Cuirassier

Thanks for the replies so far. This is good stuff. JasonC said, "In Bagration their AFV losses ran twice the German's and they managed to lose something like 3 to 2 in manpower. Despite destroying something like 25 infantry divisions through pocketing, generally the most efficient kill ratio generator there is in modern war." Why are Soviet AFV losses so high as well? By sacrificing infantry heavy formations for the breakthrough fight, and subsequently being quite cautious about the employment of armor, why did the Soviets suffer just as heavily in the armor war? Were these AFV's lost primarly in the breakthrough tank brigrades/regiments penny-packeted out to the rifle formations, or in the exploitation Tank armies?

Thanks for your efforts JasonC. I became interested in Operation Kutuzov after doing some reading on Kursk. Unfortunately in CM, it seems that the Soviet counter-offensives following Citadel recieve almost no attention, at least when compared to the initial German attack. I look forward to playing them when they are released. Just one question. Will the scenario pack be like the one you did with Operation Uranus, where you have successive missions showing the development of the offensive?

Are there some good ones out there that are suggested? I have been unable to find any. Thanks in advance. [ April 01, 2007, 09:36 PM: Message edited by: Cuirassier ]

I was browsing some old threads recently that touched on the reasons as to why the Soviets consistently took more casualties than the Germans, particularly when attacking late war, with superior odds and a sound doctrine to guide them. I still find the answer(s?) somewhat of an enigma, as I currently don't have enough resources at my disposal to find out on my own. So maybe some of the grogs can help me out. So I'll start out with what I do know. On another thread (don't remember which one), JasonC said one reason the Soviets suffered heavier casualties was the fetish of some commanders (Corps, Army level) to over-concentrate infantry forces in breakthrough operations. Being a little through Glantz's "In Pursuit of Deep Battle," I can see this happening, as it was Soviet doctrine to employ only Rifle forces for the breakthrough fighting while keeping the tank corps and armies in the rear for exploitation. From just looking at some of the schematics in the book, it becomes apparent that Soviet doctrine was obsessed with achieving mass in the primary attack sector. Though mass is the means to create shock action, against a corps level artillery barrage, it only results in outsized infantry casualties. Now JasonC said that this was completely unnecessary, as the independent tank corps could have been used to achieve initial breakthroughs, while rifle could broaden penetrations and the operational tank armies could exploit into the gap 'clean.' Again, from what I know, this makes sense to me. So why wasn't this done? Was doctrine too rigid? Were most of the higher up commanders just stupid? Were there organizational issues (tank corps too tank heavy/infantry light for breakthrough fighting)? Another thing I find confusing is that the Soviet's stressed combined armes combat, but didn't seem to achieve it. For example, Rifle Armies conducted breakthrough fighting, and possessed significant combined arms forces to achieve this. They had losts of heavy artillery, plus independent tank brigrades and heavy tank/SP gun regiments to support the first echelon rifleman. This seems like a balanced way to fight, yet they took heavy losses. Was it that the smaller independent armored formations didn't achieve the local concentrations necessary to deal with PAK's and local German armor reserves? Did the inflexibility of heavy artillery, and thus subsequent reliance on direct fire assests to provide support cause other issues? As well, I'm guessing these aren't the only reasons for outsized Soviet losses, even when attacking with superior odds late-war with clearly better operational direction than the Germans. We all know the Germans were masters of the tactical art since the days of Moltke the Elder. So then, was it primarly German proficiency, or Soviet ineptitude, that resulted in these outsized losses? Also, what about Soviet tactics and troops at much lower levels. Were junior officers generally too poorly trained or inexperienced to conduct proper attacks? Did organizational problems or tactical incompetence prevent the use of combined arms principles consistently? How did logistics affect attacks (I seem to remember that Soviet artillery was relatively immobile and less flexible than other nation's systems, preventing it from providing adequate support as Soviet forces deepened the penetration and exploited the attack)? Finally, were the deficiencies of Soviet tactical system worked out after the war? Did they develop a more flexible method of tactical maneuver after studying the failures that were occuring even in 1944 and 1945? For example, if they had fought an equally strong Germany in 1950's-70's, would they again have outsized losses (Of course this is ignoring political realities)? I'm just curious if they seriously tried to resolve the issue of high-casualties after the war, since they didn't address it during the war. Sorry if my thoughts and questions seem somewhat 'scattered' or all over the place. I just find this whole topic somewhat confusing, and am trying to find answers. Thanks. [ March 29, 2007, 05:27 PM: Message edited by: Cuirassier ]

