Cuirassier

I haven't bothered to read the whole thing yet, but I don't think this advice is workable: "A simple rule of thumb is the 3:1 ratio attackers to defenders. If Red has a platoon, Blue gets a company. Red has a single tank, Blue gets a troop." With blue attacking, that would be way too easy. 3:2 odds are plenty to conduct a successful attack. With 3:1 odds, the blue attacker would never lose. He could leave half his force on the back side of the map and still win, probably easily, provided the terrain doesn't favor the defender to an absurd degree. And I hope this suggestion for scenario design doesn't carry over to CM:Normandy, since 3:1 ratios weren't the norm. Ask Panzer Lehr...

My favorite tactic when using vehicles with good armament and IR optics is for someone to pop smoke and then the vehicle area fires from behind the smoke. The enemy RPG's can't see or fire and your vehicle can shoot all day. If thats not possible, the next best thing is keyholing with armor when possible. Move into positions where it is only possible to see on enemy unit at a time. I like to lean on the armor and artillery in street fighting when possible, as infantry seems pretty frail. Oh, and send HE first whenever ammo and RoE permit. You don't necessarily have to wait for spots.

I am a cautious player. Or maybe deliberate is a better word. I find that time is not a huge issue in most scenarios, even using the deliberate approach. Generally things start slowly as you set up your forces and send out feelers to find the crust of the enemy line. But once you get seriously engaged, units on both sides start dying fast. If you are winning in these exchanges, your advantage snowballs quickly and mopping up the rest of the enemy goes quickly. In CMSF, firepower is king. My maneuver plan is always simple and I only do risky maneuvers (eg running a tank down the map to cut a retreat, etc) when I'm nearly certain that I've completely smashed his AT network. One big distinction that I would make between my tactics and a more 'maneuverist' type of player is that, when planning and executing a battle, I always use a robust method rather than a perfectionist one. That is, instead of trying to anticipate every move that my enemy may make and come up with the perfect solution to defeat it, I try to implement a simple plan that efficiently applies the firepower of my force. I look at the map and see all of the places where I can blow up his potential positions. A large reserve is maintained to deal with this threat or that, and to carry me through the depth of the defense. The most important element I see in conducting a successful attack or defense is the proper coordination and allocation of your firepower. So I don't like to read or apply Sun Tzu to anything. Falkenhayn or Zhukov have much more to offer.

I don't remember the scenario well enough to give specific pointers, but the basic tactic when dealing with a superior weapon system in a good position is to deny battle. That is, when discovered, back off in that sector and attack elsewhere. Murder his infantry first, and killing the T-90's will become much easier. Typically against a human this forces him to bring his armor forward to hunt you, giving you the advantage of momentarily sitting on the tactical defense. Remember that the weakness of a keyholed unit is its very limited firing lane. And be aggressive with the Abrams. Drive them into the town. Just make sure they hang back until needed. Keyhole shoot and scoot at single buildings. Shoot with them from behind smoke screens to neutralize RPG threats.

Don't drive into the kill sack (breach the wall on one of the flanks).

Not sure how interesting a tactical ww1 sim would be...

Ok. Well send me a setup or some more info at rdinsdal@ualberta.ca. My only request is that the scenario/test not be larger than reinforced company size.

I'm up for CMSF. I actually haven't played it pbem yet. What did you have in mind?

