rocketman

Russia has inflated the Autopilot!
  He actually looks more like Stan's dad from South Park.  
So Putin needs to fill THIS gap with new cannon fodder....
 
 

The Japanese company making miniature Russian soldiers can make some miniature tanks based on this image. 
 

So...DOOOOOOOOOOM?
Well all war is negotiation and sacrifice, so the question will come down to both sides coming to terms with those two factors.  My pushback to the "inevitable partitioned Ukraine" is that Russia talks a good game but Ukraine has lived it.  Russia is only just starting to feel the pain and like any good nut-sack shot, that pain takes some time to build. 
Here is a dirty little inside baseball secret - professional soldiers are supposed to die, it is what we get paid for; civilians, not so much.  Every society knows this and accepts it.  We can lose people who choose this lifestyle who, like mercs, take the Queen's Coin and do the dirty work.  We have Remembrance Days and "Thank you for your service"-free coffee but in order for a society to be truly tested in war, it must be willing to feed it people who had nothing to do with warfare before it started.  The harsh calculus of regular everyday people dying in numbers is a threshold that we in the West have not crossed in a very long time (e.g. WW2 for Canada and Vietnam for the US).  Nor has Russia by this point, but it is approaching it quickly. 
However, you know who is already living in that stark land?...Ukrainians.  They have been "all in" since 24 Feb, to the point that there are no longer "regular Ukrainian civilians", the whole nation is in on this.  I see pictures of 12 year old holding a wooden AK properly and that says it all; war, has become the way of life for Ukraine.  Out of everyone talking and positioning, only Ukraine (and possibly the folks in the DPR/LPR...many involuntarily by the looks of things) has crossed that threshold.  Putin is very nervous of it, and it shows.  The US was terrified of it in Iraq, that is why they imposed all sorts of crazy things to try and keep the professional troops they had.
So before I pass judgement on the current situation with finality, I would want to see how Russia reacts when the civilian population starts bleeding heavily.  They are hurting but it has been a slow burn, and frankly I think Russia is culturally masochistic...to a point. However, despite a bunch of retired Russian warhawks barking from the cheap seats, Russia has not been tested in this trial in a very long time either.  Ukraine is the single largest hot-war they have been involved in since WW2.  History looks great in the movies and we can all get our pulses up watch Saving Private Sasha; however, watching the guy next to you get blown in half by long range arty when you were working at a now-closed Starbucks a month ago, is an entirely different experience.
So no, I do not think Russia and Ukraine or on the same wavelength when it comes to negotiation and sacrifice...at least not yet.
As to communication:
We have been over the challenge of the Russian Defence, which they need in order to "freeze" this conflict.  Right now they are keeping Ukraine busy by this very slow grinding offence, but it has been costly as hell.  At some point if they want to "freeze" they are going to need to dig in and let the UA crash upon the shores of the great Russian Steel Wall.
Problem is what it will take to build that wall.  Did some research and frankly we do not have modern troop density calcs for this sort of thing - we have lots on peacekeeping/making and COIN but basically sweet FA on modern conventional conflict.  So we are going to have to make some assumptions here and keep checking them.  In warfare the concept of "troop density" is a bit controversial.  It is a hold over of the Jomini-esque "war is math" approach.  It holds water but it is not deterministic as we already know a lot of soft non-linear factors play into this.  With this in mind, all caveats etc lets break this down a bit:
- We are talking about 800kms of frontage from the Russian western position around Kharkiv to its position ion the East near Kherson.  That is a long active front...very long.  In WW1 the Western Front was about 400 miles, or about 640 kms in comparison.
- Troop density requirements have decreased over time.  It is well documented that weapons ranges, ISR and battlefield mobility have increased the combat influence each soldier has on the battlefield over time.  Problem here is that reality cuts both ways.  In both offence and defence effectiveness and range have increased, so it is competitive. 
