LuckyDog

Some good vision here of Challenger 2 on the training range.  Includes an example of one of the things that the reporter says is an issue fielding this vehicle in Ukraine when it gets bogged in a ditch.  He comments at the end re mobility and maintenance being the main problems they've been facing.
 

SA has 150 Caesars for its National Guard. Just saying... 
 
 
 

Just off the top of my head, the Marder and the BMP-1 and -2 also had the ability to dismount their ATGM launchers to use them on foot, as well as the ability of at least some Soviet ATGMs to set their launchers up away from the control units. None of those things are modelled, so I would be (pleasantly) surprised if the Swingfire becomes more advanced than any other mounted ATGM already present in the series.

Honestly don’t know guys.  We have the system on the equipment list but BFC is not going to spend months of work on a single ATGM.  My bet is that we can get it vehicle mounted but the static control unit thing might be a feature too far.  But we will have to see.

I see the rabble are getting roused.  We all appreciate the enthusiasm, we really do. As to updates, well I can echo what Steve has already said - we are aiming to have this DLC out this year.  As to progress, well data and research are largely complete (few things left but not biggies).  Maps for the major campaigns are built (I showed off a few and one was used in that CM tourney).  Campaigns are essentially designed and waiting for the kit.  Equipment lists are done, we will likely be haggling these to the finish line.
So over all scope, scale and background are all defined.  What we are waiting for now is the second longest pole in any content creation tent - artwork/modelling.  This is where stuff gets drawn and actually put into the game.  Once we get enough of that we start rolling on really putting it all together, which in the case of BAOR should be pretty quick, but we still need to do testing and polishing.  We still have a features debate - what is in or out features-wise but that will be sorted quickly.
So the short answer is “sometime this year” and we are fairly far along.  Now it is a matter of getting very few critical people’s time to deliver their end and we can then pull it al together.  No Star Citizen, conspiracy or subterfuge, only limited resources available and waiting in line.

It's a reasonably accurate article.
The later in the war, the worse the metallurgy got.
Just as long as people realize that a pretty high percentage of the Panthers and KT's manufactured in 44 had excellent armor quality.
45 was a whole 'nuther ballgame.

Don't think this has been posted earlier but the Army trying some new tech here.
Airborne soldiers do some smart shooting with new sight that helps smash drones. 
https://www.forces.net/services/army/airborne-soldiers-do-some-smart-shooting-new-sight-helps-smash-drones?fbclid=IwAR0TWthFemVVlX_5RRp79SZg4GiWN8JOPy84i4znNrwF7E1cRtwvIsFwyi4
 
 

That brilliant mastermind Putin finally succeeded in forcing Sweden into NATO.  A very stable genius!
 

I stumbled across this article about using face-hardened and RHA armour, specifically for the Panther. It seemed to align with my basic knowledge, but I wanted to pick the group's wisdom on whether the article was accurate and your thoughts on the site's quality overall. Thanks!
https://tankhistoria.com/wwii/panther-armor-quality/

Or UKRAINIAN floating objects!

Lol
 

What?  Minimal modernization? Are you serious?  They upgraded her to a submersible Missle crusier, helo platform, first of her kind!

Regarding Poland and imports from Belarussia
 
 

do you recall at all what happened in Bucha?  I mean FFS what exactly do you think is gonna happen with negotiations with Russia?  JFC people have such poor memories or just don't give a rat's a55 for reality when they have an agenda.

Capt,
Simple answers is all people want...
Make peace - Simple problem solved
Send more tanks - Simple problem solved 
Capt keep up the good work - it ain't simple...
 

Could have been worse than where we are now as Ukraine would have had to take more troops off the front line to learn and integrate an influx of equipment.
You clearly forget the discussions at the time that we needed to send soviet era kit as easily used by Ukraine.
We could not just dump modern kit into Ukraine and expect it to be used effectively.
People want easy answers. This war isn't easy and there is no magic wand. Sure we need to better upgrade Ukrainian military forces, but that ain't easy...
 