URC, "my marginal beef with this, as with the vulnerability of marching columns, is that it's not the impression i get from action reports or doctrinal works. i may very well be wrong, but my impression is that the role of arty fires at forward positions & outposts was to cause the early deployment (which of course implies arty fires effective enough to force it -- not just harassing fires)," Yes, there aren't any reports that I'm aware of where arty in the outpost line was used with the purposed of causing casualties to prematurely deployed forces. But I think that is mainly a doctrinal issue (all the major armies put artillery in the back seat to maneuver arms in ww2) Maybe there is some useful ww1 stuff on this but I haven't looked into it. My argument is merely theoretical. "i don't mean that the latter would not take place, i just have the impression that it was not the important part. my impression is that those forward positions are withdrawn once enemy deploys, unless those positions hold special importance due to terrain covered." In most cases, probably yes. There are many instances however where Soviet forward positions hold on, allowing themselves to be bypassed. The Soviets believed that enveloped positions, if fortified and prepared well enough could still be useful tactically. "ikewise my impression is that marching columns are actually less concentrated and worse artillery targets than units deployed for attack. effects of typical arty strikes on marching columns is primarily that of causing disorganization, though there are exceptions which typically include elements like knowledge of enemy intentions or positions due to intelligence (yes, forward positions are part of the intelligence arsenal) or terrain which forces enemy to concentrate on narrow forest roads and such." Well this depends. As I touched on earlier, a whole marching column caught by surprise (with most of it under the arty foot print) is quite vulnerable as men aren't in cover and tend to be fairly concentrated (laterally). If the FD is doing its job however, then the column will be in alright shape, as it is presumed that the enemy will be found and fixed before the main body makes contact or comes in range. As you've mentioned before however, the biggest vulnerability of the marching column is its front to back separation, allowing concentrated counter-attacking elements to engage the forward elements piecemeal. "my impression is that Soviet WW2 era security zone troops depended on obstacles and long range artillery to stop approaching enemy columns. those troops would mostly be recon guys protecting FOs -- not the relatively heavy troops as in post-war Soviet forward detachments (though rear guards for withdrawing battalion strong resistance lines would preferably be of similar mechanized types) ." Which is correct. Most often, iirc, the Soviet security zone was composed of strongpoints formed from a battalion of the second echelon rifle regiment (for a RD). Obstacles and fortification (especially of villages) was especially important to the Soviets. Long Range arty from corps and army launched prep fires in their sectors, but it wasn't controlled by these guys. It was a command push system. Often AT guns would be pushed down into the security zone to give them extra punch. For the most part however, I think their task was simply to observe and grind with attacking forward elements, full expecting that many would get encircled and maybe only half would make it back to friendly lines. Remnants would typically withdraw at night if possible. Adam, "My impression of the process is: A security echelon is made of platoon sized strong-points reinforced with some anti-tank weapons. Each strong-point preferably deploys on terrain offering long fields of view. This is because the security outposts are to fire at their weapon's maximum targeting range. (Not necessarily under the effective range.) When they see the enemy, they open fire and do as much damage as they can before reply fire, and then they withdraw under cover of artillery. So, at this point, the artillery is primarily used to get the strong-points evacuated safely." Which is a common doctrinal approach, but not the only way to do things. As I look at this discussion, I am beginning to see that the outpost/observed arty approach is not much different from the later defensive tactics seen in ww1. The idea being to keep as few maneuver units in the forward positions while arty is the dominant arm and attrits the attacker. Either way though, I question the ability of security elements to cause premature deployments. Late-war Soviet FD's, for example, were quite powerful and required a fair bit of force to necessitate the deployment of the main body. As for the pbem game, I don't have the files of last one anymore. I would prefer to start a new game, but will continue the old one if you want. Did you have anything new in mind?

First off, thanks for the replies. This forum has been void of interesting discussion for too long, imo. Adam, "The argument "Moving columns are always more vulnerable to fire effects" ignores all kinds of particulars and specifics of the situation. It's cliche. Sometimes moving columns are better off against this kind of massed artillery, and being "deployed" as an attacker is no advantage when weathering a barrage of this magnitude." In most cases I would assume that the moving column is more vulnerable, if most of the column is caught under the barrage. This is simply because the force is quite tight together, all moving at once and probably not expecting to be under observation/fire. Of course, for this to happen, the marching troops needed to have had made a huge mistake by marching a whole column unprepared into an enemy defense. It is unlikely to happen. Proper tactics would have the advanced guard/forward detachment drive into the defenders security zone and seize advantageous terrain, allowing the main body to continue safely in march with a pick of routes. If instead the FD hits the MLR, it takes a beating, but at least the main body gets some intel and knows where to deploy. "The German solution is to send in as small a force as is neccessary to remove the screens. They *do* deploy, but they are company-sized forces and the artillery effects are limited by their targets. If an entire infantry division could somehow be forced to deploy on a town or sector where artillery fires have been pre-registered and massed, that is a great thing for that otherwise inflexible arm" I agree that attackers have numerous options to counter an outpost line back by arty. But even attacking forces deployed in depth and using packet movement need to concentrate more than a thin skirmish line looking to infiltrate or screen only. "Right if he deploys, otherwise the security screen is penetrated and deployment doesn't need to occur. It's just an error and exposes the attacker to both fire and other effects. It's not just one or the other." Agreed. I'm not saying that the enemy will always deploy prematurely. The whole art and risk of the thing is tricking the attacker that your outpost line is your MLR. The point of the recon in force and advanced guard/forward detachment is to correctly identify the structure of the defenses and seize the outpost line, facilitating proper deployment of the main body. Most of the time I would say these units do their job. But look at 48PK sector during Kursk, for example. Their reconnaissance failed to fully identify and deal with the Soviet security zone. So it does happen sometimes. "ps - I really miss our CMBB game. " I was under the impression you didn't want to continue after I sent a few files with no reply. My email has done strange things in the past though. They didn't get through? URC, "i naturally agree that trading space for bonus arty fires is very useful, but i am not convinced that those arty fires at outpost line are more effective than those at MLR." Which is the point I'm trying to make. I'm not saying that arty is more useful in the outpost line than in the MLR. Indeed, assuming a defense in depth, the more the attacker penetrates, the more dangerous the defense becomes. But an outpost using artillery against a prematurely deployed attacker will get decent fire opportunities, without significantly reducing the fire opportunities that would occur later in front of the MLR.

