Lethaface

The mobiks seem to understand they are completely expendable, and just be ok with it. Todays tape of two fully loaded AFVs driving past six OTHER dead Russian AFVs to get whacked within fifty yards of the same spot is exhibit A. And i fully expect there to be tape of a third batch dying in the same kill zone next week. I mean there is a Ukrainian mortar team that just leaves a tube zeroed on that spot, so they can drop death on it with thirty seconds notice. But the mobiks are so beat down from a hundred generations of abuse they would rather die that way, than shoot their officers and surrender. Ukraine may have to kill another half a million of them to get the point across. We need to be sure they have the tech, and the ammo, to do that with the lowest possible casualties.

So, again you are advocating taking one-third of the entire USMC Infantry force and basically placing them in “garrison”? What would that do to the U.S. ability to respond to “other world hotspots? Think about it, who are referred to as “The President’s Own” due to the fact that the President can deploy a USMC rapid deployment force at a moment’s notice? While it is an honor that you consider  the USMC to be such an amazing force, we do have human frailties. The USMC this three active Infantry divisions ( MARDIV) and three active air wings (MAW) that support each MARDIV. In addition we have one active reserve MARDIV and one MAW. Marine infantry basically trust only Marine or Navy Air for Close Air Support, so they will have one of them everywhere they are deployed. The concept of deploying a MARDIV and MAW on Taiwan as a deterrent is totally unnecessary and a waste of a deterrent force. Marines are basically able to deploy to any location in the World within 72 hours. Case in point, when I was a Reservist in the 4th MARDIV in 1980, just after the abortive hostage rescue mission in Iran, I received  a phone call at home (just north of Boston) on Wednesday evening ordering me to report for duty in Chicopee, Ma (about 120 miles from home) by 1500 on the next Friday. I reported in and by 1900, we were on Air Force C-141s and on route to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. When we landed a few hours later, we landed with the rest of the ENTIRE Regiment, in clouding Armor, Artillery, and Transport. And that was an Active Reserve Regiment.Think about what an active MARDIV can do today.
Please stop that type of silly “wish” talk.

For me it's the only explanation that 'makes sense', Dan. And an indication of how important this war really is for the West. 
Putin's legacy.

"No, to try and force Russia and its population in his mindset. He is turning everyone into a hardcore nationalist. This is probably one of his main goals with this war, to forever drive a wedge between the west and Russia in the Russians minds. So that the only future left is one that aligns with his vision. So that everyone who disagrees with this vision is seen as a traitor. Propaganda and hate speech work miracles. Those that disagree either leave or are afraid to speak out"
I found the above quote on Reddit very accurate and I see Putin and his war in the same light. The most important reason why Putin attacked Ukraine is that he wanted a war to unite his people and burn their bridges, to get rid of the people who oppose him and to make sure there's no way back for Russia, much like Germany in ww2. In that sense Putin has already reached his main goal. The only thing Putin is afraid of is peace.
 