- Troop density in WW1 - a frozen conflict - was in and around "5000 troops for mile" or roughly 3125 per km: (https://books.google.ca/books?id=nhhlHGWCnzYC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=troop+density+western+front&source=bl&ots=WWfd6Y7VIl&sig=ACfU3U1M05Ef9GIbmBAREwu-_obJPnXEpw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi_rO_4jf33AhXvjIkEHRJEDUoQ6AF6BAg7EAM#v=onepage&q=troop density western front&f=false).  This jives with the roughly 2 million troops each side had to sustain in the trenches, in depth, replacements and rotation, in order to sustain that deadlock.  This does not count logistics and support overhead -which is likely why each side had on the order of 12-15 million troops in total.
- Based on WW1 metrics, Russia would need approximately 2.5 million men in those trenches to achieve the same deadlock...and then have the architecture behind them to sustain it, which at a very generous 1:1 (which means a very slow burn war) means roughly 5 million men to dig in and hold that front a la WW1.  But as I noted we are not in WWI - although if the Russians tried to force generate these numbers they would probably start looking like they were from that era equipment-wise. 
- Actual Russian troop numbers as of today are hard to find; however, with the 200k they brought with them and assuming they have kept that force level (big assumption), Russia currently has a troop density of 250 men per km of frontage.  This is less than ten percent than the WW1 number. But as we noted modern forces can cover more ground, which makes this a weak analogy.  The question is, "versus a very well armed attacker, how much troop density does Russia need to "freeze" this front?"  My bet is a lot more than 200k troops, but how much more?
So let's tackle this from another direction.  Things in this war are challenging a lot of our rules of thumb; however, we can go with the 1:3 ratio of defender to attacker, at least locally.  So Russia likely needs to put at least a Company per km frontage.  This forces the UA to concentrate a BG on the attack, with all the support bells and whistles in order to make an effective shot at it.  This makes sense from a force-space-time perspective for both attacker and defender but I am not sure about firepower in the least [Note: it might be a lot less if things like UAVs and precision artillery are involved.  This is one of the unknowns]. Terrain may also give them a break, particularly on the Dnipro, however, they also have urban areas so I am betting things even out.  
So a Russian Company of say 150 men per km.  They will need at least on more company behind them to create effective depth and prevent breakthrough of that UA BG, while also accounting for attrition, so now 300 men per km.  And then they will need to rotate troops in and out of those positions.  We are not designed to live in the open, under harassing artillery/Switchblade fire indefinitely.  So we are now looking at another company for rotation and sustainment.  Throw in an armored reserve to plug holes and supporting fires/assets and we are getting dangerously close to a BTG, per km.  This would bring the Russians up to about 1500 (a fat BTG) men per km, about half of WW1 troop density.  Or 1.2 million men.  And that is just the fight stuff and basic tactical logistics.  As we know from this war, the Russians like to travel light on logistics and formation-level support, so we can probably add another third of that number, say 400k to build the backbone to keep those 1.2 million men in the field = about 1.6 million men...and they have to sustain that for years, under increasingly crushing sanctions.
I have to be honest, if I was an average Russian and I saw these types of numbers I would be asking myself "how badly do we need Putin". 
Finally, checking the old CIA factbook (https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia/#people-and-society) Russia has roughly 37 million fighting aged men aged 15-54 (I am going to assume good old Putin male chauvinism holds and they do not a start tapping women).  You can throw out a third right off the top for all sorts of medical conditions etc that make them simply unfit for service.  So roughly 24 million men to draw from, in entirety.  To freeze this Ukrainian war, to the point that you can force Ukraine to "tap out" you need to commit at least 5 percent of all eligible fighting aged males...up front.  And you count on needing an extra 1.2 million just to sustain it over time.  Now I can hear the demographic nerds out there pointing out that over time more men come of age...well the news for Russia in that regard is not good either:

Russia is in a bit of a demographic hole right now and it is going to take what look like 3-5 years to dig its way out.  Worse the big bulges in the 35-44 range are going to age out in the same timeframe.
And finally, finally, this does not take into account the the standing military bill for the rest of the country - Russia can make all the noise it wants with Finland and Sweden, everyone is going to be fully engaged on this Ukrainian thing for a few years so you may as well shut down everything else.  
So What?  After all that it comes back to: how much does the average Russian want a bunch of new broken Republics vs how much does Ukraine want its country back? 
If I were a betting man, I would put my money on the country that has already demonstrated the commitment.  If this war goes long, we will likely need to shift from send guns and bullets (fish), to funding the creation of a Ukrainian domestic arms industry (fishing rods) and then figuring out what to do when Russia totally collapses under the weight of this thing.

Just made me smile, the Germans acting quickly...
 

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it!  He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime.
In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022.
So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory.
1.  Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. 
But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 
However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy.
Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds.
2.  And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002.  I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat  (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action).
3.  A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it.
This will leave Putin and/or the national-fascist power structure in power in Moscow. Russia will patch up its broken army and economy and regear for its next move (which will surely not be a repeat of 2022, but also won't let its neighbours breathe easy).
4.  Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree). 
5.  So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. 
I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier (and resettling/rebuilding a now devastated okrajina with whom? Cossacks and Kadyrov's Chechens?).
But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.
I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk.
6.  Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.
7.  Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration.
With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases).
8.  Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere.
CONCLUSIONS:
A.  A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia.
B.  Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it.  And I think it doesn't end up happening.
IMHO, FWIW. Have at it, Steve et al.

UKR troops reportedly continue resistance in Lyman, but in SE part of the town, there is a clashes reported around railway station and 5-storey residentilal areas. The video which I posted above with retreating UKR soldiers was geolocated as northern part of Lyman
On this picture the route of BTR from this video - they drive to SE part

Approximate defense line of UKR trops in Lyman several hours ago.

UKR troops withdrawing from Lyman and taking aboard of own BTR-80 a group of own comrades, which withdraw on foot.
The words of background song:
There, where we stand to the end
And the war will not break us
Our faith unites hearts
Ukraine is alive forever!
Reportedly on Izium axis Russians prepare to use for next step of operation combined artillery group of 45th high-power artillery brigade of Western military district - 2 2S7 203 mm SP-guns and 2 2S4 240 mm SP-morars. Also together with them spotted 2 Tochka-U launchers and 2 TL vehicles. Probably all this stuff will fire on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, but maybe also on Siverodonetsk and Lysychansk

Nice response to NY Times suggestion of appeasement.
Ukraine Newspaper Warns New York Times Not to 'Appease' Putin (msn.com)
 
The Kyiv Independent, an English-language Ukrainian newspaper, hit back on Tuesday with a fiery editorial of its own. The paper's editorial board slammed the "disappointing" article that is said "attempts to pass off appeasement and betrayal of the free world's values as pragmatic reasoning."
The Independent accused the Times of calling for the West to "appease" Putin by "giving up" in the conflict, which would have wide-reaching consequences, the editorial said.
"Make no mistake: If you appease a dictator, whose troops regularly indulge in war crimes, it will lead to a catastrophic geopolitical shift," the editorial reads. "A Russian military victory would lead to land grabs and brutal conquest becoming the new norm. Allowing a power-hungry fascist dictatorship to succeed will encourage other dictatorships to try."

Losses are still coming in.....
 
 

I hope he was poisoned w the same stuff that's been used for all the murders he's done of dissidents outside of Russia.  That would make me smile and sing a happy song. 

wait, Ukrainians aren't white anymore?  Gosh, I can't keep up.   First I find out the Irish, Italians, and Poles are now 'white', at least in the US, when they certainly weren't when they came to the US.  And now the Ukrainians aren't white anymore?  Does this White Club have any rules at all?  It's almost as if they are just making it up on the fly -- but that would be ridiculous, right?   I mean, if one's whole world view revolves around this I would expect their would be some scientifically solid basis, right?  I mean, who would just do this based on nothing?  That would be really stupid.

Droog, Where's My БМП?
 
 

