Cuirassier

I've been continuing my search of the internet for relevant articles regarding this topic. One interesting essay I found is here I think many of the ideas in that essay are relevant to CM. Thoughts? Also, I've been having better luck finding information about German WWI doctrine (Stormtroop and Infiltration tactics), which is of course very applicable to CM as well. Thanks to the people who have been contributing to this thread.

"You bring up some very valid points, but your definitions are a bit off. Fall Gelb was maneuver warfare, period, by the definition of US and NATO military doctrine. Lind defined exactly what Maneuver warfare is in his book of the same name. The target in manuever warfare is not always a political target, it is anything that if destroyed/captured etc would cause the enemy to stop fighting. In actual maneuver warfare the goal is the enemy's 'critical mass'. In France this was surrounding the enemy and forcing him to surrender." Thats the problem with 'their' definition of maneuver warfare. According to them, anything that wins, and wins cheaply and quickly, is maneuver warfare. Anything that is costly and stupid is attrition warfare. Their definitions are flawed.

"But I disagree with some of your points. The Ukranians welcomed the German as liberators. They hated Moscow and Stalingrad and Communism. It wasn't an act when they welcomed the Germans." It is true that that some portions of the Soviet Union disliked Stalin's regime, saw the German's as liberators and actually aided the Nazi's when possible (eg the Ukraine, Latvia, etc) However, even if a greater percentage of the populations of these respective nations rallied to the German side, it would have made little difference. "Second, Germany come a hair from winning the Battle of Britain, their intel failed them. The Royal Air Force was on it's last legs when the Germans switched from targeting airfields and the aircraft industry and switched to terror raids. But I will agree they had the wrong type of Air Force to fight the Battle of Britain in that they had aircraft more suited for tactical and operational use rather than on a strategic effort. Light and medium bombers exclusively, short range fighters, etc." The battle was a very close run fight. It is true that the Luftwaffe suffered from poor intel and stupid decisions made by Goering. Nonetheless, in war, plans cannot be expected to fuction as intended. When mentioning the Battle of Britain in my last post, I was trying to convey that it was a gamble to fight a battle of attrition with a fixed stockpile of equipment rather than a flow, which makes good your losses. More importantly, this should have been a sign for the German leadership that mistakes (intel etc) can happen, and that an attrition strategy reduces much risk in war. It provides a good fall back in case the quick and cheap victory fails. "Next, claiming that the Battle of France in 1940 was an attritionist strategy is debatable." Our differences in opinion lies in the fact that you are speaking of the operational level of the campaign, while I was talking about the strategic level. The campaign in France was an attrition strategy (though not completely as it wasn't an example of 'Total War')because the German army sought to destroy the French and British forces. It was not primarly focused on terrain objectives. Yes, when Guderian broke out across the Meuse, he picked the channel coasts, seeing that location as important. But he did not send his Panzergruppe their because the coast had any strategic value of its own. He drove there because the allied army in the north could then be fenced in and defeated in detail, which was promply done. A maneuver strategy would not seek this effect, and would instead go for the 'shot in the brain', by capturing Paris, for example. At the operational level, as you describe, the campaign was indeed maneuverist. Manstein's feint through Belgium and thrust through the Ardennes took advantage of maneuver as a force multiplier, to better the exchange ratio between German and allied forces in the former's favor. However, the maneuver in itself wasn't decisive. The destruction of the enemy as a result of the force multipliers the maneuvers provided is what was decisive. Thus, at the strategic level, the campaign in France was attritionist. At the operational level, it was a maneuver approach.

