womble

We're in macro-masking/tactical deficit country again!
Like in WW1, this war has revealed (or confirmed, or reiterated, take your pick) that the factors influencing success in base tactical interactions did not align with the pre-war expectations of the belligerents. So officers have been ordering units around with an inaccurate concept of what they're capable of achieving in the prevailing conditions.

This happens all the time, the tricky part is figuring out what has changed and whether those changes are going to be important or applicable in the future... something people from a wide array of boxes typing in a wargame forum might be able to process better than a collection of people all sitting in the same military career box.

Or we can at least be wrong in original and unexpected ways!

The Russians claim that their artillery was in a Counterbattery duel, at the beginning of the "minefield crossing debacle". This could well be a true claim, in that UKR CB is, apparently, significantly more capable than RUS. So the duel could largely have involved displacing 10km away from their initial positions, having fired a couple of sticks at the initial crossing attempts and drawn the attention of some GMLRS. Just keeping most of the battery from getting scrapped by displacing in time might count as "performing well" in the current RUS lexicon of excellence.
It was mentioned that the UKR could have done better in the aftermath by maintaining overwatch positions in the treeline, and countered that such "stay-behinds" would rapidly be spotted by RUS drones and chopped up by arty. Surely, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and the UKR overwatch could have been maintained by drones backed up by mortars or artillery or AGL (or some other indirect fire)?

The Russians claim that their artillery was in a Counterbattery duel, at the beginning of the "minefield crossing debacle". This could well be a true claim, in that UKR CB is, apparently, significantly more capable than RUS. So the duel could largely have involved displacing 10km away from their initial positions, having fired a couple of sticks at the initial crossing attempts and drawn the attention of some GMLRS. Just keeping most of the battery from getting scrapped by displacing in time might count as "performing well" in the current RUS lexicon of excellence.
It was mentioned that the UKR could have done better in the aftermath by maintaining overwatch positions in the treeline, and countered that such "stay-behinds" would rapidly be spotted by RUS drones and chopped up by arty. Surely, what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and the UKR overwatch could have been maintained by drones backed up by mortars or artillery or AGL (or some other indirect fire)?

Well, this is how Russia is solving their ammo shortage; fewer guns means less ammo required. QED.
Putin remains the master strategist.

Phone/tablet screens are to small. Awareness and feeling where you are (as a drone) is much better when it's full view. Hence why such an insane precision with them. Furthermore if it's two cameras - that's a 3D image which allows you discern details even better.

Again?!  I mean how did Operation Canuck Freedom go last time?  https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/war-of-1812
 
Of course the old adage “History is written by the losers who only remember New Orleans, and left unchallenged by the winners who are too polite to bring it up and still feel bad about burning the White House” applies here.

I'm here to ask you guys some for some informed help.
There have been Ukrainians training in my country for a while now, and this last cycle that just graduated, they have selected 3 dozen or so candidates to go through another X amount of extended training and turn them into NCO's/Officers.
My unit is going to be in charge of that training.
I was talking with the base psychologist, who is going to be in charge of their "psychological" training. She will be giving them half a dozen of weekly addresses, but she has been given no advice or direction on what to teach them. She has some idea of where to start (stress handling, leadership skills...etc) but apart from that, taking into account these guys are headed for an actual shooting war obviously she wants to make an actual contribution and not give them hollow TedTalks.
As people with more expertise than me, I refer to you all the question:
What sort of psychological training would you recommend she prepare given the circumstances? What topics should she cover or what sort of techniques could she teach?
Thank you in advance.
 
PS I apologize if this isn't the correct place for the post but it's the place with the most traffic at the moment and the training isn't far off, so we would appreciate the help. Again, thank you in advance.

Not as such, no. There are a few different grades of building, which each offer different levels of cover.
You've identified two of the classes I'm aware of, there: modular buildings are a lot safer to be in than independent buildings. I believe "Churches" are safer-still. AIUI, you're correct. Changing the appearance of a given building from "wooden" to "stone"  (or whatever) doesn't change anything about the protection to its inhabitants that it offers.
 