In nearest 1-2 weeks we will see culmination of Russian offensive. Their pressure now is unprecedent. Lyman and Avdiivka today were shelled severly during several hours almost with all calibers and systems. Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut also under fire. Russian use own usual "burned earth" tactic. 
Russian penetrating around Popasna stabilized by elements of 80th air-assault brigade, but heavy clashes are ongoing. Villages Viktorivka, Oleksandropillia, western part of Komyshuvakha still a grey zone and arena of clashes. Russians are digging in Volodymyrivka and in 1,5..2 km south from Vasylivka - Lypove villages. Locals wrote in twitters - the endless stream of Russian armor and concentration of troops in Alchevsk, Kadiivka, Pervomaisk town. Reportedly at least 18 BTGs now on Popasna - Bakhmut axis
Russian commander of "Popasma group", mayor general Avdeev is relatively young general and he uses more flexible tactic, than direct assaults after artillery fire. He use HUGE amount of artillery and aviation support to supress resistsanse but instead direct assaults he uses outflanking and infiltrations of relativelly big number of small combat groups (1-2 reinforces platoons), consisting of mix of 76th VDV division  and PMC units. Our soldiers point that PMC have many experienced troopers, which passed many wars - they are dangerous enemy, which never surrender and never take prisoners. This actions and lack of troops on Popasna-Bakhmut axis (as well as retreating of some TD units) forced our command to pull our right flank. 
Today UKR troops on Svitlodarsk bulge destroyed the bridge through reservoir of Luhan' river and abandoned Myronivskyi settlement. Looks like we will retreat soon also from Svitlodarsk beyond the river and all efforts will be concentrate on defense of Bakhmut area. 
Destroyed bridge near Myronivskyi
Russian occupants (PMC?) in Myronivskyi

And hypothetical solution...

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

So ... I was thinking the other day ... if only there was a war game that had a lot of the equipment and forces used in the current conflict/special military operation in which you could build maps and stuff ...
Map size 4,800m wide by 3,664m deep
Topo overlay

Satellite overlay

CM overhead ...

Where it is in Ukraine
Chervone Overlay.kmz
A couple of comparisons ...


The Combat Mission Black Sea map file ...
Chervone.btt
Just a map folks so no you can't do a QB on it or play it unless you actually click the editor button and add forces and plans etc.  Will this be a scenario one day ... hopefully.
I was prompted to make it because it looked like a BTG or two were going to roll south towards Barvinkove having rolled into Velyka Komyshuvakha towards the end of April and I though it would be worth seeing how it looked in Combat Mission and whether a scenario or two could be built around it - there's definitely meat there for sure so hopefully I can put something together.  If I do so it will be the subject of a separate thread.

A joke I saw a week ago elsewhere.
Russian mother calls her son, finds out he's in Ukraine.
"Why are you there?" she asks.
"It's a special military operation."
"A war? Will you be ok?"
"No mother, a special military operation. It's a proxy war between Russia and NATO, not a real war."
"Oh, that's good to hear," she says, "how's it going?"
"Well," he replies, "so far we've had 20,000 casualties, lost 1200 tanks and several thousand other armoured and military vehicles, had a cruiser sank and lost most of our officers."
"Oh," said his mother, "That doesn't sound too promising. How is NATO doing?"
"They haven't turned up yet."

Rather important if true:
 

That's very odd. Maybe someone managed to grab it rather than download it. Didn't think that was possible in Dropbox invites. It is uploaded again.