"It's one matter to convince people when everyone is set against you because of your own actions and you are all stuck in the same **** together." Agreed. "It's completely different when all you original goals have been achieved almost bloodlesly." I disagree. I don't see why it has to be any different. In a regime such as Nazi Germany, if the government can successfully convince a population that a war will be bloodless for them, then why can't they convince the population that the war will be long and arduous. Again, if the German government had given their population two options-either fight a longer "Total War", but with a good chance of victory, or a short wreckless war that will result in the destruction of their state-any sane indivivual will pursue the former. "And the Phoney war illustrates this well. The Germans gain both another easy victory and fool the Russians which then convinces them this will be the status quo. The Allies are unable to persecute a war because noone believes them that the Germans are a real threat." I disagree. Just because the campaign in Poland and France were cheap victories, the German leadership should have readily realized during the Battle of Britain, and when considering an invasion of the Soviet Union, that their entire country's resources would be needed for the war. The Germans gambled however thinking the entire war would be cheap, and lost as a result. Thus, the Germans didn't fail to mobilize because their population was lazy and wouldn't accept the concept of 'Total War,' despite however disasterous the consequences may be. They failed to mobilize because the German leadership was overconfident and foolish, wrongly thinking that the war would be short and cheap. History proves it was neither cheap nor short. And to say that the allies didn't consider the Germans to be a real threat is complete folly. If anything, the allies sat on their hands because they saw Germany as a very dangerous agressor, and thus didn't want to do anything that might cause the war to escalate, even if it meant ignoring their defensive pact with Poland. WWI experiences were still very fresh in the minds of the allied leadership, and they wrongly assumed that sitting passively would make the situation go away. It didn't. "In point of fact it was the Allies who came in for some stick over their conduct. The Germans mounted a successfull propaganda campaign that displayed the Allies as aggressors against the peace loving Germans (which was true in part as raids were being conducted ny the Allies on German military sites)." Not sure what your point is with this statement. Nonetheless, this thread was orignially intended to discuss German maneuver doctrine at the tactical level and how it can be employed or imitated in CM. This thread's purpose is *not* here to discuss the 'what ifs' of WWII and the decisions made by Allied and German leadership in the war. If you want to discuss those things, please start a new topic.

"Wrong, so hopelessly wrong. Your judgements of people are not absolute, it's merely your belief in them." Instead of just disagreeing with people on a basis of what seems to be just arbitrary choice, why don't you actually back up your postion like everyone else. If you have something worthwhile to add, then say it. If not, then don't post.

"So, instead of selling an easy quick war with little discomfort to the supporting populace, you will now tell me how they will accept a long hard war with great personnal sacrifice." When faced with a long war, though one that can be won through total war, or a quick, cheap attempt that will inevitably result with a their own destruction, any population will likely choose the former. Goebbels successfully rallied the German population in 1942 after Stalingrad and the German population carried out the concept of Total War. The allied nations did it throughout the war. To say its impossible is ignoring historical fact. "Meanwhile, all the other countries are going to idly sit on their hands while you visibly gear up for world domination." Umm. When Germany invaded Poland and the western flank of Germany was horribly exposed, France and Britain sat on their hands and did nothing. When France feared invasion, Belgium thought neutrality would save them and did nothing. Denmark did nothing. Norway did nothing. When France was overrun and Britain was hanging alone, the US did not intervene with force until they were themselves attacked. When Germany was making threatening moves in the east, Stalin ignored it. To me, that seems like substantial proof that these things do happen, whether you choose to ignore them or not.