I've been reading Glantz's book "The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver," and some essays of his I have found on the internet. I am still waiting for my book "Soviet Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle." Nonetheless, from what I've read of Glantz so far, I'm quite impressed with the amount of detail and insight he provides in his writings. I have some questions for the grogs regarding his one essay found here. Basically, Operation August Storm was the culmination of Soviet war experience and theory and the maturation of their doctrine. In an extremely short period of time, the Soviets virtually annihilated their Japanese opponents via deep operations. During this operation, the Soviets showed excellent combined arms coordination, flexibility and creativity. They also employed surprise well and their use of foreward detachments is notable. At least this is how Glantz puts it. So what I am wondering is this: was the Soviet success in Manchuria a result of an excellent doctrine that was fully matured and commanders could use it to the fullest, or was it a result of of an ill-equipped Japanese army not close to TOE that was poorly handled in the field? I look forward to the replies.

Interesting discussion. I was thinking about buying TOAW III, but if its unrealistic and unplayable, then I won't. How is Korsun Pocket in comparison to these games? I was thinking of getting it. JasonC, How do I get A Victory Lost for computer? You talked about the game on a different thread and it sounds quite well done.

When will this thread end? lol Btw, nice quotes and interpretations Dorosh. They add a much needed level of sanity and perspective to this discussion.

When will this thread end? lol Btw, nice quotes and interpretations Dorosh. They add a much needed level of sanity and perspective to this discussion.

JasonC, "There is a VASSAL for it and I have a hard copy, if anyone is interested in trying their hand at it." As I continue to study the German and Soviet doctrines, I am becoming much more interested in the operational aspects of the war. But pardon my ignorance JasonC, I have practically no experience with operational wargames and don't know what VASSAL is. Still, I think I would be interested. Also, could you direct me to some accurate operational histories concerning German forces on the Eastern front? I don't know where to start looking. I wouldn't mind to see Soviet operational histories as well. If you can't think of any thats fine too. AdamL, I will let you know what I think of the book as soon as I can, though that will probably be a while from now. I have also ordered Glantz's book that discusses the tactics and roles of forward detachments. While I've been waiting for my books I've been combing through the internet trying to scrape up whatever I can concerning Soviet operational theory and doctrine. I find the subject very interesting. If anyone is interested in sharing insight on the subject, and comparing it to German methods, feel free to do so. Perhaps in a later post I'll write down some things I've noticed and learned, though my only resource so far has been the internet.

Thanks for the title AdamL. I've placed an order on Amazon for the book and should get it in a couple weeks.

MikeyD, I'm just curious. Do you ever get the chance to actually play CM? Judging by all the awesome mods you are constantly working on and releasing I can't see how you could possibly afford the time to play CM.

Well, I've decided to add some more to this thread. Over the past couple days I've been searching the internet looking for information about the Russian pre-war doctrine (1936), as I understand it was maneuver based as well. I also want to compare it with German ideas. I've been having difficulty finding information on the subject however. Could someone point me in the right direction where to look for information on pre-war Soviet doctrine? Or if anyone has good knowledge of it could they please post what they know, and compare it with German doctrine? Also, was the Soviet pre-war doctrine mostly just concerned with operational concepts (eg deep battle, successive operations) or was it largely concerned with tactical concepts as well? If any of my questions seem confusing, I can try to elaborate. Thanks in advance.

"The Titanic settled at the bottom of the ocean. Did the Bismarck settle at the bottom of the ocean ?" I wouldn't call the sinking of the Titanic peaceful, whether in comparison to the Bismarck or not.

"The Titanic settled at the bottom of the ocean. Did the Bismarck settle at the bottom of the ocean ?" I wouldn't call the sinking of the Titanic peaceful, whether in comparison to the Bismarck or not.

