Cuirassier

To quote someone responding to the previous attempt, you are nuts.

Don't worry. More will be on the way. The battle is actually done. I just need to find the time to post the turns.

Since the CMBB forums have been fairly quiet for a while and there hasn't been an AAR in ages, I've decided to make one on a small scenario I recently downloaded and played. There isn't any real particular point to this AAR, though I do hope it will maybe show some useful tactics, procedures etc for less experienced players. And now to the battle, which is called AL-Village. Spoiler * * * * * * * * * * * * * A picture of the battlefield The briefing tells me that the Soviets have established a small strongpoint within the village. Probable enemy positions are marked with asteriks. Judging by the size of the scenario, I guess that I am probably facing an understrength company with a few support weapons. They are likely of low quality as well. To take the village, I'm am given two Kampfgruppes, which both have their own small setup zones. Kampfgruppe Winter deploys on the bottom right of the map and consists of: 1 1941 Infantry Recon Platoon 1 MG-34 HMG 1 MG-34 LMG 1 Pz. 38(t)E 1 SPW 251/1 1 75mm Infantry Gun Kampfgruppe Keller deploys on the bottom left of the map and consists of: 1 1941 Infantry Recon Platoon 1 MG-34 HMG 1 MG-34 LMG 1 8cm mortar 1 PSW 231 8 My biggest concern for the attack is the time limit, which is only 18 turns. My forces will have to attack aggressively to capture the position in time. The Plan The plan for the attack is relatively simple. I expect the enemy to have units in the marked locations. The bridge itself is probably heavily defended. The small heavy building on my side of the river probably is an OP position with an LMG or Tankhunter inside. On the left flank, I expect the farthest left asterik to be the location of an MG or gun, probably in a trench or maybe in the tree patch. The righthand attack route does not offer much opportunity for concealment, so I expect the enemy to see it first, and meet it with his reserves. I hope to conceal the lefthand thrust long enough so I can quickly break into the village defenses on that wing and attack the rear of the forces defending the bridge. On my left flank, the HMG-42 and 8cm mortar will form a heavy weapons group and cover my left flank. Infantry will move though the woods and then the scattered trees and hopefully achieve surprise and achieve a quick breakthrough. My PSW 231 8 will not move into LOS of enemy positions until I know what the far left enemy unit is, since it may be a gun. On my right, my Pz-38 will lead the road advance, carrying the LMG-42 scout. Behind is the SPW 251/1 with the infantry gun and HMG-42, which will setup as a heavy weapons group in the woods near the bridge, once the enemy OP is eliminated. Winter's Recon platoon will advance through the wheat and to the scattered trees, but stay on the reverse slope until the OP is identified. Once this happens, they will assault and then prepare for crossing the bridge. First few turns: Nothing happens as my units move along the planned route. Lt. Winters' platoon travels through the wheat while the Pz.38 and SPW 251/1 await for the infantry to get into position to attack the outpost. More to come in later posts (including combat lol).

A challenge? Well not right now since I don't think I'd have the time. But I can let you know when I do and we can play a game if you want. Until then I'll get my game face ready... :mad: :mad: :mad: :mad: Btw, what is the scenario you are playing right now? I'm just curious.