civdiv, There is already a very long thread discussing whether or not Germany could have won WWII somewhere on the CMBB forum (which I began incidentally), if you're interested. "They went forward against France with the expectation that they could conquer the country in a month. This they succeeded at. Basically, at what point should they have gone to the attritionist strategy?" Well, as history proves, Germany didn't need to rely on production or numbers to knock out Poland and then France. Spaces were small enough and terrain friendly enough (plus the lack of knowledge of either nation on how to counter concentrated tank penetrations) enabled Germany to rapidly break through enemy frontlines and encircle and destroy their enemies in detail, earning them very lopsided victories. Against France, I don't see why an attrition strategy would fail. In fact, half of German doctrine was attrition based really, since they focused on destroying their enemy's army. They just had trouble accepting that attrition also applied to them. Either way against France, if they adopted an attrition strategy, they still could have used Manstein's maneuver approach, while also ramping up production. The campaign thus would have ended the same whether production was ramped up or not, as the Germans proved they could destroy France quickly. However, the ramping up of production would have been a good fall back plan if the Meuse crossing was halted or if the planned counterattacks had been successful (eg. De Gaulle's attempt). Remember though, an attritionist attack doesn't mean one has to conduct slow, costly frontal assaults or something. Strategic attrition is primarly based around production capabilities and manpower reserves. A attrionist strategy may still use operational maneuver as a force multiplier to gain favorable kill/loss ratios. Also, from what I know, Germany was a much more powerful state at the beginning of WWII than they were at the beginning of WWI, in terms of manpower, production capabilities, etc. France, in comparison, had declined in strength. Thus, even if the west front in WWII had become another positional trench war as in WWI, Germany could still come out victorious, even with Britain against them on French soil. Falkenhayn at Verdun nearly bled the French to death in 1916 using an attritionist approach. As the relative strength between Germany and France had increased in the former's favor during World War 2 when compared to WWI, it is likely that the Germans, if they had decided to ramp up production, could still have bled France to death. Finally, the German's were much more proficient than the allies at the tactical level during the first years of the war. Even if they made operational blunders during the attack on France, it is likely they would have still achieved decent kill/loss ratios because of this discrepancy in tactical capabilities. "Given, their strategy in France ended up being flawed." Not sure how you determined this. The campaign in France was as flawless as one can expect in war. "So when (given Germany in WWII) should attritionist doctrine be used? When in Russia? After the initial drive on Moscow?" Well, by invading Poland, the Germans (at least Hitler) should have been aware they were starting a World War. When a nation is going to be fighting a World War, it is wise to use every resource you have. Really, the Germans should have started ramping up production and thinking about mobilizing the country when they invaded Poland. Luckily for them, there were no setbacks in Poland or France, allowing them to win cheaply without having to use much of their resources. To there disadvantage however, these cheap victories made them overconfident, and they thought they could defeat anyone within a month. The first time the Germans were really confronted with a battle of attrition (where they weren't achieving quick, lopsided victories)was during the Battle of Britain. Germany started with a larger airforce than the British, but they drew all their combat power from stockpiles of planes already made. They weren't producing even remotely enough planes to replace the losses sustained over Britain. The British however ramped up their production and produced as many Spitfires and Hurricanes as they could, and staved off defeat beacause of it. Germany would have easily achieved air superiority over Britain if they had increased the production of their own aircraft, using a flow of planes and pilots to gradually defeat Britain, instead of relying on a fixed stockpile. This was another oppurtunity for the Germans to realize that not all battles would be easy and cheap in the war, and that they should mobilize their economy. Instead they gave up on the aerial campaign over Britain, and ignored the important lessons to be learned from it. Despite this, the war wasn't lost. It was lost when Germany invaded the Soviet Union without mobilizing the economy. Up to this point, their risks and gambles didn't have adverse consequences. However, invading Russia without a mobilized economy was a stupid gamble that ended in disaster: German losing the war. The Germans should have mobilized before the invasion, knowing they were fighting a power of equal strength, with great manpower reserves, production capabilities, and vast space that could be traded for time. Instead, they mobilized after the defeat in Stalingrad, and never really came close to matching allied production numbers until 1944. By then, it was obviously too late. "Also, what is your read on how things would have been different in the USSR if they had acted better towards the Russians who initially greated them as liberators. Actually, let me distill this further and give you three scenarios, or any combination of the three; 1. They convert to a war economy when they should have. 2. They treat the citizens of occupied Russia as a liberated people? 3. They had adopted an attritionist approach at the proper time in the USSR and post-D-Day, or in N Africa? What combination of the three above would lead to either stalemate, or a German victory? What does an extra year of the Nazi regime mean?" When a country is invaded, and the invaders act nicely to the population (though invading in the first place isn't a very nice thing to do) it is unlikely that the population of the country being invaded will just wave the white flag without a fight. It is a maneuverists dream that a nation can be counquered by instructing invasion forces to be "friendly" and act as liberators. All national populations have some sense of pride and duty to their country, and will normally defend it when faced with destruction. In any case, the concept of Germans acting as liberators during the invasion of the Soviet Union was an impossibility considering Nazi policy regarding Bolsheviks. So basically, if the Germans mobilize their economy before invading Russia, and the US stays out of the war long enough, they could indeed have won. However, they failed to do this, and predictably lost.

Joachim, I think I have come to similar conclusions as you. I've played numerous scenarios of varying sizes against the AI trying the 'penetration of weak points' doctrine described in the pamphlet. When looking at the maps of these scenarios, it is difficult to see how one could isolate the defenders and walk over them in the small time frames usually given. Also, achieving a penetration seems of little use since it just leaves your flanks vulnerable (mainly a problem with armor), and you can't exploit it by driving into the enemy's operational rear. I'm guessing these tactics are only really applicable in the specific circumstances as you describe (covered routes for surprise, lots of space to maneuver, thin linear line ahead of flags giving a penetration an actual objective to achieve, battalion to regimental sized force with ample reserves etc).