Being totally honest, I was very surprised by the stalemate of this summer.  My assessment was that the UA would break that line and likely threaten that entire corridor.  I was not thinking Melitopol, that was likely a stretch too far but engineering another RA collapse to the coast was definitely viable.  Why:
The RA had demonstrated itself over-stretched over Summer '22 and into the Fall.  It took enormous loses in its pre=war front line forces.  These were the best trained and equipped expeditionary forces Russia had.  Two operational collapses, some hasty force generation - pulling old tanks out of stocks, rapidly mobilized troops etc all pointed to a military in failure.  The RA had not demonstrated that its C4ISR game had improved, quite the opposite.  About the only thing it had going for it was shortened and narrowed logistical lines, but it logistics were a mess too.
Then Russia spent just criminal numbers of men on Bakhmut.  But as we have seen, people are cheap.  An ability to not only lay mines, but effectively defend them...and coordinate that defence was a surprise to me.  To be able to do it all summer was beyond the capabilities of the RA as far as I could see.
Some people "called the ball" on this one, but really these were nothing more than guessing.  No one truly knew or understood force ratios until they happened.  Find me a ground warfare doctrine book that says a deliberate defence can be sustained at 300 troops per km...even with minefields.  And no conventional air cover to speak of.  This wasn't about Russian stick-too in my opinion.  This was something else.  And now analysts are starting to catch up.
Something fundamental has happened to mass.  Honestly I am not sure why this surprises everyone.  Something happens to mass in just about every major war we have had - WW1, WW2, Korea, Vietnam and Gulf War.  Mass worked very differently in each of those wars for various reasons.  Why one earth we thought it would work like the Gulf War in this one is beyond me. 
Corrosive warfare should have worked, again.  But it did not.  I am fascinated to understand why.  What prevented the UA from engineering another collapse?  They were still attacking all along the RA system.  Did that drop off?  Was it not enough for the new shortened lines?  Was it a shift in RA capability?  Corrosive warfare failed.  Instead the UA fell back on more conventional attritional warfare and basically went nowhere because you can gnaw at the front end for years before the RA will break.     
I am not sure where we go from here.  But here are some pretty solid assumptions:
- Manoeuvre warfare is not going to suddenly start working.  It needs pre-conditions that constitute entire operations.  This is well beyond "better training".  I have heard the reason - "well both Ukraine and Russia are using the old Soviet system."  Ok, the old Soviet System was all about operational manoeuvre and combined arms.  The West does not have some secret dancing sauce that allows us to drive between minefields either.     
- Mass is not suddenly going to start working.  I have seen far too many examples of force concentrations failing gloriously.  I have no idea what a distributed offence looks like but I think it needs some thought.
- No amounts of hardware are going to change those first two.  At least not realistic levels for this war.  Hardware = status quo.  At least for now.  If some new hardware, or technology is introduce we can revisit.
- Software might.  I am not sure where things are going in the backfield but I am betting tiger teams are working on new ways to do targeting and C4ISR right now.  Unmanned and PGM almost constitute a Sharpware, somewhere in between.  They are not only hardware capable, but they are a system expression of the software, and feedback into it.
- Attrition rules...for now.  Attrition is all its forms will be how this war is waged until it isn't.  This one is really hard as the West has not fought a truly attritional high intensity conventional war since Korea.  But here we are.  So what?  We need to get a lot better at attrition and its underlying calculus.  Stop this "just one more time over the top and manoeuvre will come back".  Learn the new rules quickly and exploit them better.
So what now?  Well Ukraine digs in and hold on.  We might see some tactical offensives but over the winter it may just be static.  Unless the UA have a rabbit somewhere.  Maybe they can see a weakness in the line and are waiting for the cold weather to exploit.  I do not know.  Now is the time to lean on operational objectives.  The primary one being, do not let the RA advance.  The second, kill the RA as much as possible at high ratios.  The third, wait for opportunity and seize it when it comes.  Last, make opportunity if you can...learn faster than the RA.
  

I'm disappointed by you all. All this talk about toilets and nobody posted this:
 

It seems to me that most people forget how humanly normal it is for the Ukrainians to be war-weary and somber, and to even question a positive outcome. But it is almost certainly TEMPORARY!
It is not only the longevity of the war, and the corresponding fear and stress that goes along with it, that creates this grim atmosphere. In my experience hope that doesn't get materialized tends to weigh heavier on most people's morale, than physical pain, fear, disappointment and other adversities.
And in this war the average hope before the summer offensive was very high, perhaps - in retrospect of course, unrealisticly high. The unexpected defeat of the Russian invasion, the sinking of the Moskva and the further humiliation of the Black Sea Fleet, the Wagner-uprising, the endless amount of video's and reports of exploding Russian vehicles and dead and dying Russian soldiers, and the large number of countries that gave material and/or financial support (Which in hindsight gave a false impression of the usefull amount of support. Ten countries donating 10 -20 tanks each sounds nice, but creates unrealistic hope.), all contributed to an understandable belief in succes.
In my opinion a sudden realisation that thing aren't nearly as rosy as expected, weighs people down. Mostly because rational thinking cannot cope very well with accepting the fact that our expectations were too high.
It just takes time. Whether the situation on the frontline stays as it is, or even when there are going to be more setbacks for the Ukrainians, this current "depression" will subside. The Ukrainian tenacity and unwielding fighting spirit just have a little understandable setback.
And to parafrase Schwarzenegger's famous quote: "They will be back".   