URC, My rationale is that the attacker, who has deployed early expecting the MLR to be just ahead, concentrates to apply maximum force (via shock) against the defending line. He instead hits air (the outpost line) while being shelled by the artillery. So by committing more forces to the attack, the attacker increases his force to space ratio, which increases the effectiveness of the artillery. An infiltrating recon screen (used to lead a march or gain assembly room for the main body) is relatively thin on ground by comparison, and therefore not as good an artillery target. The fact that there is lots of enemy visible does not really hurt the outpost line because they are just acting as FO's for the artillery. The artillery isn't vulnerable to attacking tanks or infantry until they've broken through the MLR. Only counter-battery or air attack would have to be worried about. When the attacker is in march column and engaged, it is true that this can favor the defense. But this doesn't improve the effectiveness of the artillery (which prefers a denser enemy). The advantage of counterattacking leading units of the march column comes with armor and shock action. There are plenty of midwar examples of concentrated panzer units smashing leading Soviet tank brigades because the main body is a good 50km behind and unable to help. So I agree that the main use of making an enemy deploy early is simply to gain time, which is especially useful when the attacker seeks breakthrough and exploitation. But I think it is also useful by making the attacker concentrate under artillery, instead of infiltrating with a more limited force.

JasonC, "Well they fired the counter-prep at 2 AM, on a dark and stormy night. So yeah naturally it was unobserved. Yes an observed fire would have been more effective, but the Germans started their recon in force well before dawn for that reason." As I understand it, the 48th PK conducted their recon in force during the afternoon on the 4th. "Also, observed fire and fire that all starts at the same time at one word of command are fundamentally at odds. Observation occurs when it occurs. It is an eyes-forward-pull vs. brains-rearward-push trade off. In my opinion the eyes have it, pretty clearly. But you can't get both just because you want them - the enemy does not show himself uniformly along a whole front hundreds of miles long." Agreed. I'm not arguing that the Soviets should have adopted an opportunity-pull artillery system. I'm just using the Kursk example to help visualize how an opportunity -pull artillery system could gain fire effects by having previously forced the enemy to deploy early. The advantages of course being a more concentrated and visible enemy to shoot at. This is of course something the Soviets couldn't have achieved, given command-push doctrine and German night infiltration. But its something that modern western forces, for example, could achieve.

It's been awhile since I've looked closely at this thread, but after doing some reading on Kursk, I want to revisit it. IIRC, Some argued that forcing an enemy to deploy early gains no fire effects. Others said the opposite. Looking at the opening stages of Kursk (4th Panzer Army sectory), maybe forcing the enemy to deploy early could generate some useful fire effects. Here is my reasoning: When 48th Panzerkorps and 2nd SS Panzerkorps began their reconnaissance in force, they committed a line of grenadier battalions and limited armor, as far as I know. No significant artillery was used. I'm assuming the main assault groupings were in defilade waiting to gain assembly room for the assault the next day. Thus the Soviet outpost line only had LOS to the leading skirmish line of 4th Panzer Army. Once driven back past the ridge overlooking the German assembly areas by the skirmish line, the Soviets lost LOS to these areas. The Soviets fired a counter-preparation anyway, with seemingly limited results. I'm assuming this is because of the wide German deployment, lack of LOS to the German side of the field to adjust the fires and relative inflexibility of the Soviet artillery system (eg directed by Division to Corps commanders, not platoon, company commanders). But imagine a similar scenario where the Soviet outpost line forces the premature deployment of the German assault forces. Now the Soviets see more battalions, both of infantry and armor, to shoot at and have the LOS to call down more accurate fires. I would think the per shell effectiveness would increase in comparison to the blind fire counter-preparation that actually occurred. So forcing the enemy to deploy early gives the defending artillery and the FO's guiding the artillery more enemy to chew on. Now, this isn't because the attacking force isn't in column, but because the attacking force is prematurely committed, with lots of it in sight of the guns. I still need to look into this further and want more numbers, details etc. But its an initial thought.