Barns are, I believe, a fourth class of building (not saying there are only four  ), with the general protective value of a string vest, and sturdiness of a well-whisked meringue. Troops in barns are worse off than fish in barrels.

Not as such, no. There are a few different grades of building, which each offer different levels of cover.
You've identified two of the classes I'm aware of, there: modular buildings are a lot safer to be in than independent buildings. I believe "Churches" are safer-still. AIUI, you're correct. Changing the appearance of a given building from "wooden" to "stone"  (or whatever) doesn't change anything about the protection to its inhabitants that it offers.
 
Barns are, I believe, a fourth class of building (not saying there are only four  ), with the general protective value of a string vest, and sturdiness of a well-whisked meringue. Troops in barns are worse off than fish in barrels.

Perhaps only hang them once?
Or sentence them to 98 years at Hard Labour rather than 99?

Untypical, expensive, built to "lowest bid" in one of the most corrupt regimes in the world. It's amazing the thing's still standing even without explosive perturbation and hours-long petrochem fire insult.

Untypical, expensive, built to "lowest bid" in one of the most corrupt regimes in the world. It's amazing the thing's still standing even without explosive perturbation and hours-long petrochem fire insult.

Russia's messaging appears to be a bit all over the place, on the drones:
 
It'd be so sweet of the Western Powers chose to take this admission of guilt as a chance to name Russia at least a State Sponsor of Terrorism. S'pose they'd have to do the same to Ukraine too, though, in that case.
I think the actor (whoever this is) missed a trick though. If the warheads were disarmed or removed, they could have been replaced with leaflets. Or blue and yellow smoke. Or a mix of both.
 

I think he'll have a terrible allergic reaction, stumble down a staircase and through a window, unfortunately slashing his throat on shards of glass, then land on some bullets outside.
Twice.

I think he'll have a terrible allergic reaction, stumble down a staircase and through a window, unfortunately slashing his throat on shards of glass, then land on some bullets outside.
Twice.

I wonder whether expat Turks are keener on Erdogan because they don't have to live in his mess. He talks a great show, even croons a little, but the corrupt/shortsighted pandering to the demands of his core electorate for free/cheap stuff is going to come back and bite him in the ***, with any luck.
 
And risk him running into Putin's arms? The man's almost as delusional a narcissist as Vlad is, and has all the autocratic tendencies. It's not beyond the realm of possibility that he cuts his nose off to spite his face. Then you have to do the same to Hungary, with the same, though slightly lower risk.

I wonder whether expat Turks are keener on Erdogan because they don't have to live in his mess. He talks a great show, even croons a little, but the corrupt/shortsighted pandering to the demands of his core electorate for free/cheap stuff is going to come back and bite him in the ***, with any luck.
 
And risk him running into Putin's arms? The man's almost as delusional a narcissist as Vlad is, and has all the autocratic tendencies. It's not beyond the realm of possibility that he cuts his nose off to spite his face. Then you have to do the same to Hungary, with the same, though slightly lower risk.

I didn't follow this discussion, just stopping by to say: Come on, that is a bit cheap and you usually do much better than that. 😉 I think in this context by "winning the election" almost everyone meant "becoming president". Also, saying he did not win in the primary election is stretching the truth a bit. With 49.5% Erdogan had the most votes and almost managed to achieve an absolute majority. That is quite a feat if you compare it to, say, Macron, who got only 27.8% in the primary election in 2022. The primary election isn't meant to be won outright, that's what the runoff is there for, and it it doesn't make the winner any less democratically legitimized. True, 52% vs 48% isn't a large margin but if you go by popular vote, looking at the last two decades, almost all US presidents won by a similar or even smaller margin. Biden vs Trump was 51% vs 47%, Trump vs Clinton 47% vs 48% (!), Obama vs Romney 51% vs 48%, Obama vs McCain 53% vs 46%, Bush vs Kerry 51% vs 48%.
You are right about the tricks Erdogan pulled off, though I'm not too sure how much if a role they played. Germany has a large Turkish community and people here have free access to all sorts of information. They still voted 67% for Erdogan.

I said, "Look after him," not "Look after him!"

