Lethaface

I think the plan is to let one drive onto the Kerch bridge and watch it collapse from the weight.

Agreed. When I was younger I didn't mind to watch more gorey stuff war footage, but because of life experiences I now refrain to view too much of those type of stuff (my soul has enough scratches 😉).
However watching footage of the war, not necessarily the gorey focused ones, does indeed provide more information than the ISWs etc do sec. Plus I always look to verify information from various sources and not only stick to one source, even if that's a good one like ISW. 
Especially in the early beginning of the war a lot could be learned from watching the footage posted all over the internet. Another drone video might not always add to the already established picture, but without analyzing them one won't know.
Plus nobody is obliged to watch 'war porn' if they don't like to watch it. It's a bit of a holier than thou discussion imo.

It's hard to render airfields inoperable - all you need is a long flattish spot, and to do that all you need is a bulldozer or a bunch of conscripts with shovels and rakes.  For all the things the RA does wrong, one thing they've historically done well is make aircraft that aren't very picky about runway quality.
If you're bombing an airfield, you need to either hit the aircraft directly (or indirectly, as we saw in the airfield bombing that took a while to decide what actually happened on the ground), or hit the infrastructure that makes it more valuable than a bare flat spot: fuel storage tanks, fuel trucks, ammo dumps.  
IIRC, in the Syrian cruise missile attack, they were mostly targeting aircraft directly through hangar roofs or doors.  

I don't know when the Ukrainian counter-offensive will kick off but I wouldn't put too much stock in what Zelensky has to say about it. The Ukrainians have to maintain OPSEC so it's not like Zelensky is gonna go around saying "Our forces are fully ready and the offensive is imminent."

So not to pile on and beat up.  I get the position, video after video of Russian saps getting blown up may seem excessive and masturbatory, and for some it is. However, every video gives off information. Some is just noise, or repetitive.  While others are gold and constitute key indicators which when confirmed by other observations can point to trends.  Trends lead to broader deductions and assessments - this is not a single “keyhole” it is thousands of them.  In most keyholes the milk maid is bathing, but then you start to notice the copy of Karl Marx next to the tub.
ISW and other OS intelligence analysts are doing exactly what professional military are doing.  Looking at all the “war porn” and pulling out trends and indicators that tell a larger story.  Oryx is not counting blow up vehicles because people get their jollies seeing blown up Russian tanks.  They are doing it because individual losses sum up to larger attrition trend which chart the course of a conflict.
This is micro-analysis and has pretty much set this group apart - or did, other groups have caught up.  Example: back in the early days of the war the majority of open source assessment (and frankly military as well) were expecting this war to take a predictable course.  A rapid overwhelming Russian invasion, shock and collapse of the UA, and a drawn out insurgency against a puppet Ukrainian political regime.  It was places like this forum where micro-observation first challenged a lot of macro assumptions.  We saw war porn, but it added up to something going very wrong for the RA.  In fact it pointed to something even more fundamental shifting in warfare itself.
This was not a one-shot deal.  Micro-analysis backed up be expertise has kept us well ahead of the pack in all phases of this war.  Phase II did not become a protracted set of urban sieges - the RA logistical losses and Ukrainian resistance demonstrated that.  Phase III did not see an RA “cauldron” despite their use of WW1 levels of massed fires.  Phase IV the UA counter offensive did shock us at its scope but one could see that this was indeed a collapse of the RA operationally on two fronts (one slow, one fast).  Phase V - Op Russian Leg Humping: was going nowhere - one need only follow the famous “battle of the T” to see why.  And we will use it for Phase VI to try and understand how the UA offensive is unfolding.
So while some may only see Russian sods getting blown up.   I see: poor basic field craft in poorly constructed trench lines which suggest basic training shortfalls.  No effective C-UAS counter measures on the RA side.    The evolution of drone warfare throughout.  The big fact that Russia has still not been able to create information denial (let alone control) in the battle space. HVT losses within the Russian operational system - C2 nodes, A2AD platforms, engineering and logistics.  Failures in RA C4ISR…the list goes on.  I do not see this through a single war porn keyhole, I see them through thousands of them.
Are these view’s skewed?  Definitely.  But the fact that we do not see thousand of videos of Russian UAS blowing off UA heads is telling in itself (does anyone think the Russian info sphere would show any restraint in this?).  Open source is “open”.  In the end it is about filtering noise and trying to hear signal - and again, this is exactly what ISW or any other public analysis platform is doing, along with professional military.  We are just doing it in house - this is how the sausage is made.  What bakes my noodle is that in my lifetime a large virtual collective is able to conduct this sort of work, and demonstrate accurate assessments (more than just a lucky once or twice) is game changing.  
In twenty years we will all be old, senile or dead. However an another group of young(ish) folks will do this for another war but they will likely have AI support (we have already seen it here in its infancy).  They will have access to even more raw information but will have a better ability to use it - they may very well be directly involved in the prosecution of the war and not just sitting in chairs on the sideline.  We are at the beginning of an age of Open Source Warfare - all those keyholes are “pixels” in reality.

