Rokossovski

(In the above quote The MonkeyKing was paraphrasing an argument from someone else, so, to be clear, my below comments are not intended to criticize The MonkeyKing in any way.)
I've been seeing similar arguments elsewhere as well: that there is nothing on hand to replace the tank, so therefore the tank is not obsolete.
When I read such arguments I think back to a book I ran across years ago in a university library. It was an English translation of a German book on tactics, published in 1914 just before the outbreak of hostilities. (I would provide a cite, but this was decades ago and of course pre-internet). The book's author described the history over the 19th century of increasing dispersion of infantry on the attack in reaction to increases in defensive firepower. The author stated that in his view further dispersion was not longer possible while maintaining command over forces, and so "therefore infantry attacks will be successfully made under current [1914] conditions without further changes." [Not a real quote, this was decades ago, but that was the thrust of what he concluded].
In other words, the author was stating that there was no available alternative to massed infantry attacks into the teeth of machine-gun fire, and therefore such attacks would continue to be completed successfully. With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the absence of a ready alternative to flinging infantry into machine-gun fire would not make such attacks any less foolish or costly. It would be the same reasoning behind the old quip that "something must be done. This is something. Therefore this must be done." 
The correct answer (that the 1914 author did not have the foresight to grasp) is that until alternatives to massed infantry attacks could be devised then attacks would generally not succeed. He failed to consider the possibility that in 1914 the correct answer to the question of "how do you successfully attack into machine-gun fire" was "you don't." 
Along the same lines it's possible that the statements "(1) we have no ready alternative to tank" and "(2) the tank is obsolete" could both be true.
I'm not actually sure that the tank has reached that point, and, even if so, it is also possible that an alternative will be devised. My objection is to the misconception that whether there is or is not a ready alternative to the tank has any bearing on whether it is obsolete.
[For the purposes of this post I am defining "obsolete" to mean "no longer capable of reliably performing its duties in a reasonably cost-effective manner" or something similar. Tanks are plainly still being produced and used, and so under some common definitions they are technically not "obsolete"].

The ones that want to foster an image of being forward-thinking will rename their institutions "Think-UGVs"

It's like the transition from battleship-centric fleets to carrier-centric fleets. Battleships stopped being viable frontline units when the combination of submarines and carrier-based strike aircraft extended the lethal range of fleets (and airbases!) from the 40ish km range of battleships to the 300ish km range of strike aircraft. The logistical weight of battleships didn't help their cause either.
We managed to repurpose ours as floating artillery batteries. Tanks might see a similar second life as you suggest.
edit: And floating AAA batteries; I wonder if tanks can be repurposed to specialize in anti-UAV missions?
it is a collision of systems, one we recognize, the other is something else.
I think we're seeing in the Battle of Kiev something like the Battle of Taranto. Everyone should have realized that naval combat was fundamentally different after the British rendered three Italian battleships combat ineffective with cloth covered biplanes. But the British themselves didn't see the dramatic systemic shift and lost the Repulse and Prince of Wales more than a year later.

Natural gas makes no sense, we already covered that.  Ukraine has a tiny fraction compared to what Russia already owns.  Water, Lithium and Neon, now that is a twist, maybe.  I am not sold on the "economic theory" of this war, or at least any I have heard, the cost/benefits do not add up.  I think this is about power overall, but I am not sure it is all about economic power.

@The_Capt, I know the Russians haven't been all that savvy about finessing a situation, but if they used weather conditions that caused severe foggy/hazy conditions to attack in, would that really help or hurt the Ukrainian defense.  It would make for better NLAW conditions but the longer range ATGMs may prove much less useful.
I really wish Black Sea could come out with a pre-release that had all the Western AT weapons included in the TOE for the Ukrainians. Plus leopards, M113s,... so we could simulate the possible upcoming battles and see how the simulations match reality.

This is really interesting - are there any good books that are primers on this sort of operational thinking?
(I've been a lurker for the past 20 years, but this made me post! Huzzah.)
(Also, if you've had a hand in CMCW, many thanks. I've found it a really compelling simulation; forced me to learn to think really differently from either CMBS or the WWII games.)