Sometimes your defence may be mobile (ie ambush and fall back) or sometimes it may just be a static one. Whatever type of defence it is though, you shouldn't be just hitting 'go' throughout the entire game, at least if you're playing a competent player. Though your defence may not move a lot, you should have to make fire control decisions, such as adjusting MG and AT gun fire lanes, infantry cover arcs, artillery fire etc. Also, infantry need not always stand still. Sometimes it is good to pull out from exposed fighting positions and to retreat to prepared positions in your rear area. Also, as Bannon DC said, in most games you'll have some kind of reserve. This you'll have to move around as the battle develops. Lastly, in most battles you should have OP positions, which need to be micromanaged. They need to advance to find the enemy, perhaps ambush some half-squad scouts, and fall back to the MLR. If you just hit go when playing a decent attacker, your defence will likely collapse rather quickly.

JasonC, You cleared up my confusion over how the fundamental ideas of maneuver doctrine work. I guess you had already explained it in your first posts, but it went sort of over my head. So thanks for responses. AdamL, Thanks for the post. I think it is somewhat difficult to debate the mechanics of a maneuver attack when how any attack should be conducted is largely dependent on the specific situation. I think most things and POV's we have exchanged or advocated in our posts have relevance. Really, it is difficult to argue which principles may be better or worse, when there is no specific situation to apply the principles to.

"I know, I'm familiar with the doctrine. But what makes you think your enemy is going blind in any meaningful way in the average CM scenario, simply because his point teams get clobbered?" For the average CM scenario, I would agree. In conditions of low visibility however (heavy woods, town, fog, night etc), the recon screen is very capable of blinding an enemy force by neutralizing his advanced positions before the main body travels one of several possible routes of advance. In conditions such as this, the enemy OP's will not know what route the main body will travel, since they are dead. Thus, the defense should not know where the main attack is occuring until it has already contacted his main positions. By this point it should be too late (unless the enemy just guessed correctly and concentrated in the right spot, despite having no prior intel to act on). Either way, if the recon screen does its job, the defense will either have to just guess where the main blow will fall, or defend everywhere, and risk being defeated in detail. Of course, this is assuming that the defence cannot be fully intergrated because of the low visibilty conditions. "If the recon screen eliminates the enemy OP's in tight terrain, you do no more than announce your intention to begin a skirmish and probably an attack. He then readies his forces for defense (if they were not already) and sends new teams forward to take a look." I don't think this is necessarily true, if the recon screen is handled correctly, and the terrain conditions are favorable. The recon screen *should* be able to eliminate enemy OP's over quite a large front, as it is generally a company on line. If tight terrain or limited visibility prevents easy integration of a defence, then it is possible for an attackers main body to concentrate an assault behind a small portion of the recon screen, without all the defenders being able to help each other out. Thus, by knocking out OP's across the frontage (or a large enough portion of it), the attacker is signalling that he is preparing an attack, but the attack could fall anywhere behind the screen. If the defender does not have adequate intel, he can only guess where this location may be. Also, the new teams a defence sends forward to scout or replace the OP's already lost will have a difficult time fighting their way through a recon screen. It could be a costly way for a defence to gather intel. "If at any time his line comes under attack from your main body, it is *communication* and not his recon screen that will inform him of this. His reserves will be able to meet your attack to the degree that they are aware of it. It does not matter that the screen OP's are gone - they are meant to provide early warning, force you to deploy early (and be exposed to fire), and so forth. They are not the only way the enemy has access to information." It is true that the defender will know when the main attack is underway, once his main positions are engaged with weapons and numbers of troops that exceed what would be found in a recon screen. It is also true that OP's provide early warning. However, assuming favorable terrain, if the OP's are knocked out before getting a glimpse of the main body, the defence will not be aware where the attack will actually fall. Once his main positions are engaged on a selected frontage, he will know where the main body is attacking, but by then it should be too late, and the defence should suffer irrevocable damage as a result. "Right, although *pursuit* can accomplish this too, without prior encirclement being needed at all. You also have fire options that don't need LOS - mortars, artillery." Agreed. What method should be used is dependent on the situation, whether it is infiltration, interdicting overwatch, or pursuit by fire. "Doesn't matter that they're static if they are strong. If he has an entrenched platoon on key terrain, what does he care if you want to take the places he is "not". For he is "not" there probably for pretty good reason." Static positions are very strong if they are all integrated into an effective, supportive set up (everyone has LOS to everyone else). A maneuver attack against such a defence is impossible. However, in suitable conditions, where many of few situations are possible against each position, in sequence, a static defence would be quite weak, as it cannot adapt well. This is especially true if the recon screen is successfull in isolating enemy positions, preventing easy shifting of forces and hinders reserve movements. I also think seizing empty terrain features to be valuable in certain cases. While such features, particularly in the rear of the defencem, may not have value to him, they may have value to the recon screen to be used as places to cut up retreats, prevent easy reinforcement, observe, etc. "Basic idea "prevent enemy from putting reserves in action, or shifting strength to meet your strength" is fine. But it is a broader idea than the means to accomplish it (in your case, occupying empty spots all around his main positions. - hopefully not KZs.)" Agreed. Artillery can be used, HMG's, armor, among other methods. An attacker does have various options to achieve this. "BTW, the primary point of the security screen for the defender is often just to counter the attacker from getting cheap exchanges with his probes. The attacker wants to lead with small elements (assault teams) from each of his platoons and likewise with whatever first echelon screening forces are present. You know the why of that. So the defender seeks to negate that as much as possible by biting off the attacker probes in a skirmish phase or during the first echelons of determined attack. It is not usually as eyes, although every unit plays that role, that aggressive screening is sought by defenders." This is a very valid point you bring up. A fast moving recon screen will definately suffer heavy casualties for little gain if a defender employs a strong, aggressive screen himself, particularly if it uses the 'ambush and fall-back drill.' I think a more attrition based approach would be a better counter to this defence. Basically, probe very carefully ahead, and slowly, while most of the attacking force overwatches. This would mean a slow, predictable heavy front that has lots of firepower readily available. Countering such a defence would warrant a separate thread all on its own I think.