I haven't read the article yet, but I really don't get how anyone can claim that the Soviet Union made Ukraine. There was clearly a Ukrainian national identity before the Soviet Union existed, because I specifically remember Ukrainian forces in the Russian Civil War failing to achieve independence where Polish forces succeeded. The outcome of a few battles in the Russian Civil War are the only reason that Ukraine spent the 20th century as an SSR while Poland spent it as an independent country.
But I suppose the important thing that Putin is really missing is that it doesn't matter when Ukraine came into existence or how. Whether or not a country existed in the distant past doesn't give it any more or less right to exist now. I don't think any reasonable person could argue that the Roman Empire (was a country 2,000 years ago) should be brought back at the expense of all the countries currently in its place, any more than any reasonable person could argue that the United States (wasn't a country 300 years ago) should be dissolved. Ukraine is a country now, and that's the only thing that matters.
That's a fun bit of irony

For me, WEGO is the only way to play. RT may as well not exist, as far as I'm concerned. A massive chunk of my enjoyment is in re-watching the turns unfold, finding the engaging little stories that play out. RT simply doesn't give anything like the same opportunity for watching situations develop and resolve.
I hate to miss anything, and even on a small/Tiny map, you will in RT.

That’s an interesting thought experiment or alternate history proposal. Would less arms spending by the Soviets have saved them? Put another way, was the Soviet Union a stable, healthy, going concern apart from its swollen defense budget?  In a word, no.
The entire edifice was rotten. Examples include “Collectivization” of agriculture, destroying their ability to even *feed* themselves. The oil price collapse, a tremendous shock to an artificially propped up financial house of cards. Chernobyl. Afghanistan. Glasnost. Lithuanian independence. East Berliners knocking down the Wall. Even with a somewhat less extreme defense budget, with failures across the board, unrelated to just budget levels. The utter corruption at every level sapped nearly every Soviet enterprise. You might look to any other primitive command economies riven by corrupt dictatorships for comparisons. Perhaps the most that could be said is that your scenario would have delayed but not prevented the breakup of the Soviet Union. Often left unsaid is the artificial nature of the USSR itself, the inherent difficulty of keeping the lid on the great number of wildly varying “republics” and peoples tied together however unwillingly.
To be clear, no one is disputing that defense spending took a toll on the Soviet economy.  Ultimately, the judgement of history nowadays is that the Soviet Union’s collapse was due to a number of causes not limited to arms race spending. Or more simply, they made too many losing economic and social bets.

In reality, there was never, not at any point, any threat from the West against the USSR outside of the MAD assurance. Russia could have had zero tanks and infantry and been just as safe from invasion as it was with millions of men under arms. The Red Army, once WW2 had ended, was always a weapon of propaganda, mostly existing to convince her own people that there was an external threat ("There must be a threat, or why would we need such a massive army?"). The reality or otherwise of that threat was largely immaterial to how much they had to spend to "keep up" militarily.
I think the systemic failings (structural, economic and moral) of the USSR/Russian Empire (some of which led to unsustainable military spending that might've had greater effect if spent elsewhere, but probably not, because of those failings) have much greater impact on the trajectory of that polity than the spending levels of its rivals/enemies.

In reality, there was never, not at any point, any threat from the West against the USSR outside of the MAD assurance. Russia could have had zero tanks and infantry and been just as safe from invasion as it was with millions of men under arms. The Red Army, once WW2 had ended, was always a weapon of propaganda, mostly existing to convince her own people that there was an external threat ("There must be a threat, or why would we need such a massive army?"). The reality or otherwise of that threat was largely immaterial to how much they had to spend to "keep up" militarily.
I think the systemic failings (structural, economic and moral) of the USSR/Russian Empire (some of which led to unsustainable military spending that might've had greater effect if spent elsewhere, but probably not, because of those failings) have much greater impact on the trajectory of that polity than the spending levels of its rivals/enemies.

What are the chances of the transport system actually delivering a viable nuke to whatever target the Russians pick, given the ABM/AD capabilities currently deployed in Ukraine? Less than 100% I'd suggest, and sending a city-killer and it not going off gets them the same international response as if it detonates, with no intimidation effect whatsoever, just anger and determination turned up from 11 to about 200 on a scale of 1 to 10.