For BMP-1's at least, it would seem that it means the vehicle is in defilade except for the ATGM and the gunner's head. Haven't tested how it functions with tanks or other IFV's. CMSF's los system is more complicated than I originally thought.

Today I ran a few tests using the ATGM's on the BMP-1(4c) IFV. I am interested in seeing if the game models the ability for roof mounted ATGM's to peek over crests and snipe armor without exposing (or very minimally) the launching AFV. I set up a company of vet BMP-1's against a green company of T-72M's. The range was 2000m (I used normaldude's firing range map). When the BMP's were in partially hull down or hull down positions, they readily spotted the enemy tanks and were spotted by the enemy tanks. They readily lost the duel, which was unsurprising considering the T-72's advantage in weapons accuracy, ROF, armor muzzle velocity etc. However, when I setup the company of BMP's to have the los line read 'reverse slope, no aim point,' I saw some interesting results. First, the BMP's took more time to spot enemy T-72's (40 sec to a minute). Once spotted however, the BMP's engaged and achieved around a 60% hit rate, with all missiles hitting achieving kills. Turret hits regularly brewed up the T-72's while hull hits caused minor damage. Most interesting was the fact that the T-72's failed to locate the BMP's about 90% of the time. When they did spot the BMP's, their reply shots went high. I will continue to test this (with other roof mounted atgm vehicles as well) and see if I can reproduce these results consistently over various ranges. So far it looks like that roof mounted ATGM's, when used carefully with supporting infantry giving spotting information, are great at dueling other AFV's with practically no threat to themselves. Has anyone else played around with this? Seems to me that BMP's may be much more dangerous AT vehicles than I originally thought.

JonS, Exactly. The Sherman (and other tanks like the T-34) didn't earn their praise by killing big cats. They were good AFV's because they could appear where required in more than adequate numbers and bleed the defending German infantry white when properly supported. Certainly the most sane way to compare the value of different IFV's. However there is still the problem that the US's other arms are so overpowered compared to the Syrians (eg Javelin, arty, aircraft) that the true value of the IFV's may be difficult to see. If Syrians could be armed with Javelins and super reactive arty, or the the US infantry was 'dumbed' down to the Syrian level, it would probably be a fairer test. Also I'm not sure how many people would be willing to take this much effort to conclude this debate. Still though, a great idea.

Mikey D, The BMP-3 is not in limbo, sitting outside of Russian doctrine. I'm sure it fulfills its intended role very well, which is to support the leading rifle regiments in breakthrough attacks. Rider comfort, carrying capacity, etc are secondary. The most important element, as the Russians saw, is to bring tremendous fire power to the fight, so the enemy defenses can be suppressed and mopped up by riflemen. The BMP-3 is not a patrol vehicle, as some people on this thread seem to think. Sure better armor would be desirable. But I would sacrifice it for better firepower. Superior application of firepower, not thicker plate, protects the friendly force. Ask the Germans. Besides, modern AT weapons are so effective (AT-14, Javelin etc) that having thick armor doesn't matter a whole lot. An AT-14 doesn't care if you're in a ERA Bradley or a BMP-3. Either way it will KO both vehicles reliably. And historically forces have gotten incredible use out of thin armored vehicles with 'hammers.' The Marder, Su-76, US TD's etc all served admirably despite being vulnerable to all heavy weapons. I mean, just because an AFV was vulnerable to Panzerschreks didn't make it useless. All armor plate needs to do is keep out the light, stealthy AT that firepower arms can't chew on when engaging. And if BMP-3's are being used like tanks or something else, its not a problem with the vehicle. It is a problem with doctrine. Just fire the blockheads and put men in charge that understand how to use the assets they are given. If anything, the Stryker seems out of place, in terms of basic doctrine. It is too lightly armed to be classified as a real IFV, while it is too heavy and expensive to be optimum as a basic APC. Really an upgraded M-113 or BTR would serve better in these roles. And one final thing. Trying to rank IFV's by seeing which ones trump the others in a direct duel is silly. IFV's aren't designed with the purpose to kill the enemies IFV's. The value of an IFV is shown in its ability to get its infantry to where they need to be, alive, and then support them with effective fire. Leave the IFV and tank killing to the tanks and ATGM formations.