There have been some pretty terrible videos linked here. By terrible I mean things like splicing together entirely unrelated - in time, space, or even war - pieces from various places to ... tell a narrative? Of something? I guess?
It's happened often enough that, by and large, I don't bother with any of them. IMO, at least some of the folks posting links here are - at best - entirely undiscriminating in what they chose to watch and link. Either that or they're addicted to giggling.
This thread might be the single best piece of crowd-sourced OS analysis of the war available, but that doesn't mean that everyone posting here is contributing to that value.

The comparison with ww2 is interesting. I had some similar experience in that T-62 have issues hitting targets at 1000-1500m (and preferring HEAT over APFSDS) while German ww2 tanks performing better at such ranges. Even got a kill with the Jagdtiger at 2200m.
 

Certainly seen my fair share of troops seemingly sleeping or feigning death in the hope of avoiding the attention of the drones bombers.
But in my viewing of drone and combat videos these last few weeks, there's a very constant theme of trenches littered with Russians that are obviously dead. And not infrequently, as far as it can be determined, some of the dead are a bit ripe.
That does seem to point towards a certain psychological breaking point being reached. Not recovering your dead or even chucking them over the parapet are indicators of a very grim mindset having set in. Of course, that is not an indicator of fragile morale. It may even be evidence of a fatalistic mindset amongst Russians that they will endure whatever they need to. OTOH I think troops that let their dead buddies lie where they fell aren't first in line to take the initiative in a fight.
All in all, I have confidence that the Ukrainians will be able to break through wherever they decide to launch their big attacks. And I have very little faith in the Russians in their current state being up to the task of slowing or stopping an advance once they break through. If the reserve trenches fail to stop the Ukrainians, the latter can keep going until logistics or the Azov sea forces them to stop, I think.
 

One talking head I heard today was smirking (as well) and made a reference to 1941: even while the battle of Moscow raged rather close, Stalin held a grand Oktober military parade in Moscow.

I thought it was very fair to do so given how Russia likes it's historical references ;-).

This morning we had Russian missile attack again. 35 cruise missiles were launched (29 Kh-101/555, 6 Kalibr), 33 shot down. About 15 of them were shot down on approaches to Kyiv (two of them likley were interceped inside over the city outskirts, because two loud explosions were heard)  
Remains of missile shot down in SW part of Kyiv - it has spoiled a strawberry garden bed

And this homestead in some village or town near Kyiv was really lucky

So that is about 833 casualties per day, Jan-Apr 23.  That is approx half of the daily rate of WW1 on the western front when things got going.  That is double all the KIA in 80s Afghanistan in 4 months.
What we do not know is how much of this was cannon fodder and how much as enablers and operational level capabilities.  

Interesting discussion. Unfortunately only have time for drive by posts, I just noticed some rumors about Ukraine having begun a counter offensive in Bakhmut. Could just be local stuff / rumors.
But in my brain it kind of make sense to do so. Some of the better informed talking heads overhere predicted it a while back.