This is why we need new folks, they keep us on point by (re)asking the central questions. So what happens next?
No idea.  I have ideas, opinions and what my instincts are saying but I really do not know.  In my thinking the main effort here is to create a mental framework that allows us to understand what we are seeing, when it happens.  As we confirm phenomenon a lot of other realities die quickly.  For example, we knew about 3-4 days into this war that it was not going to be quick because all the observable phenomenon killed that reality, it collapsed into unreality and fantasy.  
So what am I looking for now?
Strategically - The major shift and re-framing of strategic ends by Russia clearly signaled a change in negotiation position.  Ukraine's increasing strength in dictation of the terms they will accept was another signal.  We should keep an eye on this as it will continue to evolve; negotiation positions are directly tied to viable options (which I have gone on about at length) and as options spaces collapse or expand negotiation positions shift.  Further it is a sign of confidence in those options, we have seen Russia shift its negotiation position dramatically in this war: hard-medium-softer-hard.  That last "hard" negotiating position was the last we heard, likely because Putin thinks his current offensive options will give him what he needs now that the political ends have been conveniently reframed.  So for the strategic, track the options and negotiation positions.
Operationally - There is an indicator here that we have not discussed much but for what is coming will be important: decisions.  A "decision" in military terms seems simple on the surface but it is in fact very complex.  Basically a "decision" is the "death of alternatives" or a collapsing point of options.  Germans lost at Stalingrad, Russians won = German strategic offensive options die in the East...forever (insert ironic trombone sound).  This is primarily how conventional operational military planning thinks, in terms of lines of effort/operations that link "decisions" together in a linked framework that creates a successful outcome - victory (yay!).  These are what I refer to as "positive decisions".
However, in the wacky world of warfare, there are more than "positive decisions".  There are at least two, maybe three more types: null, negative and strange.  A null decision is basically a "non-decision" or an undecidable condition.  It can be generated and projected.  Ukrainian defence has been a master class in the projection of null-decisions onto an opponent; the Ukrainian approach has left the Russian military machine unable to solve for X operationally.  The end result of all those unsolvable decision spaces, along with attrition, create positive decisions for the Ukrainian defence when the entire Russian operational offensive collapsed - so you can see how this can get complex fast.
Wait, there is more!  All human decisions are metastable, which is a fancy word for "semi-permanent but subject to review".  So it is possible to "undecide" something within human perception and cognition to very real effect.  For example, SOF's primary contribution to warfare is not primarily positive decision space, or even null -they contribute here but this is not home turf - they are at home in creating negative decision, or undeciding things.  Classic example is the SOE in WW2.  Its job was not to create positive decisions in Western Europe, it was to "undecide German victory and control" - in the minds of the home front in the UK, the populations in Europe and in the minds of the Germans themselves.  Through demonstration-thru-communication (e.g. raids) the SOE did a lot of damage to German reality in undeciding things.  I am not going to get into Strange but it speaks to a human ability to "remember the future" and relative rationality, but let's leave off that one.
So what? Well for the upcoming fight in the SE, I will be looking for decisions (all types) at the operational level.  The Russians need positive, the UA will likely project null and negative on that...right up to a moment when they think they can get positive ones of their own.  The playout of that decision space will be key in reading the operational flow of things.  Next question is "which ones", well that could fill a separate post but for the Russians is likely means a decisive use of mass to pull off this pincer movement they are lining up, and then resist the UA c-moves. However, we will likely see a lattice work of decisions form up, the shape of that will dictate how things are really going.
Tactical.  Steve covered off a lot of this already.  I will add:
- Russian Mass - will it start working again?  Because it has failed (erm) decisively, so far.   Is there a tipping point in this war where mass will still work?  I suspect yes, but can the Russians build it and project it effectively?  This includes some sort of re-invention of combined arms and joint integration, which Russia desperately needs to create any of those operational decisions I was talking about.
- Russian Fragility - A tactical warfighting unit, within a formation system is a complex beast.  It has redundancies built in but it takes years to build an effective tactical unit and minutes to destroy it.  The Russian war machine has been severely beat up.  Estimates are now circling 25% losses for the initial invasion force. Normally it would take months to re-constitute damage like this and Russia is going to make a run at fixing it in days/weeks.  This will mean the Russian machine going into this phase is more fragile than the first attempt.  What remains unknown is what offsets the Russians have been able to bring to bear for this, if any.
- Ukrainian Friction - What has been amazing to watch in this war is the Ukrainian ability to create and project friction.  This is a primary role in defence, along with attrition but the breadth and scope that Ukrainian defence has been able to project friction in all domains has been breathtaking. Ukrainian defence has been able to create friction across the entire length and breadth of the Russian offensive.   If they can keep that up tactically, they will likely simply grind this next Russian offensive to a halt.
- Ukrainian Mass - they have conventional mass in this fight but are using it judiciously.  I suspect the UA is waiting for its moment, and if it times it right, it will be spectacular.
Beyond these big ticket items, we should be looking out for shifts in equipment and vehicles.  More T90s (and T-14...everyone wants to see a tractor pull on that one) or T62s all start to show something.  Cannon fodder troops in front with the good ones in the back will likely be the order of march, massed dumb artillery fire across broad frontage with little precision.  All this sort of stuff adds up, along with mass surrenders and uncontrolled movements. 
Anyway, strap in because we should see at least a few more big muscle movements before this thing winds down, or falls apart on the Russian side.  How this goes will determine if a stalemate option is even on the table for Russia and what the end-game will look like.  I still consider this the "posturing for end-game" phase with Russia racing for some sort of stalemate and Ukraine not letting them.
Either way, we will be here doing this for the duration.