Kipanderson, "The German army that crossed the border on 22 June ’41 was indeed in fine fettle manpower wise, but of course even then not in equipment, very poorly kitted out." So what. The Germans romp with Pz. III's and IV's in Barbarossa and the early stages of Blue. They annihilate entire armies. When they get Tigers and Panthers, they suffer a near continuos stream of defeats. Does this not show the abilities of the invading German army? And the failings of the June 1944 army? Tech thus means little to the quality of an army. This is especially the case by 1944. The Germans only have a slight lead in tech over the West and Soviets, so it is not much of a force mulitplier. "By the end of September ’41, let alone the end of December ’41 it was shattered. In every way a mere shadow. This happened again and again over the three years to June’44. The so called glory days when the German army in the east was fully equipped and trained that you seem to reference never existed." I never said there were "glory days" of the German army in the East. The 1941 army was clearly superior to any German army during the war. All formations were near full strength if not full strength before the invasion. And while the June 1944 army was formed around a core of veterans, the 1941 army had many more veterans. Other than a few of the newer SS units, most German formations consisted of veterans from Poland and France. They certainly had combat experience. By 1944, many of these men are dead, and are replace by Volksdeutsche. And the German army was not shattered by Sept. 1941 or Dec. 1941. Running on a logistical shoe-string certainly. But shattered? If shattered, how does the German army bag another group of Soviet armies at Viazma and Briansk? Why would the Soviets take another 4 years to kick the Germans off Russian soil if the Germans had been shattered after the 41 campaign? "The intake of November ’43 was a full intake of standard quality. It was fully trained, they were not sent to the front to fill gaps before their training was complete, and they were equipped to a standard far above any German units that went before them." That is untrue. By 1944, the best available soldiers were already in the army, as these were the men that had survived the campaign up to this point. To replace losses (something the Germans didn't do on a 1-1 basis), Hitler was more keen to use outlying regions for recruits, as it did not disrupt life as much in 'Greater Germany.' However, it made for poor quality troops. "In everything from machine guns per unit, to tanks, to radios they had more per unit than any German army before them. Their equipment was also of a far higher quality." Sure they had better tech. Tech gets better with time. Everyone else had gotten better tech as well. However, to say the army was full-strength is nonsense. Virtually all infantry divisions are down to 2000 men and organized into 6 battalions, instead of 9. The 78th Sturm division, opposite the Orsha thrust during Bagration, was only slighty better than the norm with probably 3000-3500 men. This was *not* the case in 1941. Panzer divisions were also understrength, and often Panzer Recon or Pioneers had to be used in infantry roles, as there were never enough Panzer-Grenadiers, as can be seen in many after-action reports. And as I said early, some Panzer divisions were lacking a full battalion of tanks. "Remember all sides had the units in contact with the enemy severely written down, not just the Germans. During the near three months of “relative quiet” on the Eastern Front prior to June 22 ’44 the army in the east did successfully integrate the November ’43 intake and re-equip." I've already said that both the Soviets and Germans were understrength. I don't deny that. The Germans were deffinately more understrength however. The Soviets were using their manpower pool to the fullest to equip their army. The Germans weren't. The Germans would not pull out all the man power stops until after Bagration. I look forward to seeing who this historian is.

Perhaps an AAR will make both sides more clear

Sorry, whoever the hisotrian you speak of is, he is flat wrong. German formations were much more understrength in June 1944 than they had been before and the problem was getting worse, not better. For example, infantry divisions adopted the 6 battalion orgainzation over the 9 battalion organization as one measure to deal with understrength units. There were never enough men in the German army. And how could there be. The Germans never pulled out the manpower stops until *after* Bagration. The Germans realized perhaps they may need more men only after Army Group Center had been destroyed. Oops, a little late. And I know The Soviets were also understrength, but not as much as were the Germans. Regular Rifle divisions were likely to have at least 1000 more men than their German counterparts, whereas Guards Rifle divisions were closer to TOE. Soviet mech formations were always brought up to TOE before any major offensive. Obviously, they would be reduced, sometimes severely, during operations, but that is not the point. The point is the Soviets are using all of the manpower they can aquire to feed their formations, while the Germans aren't until post-Bagration and D-day. As a result, German formations are very thin manpower wise in 1944. As for quality, according to Zaloga and Glantz, the German army was replacing losses with Eastern European Germans and also drafted other ethnic minorities from the fringe of Germany. These draftees were of much lower quality than anything the German army had used before. To say the German army of 1944 was better trained than the German army of 1941, is laughable. It simply wasn't. And from 1943 on, the German army does not improve technology wise very much. The Soviet army does however, with the introduction of the T-34/85 and IS-2. Thus, German tech advantage, while still there in June 1944, was not as great as it had been during Kursk. And if you are talking about how great an army is, operational leadership must be taken into account. The Soviets had been steadily getting better in the area, and had many good commanders who had proven themselves directing operations. (eg Rokossovsky, Konev, Zhukov) OTOH, the Germans are horrible operationally at this point in the war. And it is obvious why. Hitler was virtually running the show and the best field commanders (eg Manstein, Guderian, Rundtstedt) had all been fired before. So, as far as Eastern Front history goes, I think I'll stick with Glantz and Erickson. [ December 16, 2007, 04:06 PM: Message edited by: Cuirassier ]