Imho not necessarily from a classical 'maneuver to attrit' perspective, but from a perspective of attack where the enemy is the weakest, plus, perhaps more important, where success has the most effect (on 'National Ethos' or however one wants to call it).
If UKR manages to undo the progress made by Russia over 3/4 year, at heavy costs, in a short time and at a fraction of the cost; how can RU nationalists still maintain they can win this war? Of course the easy answer would be 'the same ignorant way they have been doing for quite some time now', but not the only answer.
Put in another way, what other result, achievable with equal or less resources, will have a larger impact on Russia's strategy of continuing this war until UKR / Western support gives in?
(taking into account opportunity costs and maximizing effect per life put on the line).
Even in a successful Bakhmut offensive Ukraine might not be able to destroy / encircle large parts of Russian/Wagner forces. But it will destroy the myth of Bakmuth/Wagner/Russia.

Interesting discussion. Unfortunately only have time for drive by posts, I just noticed some rumors about Ukraine having begun a counter offensive in Bakhmut. Could just be local stuff / rumors.
But in my brain it kind of make sense to do so. Some of the better informed talking heads overhere predicted it a while back.

Imho not necessarily from a classical 'maneuver to attrit' perspective, but from a perspective of attack where the enemy is the weakest, plus, perhaps more important, where success has the most effect (on 'National Ethos' or however one wants to call it).
If UKR manages to undo the progress made by Russia over 3/4 year, at heavy costs, in a short time and at a fraction of the cost; how can RU nationalists still maintain they can win this war? Of course the easy answer would be 'the same ignorant way they have been doing for quite some time now', but not the only answer.
Put in another way, what other result, achievable with equal or less resources, will have a larger impact on Russia's strategy of continuing this war until UKR / Western support gives in?
(taking into account opportunity costs and maximizing effect per life put on the line).
Even in a successful Bakhmut offensive Ukraine might not be able to destroy / encircle large parts of Russian/Wagner forces. But it will destroy the myth of Bakmuth/Wagner/Russia.

I never take in serious our GS reports. Main interest is their reports were most significant actions took place. They already two weeks say about "heavy clashes in Bakhmut" and "minor advance of Russians on some streets", but in real UKR troops now controls last small SW part of the city. Though, todays GS report about some successfull counter-attack actions inside city confirmed by "trench news". But it's only because Wagners almost stop active assaults and now probably their commander await for new batch of meat - to bring a sign victory to Prigozhyn on 9th of May, that will strenghen his position in Kremlin "games of towers" 

In this sad new some interesting statistic of typical "Starstreak" tasks:
Andriy Liniychuk (callsign "Celt") has died at the war - most effective AA-shooter of AFU. On his count 16 Orlans, 1 Zala and Kа-52 helicopter. Andriy was first, who has performed combat usage of "Starstreak". For three years of service he was wounded twice and twice has returning back to own unit. He served in 95th air-assault brigade. He was killed in artillry shelling of out positions. 
 

Interesting discussion. Unfortunately only have time for drive by posts, I just noticed some rumors about Ukraine having begun a counter offensive in Bakhmut. Could just be local stuff / rumors.
But in my brain it kind of make sense to do so. Some of the better informed talking heads overhere predicted it a while back.

Imho not necessarily from a classical 'maneuver to attrit' perspective, but from a perspective of attack where the enemy is the weakest, plus, perhaps more important, where success has the most effect (on 'National Ethos' or however one wants to call it).
If UKR manages to undo the progress made by Russia over 3/4 year, at heavy costs, in a short time and at a fraction of the cost; how can RU nationalists still maintain they can win this war? Of course the easy answer would be 'the same ignorant way they have been doing for quite some time now', but not the only answer.
Put in another way, what other result, achievable with equal or less resources, will have a larger impact on Russia's strategy of continuing this war until UKR / Western support gives in?
(taking into account opportunity costs and maximizing effect per life put on the line).
Even in a successful Bakhmut offensive Ukraine might not be able to destroy / encircle large parts of Russian/Wagner forces. But it will destroy the myth of Bakmuth/Wagner/Russia.