@BeondTheGrave @OldSarge @G.I. Joe
And other, who asked about Neptune ASM
The missile R-360 of Neptune complex is not a version of Kh-35U, though has similar parameters. Yes, it has very similar hull, and initially since R&D works have started as far as in 2013 or earlier, the missile should be as  localized and upgraded analog of Kh-35. This gave to Russian propagandists a reason to claim "Stupid Ukrainians proud because could copy old Soviet missile ahahaha!", so far like their claims "BTR-4 is reworked BTR-70". Russians in own chauvinism believed that without Russia all industry in Ukraine completely declined and we can't develop nothing own, but upgrade USSR lagacy. But Soviet/Russian Kh-35 was really "long played" project, started as far as in 1977, first prelimilary design was ready only in 1983, brought to tests only in 1992 and adopted to service in 2003! And Kh-35U with some improvements, like coordinates transmittion via satellite, was adopted in 2015
Currently Russian navy use this missile in next versions: Kh-35 (AS-20) for planes and helicopters, Bal (SSC-6) - coastal missile complex, Uran (SS-N-25) - ship-bases missile complex
Turning back to Ukrainian R-360 - since 2013 the missile have changed at least homing heads (or even three) and many more. First test launches were in 2018, but despite on success, there were found many problems in homing, flight stability also sea-skimming mode had enough hight altitude of flight. In 2019 new tests with new homing head and some constructive changes were conducted, but anyway missile demanded many finalization works. Also there was main problem - previous launches were conducted with USA aid - they detected target and transmitted coordinates to launcher vehicle via own sattelite. Ukraine has been developed own targeting radar Mineral-U, but encountered with many R&D problems, so manufacturer tests were passed only in October 2021 and two radars has been preparing to state test program, but unknown either it was started before a war or not. So, in present time Mioneral-U is nor adopted, but probably can be used in test mode. So, the strike at "Admiral Essen" and  "Moskva" could be done both via US satellite and Mineral-U tergeting. 
Also results of test showed that the carrier of missile complex and radar, based on 8x8 KRAZ-7634NE has low reliability and because of bad financial situation on KRAZ plant, technological problems and inability to provide timely technical support and implement constructive changes, there was assumed a decision to change the carrier to Tatra T815 (Chech Republic). Both Mineral-U radars were produced on Tatra chassis, but crossing of RK-360MC on Tatra took some time, so first battalion of Neptune have to be operational in April 2022 only. To this time the unit, armed with this complex - 65th coastal missile battalion had on armament only one launcher on KRAZ chassis and support vehciles. There is unknown either was a missiles or not, because in 2021, when this battalion was established, there was an information he had only dummy of missiles and first real nissiles have to arrive also in 2022. So, this is one possible answer, why Neptunes have awake only now. First reason - they got a missiles only now, second reason - they could have very short number of missiles and kept its for case of enemy landing attempt n Odesa area. But since new missiles issued and UK/Norway offered own ASMs, they could fire free.   
So, about R-360 pararameters: 7 ... 280 km range, 150 kg warhead, velocity - 900 km/h, radar/satellite coordinates and targeting aquisitoin, seeker field of viev +/- 60 deg (even more than Harpoon), sea-skimming mode, seeking during maneuvering, EW protection, maximum range of launcher from the sea shore - 25 km
Composition of battalion:
Three batteries per 2 launchers: 6 launchers USPU-360 (each has 4 tubes of R-360), deployment time 15 minutes
Technical battery:
6 transport-loader vehicles TZM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each), deployment time 10 minutes, reloading time 20 minutes
6 transport vehicles TM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each)
1 mobile command post RKP-360, deployment time 10 minutes.
1 targeting radar (optional) Mineral-U
So one battalion should have 72 missiles. Full salvo in 24 missiles simultainously is possible.
First version of launcher USPU-360 on KRAZ-7634NE 

Serial version of launcher USPU-360 on Tatra T815

Transport-loader vehicle TZM-360 first version (KRAZ)
 
Serial versin of transport-loader vehcile TZM-360 (Tatra)

Transport vehicle TM-360 (KRAZ)

Transport vehcile TM-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mobile command post RKP-360, first variant

Mobile command post RKP-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mineral-U radar

I watched a lecture by that guy and his main problem is that he basically agrees with Russia ideologically: Only "superpowers" matter, what smaller countries want is irrelevant and in the name of peace one should not meddle in other people's "spheres of influence", no matter what bull**** they get up to there.