I seriously wonder about the tone of the NYT.
There is reporting, and there is opinion shaping. I think this stuff is very much in the latter. Just the language being used and purposefully repeated through the article is very much not objective.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-river-russia.html
Their next article is called "people snatchers"
No mentioning of russia, their conditions, the 300 vehicles they burnt through this month, if UA did that, oh how many sob stories would they write?
Also it irks me they call it "russia-Ukraine war" instead of invasion, or russias war on Ukraine. But Im sure thats just coincidence

I really hope not. I get too stressed with that type of garbage. Definition of stress: “The overwhelming desire to choke the living **** out of some ignorant S.O.B. who really deserves it!”
 

Would that be standing looking down drain or up?

Why would anyone take hydrological advice from a guy whose toilet spins in the wrong direction?

Thank you Dan, you're probably much more up on this than I am. My naval interests are relatively new. For those like me with new naval interests the little I know is there's two current 'big ideas' in USN circles with respect to full scale conventional war with China over Taiwan:
1. Air-Sea Battle, Air Force long range strategic bombers takes out Chinese A2/AD capability to allow the carriers to operate within the 1st island chain and range of their strike aircraft
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf
Dated 2013 but a primer on the strategy
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/back-to-the-future-resurrecting-air-sea-battle-in-the-pacific/
Suspect given the source, but with bias filters on still nice brief summary
2. Submarines are the only platform capable of effectively engaging a cross strait invasion force in the time window needed to defeat the invasion before/as it lands, there aren't enough submarines, many of the submarines we have need to be reconfigured to launch cruise missiles not ICBMs, and US submarine doctrine needs to be turned on it's head (in the shallow waters of the South China Sea make and use noise, don't try to be silent)
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Fighting+into+the+Bastions+Bryan+Clark+Timothy+A+Walton.pdf
 

I think you need to look in the Science Fiction section of the library, but you very well might find something there that's not far off.
I agree that use of "AI" is inevitable.  I just don't think we'll see it in Ukraine.  I'd be more surprised if there weren't prototypes than if there are. But figuring out how to implement them en masse in the field with a mix of drones and without accidentally sterilizing the wrong side of the FEBA isn't something that I'd want to bet a couple battalions of the UA on.  But I think there's enough autonomy available now that there could be "drone prep" crews sending drones into the rear to replace the ones that are getting used up and handing them off to operators who are using drones like the UA rambo video was using guns some months back, except they'll be pro video game players with high SA pulling reserve drones from the bottom of the screen.  Sounds kinda like Ender...

Really appreciate the thoughts on this by @chrisl and all others after.
I just started looking but haven't found anything that looks like force structure or doctrine for massed use of drones. Maybe not surprisingly there does not yet seem to be a 'FM 7-7X, the Drone Platoon in the Attack.'
The impression you get is field practice in Ukraine is way ahead of published military thought. Maybe someone here knows the Ukrainian or Russian drone equivalent of JFC Fuller or Immelmann/Boelcke.
I might differ with others on AI. I think the integration of autonomous AI into conventional war kill chains in recon/strike complexes is inevitable given the advantages in response/decision cycle time.
I did find this interesting, thoughts on drone 'swarm tactics.' Author is an Italian Air Force Lieutenant attending USMC U.
https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/A-New-Way-of-War/
 

Fwiw in Malaysia the view you sketch is not accurate (posting from now). The Ukraine war gets less attention/focus here, it's far away and limited impact. However the agressor is clear.
China isn't seen as favourable as you sketch it to be, although US foreign policy isn't always either. They don't see the need to get mixed up in the conflict, mainly looking after own interests.
The Palestine/Israel conflict gets more attention, overwhelming majority support a free Palestine state and see the lack of that as the main reason for the conflict there. And that Israël can get away with almost anything, where other countries wouldn't.