I have a collection of over 400 MB of building skins that I created for Normandy and for the Netherlands. I especially like the proper Dutch (Nederlandse) look to the houses. I have asked Shane how I can go about uploading that much material to CMMODS III. So keep your eyes open. I would also like to u/l Falaises's two church skins to CMMODS III since his Normandy stones colour and Dutch brick looks much more authentic.

I have this morning uploaded the 'final' versions of my creations including:
(1) Normandy and Netherlands Master Maps (7 maps)
(2) ASL/SL to CMBN conversions. (11 Scenarios)
(3) Kandu's Original Scenarios (6 Scenarios)
(4) 82nd Airborne in Normandy standalone scenarios (29 Scenarios)
(5) Mission Boston - Objective La Fiere; a short, five mission, linear, 82nd Airborne in Normandy campaign. A longer version is still in development.
 

That's kind of the wrong way to think about artillery, although I am making the perhaps heroic assumption that the Russians aren't just using their guns in direct-fire mode.
The D-30 ("artillery over 100mm") has an effective range of about 15 km, so if it was right on the front line each gun could - theoretically - cover 15km to the left and 15 km to the right, for 30km total coverage. But it won't be at the front, so call the effective coverage 20km per gun, therefore at a minimum about 7 positions are required to cover the entire lineage. There are 763 guns in total, so at any point along that frontage you can expect to be opposed but about 110 guns, or about 10 battalions.
Similarly for the MLRS. Those have highly variable ranges, but 30km seems about typical. That gives 60km of maximal frontline coverage or 40km of effective coverage, so 3 positions minimum across the 125km, with 70 launchers at each position.
So, an attack anywhere along that front can expect to be be opposed by 10 battalions of barrel artillery and 6 battalions of MLRS, along with a battalion of ballistic missiles messing around in your rear area. Not 6 guns and 2 MLRS launchers.
Note1: Command and control arrangements can upset that; commanders might not be willing or able to share "their" indirect fire-support assets across divisional or higher organisational boundaries.
Note2: the above rough calcs assume a perfectly straight front line. Any wiggles and salients (convex or concave) will increase the average density.

Yeah getting that same temp scoring glitch as we finished one game. Expecting it to fix itself when we finish the other game shortly.
Looks like I might be knocking @Lethaface off his scoring pedestal! 😃
By the way whats up with the leader board, that anodia player should be 3rd place with his 2830 pts. But he's at number 1?

The Iroquois nation appreciates your support.

So if Cuba invades Florida and claims it is Cuba now because many Cubans live there, will a referendum, among the mainly Cuban people remaining in Florida after the invasion, be 'legitimate' ?

One of the 'interesting' findings is that (some of) the worst of these units where 'ordinary men' (yes I have that book) mostly consisting of small boring village policemen with, probably, some power fantasies which turned into killing machines. 

I get your point, but it's possibly a bad example? AIUI, the mass of Cubans currently in Florida are there because they really don't want to be part of Cuba as it is currently constituted. Wouldn't a plebiscite after your hypothetical invasion come back overwhelmingly to stay as part of the US?
If, say, Putin had declared back in 2015 that Russian policy henceforth was that anyone unhappy with Russia could move down to Crimea, with their relocation costs part-funded by the state and accommodation and employment provided on arrival, and then some years later there was a plebiscite over whether Crimea would stay part of Russia or revert to Ukraine ... then the analogy would hold, I think. But that poor analogy is getting pretty tortured by now, worse than the random civilians picked up and deposited in Guantanamo Bay, to circle back to Cuba.

My take after 6 months peacekeeping in Bosnia in '93 -  Savagery is baked into human beings.  Sorry, there is no 'better angels of our nature'  My time in Bosnia dispelled that myth real quick.  The 'better angels of our nature' happens because we employ the frontal cortex to govern ourselves.  But warfare is very primal and hits the primitive emotional centers of our brains first.   Once that happens, the excesses of violence humans are capable of know no bounds.  Which is why in the 22nd century in the future, historians and people will be examining the genocides of the 21st century and asking the same questions.