Taking the Viking as the example, it comes to roughly 1 x assault boat per vehicle (plus driver):
 https://www.utvdriver.com/yamaha/viking/
https://shop.tacticalinnovations.ca/military-series-assault-boat-140/
You would have to adapt the boat but that is not a serious problem.
So 20 boat rides to get 20 of these beasts across.  Say another 20 for ammo, crews and supplies.  A 40 x boat crossing (say 50 - for redundancy and losses).  Now do you do them in a single lift?  Yes, if you can, but that is likely too big and will get picked up.  So this is likely a 2-3 trip operation.  
Given the width of the Dnipro:

Lets call it 1km on average.  Boat with a decent 40 hp motor and that kind of weight, we are looking at decent walking speed - so say, 5 km/hour - taking into account wood and Styrofoam silencers around engine which cuts efficiency.  So 20 min crossing (give or take).  Offload - 10 mins, trip back 20 mins.  If you want to shift sites (say a km or two up or down stream) you will have to relocate, which takes time.  I am thinking 3-4 hours to get 20 of those beasts over the water with crews using 20-30 assault boats.
So operation in phases:
- Combat divers and swimmers go first to link up with LRPs you already have in place.  They clear bank, setup offload points and beach management.  Need at least 3-4 sites.  They then roll into bridgehead force with what they can carry on their backs - so small arms, drones etc.
- Main body bridgehead force goes first.  So, vehicle crews etc, with heavier weapons.
- Then vehicles in waves, likely 2-3.  Offload and clear the beaches/landing sites.  Get em into hides and patrol bases.
Pick your night.  Foggy/rainy is best, stormy second best.  Sound will be a major issue.
Once you get them up and over the follow on support op gets a lot easier.  You can set up rolling far bank DPs and caches.  Troops can source water locally.  Ammo, food, fuel and medical will be the major issues but with this light a force, manageable.  Now you have roughly a light company with wheels who can make trouble up to 20-30 kms deep.
Now do that 3 more times and you have a raiding battalion.  Each of those small teams with FPVs and Javelins (and maybe some mines but they take weight) could make serious trouble in the Russian backfield.  Heavy UAS re-supply and casevec would make a significant difference. 
Russian troop density is in and around 100 troops per km, which is really thin.  Almost zero depth, no real rotations and thin c-moves.  Then you go conditions based on the planning - if the raiding bn is getting serious pushback, let them just make trouble (hit and runs etc).  If they can actually get RA forces to fall back, well you have a bridgehead for something larger, but that is a whole other thing.  
Risky and may not work.  But to my eyes it has a better chance in the risk/opportunity space than trying mechanized breaches over incredibly dense minefields with higher Russian troop densities. 
But...and it is the major one, you have to resource it. 

I'll bite...
Similar to 1916, both sides are exhausted but still swinging. Both sides think they can win and noone has proposed a solution that is remotely acceptable to both sides. Russia wants a divided and submissive Ukraine with a puppet government in power. Ukraine wants to return to 1991 borders and a substantial security guarantee to prevent Russia from invading again. Those are totally incompatible positions so they keep fighting. 
In WW1 the central powers were blockaded until they were unable to keep fighting. It took another 2 years. That is likely how this war will end. 
If the West allows Ukraine to lose then pax Americana is over and we return to the bad old days, except now we have nukes. So we need to make sure they don't lose. It really as simple as that. 

Alright, can someone explain what exactly David's "game" is?
I already know why other members of Putin's cheerleader squad do what they do ( Ritter,Seagal,Tucker). I looked David up on Wikipedia and he seems like some tech entrepreneur. Interestingly enough in the past he has donated money to Mitt Romney's and Hillary Clinton's campaigns, not two names that I imagine are very popular in the Kremlin.
Why is he so busy pushing the Russian propaganda right now? Is he just bored and enjoys being an edgy contrarian? Unlikely
Is he making money from this? More likely but I do not want to accuse anyone without evidence, even this scumbag. 
and I apologize for making you look at his face again my friends.

"William Alberque, director of strategy, technology, and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the FT that Russia likely has a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine due to fears it would likely "escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the U.S. or U.K."
Heh, maybe the poor weak old West is having a bit more of a deterrent effect than popular opinion on this forum believes.
Of course a major nuclear power bogged down in a losing war and nervous at both ends is not exactly good news either.

Digging around on this wars impact on the Russian economy and found this:
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2400/RRA2421-1/RAND_RRA2421-1.pdf
Originally written in late ‘22 there is a Ch 6 update written in late ‘23.  So the punchline as far as I can tell is that Russia can sustain this war at current intensity (note that important proviso) for several more years.  However, the hurt is starting to settle in.  Russia as a nation is definitely not becoming more wealthy as a result of this war.  This report does not cover the overall cost to rebuild its military to pre-war levels, adjusting for military and sanctions inflation.
So as we have discussed at length. Sanctions do work, but not how most people think.  They apply strategic pressure over time while eroding the overall Russian economy.  Further they will make it harder for Russia to rebuild after this:
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html
(have not looked in awhile but these numbers are truly staggering - for those still counting tanks, Russian losses are coming up on 3x of the entire UA pre-war fleet. AFVs are similar).
 