There may’ve already been a discussion on this that I missed, but one thing I’ve been wondering for a while is why did things end up going nowhere on the Velyka Novosilka axis during the Ukraine summer counteroffensive?
From day one it seemed like this was the most promising of Ukraine’s 3 axes of advance. Ukraine needed months to capture a single solitary village on the Tokmak axis, while further east they were liberating the first villages on the Velyka Novosilka axis within days. 
My impression the whole time was that the defences in this area weren’t as extensive as around Tokmak. Unlike at Tokmak, Ukraine just needed to break through one fortified line rather than 2-3. And yes, it is farther to get to Berdyansk than Melitopol, but the whole idea behind this offensive was that the key was to get past the great minefields. From how things have played out I’d reckon it’s easier to deal with 10 km of minefield followed by 100 km to the coast rather than 30 km of minefield and then 40 km of clear to Melitopol.
So why did Ukraine seemingly break a key principle of war by reinforcing failure (the Tokmak axis) rather than the one line of advance where real progress was being made?

Communicating with people can be pretty exhausting. Companies with resources can afford to hire people whos only job is to communicate with the community. What would you expect to see in monthly status updates anyway besides "no, we aren't there yet"? Trying to boil progress down into some sort of tangible percentage is a pretty rough exercise, and more likely than not to be misleading anyway.
I think Lethaface put it pretty well over on the 'Annual look at the year to come - 2023' thread.
 

The key question is whether the people of France and Germany, as well as other NATO countries, will be ready to shed their blood for a long time for these small Baltic countries in the east. It doesn't look like NATO countries are preparing for a major war. Perhaps they hope that it will be possible to reach an agreement with Putin? I know one president who also thought so; his name is Volodymyr Zelensky. And his opinion on this issue has changed dramatically

Many Ukrainians criticize our generals. However, our military leadership is only capable of conducting operations at the level at which it is possible for them
1. Training of their subordinate officers and soldiers.
2 Possibilities for the exchange and processing of information by headquarters
3. And of course, the level of supply with everything necessary
Criticizing leadership is the favorite pastime of the Ukrainian people. There is a funny opinion that fate is unfair to Ukrainians and constantly appoints cunning and self-interested leaders to govern them. But my opinion is that every nation has exactly the leaders it deserves. Ukrainian commanders have exactly the level of competence, material support and communications that they were able to provide during 8 years of preparation for a big war. We have had enough time to carry out reforms...

I have always considered Tatarigami one of the most valuable sources of information about this war. Until I read his statement that Bakhmut did not need to be held, but instead had to retreat to more “advantageous positions.” If it were not for the retention of Bakhmut, then who knows where our positions would be now. Near Slovyansk or to the west of it?
Now the opposition to Zelensky media is promoting the assertion that the reason for the failure of the Zaporozhye offensive lies in the retention of Bakhmut. They say the reserves necessary for the summer offensive were spent there. Based on this logic, in March 2022 we needed to leave Kharkov, Kiev, Chernigov and Sumi. After all, the defense of these cities was also very bloody.

Damned Soviet army sh....t still to kill personnel. 
In honor of Artillery and missile troops Day command of 128th mountain-assault and 65th mech.brigade gathered personnel of these brigades - about 100 men for solemnly awarding reportedly in Zarichne village of Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is about 25 km from frontline. Reportedly Russian Kh-59 missile hit gathering of many people. It's unknown - either they were spotted by UAV or ELINT asset by multiple cell phones signal in one place, or some traitor from locals gave information. 
As result of strike 18KIA, 20 WIA (including three civilians) 
High-rank and mid-rank officers still roughly violate an order of General Staff about debarment of personnel gathering in one place more than platoon size. In their heads Soviet-style rules and "traditions" of "service" with endless alignments, cheking of "journal of journals accounting" still more important than reality of war, good sense and effectiveness. 
More worse, according to the General Staff order, soldiers and officers if they understand that higher command orders about non-combat purpose mass meeteings, which can threat their lives, these orders can and have to be contested. But this is only on paper. In real Soviet tradition "I'm chief - you are foul" still alive. And lower officers and soldiers often afraid to contradict such orders. Beacuse they are in full power of higher officer and can be punished. All "hot lines" of MoD, which should to prevent this rarely work indeed. Because after such call higher command gave an order to make investigation.. by officers of the same brigade from where they got a complaint. Guess who will be fu..d after "investigation"?
By current laws officer can punish own subordinates, who reject to execute his orders. But no any responsibility for officers, whoes stupid decisions lead to death of dozen soldiers. This is maybe highest problem of UKR army, inherited from Soviet army system - absence of repect to subordinaties, considering them as supplies. And really many people in Ukraine now scare to be mobilized in first order because of such Soviet attitude from commanders. 
 