"Shouls we really utilise our shiny, spotless guns against the sorry bands of bewildered patrols who seem convinced by industrial alchohol that their zigzag stumbling represents anything worthy of being called an attack ? Or should we just wait untill they fall down by themselves in delerious nightmares and tenderly escort them to the workcamps where they'll be gratefully accepting their new futures in sowing and harvesting?" I suggest using the shiny, spotless guns.

Bump again for JasonC or anyone else interested.

"Have you tried throwing up some dust using vehicles, at least under dry conditions?" Unfortunately thats not a possibility in CMBB.

"So... you took my post seriously, or are you trying to out-irony me? If it's the latter, buddy, you're in for a fight!" Deal. We'll do it the old navy way...first man to die loses.

"What sort of twisted a-hole doesn't simply answer the question?" What sort of doubly twisted a-hole finds it necessary to attack one who simply made a joke in good humor.

Well, has anything happened in this battle yet?

Just downloaded the first two and will give them a try.

What kind of sick, twisted person would want to conscript babies to build trench networks???

Bump

Thanks for the replies JasonC. I have played most of my CM games with an attritionist style, and am now just realizing how attritionist my mindset is. Yesterday I was doing some searches on google looking for sites regarding German tactical doctrine of both world wars. The best document I found was a US handbook written in 1945 I believe discussing German tactical methods. You have probably read it before, but here it is in any case:Lonesentry I've read all of the CM relevant sections. Basically, it describes the basic methods of the German maneuver attack. From what I got out of it, you send troops forward on line (actually attacking certain vital points of the defense) hoping to drive wedges into it at various points, while disguising where the main attack will fall. The main body is then launched through, arranged in depth and typically in waves, and looks to completely penetrate the defense. The frist wave continues into the open areas and can cut off retreats I'm assuming (since one can't drive into the operational rear of the enemy to destroy his artillery parks on the CM scale) The second wave in depth completes the breakthrough and rolls up the enemy position on both newly created flanks, engaging each position in sequence. Strong reserves are necessary for the breakthrough force to repel counterattacks and to have enough momentum to breakthrough and roll up the position. Heavy weapons are generally located on the flanks of the breakthrough force and helps launch them through the position while suppressing flanking fire, delaying reserves etc. Some heavy weapons are decentralized do deal with unexpected threats during the breakthrough. What do you think of the accuracy of this document JasonC, and its applicability to CM? What counters can be used against this approach? What must be achieved for it to be successful?

I have another question for JasonC: With the recon screen, should the full squads on line being the leading elements, or will there be some halfsquads ahead of them to trigger ambushes?

"how far behind the recon screen advance would normally be appropriate for the main body?" I would say it depends on the terrain. In tight terrain (woods etc), I think the main body could probably travel safely 50-100m behind the recon screen. In terrain with less cover, I think between 200-300m would be appropriate.

I've been trying various maneuver oriented methods just against the AI (and planning to in a pbem soon)using the methods described by you, JasonC and Joachim. They allow me to stomp the AI, but that has never been a hard thing to do. Nevertheless, it is allowing me to see how these concepts can work. AdamL, Thanks for the replies. I think what you said reinforces the importance of the recon screen. Simply guessing what the enemy will do in the game and countering it isn't so simple. Information certainly helps, and the recon screen (in combination with lots of thinking) gives one a better chance of 'wrongfooting' the enemy, without being wrongfooted in return.

AdamL, I was hoping you would contribute to this thread. By just reading some of your posts from older posts involving tactics, I have learned that you play CM using a more maneuverist touch (correct me if I'm wrong). So would you be willing to share some of your maneuver concepts on the CM tactical level?

Bump

Finish him! Finish him!

"Cuirassier, to be fair, aren't we all pretty viscious with a bottle of vodka in one hand (half full bottles make me even more viscious) and a machine gun in the other?" Well of course. But no national population wields vodka in one hand and a PPSH in the other as often as the Russians do. And no one therefore matches their experience in drunken, automatic weapon gunfights involving many combatants on a vast, unforgiving frontage.