JasonC, "Tiny point - I'd usually have the company HQ group right up with the screen and quite light, lighter than you describe. I'd rarely consider attaching an FO, for example. Occasionally a single AFV, mostly to destroy enemy counter-recon screen light armor. You really don't want one T-26 stopping the whole thing" I can see why one would want the screen light. It means less forces exposed, more forces available for the main body, and the fast screen not slowed down by mortars, FO's etc. However, I came across the idea for a heavier screen when reading some of Fionn's AAR's at CMHQ. He advocated having FO's travelling with leading elements to provide immediate fire support. "Little point - on force selection, some armor or mobile support is thematic. I realize you are talking about northern woods. But unless it is a continuous blanket of trees, such support is still possible. A 251/2 as fire support, for example. Or one 75L24 tank back with the main body." Point taken. Before I was just thinking of pure infantry forces or tank heavy forces. Not a mix. "Big point - Basically you have the execution mechanics right, but the main theme is missing. It is all supposed to start with a guess about what the enemy is going to do, anticipating and outthinking him. In the case of the AI that still happens - it means exploiting its predictability in some way. So yeah there should be flags. Even if you ignore them, the enemy might not." As you've pointed out, this is where I become most confused regarding maneuverism. You say a maneuverist should anticipate largely how the whole battle will play out before it happens. They should, through very intensive planning, devise a way of manipulating and surprising the enemy force in such a way that it ensures victory. So success or failure really hinges on the plan itself, and its execution. OTOH, after reading Fionn's AAR's, and some notes on Moltke the eldar and Clausewitz, there seems to be a slightly differing view, at least that is how I see it. Basically, this view is that, no matter how much you plan, you cannot be assured what an enemy will do or fail to do. Thus you should develop the battle, 'think on your feet,' and react appropriately. To me, the whole idea seems to revolve around flexibility and good judgement. Nonetheless, considering both POV's, it becomes obvious that a mix of both worlds would be best. A good plan provides direction, while flexibility allows one to adapt in case things do not go according to plan, which often happens. I will respond to AdamL's comments in a later post.

"Indeed. As well as shooting anything that moves. And anything that could move. And a lot of stuff that doesn't move." Does that list include your own men if they retreat?