I think the firepower of a vehicle is much more important than its carrying capacity, road speed, armor, etc. Compare a Stryker company to a BMP-3 mech company. The Stryker company needs to rely pretty much on the infantry with Strykers helping out where they can. A BMP-3 mech company, OTOH, can deliver its attack with its armor. The BMP's can shoot all day and obliterate strongpoints, making the job for the infantry much easier. Thus BMP-3's have the ability to give much better support to their infantry, whereas Strykers are less likely to be as effective.

Dima, Couldn't agree more. To me, at least, the Russians have always seemed more practical with weapons designs. The BMP-2 is still a great design in my books and I even think the BMP-1 is still a capable vehicle and would take it over a Stryker. The BMP-3 has tremendous firepower and good operational mobility, which are probably among the most important attributes an IFV can have. Despite this, I don't think the Stryker is useless. Even a modest .50 cal will help suppress defenders. But a 30mm auto cannon and 100mm HE are obviously better.

And remember, when the Soviets invented the IFV with the BMP series, they added ATGM's. The Americans probably thought it was a worthwhile attribute to adopt. In fact, the Bradley does the BMP-1/2 one better by mounting two ATGM tubes rather than just a single. Competitive Americans...lol

You park your car in defilade only.

Not sure if what you are asking is even desirable. Tanks tend to be shell magnets, meaning infantry bunched up behind are likely to suffer from all kinds of metal chucked at the tank. Tanks protect infantry with their guns, not armored plate. Though I guess it could have some use when all of the enemies heavy weapons are neutralized.

Time machine?? So he got nuked 3 times??

nomorebullshyt, No attackers did not always take higher casualties. Both the western allies and the Germans achieved favorable kill/loss ratios when they were winning operationally. The Soviets didn't. Thats the point. And I wrote that the only case you see tank-heavy forces defeated within the tactical defense are early war British and Soviet attacks, not JasonC. Contrary to what you think, Mars and Kursk are not counter-examples to this. In fact, both campaigns support what I'm saying. In Mars, the Soviets tore big holes in the front and broke through. But the Germans had enough PD's to slide into place and defeat the Soviets in detail (central positioning, mobile counterattacks etc). Similarly, the Kursk offensive was stopped in the operational depths, not the tactical. The Germans broke through the tactical defenses in a matter of days, and had plenty of runners to complete the encirclement if Soviet armored operational reserves had been absent.

URC, Well the Germans were the only ones to lead with tanks consistently. And whenever they had the odds to actually an attack with a realistic chance of success, they broke through the tactical defenses easy. Even when you look at battles such as Mortain or the counterattacks by the Panzer Brigades in Lorraine (scenarios where they had no business attacking), they don't have trouble making the initial break in. Certainly they aren't not stopped by AT guns. Instead they break in some kilometers, get infantry stripped by tons of indirect artillery, and then the armor is hunted down by TD's and bazooka infantry, well within the defended zone. The Soviets also put Tank Corps in first echelon a few times, and such attacks were successful. It was only when Panzer Corps sized counterattacks showed up that the Soviet armor was heavily attritted and slowed down. Goodwood was of course bloody. But the British had a notorious fetish with treating armor like cavalry and using it independently in unsuitable terrain. American breakthrough doctrine was solid and worked fine. Sure, they led with infantry, keeping the AD's in reserve. But the Americans also had super-reactive artillery and tons of it. Independent tank battalions and TD's also boosted the armor strength of some infantry divisions up to AD strength for short periods. So basically I see two effective ways for breakthrough. One is to run the enemy off his feet with an armor heavy attack, achieving a cheap and quick breakthrough, and then hoping you have enough to defeat arriving reserves. Essentially this is the method best demonstrated by the Germans. The other good method is to efficiently bleed the enemies frontline strength, effectively running him out of reserves through infantry probes heavily supported by arty. Call this the American way. Both work and both are relatively inexpensive in human and armor cost terms (the attrition method obviously requires lots of artillery). And Bagration is notable for its failure to achieve a favorable kill/loss ratio. Sure it was an operational success, smashing the Germans etc. But no one else in their greatest operational victories accomplished this. The early war German victories achieved favorable ratios. And so did Falaise. So as long as the terrain allows armor to deploy fully, and the armor is supported by all arms, massed armor attacks cheaper and quicker than trying the same with massed infantry numbers. Sorry if this is all over the place, but there are lots of points to address.