"BTW… the June’44 army the Germans fielded was their best ever. Superbly equipped and trained. In most units full order of battle. It is just that everyone else had improved even more." What? By June 1944 all German infantry formations were seriously understrength and were only to suffer more once Bagration kicked off. Even many Heer Panzer Divisions were understrength, with many missing a full Panzer battalion (usually undergoing refit at home to get Panthers). Only the favored SS Panzer-Grenadier and some Heer Panzer formations were kept at anything close to full strength. Training had also suffered and the large amounts of casualties (those being replaced by drafted, less skilled troops) lowered quality of the army. Technology wise, the German Army was weaker relatively to the Soviets than it had been the previous summer. Nonetheless, I think the most interesting area/time of operations for a CMX2 East Front would cover the Soviet counter-offensives after Kursk up until the Soviets halt at the Carpathians. Obviously, if the theatre could also cover the center and north of late 1943-44, that would be great too.

An interesting discussion. First of all, I disagree that the American method of war is to superior to the Soviet. Certainly, both doctrines have their strengths and weaknesses; they just occur in different areas. Really it is nearly impossible to determine which is better, since the Soviets and Americans never fought each other directly. But IMO, the American method of war is not the best, and I think it has actually gotten worse since the the 1991 Gulf War. It has become to maneuveresque and relies on technology too much. Traditional American doctrine was much more sound as it focused on only the destruction of the enemy. Current doctrine is much more inclined to drive through gaps and disrupt communications and create command shock yada yada. The reason it has stomped Iraq twice in the initial invasion is not because of superior doctrine, though doctrine was sound in 1991, but because of superior technology. Quite simply, a 1960's-70's era Warsaw Pact style Tank Division or Army gets slaughtered in the face of an American armored division. The Abrams is just superior to T-62's and T-72's in every respect. The real problem we see with the American method of war is during the occupation phase, when insurgents must be dealt with, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem is that the US has become so reliant upon technology that it no longer is willing to accept realistic levels of casualties. The US thinks technology is a substitute for blood paid. And cetainly, technology can do that to an extent. But not to the level Americans demand. And sure the Russians had trouble in Chechnya. But they still came out on top by developing a fairly effective doctrine to deal with insurgents. The US has yet to win in Afghanistan or Iraq. Also, I don't think the Soviet method of war is accurately represented by the Yom Kippur war or the invasion of Afghanistan. In 1973, it is true the Egyptians and Syrians used Soviet tactics. While some didn't work great, others did (eg massing anti tank missiles and SAM's). Also, the equipment and training levels of Egypt and Syria were not on par with the Soviets. Most importantly however, the campaign shows that neither the Syrians or Egyptians followed the Soviet doctrine of war. The Syrians and Egyptians planned to grab some territory, set up strong defences, and then sit there for a politcal settlement. Soviet doctrine OTOH always seeks destruction of enemy forces first and foremost. Territory is ignored, other than how it will affect destruction of the enemy. Thus, military victory precedes political victory, not the other way around. Afghanistan is not representative of the Soviet way of war either as the invasion was not intended to decisively defeat the opposing forces, letting the Soviets conquer the area. Instead, Soviet troops were deployed in small numbers to prop up a pro-Soviet goverment for as long as it would take for Afghani forces to be raised to do the job themselves. The campaign did not seek decisive aims ( and thus did not follow Soviet doctrine) and failed as a result. Furthermore, since invasion was seen more as an occupation, only the small forces of 40th Army were deployed. The Soviets nearly always fought in Afghanistan with fewer men over a larger area than did the Americans in Vietnam for example. If the Americans had fought the Soviets in Europe however, airpower must also be taken into account. American airpower has been largerly responsible for American victories since the Korean war. This is because the US has a top of the line air force and can easily gain control of the skies. Against the Soviets however, American air supremacy would be much more in doubt, since the Soviets had many good aircraft with good pilots. Probably more important though would be the number and sophistication of the Soivet SAM's that travel with virtually every gound unit. These in combination would put American control of the skies in doubt. Finally, I deny the statements that the Soviets were rigid or lacked initiative or something. Arguably, the force structure and its intended roles was rigid during WWII, but this was no longer a factor afterwards with the increase of afv's in every formation. In terms of exploiting opportunity, the Soviets were never rigid. The Soviets exploited the successes of Bagration and the offensives in the south to the fullest. Operation Uranus and Little Saturn were actually exploited too much. The Soviets were perfectly capable of changing a plan to meet circumstances. Its just that it was Army and Front commanders making this call, which is traditionally much higher up the chain of command when compared to western systems. Thus, the Soviet system was indeed 'command push,' but it was not overly rigid. You just had to be someone quite important to change a plan. But if you were, you could deffinately change the plan, and this did happen.