Again, thanks to everyone who is helping to keep this thread going. AdamL, "If I had to find fault with it as you wish us to do, I would have to say that it seems so thorough and precise as to be designed for a game and not for war. To be fair you note you see it as being under ideal circumstances. But as a warfighting doctrine and not just an account of a specific attack, it probably assumes too much." I tried to make my description of a German maneuverist attack thorough for several reasons. First of all, a German infantry force and a German mech force will fight differently, so I thought I'd just pick one and describe how it may fight. Secondly, maneuver doctrine won't be applicable in all cases. Infantry can only do it in heavy cover, or poor visibility conditions. Armored forces can do it on any map. Lastly, I thought I should give some specifics, just so who ever may reply to my post could not come up with 'what if' counters, since it would be left so open for them to justify it. Also, JasonC has already outlined the basic maneuver approach in earlier posts, so I thought I'd do something more specific, to prevent needless repetition. Nonetheless, I feel that my described approach is feasible with vet infantry forces with lots of cover. "For example, you say the recon screen will leave the enemy "with his eyes gouged out", but I can think of a number of ways that's not true. What are "eyes"? What do you mean, that he is completely out of contact with his parent and you?" The line "with his eyes gouged out," I actually stole from one of JasonC's earlier posts, along with numerous other things lol. What I meant in saying that though was that it is one of the recon screen's primary tasks to knock out enemy OP's and scouts. In tight terrain, with limited visibility, we both know that one has to have advanced positions on the defence to maintain any situational awareness. Thus, if the recon screen eliminates these, and secures ground that prevents easy repositioning of scouts detached from the MLR, the enemy will have poor intel, and be far less likely to respond effectively to wherever you send your main body. "Or what about encircling the enemy at the local tactical scale makes him "strangle"? The advantage is that he doesn't get away if your assault element goes in and tries to flush out a trench line, for example. But he doesn't need to be physically surrouneded - having LOS to fire on his escape route is just as good." I agree that having LOS to interdict escape routes and routes required to shift the defence can be achieved without physical encirclement. For example, HMG-42's can cut up and isolate certain blocks of cover from an overwatch location if you can find a place with decent LOS to do so. However, in tight terrain, this can be difficult to achieve from distant locations, or by units that have not penetrated the enemy defence. I see such an attack as "strangling" the defence in that, by avoiding strong points, and taking whatever ground the enemy does not occupy, you are effectively hemming in the defence into static positions. Ideally, any shift of serious forces he tries to make will be interdicted slowed, and at least spotted. Also, by having enemy forces occupying areas all around his main positions, and them having little intel as a result, it will be very difficult for the defender to adjust his defence to encounter wherever the attacker's main blow falls. Anyway, that is how I justify what I said earlier. Thanks for the comments. I'm hoping such criticisms will allow me to better understand the maneuver doctrine, and enable me to work out any kinks in my present interpretation of it. One last thing. You said, "It's a strange combination of sound principles (local odds edges, use of covered approaches & so on) with maneuverist imperatives (e.g, ranged fire as suppressive only)" Could you elaborate on this statement please? What makes it strange? Thanks again.

