to satellites and signals intelligence. If the new president orders the heads of the CIA and the NSA to stop data sharing and all cooperation with the UKR immediately, can e.g. the UK take the same data via their NATO arrangements  and subsequently re-transfer it to the Ukraine? If not and the Ukraine actually loses access to the information it used to receive this could potentially be decisive.

To avoid this mental trap it suffices to remember that the Russians will react, somehow. Their reaction will be better or worse, but they will not allow the line on the graph showing the number of remaining IFVs or artillery or ammunition to merrily continue on its current way and hit zero. They will do something to change the trajectory t e.g. by switching more to meat waves, or reducing tempo of operations, etc. The thing is, they will incur extra costs or lose opportunities by switching from their preferred action to the less preferred action.
So when thinking about what will happen next in a war one should not extrapolate the present into the future ad infinitum but try to anticipate the opponent's reaction and be prepared to explore the inefficiencies forced upon him- the sum of which is eventually going to lose him the war. At least that's the plan.
PS. This is basic stuff for any war or any opposed action, really. The mistakes like the Werhmacht General Staff thinking should not really happen. But they do happen, in particular to armies fighting the Russians. I think that Russian peacetime armies when they transition to war habitually look so incredibly and obstinately stupid, that their opponents start to believe they are permanently unable to adapt. But they do, just very slowly at the beginning. But after 2-3 years of war they hit their stride.

To avoid this mental trap it suffices to remember that the Russians will react, somehow. Their reaction will be better or worse, but they will not allow the line on the graph showing the number of remaining IFVs or artillery or ammunition to merrily continue on its current way and hit zero. They will do something to change the trajectory t e.g. by switching more to meat waves, or reducing tempo of operations, etc. The thing is, they will incur extra costs or lose opportunities by switching from their preferred action to the less preferred action.
So when thinking about what will happen next in a war one should not extrapolate the present into the future ad infinitum but try to anticipate the opponent's reaction and be prepared to explore the inefficiencies forced upon him- the sum of which is eventually going to lose him the war. At least that's the plan.
PS. This is basic stuff for any war or any opposed action, really. The mistakes like the Werhmacht General Staff thinking should not really happen. But they do happen, in particular to armies fighting the Russians. I think that Russian peacetime armies when they transition to war habitually look so incredibly and obstinately stupid, that their opponents start to believe they are permanently unable to adapt. But they do, just very slowly at the beginning. But after 2-3 years of war they hit their stride.

One reason could be if they were unable to provide support which cannot be substituted. Examples: 155 mm artillery ammunition and Patriot SAM missiles. Apparently Europe can manufacture more artillery shells than the USA but somehow it was sending to Ukraine much smaller numbers - which is evident because the absence of US support in the past 6 months soon caused a shell hunger. The Europeans could not close the gap. Assuming that the US withdraws support in January 2025 again, will European countries be able to deliver their own shells in the Americans' place in sufficient numbers?  I have no idea. The Czech deal is 152 mm ammunition scrounged from some secret place, Shangri-La or whatever. But re. delivering shells from actual domestic European production of 155 mm shells, something has been holding them up.Will that problem be overcome in the next 6 months? Again, no idea.
Re. Patriots. There does not seem to be anything comparable, S-300s ammunition is running out or has ran out, German and French systems have shorter range and will not provide equivalent coverage. F-16s or no F-16s, the  Ukrainians will not gain air superiority so they need their S-300 replacement. Can European countries get Patriots for the Ukraine somehow?
In the case of unsolvable shell hunger problem and Russians gaining the ability to bomb the entire Ukraine with reasonable impunity I can well see the European nations deciding the war is lost and good money should not be thrown after the bad.
Other than the arty shells and SAMs - which, as I described above, I think could be decisive factors - I am also wondering about the access to the US reconaissance and intelligence assets, in particular to satellites and signals intelligence. If the new president orders the heads of the CIA and the NSA to stop data sharing and all cooperation with the UKR immediately, can e.g. the UK take the same data via their NATO arrangements  and subsequently re-transfer it to the Ukraine? If not and the Ukraine actually loses access to the information it used to receive this could potentially be decisive.

While I'm no fan of Trump, I think he will actually end this war if he gets elected. And I think he probably will be.
It won't be a happy peace though. Just like with Afghanistan, the US pullout will leave behind a complete mess. But Trump can at least say it's not a mess paid for by US taxpayers. And I think that carries quite a lot of political weight at the moment, both in side the USA and internationally in a time when many people are losing faith in the US as a guardian of the whole western "rules based order".
In both Ukraine and the US, a stab-in-the-back story will then emerge, claiming that the war could have been won if it had not been for perfidious Trump suddenly dropping the ball. Whether that is true or not will be a subject for historians for decades.
European countries will not protest much, and will quickly change their official narrative to align with the new US position. They will however continue to invest much more in their militaries and slowly drift out of the US orbit. Americans will finally achieve their wish of having Europe pay for our own security, but it will come at the cost of a lot of the American political influence over us.
Both America and Russia will come out of the war worse than before. The US will have lost a lot of political/cultural/moral authority, whereas Russia will be more physically and economically weakened and isolated.

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

And on the Russian side, some (barely) mobile barns accompanied by bikers. Proper Mad Max style.

And on the Russian side, some (barely) mobile barns accompanied by bikers. Proper Mad Max style.

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.
 

OK, my answer to the question "what is Putin actually up to?" (which should be read with a massive dose of skepticism, as it involves making a theory of mind of man having massively more information and usually thinking in massively different way than I; i.e., a wild guess)
1. Putin thinks the war will end through Donald Trump becoming the President of the US and successfully implementing his plan to pressure Ukraine politically into armistice on the basis of status quo in early 2025.
2. Therefore, the war has a probable end date in early 2025 which is based  on external political considerations and not dependent on any actions of Ukraine or Russia. All territorial gains must occur in 2024 and on the other hand, the risk of all losses is also limited in time to 2024. Timeline after early 2025 does not matter much - Russia is not worried about NATO or the Ukraine rekindling the conflict at any reasonable time after 2024, and even if its army is generally wrecked, it thinks it will always be beenough to defend the armistice line (even provided that NATO and the UKR muster political will sufficient to even think of restarting the war). 
3. Therefore Russian army is going all in to maximise territorial gains in 2024, particularly in the Donbass area which Russia claims to be its own, but has not conquered it yet. If they are successful in Donbas or if they statemate in Donbass, they may try to do the same thing in the Zaporozhie area. They do not care about the losses, they do not care about the war materiel stocks (they know they won't be attacked) and they do not care that much about their economy either, which they think will somehow limp through the rest of 2024 anyway, and Russians will start rebuilding it in from 2025.