 

Ok, well let’s start there then.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder
And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord
And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf
So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats.  Ultimately it is a question of weight.  How much weight is being projected across the river as combat power?  How much weight is needed under combat conditions to sustain the weight of the combat power on the other side?  There are multiple ways to get that weight across a river other than a fixed bridge.  Fixed ferry, unfixed ferry, tac aviation and now, UAS.  Forward foraging and cannibalization etc.  
Now doctrine agrees with you, the best is solid fixed LOC bridging but any crossing operations, even conventional ones come in phases.  The opening phase is very often lighter more mobile resupply methods until the bridgehead force can push the enemy back far enough that it is safe to build a series of fixed bridges.  Essentially almost every opposed military river crossing in history began with what we are describing south of Kherson - light forces establishing a bridgehead, sustained and then heavy force link up once conditions are established.  D Day being an exception as were other amphib operations which all had to be sustained by air and sea.
So “sustaining a scale of operation” without a bridge is not only possible, it is really the only way to get many water crossing started in the first place.  Now as to “how long and how far?”  Well that depends on a lot of factors.  If the UA stays light it keeps the logistics bill low.  They might not need a fixed pontoon bridge if they can advance - as you say - “10-30kms”.  Pontoon ferry’s might be able to sustain them as they did for the RA for quite some time before the RA withdrew.
So basically as an engineering and logistics problem what we are looking at south of Kherson is not new or novel.  In the current environment it is going to be challenging and dangerous but it is not the thing being invented from zero in all this. 
 
Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side?  Light forces have proven pretty important in this war.  They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force.  If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct.  But have they?  We really do not know, but the fact that a small bridgehead at Krynky for months - no massive RA armoured c-attack, and a few maps of force lay down estimates may help:
https://features.csis.org/ukraine-war-map/
https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/
These seem to suggest that the RA have accepted risk in this sector exactly because there is a river there.  So how dense are those RA fortifications?  That map appears to show roughly a single Division covering off 100 kms of frontage.  That is - and let’s be really generous and say that RA division is at full strength - approx 10,000 troops, or 100 troops per km..which is extremely thin.  Estimates of the rest of the RA line are around 300 troops per km.  100 RA troops per km means that there are massive holes in that defensive line.  Light troops can not only cross, they can infiltrate between forces and get into rear areas, which will force the RA to react.  So we are not talking the Atlantic Wall here, we likely have RA hard points on obvious crossing sights, small c-moves forces and a bunch of RA ISR.
So indications are that RA force density is quite low, which makes the light dispersed option a good fit.  Now the UA has much better intel and will have to plan according to that but based on what we can see, the employment of light forces over that river in strength is not only possible, it is viable.
An and now we get to the crux…but you kinda answer your own question here.  “What can these light forces actually do?”  Well at Kyiv they stopped the RA cold.  Elsewhere they have been instrumental in causing the RA to collapse - please find me one major tank battle in this war?  Hell it is hard enough to find a decent mech battle.  This is a war dominated by fires, not manoeuvres.
So the answer to your question is right in your post:
”RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support”.  
That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield.  Why?  Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else.  This is the minimum objective by the way.  If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself.  If those light forces can actually establish a bridge head then options open up for heavier forces and other crossing options.  By that point the entire left end of the RA line is in trouble. But let’s leave that all as a branch plan and stretch goal.
So the real question is not in your response or reasoning.  They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?”  The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale?  This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.

1.  There are migrants in desperate parts of the world who would man the modern equivalent of Birkenau crematoria blocks if they could wire home 700usd per month.
2.  That said, they can't wire home that monthly pay if they are missing arms, legs or their heads; or if it's simply getting stolen. And word will get around, fast.
3. My personal KPI for Russia running out of mercenary cred, FWIW, is Norks. The Kim dynasty has sent thousands of young men to awful jobs in inclement parts of USSR/Russia (logging camps, mines) to earn money for the glorious Juche state ever since the Gulag tailed off. Their opinion in the matter is not requested.
I suspect there are already some DPKA military specialists working to support the RUAF. When tiny corpses of (underfed) Korean kids start showing up in the storm units, we'll know other options for mercs are running down for Putin Inc.

Did LLF get hacked?  The above post is rather ..... positive?  Uncharacteristically positive.  There is a Sun Tzu reference which certainly makes it seem like LLF.  
But seriously, excellent points, LLF.