Thanks again for the replies everyone. I've been looking forward to applying these principles in CM, especially versus other people via PBEM. Most of the games I'm playing now are too far in however to change my strategy, or they are me playing defense. However, I have done a few quickbattles against the AI just to get somewhat of a 'feel' for the German maneuver strategy. Below I'm going to give a general description of how to conduct a maneuverist attack modelled after historical German methods. My interpretation of how to conduct such an attack has been influenced primarly by the contributors to this thread, online information I've found discussing German infiltration tactics, and my own observations while playing a couple QB's against the AI. Of course, I consider myself a student of tactics, and am willing to recieve any criticisms and possible counters to what I've written. For starters, lets assume I have two veteran companies of vanilla foot infantry (lets say June 1941), with organic heavy weapons (6 50mm mortars, a couple HMG-42's). I also have a pioneer platoon, which are veterans too, maybe a couple sharpshooters, and 1 or 2 105mm FO's. The enemy has 1 basic rifle company with organic weapons, maybe and 82mm mortar FO, a couple light tanks, such as BT's, some mines, trenchs, wire and pillboxes. Maybe one or two infantry guns as well. The battle is set in the north, within the heavy pine forests, which allows for infantry to use the maneuver approach. I'll pretend there are no flags, and instead focus on killing the enemy. Knowing this, I study the terrain and identify covered approach routes, and routes that travel through dead ground that will either lead to where the enemy will likely be, or important terrain in his rear that will allow me to see much of his likely positions, cut up retreats, and hinder movements of reserves. Most importantly though, I want covered routes that will allow my main body to rapidly travel through, break through enemy lines, and outflank and roll up the enemy position. I then decide which route I will likely send my main body through, though will want to keep my main body back far enough so it may take a different route if it looks more favorable. This is because I am constantly looking to see where the enemy is weakest, so my maneuver units have clear local superiority immediately over anything encountered. I plan to engage each position in sequence in this manner. Thus, I have a plan from the outset, based on my anticipation of where the enemy is and how he is going to be setup, though I remain flexible so as to either capitilize on unforseen oppurtunities, or to adapt, if my plan is wrong. My attacking force will normally be seperated into three waves. The first wave is the recon line, and has the vital task of rapidly overrunning enemy outposts and scouts, lowering the enemies intel, infiltrating the enemy position wherever he is weak, cutting up retreats and his room to maneuver, while also identifying his main fighting positions. The recon line will be a company in strength. Though a basic infantry company has only three platoons, each platoon gives one of its squads, preferably the best ones, to the company HQ, who makes a fourth platoon. The company HQ can also get a 105mm FO (must be radio to keep up), 2 or 3 pioneer squads, and maybe a couple 50mm mortars. It is the recon line's immediate reserve, and has a good combined arms mix to deal with any threats. Thus, three platoons from the company travel all on line, traveling as fast as possible along their selected routes to maximize surprise, so outposts can't retreat in time. The fourth, heavy platoon, follows immediately behind, in the center. It can either help extricate part of the recon line that smacks into a full enemy position, detach to create a strong feint somewhere where your main blow will *not* fall, or can reinforce success found elsewhere, boosting firepower at a particular location of the recon line before the main body arrives to achieve a quicker breakthrough. Typically, the third line of the attack overwatches the first line (recon screen), as it consists of the centralized heavy weapons supporting the attack. In this case, I don't really have one, as the terrain is too tight. Heavy weapons are instead decentralized to sub-formations, to give immediate support when and where it is needed. This is consistent with historical German doctrine. The main body is the second company, echeloned in depth, or a wedge formation (1 up, 2 back), and forms the second, and decisive line, of the attack. It should be the better company of the two, and will have the remaining heavy weapons. The lead platoon can be heavy, having attached pioneers to deal with mines in case the recon line reserve hadn't, and can also have an FO and 50mm mortars to provide immediate support. Again, the route of the main body is planned from the outset, based on however one thinks they can achieve surprise the best and attack the enemy in sequence, where they are weakest. However, it should remain uncommitted for as long as possible, so it can react to information the recon screen develops in its own battles. Then again, it must be close enough to the recon screen, so it can rapidly push through gaps in the defense before the enemy can react, close the door, or change his dispositions. On the attack, the main body should suppress whatever defenders it encounters with the entirety of the force. Small assault detachments (couple squads, preferably pioneers) then close with the suppressed enemy and overrun them. Portions of the main body, if judged not needed to suppress opposition or assault, can be used to bypass remaining strongpoints and grab more terrain, cutting retreats etc. By suppressing and bypassing opposition, you look to strangle the defense through envelopment. Actual destruction of the enemy is not done by ranged suppressing fire, but by the small assault detachments that phyisically overrun and annihilate suppressed defenders. Basically, IMO, the battle should be heavily in your favor *before* the main body is commited. This emphasises the importance of the first wave, or recon screen. If the recon screen has been successful, the enemy should have lost most room to maneuver, have his eyes gouged out, have his main positions identified and using ammo against the screen, and be unable to make any serious shifts in his dispositions, without being spotted and suppressed. Also, the recon screen, having held much of its fire for most of the battle, can help the main body suppress positions when stationary and in cover. The screen should also draw some of the defenders attention away from your main thrust. The main body is supposed to 'exploit' this state, murder the defense when and where it chooses, because of the said advantages the recon screen provides. So basically this is how I see such an attack, in ideal circumstances, can be conducted, based off of what I've learned. Again, any constructive criticisms or additions will be accepted.

Hetzer38, Great job! Taking out KV's can be a daunting task when you have nothing that can reliably penetrate them, even when playing against the AI.

"The pictures will follow after the Red Army's glorious victory. Patience, comrades." You should post as you go, to prevent the inevitable Red Army bias that will occur if you post only after the match.

Another question: What are some good books that outline or discuss German tactical doctrine either during WWI or WWII (preferably company to regimental scale)? Where could I purchase them? Thanks.

AdamL asked, "Are you primarily interested in CM or something else?" I'm primarly interested in the historical German doctrine used during WWII. Of course, I'm also interested as to how it can be applied in CM.