So, some updates, based on analysys of Konstantin Mashovets, our military expert of "Information resistance" group. I would recommend it, but he writes in Russian in ironical and mockery way, so his texts will be too hard to understand for western reader. But his thoughts much deeper, than texts of Cooper and even ISW. 
So, Russians 2-3 days ago launched decisive phase of "plan F" (?) - encircling of UKR troops in agglomeration Rubizhne-Siverodonetsk-Lysychansk. Now their main efforts shifted again. But anout this later.
After Bilohorivka disaster, Russian troops took a pause on this direction, but tried to attack to Siveriodonetsk from NE and SE. In previous days UKR forces withdrew from southern part of Rubizhne and after about two days resistsnce in Voyavodivka - the village between Rubizne and Siverodonetsk, left and this village too, crossed the Borova river. Yoy could see the video of bridges demolish - this is that. Russians attack on the city were repelled by our artillery, so one day after their attack there was relatively quiet. Despite our troops left Voyevodivka, Russians to this time don't control it, because the village under fire control of UKR artillery. Now Russians shelled Siverodonetsk with artilelry and thinking about crossing the Borova river in the city vicinity.  
Most bad situation around Popasna. Initially Russian forces attacked north on Komyshuvakha, aiming on Vrubivka - Mylokaivka with coming to Bakhmut-Lysychansk road, but UKR forces repelled their atatcks so severly, that Russian coomand was forced to mix VDV troops, which suffered losses with PMC fighters and shift own efforts again. Russians and LPR still atatck in Komyshuvakha area, but main strike VDV+PMC+LPR forces conducted on Popasna - Soledar axis and, alas, their advance was successfull. This is not confirmed officially, but from reports of locals, enemy captured Novozvanivka, Pylypchate, Druzhba, Trypillia and even partially entered to Volodymyrivka village in 6-7 km from Soledar. Developing this sucess, Russian command threw in the battle here reserves - 3 new BTGs, at least two of them Russian VDV. Other analyst claims Russian already have on this direction 18 BTG - involved units of 5th CAA, Naval Infantry, VDV, PMC, LPR regulars/conscripts. Commander of "Popasna KampfGrupp" - lt.general Adveev, deputy of Southern military district comamnder.  Today, likely after new reserves arriving, Russians opened third axis of own attack from Popasna - SW. Reportedly they siezed Troitske (only one report, so RUMINT level) - large village, and the gate to Svitlodarsk bulge, which all this time was relatively calm place.  
Simultainously LPR forces, advancing from Novotoshkivske, seized Orikhove and Toshkivka villages and counduct fighting in Zolote and Hirs'ke areas, threating to come on southern outskirts of Lystchansk.
Obviously in interests of Popasna group, Russians changed own actions around Avdiivka. They rejected from senseless direct assaults from Yasynuvata to "promka", which cost huge number of DPR troops and shifted own efforts north along H-20 road toward Kostiantynivka town in 20 km SW form Bakhmut, which lays on the road Dnipro - Pavlohrad - Pokrovske - Bakhmut.
Thus, Russians now shifted own main actions on southern part of own encirclement. But on other axis they continue to atatck or regroup forces. Their "Izium group" now trying to advanse on direction Dovhen'ke - Krasnopillia and Dovhen'ke - Bohorodychne, assisting the "Lyman group" in own mission to cut UKR defense on several parts and to throw them to the river, maintaining wide accsess to Siverskyi Donets - reportedly they already gathered about 40 PMP pontoons sections to repeat crossing (part of this dtuff appointed for Borova crossing). Bakhmut now under MLRS and artillery fire. Russian aviation almost with unimpunity strike from the sky. Our soldiers say it's very hard to hit with MANPAD fast maneuvering target , flying on extreme low altitude. Also features of terrain not always allow to detect their attacks in time. 
But on other hand UKR troops are doing somethig near Izium - today appaerad a video with captured soldiers of 15th GMR of 2nd GMD from this area, so Russians moved some troops from Barvinkove- Sloviansk direction somewhere to Izium and even to Shevchenkove area, where Ukrainain troops are conducting probes in Kupiansk direction.
 
 

I think the diplomatic problem for Ukraine might be that the war seems to be going so well for them that people in EU stopped being afraid of the Russians. As they are pushed back, the feeling of crisis is passing, and EU politicians are no longer under pressure to do everything to help out.

Maybe it's just me, but I think it's bit funny that someone from Poland is now blaming Germany for not wanting to be a leader east of the Oder

I don't think there is much doubt that Fox is a news channel only in the same way that fanta is an orange drink.

Crossing to hell
Composed panorama from many fragments of UAV filming, but it does not include last 7 tanks sunked by Russians in finale. 

Their losses are terrible and in LDPR social media so far is growing a fury about this "Donbas men extermination". Their losses nobody counts officially. Only now LDPR authorities claims that "all our heroical reservists units" will be gradually withdraw from combat zone to get proper training and to be included to "LDPR People's militia service" officially 
This is the same, what Red Army did during WWII on liberated territories since 1943, where "field enlistment offices" grabbed all men 17-60 and reinforced with them regular units. Sometime these "black jackets", as they were called, because they went to the combat in own civil closes, could be more than 50 % of unit. Sometime all platoon ot company had such conscripts - all depended on previous losses. Commanders sent them forward first of all in order to they "washed the shame of occupation". They often went to the fight either immediately without even basic training or after several days poor tarining in style "this is a rifle, here this is how it loads, and in this way it shots - Germans will teach the rest". Only after several clashes, survivors took military oath, received uniform and were officially included in the lists of own units. How much of "black jackets" got lost - nobody knows. Probably large part of them, who got lost before official including to unit lists, never were counted as military losses and to this time counts like "civil victims of fascism"