 

Yes I'm long behind on the thread 🤣
However I wanted to react to this. Your perspective in imo the glass half empty variant, explaining a selection of geopolitical level examples from a citizens perspective.
There are more perspectives imo. Not only on explaining the why behind things like Taurus, whether one agrees with the reasoning or not. There are also glass half full perspectives on the geopolitical front.
Just one example I want to lay down: look at WW2 at end of 1940 / 41. Half of Europe was effectively overran and defeated on the battlefield. Things looked very gloom, there was plenty of issues between allied parties. 
Not all is well in Ukraine obviously, there is plenty of issues both in Ukraine as among those supporting Ukraine. One can focus on these issues, but it is only fair to put it into perspective that there actually is wide support for Ukraine. Also, Ukraine was able to defeat most of Russia's large offensives. Both weren't to be taken for granted before Feb '22. Of course that doesn't mean things couldn't have been better or can't be improved; it is imperative to remain vigilant and critical.
But at the same time, it is also imperative to value achieved accomplishments and realize those weren't a certainty; almost nobody predicted the current status quo as favourable for Ukraine as it is now.
Or maybe I just prefer half full glasses 😉

1. So if I follow the last few dozen pages correctly, this frozen front with no cease-fire would require both sides to fortify, man and sustain a 'high hazard' drone-and-arty-vulnerable zone of 25-30kms (?) on each side of  line (i.e. mine belts?), extending along some 850 (?) km of front
2. (that excludes Belarus, which btw has got to be in even worse economic condition than Russia or Ukraine, assuming the EU has truly closed its borders to 'Belarusian octopus')
3. Note my stress on 'sustain.' Over 1/3 of that extended front is in the southern zone from Donetsk city to the Dnipr mouth. The river and its adjoining bayou areas has proven vulnerable to raiding, so must be fully manned, including artillery support.
4.  With the Ukies now gaining proficiency with ATACMS and other long range precision weapons, including drones, the very finite supply lines sustaining this, ahem, Russian 'Long Left Flank'© become more vulnerable to systematic interdiction and destruction than ever. 
5. Supply lines by their nature cannot hunker down. They must move, continually and, in the case of the land corridor, predictably. And in a world where movement carries increasingly high hazard, that's an asymetry I would expect the UA to feast upon richly.
...I would expect at minimum the Perekop isthmus to be shut down. Fix a bridge, knocked down again next day, ad infinitum. Or more likely, the bridging equipment itself gets targeted.
6. In conclusion, we could see a slow motion winter campaign, where we watch Adviivka be very slowly (and expensively) eaten away Bakhmut-style, but where simply holding the Surovikin line saps a majority of Russia's logistics train.
Does this win the war? Nope, unless Russia finally decides it isn't worth it.
Does it create temporary 'bubbles' that UA land forces can work within? that can only be countered with extravagant RU efforts from bases far away (e.g. air and helos, plus exhausted 'quasi-VDV' kampfgruppen scurrying about and getting cluster bombed -- you know, that movement is hazardous thing).  We shall see, I suppose.
P.S.  Does the Russian defensive conundrum on the southern front start to resemble the Wehrmacht's situation in early 1944, with 'denuded fronts', PZ/SS fire brigades and all that?

Maybe a few trillion dollars in economic development will help:
https://www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-in-ukraine-ahead-of-enlargement-decision/#:~:text=KYIV — European Commission President Ursula,said on X from Kyiv.
But you right…we suck.  It is all our fault.  That is the narrative to take and totally does not play into the hands of people who want to withdraw support.