Well I haven't tried it yet, but I'm sure excited to!

WWII. I can't get enough of it, particularly eastern front. It is deffinately my favorite setting for a wargame. However, I would love to see an Israel vs Egypt/Syria CM.

According to Glantz (In Pursuit of Deep Battle), the 1943 Rifle Corps was pretty bare. Other than the 3 Rifle Divisions it could have an artillery regiment, consisting of 122mm guns, though this was not always the case. Other than this option, the Rifle Corps had a signal battalion and sapper battalion. This makes sense for this time period, as the Soviets were not as 'rich' in equipment as they would be in 1944 and 45. Thus, the most important assests are held at Army level and are then distributed to Rifle Corps and then Divisions as seen fit. For 1944, Glantz lists the Rifle Corps as having 3 Rifle Divisions, 1 self propelled artillery regiment, 1 guards mortar regiment (katyushas), 1 AA battalion, 1 sapper battalion and 1 signal battalion. Regular Rifle Corps are listed as having 1 artillery regiment, while Guards Rifle Corps have 1 artillery brigade.

What are some recommended 2 player company to reinforced company sized scenarios? They can be any time frame.

I was reading some von Clausewitz today and came across this, which is related to the excerpt originally posted by JasonC. Again it shows how the Germans departed from their sound doctrine during WWII. Thought some may find it interesting. Edit: What I find most ironic about this is the fact that the Soviets, with their concepts of correlation of forces, successive operations, deep battle, etc have historically seemed to adhere to the concepts of von Clausewitz more than the Germans have. Apparently the German's believed that their nice, powerful Panzer divisions were a substitute for the sound doctrine of the past. von Clausewitz: "Relation of Power In the eighth chapter of the third book we have spoken of the value of superior numbers in battles, from which follows as a consequence the superiority of numbers in general in strategy. So far the importance of the relations of power is established: we shall now add a few more detailed considerations on the subject. An unbiassed examination of modern military history leads to the conviction that the superiority in numbers becomes every day more decisive; the principle of assembling the greatest possible numbers for a decisive battle may therefore be regarded as more important than ever. Courage and the spirit of an army have, in all ages, multiplied its physical powers, and will continue to do so equally in future; but we find also that at certain periods in history a superiority in the organisation and equipment of an army has given a great moral preponderance; we find that at other periods a great superiority in mobility had a like effect; at one time we see a new system of tactics brought to light; at another we see the art of war developing itself in an effort to make a skilful use of ground on great general principles, and by such means here and there we find one general gaining great advantages over another; but even this tendency has disappeared, and wars now go on in a simpler and more natural manner.—If, divesting ourselves of any preconceived notions, we look at the experiences of recent wars, we must admit that there are but little traces of any of the above influences, either throughout any whole campaign, or in engagements of a decisive character—that is, the great battle, respecting which term we refer to the second chapter of the preceding book. Armies are in our days so much on a par in regard to arms, equipment, and drill, that there is no very notable difference between the best and the worst in these things. A difference may still be observed, resulting from the superior instruction of the scientific corps, but in general it only amounts to this, that one is the inventor and introducer of improved appliances, which the other immediately imitates. Even the subordinate generals, leaders of corps and divisions, in all that comes within the scope of their sphere, have in general everywhere the same ideas and methods, so that, except the talent of the commander-in-chief—a thing entirely dependent on chance, and not bearing a constant relation to the standard of education amongst the people and the army—there is nothing now but habituation to war which can give one army a decided superiority over another. The nearer we approach to a state of equality in all these things, the more decisive becomes the relation in point of numbers. The character of modern battles is the result of this state of equality. Take for instance the battle of Borodino, where the first army in the world, the French, measured its strength with the Russian, which, in many parts of its organisation, and in the education of its special branches, might be considered the furthest behindhand. In the whole battle there is not one single trace of superior art or intelligence, it is a mere trial of strength between the respective armies throughout; and as they were nearly equal in that respect, the result could not be otherwise than a gradual turn of the scale in favour of that side where there was the greatest energy on the part of the commander, and the most experience in war on the part of the troops. We have taken this battle as an illustration, because in it there was an equality in the numbers on each side such as is rarely to be found. We do not maintain that all battles exactly resemble this, but it shows the dominant tone of most of them. In a battle in which the forces try their strength on each other so leisurely and methodically, an excess of force on one side must make the result in its favour much more certain. And it is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. Buonaparte, the greatest general of modern times, in all his great victorious battles—with one exception, that of Dresden, 1813—had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipsic, Brienne, Laon, and Belle-Alliance, he was beaten. The absolute strength is in strategy generally a given quantity, which the commander cannot alter. But from this it by no means follows that it is impossible to carry on a war with a decidedly inferior force. War is not always a voluntary act of state policy, and least of all is it so when the forces are very unequal: consequently, any relation of forces is imaginable in war, and it would be a strange theory of war which would wish to give up its office just where it is most wanted. However desirable theory may consider a proportionate force, still it cannot say that no use can be made of the most disproportionate. No limits can be prescribed in this respect. The weaker the force the more moderate must be the object it proposes to itself, and the weaker the force the shorter time it will last. In these two directions there is a field for weakness to give way, if we may use this expression. Of the changes which the measure of the force produces in the conduct of war, we can only speak by degrees, as these things present themselves; at present it is sufficient to have indicated the general point of view, but to complete that we shall add one more observation. The more that an army involved in an unequal combat falls short of the number of its opponents, the greater must be the tension of its powers, the greater its energy when danger presses. If the reverse takes place, and instead of heroic desperation a spirit of despondency ensues, then certainly there is an end to every art of war. If with this energy of powers is combined a wise moderation in the object proposed, then there is that play of brilliant actions and prudent forbearance which we admire in the wars of Frederick the Great. But the less that this moderation and caution can effect, the more must the tension and energy of the forces become predominant. When the disproportion of forces is so great that no modification of our own object can ensure us safety from a catastrophe, or where the probable continuance of the danger is so great that the greatest economy of our powers can no longer suffice to bring us to our object, then the tension of our powers should be concentrated for one desperate blow; he who is pressed on all sides expecting little help from things which promise none, will place his last and only reliance in the moral ascendancy which despair gives to courage, and look upon the greatest daring as the greatest wisdom,—at the same time employ the assistance of subtle stratagem, and if he does not succeed, will find in an honourable downfall the right to rise hereafter." [ December 07, 2007, 08:41 PM: Message edited by: Cuirassier ]