Indeed, didn't this bulls--t get squashed in the first 100 pages of this thread?  "West is responsible for the war because it made Russia feel sad".  Which is ridiculous, because the only thing keeping the baltic states free is their NATO membership.  What a clown.  Like saying Greece was responsible for Hitler's invasion because it had the temerity to beat the Italian invasion.

There's another factor as well. With Europe FINALLY re-arming itself and doing what it should have done a long time ago for it's own defence (hopefully against an impoverished and weakened, but no doubt still dangerous Russia), the US can continue to concentrate more on the Chinese. Personally I not only would like to see Europe stronger, but I would also like to see the US, our only reliable ally, to remain world power number 1. In the past month we once more have been reminded how small the number of countries is that really value freedom and democracy. 

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

It looks like they were trying to go for the BMP with a second shot and it overflew the target. If you look at the video at about 18 seconds you see a second launch just above where the first one came out of the tree line and then it explodes off to the left of the burning tank in the trees. 
Yes they need to get better at protecting their assets. Those shots were less than 500 meters from that tree line. The only excuse would be if the RA LP/OP over there is dead in the foxhole with their throats slit. 
This is a pretty common thing we have been seeing in these videos. Like in this one you see armor, bmp and soft vehicles scattered around this village and always close to houses. I'm thinking that most of the RA is choosing to stay in the houses instead of active patrolling or digging into positions in key terrain. Is this for comfort? Are they trying to hide from drones? Poor leadership and situational awareness?

I think another thing to look at is the difference in combat unit structures between the UA and RA. The BTG's have been gone over pretty good so far in this thread and in general we have compared them to US structures. If you look at the UA brigades it isn't the same. The first thing that you see is that the standard UA mech brigade contains 4 battalions of infantry (3 mech and 1 motorized), a tank battalion and an arty battalion along with service and support elements. This is twice the infantry of the US model and way more than the RA model when considering everything said about their deficiencies in manpower, etc. The airborne, airmobile and motorized UA brigades are lighter with 3 battalions of leg or motorized infantry and no tank battalion.
This structure has several advantages over the RA.
Being on the defensive they can cover a bigger frontage with their infantry. Their tanks can be massed and used as a Bn sledgehammer when needed and not parceled out. Their supporting fires can be used in mass and not split amongst BTG's. So overall the UA formations appear to be way more flexible and can mass their combat power easier. Combine that with the overall better ISR and the UA knows when and where to mass that power. Huge advantages.
If we look at all the failings that have been observed about the RA to include poor communications, poor ISR, poor logistics, poor operational planning and poor air superiority we point to the "Russians suck" and leave it at that. Of course this is really easy as you can look at literally everything they have done up to this point and find nothing, NOTHING, to point to and say, "Wow, the RA did a pretty good job at X." But I digress.
If we were to look at the comparative units with different operational assumptions, how do they stack up? Take the BTG's and have them operate under what you would consider normal conditions for supply, communication, etc. Could 3 or 4 BTG's attack a UA mech brigade and succeed? Maybe, but I really don't think so due to the flexibility of the brigade vs the BTG. The brigade retains the ability to shift their heavy mass and support as needed where the BTG is an island to itself. 
I think this is some of what we have seen in the Donbas area. The UA there are predominantly regular forces dug in and defending against repeated assaults and holding. The ISW reports over the past few weeks would state how those forces around Donetsk were repelling multiple assaults every day. This situation should play into the hands of the RA with dug in forces being prime targets for their supporting arms. Yet the result of break throughs and totally smashing the UA line hasn't happened. To me this points to a high degree of inherent flexibility among the UA formations as without it they should be pummeled to death in that situation. 
In conclusion I do believe that the actual force structures of the UA and RA do play a part in what we are seeing. Of course it is hard to tell to what degree when all the negative factors affecting RA performance are present.

I can't speak about the other Western countries, but in the US there are a lot of very good reasons to sign up.  Pay is decent, educational opportunities are made available (even required in the case of officers), professional development is promised (though imperfectly implemented at times), there's a raft of benefits for veterans after leaving, and if you stick with it there's a significant pension paid out for the rest of your life.
And then there is the best reason of all, because they want to be a soldier, sailor, airman or Marine. This is a very big qualitative difference especially when it comes to morale. Then add in the other things that have been mentioned like the support and respect of their country and it's people backing them. Lay on the good gear and training and a trust that your life won't be thrown away by your commanders and you have a good recipe for a solid war fighter. So the difference between a western soldier and a conscript is pretty big and hard to quantify. It is probably the difference between the slave and the gladiator in a colosseum. 
Yes, longleftflank, your painting all infantry with that big old brush is pretty offensive to those that served. It is pretty par for the course though for the educated elite to look down their noses at those that aren't. The thing that I always thought was funny though is that when a young person is a Marine they are a dullard who couldn't do anything else with their life so they joined the military. Then after they get out and get done with college and are working as an engineer somewhere they were miraculously transformed from the knuckle dragging imbecile that they were to this newly intelligent creature by some magic wand. Education does not equal intelligence. The position that someone holds in life does not equal their potential. 
The inverse to your statement is that those that didn't serve are a bunch of soft pathetic effeminates with no concept of honor, integrity, pride or courage. We know that is not the case, just like we know that classifying all combat arms soldiers into the too dumb for anything else category isn't the case. I think when you paint with a wide brush like that it is called bigotry. In my opinion everyone needs to be very careful with the wide brush when applying it to people. Everyone is wired different. Everyone makes choices. Everyone has their own set of circumstances. It is very dangerous when people are viewed as faceless masses and not the individuals that they are.
I will concede that  there are some dullards in the military. I was blessed with serving with a couple of them. However, the vast majority were awesome and don't deserve such derision. 

Another variant popular in politics has 4 stepe:
1. It's not true
2. It's not true
3. It's not true
4. It's old news

if you use "woke and PC" you are just another brainwashed tool.  This is just a shiny object meant to ignite culture wars.  We have much bigger problems.  Like in the USA we are considered now a failing democracy.  And it's not because of some "woke & PC" horses-t.  It's because of a very different brand of propaganda.
So how about we all call a truce on this foolishness and get back to Ukraine?  Do we not (nearly) all here have a shared interest in seeing the new Hitler defeated?  What I care about is that the west (and the world) stays united and that Ukraine can emerge 'victorious', although that's an odd word for having a big part of one's country laid to ruin.

To add to the absurdity, the "woke brigade" in DC is beating down the doors of the administration to give more aid to Ukraine. Please stop the trolling, you just look dumb.

Are you being deliberately dumb here?  The reason you are correctly being accused of trolling isn't what you say about the Russians.  It's because you have decided that it's the "PC and woke" brigade that are the entire problem in the west. 

This comment...

This is what the PC and Woke Brigade of the West cannot grasp about Russia

...has absolutely nothing to do with Ukrainians being angry about Russian war crimes!

I KNOW exactly what it represents, and it has no place in this thread and that's why I'm calling it for what it is.

That's whether you, or anyone else likes it or not... it is trolling! 

Now I joined this thread after the first week of the war to read others views about the conflict, not to read about this sort of nonsense. Quite frankly, there's nothing that I am going to learn from this sort of socio-political diatribe, but there is a lot that I can learn about the military conflict. But these particular comments have no place here and are irrelevant to the topic. 

Tiresome and boring! Stop trolling!

Gents please pay heed and take all this off line for heaven sake.

Seeing what you’re seeing it’s understandable you’d question the basic humanity of the perpetrators. Every rational observer does but for you it’s even more. I get that.
I’ve also given thought to the comments here to let it go given what you’re country is going through. I disagree. What’s the point of claiming democratic values of respect for humanity and the rule of law if you don’t try to respect them?
But frankly, I’m pretty sceptical about the merit of denying the basic humanity of people. If you don’t do that, it’s got to be pretty hard to get a democracy to work as anything other than a tyrannical majority.
Zelensky is popular because he keeps aloof of Putins’ quagmire of racist crap and promises the rule of law. I’d encourage you to heed his example. It’ll go further with the democratic centre of the EU and US. 
You’re wrong about denazification. People don’t want to know things that are hard to accept. Thats whole “big lie” thing. Ask a German, but the majority of Germans in ww2 ignored or allowed things to happen because the price to them personally was too high to question it. Denazification was about showing to ordinary Germans what was done in their name. Showing them the basic humanity of their victims.
I’m now done.

To be honest I was surprised that  this post was  left up and intact .

I never said anything about not being responsible. And yes his country is under (brutal) attack, which is why I usually don't think/say too much about certain things. But he replied to me so I responded.