The true German doctrinal approach would be to send a Panzer regiment supported by a Panzer Grenadier Battalion. Of course, this would make for a seriously unbalanced CMBB game.

Agreed. I still think CMSF would have been best if it modeled a high intensity conflict between near equal powers.

Lol. Javelins can be nasty.

Thanks, I'll check these books out. Is there anything specific on the battles for the Dnepr? I'm particularly interested in the period involving the Soviet breakout north of Kiev and the following German counterattacks.

Unfortunately I do not speak German.

What are the best books discussing the 1944 Soviet winter campaign and the Vistula-Oder operation? Does Glantz have anything on these (other than a general history eg When Titans Clashed). Are there any Soviet general staff studies on these subjects? Thanks.

Is the OICW still being developed?

And the aura of Tiger invincibility comes to an end. No need to worry though. I was in for a rough ride during my first PBEM games too. I still had a blast though; losing to a human is still always more fun than stomping the AI. You learn quick from playing a human too.

I recommend JasonC's campaigns. They aren't actual operations, but strings of missions you play in order. They have certain rules you are to follow, which makes them play out like an operation. They can be found at The Proving Grounds. My personal favorite is the Ponyri operation that depicts the actions of 41 Panzer Corps north of the Kursk bulge during Citadel. George Mc's opertations have been great too, though their size can be daunting at times.

Lol. I've made some scenarios for myself against the AI. Lets just say they are a little uninspiring. I'll will send you a setup tomorrow. It will probably be a QB unless I find an interesting scenario I haven't played yet.

Sivodsi is you are still looking for a game to play I'm up for a small one. QB or scenario.