Vanir Ausf B

Russia started to use super-long range air-to-air missiles R-37/R-37M. Theese misiles have claimed range up to 398 km (but more reliable is 300 km). R-37 can be launched from MiG-31BM heavy interceptor, R-37M - from Su-35S and Su-57. Missiles likely get initial targeting from A-50 AWACS
Allegedly already two UKR jets can be shot down with theese missiles. One of more probable victims - last shot down of Su-24M, which was damaged over Donbas and fell in Poltava oblast. Also likely was shot down one MiG-29 HARM carrier. One missile was spotetd over western Ukraine, but result unknown 
MiG-31 now often take off from territory of Belarus
R-37 in flight over westren Ukraine

 
 

Oh, theese 1941 vibes 😆
Kharkiv front - UKR trophy BMP-3 tows a turret of another BMP-3. Cool "white cross" mark on sidehull - 100 % mockery and humilitation )))
 

Is it just me or that about the best camo scheme I have ever seen on a tank?

Ok let’s get some knowledge on this whole Wagner Line thing.  I will caveat that 1) I am not even sure a complex obstacle belt will work against how the UA has been fighting this war and 2) I have no idea how long this Wagner line is, or whether it ties into natural obstacles nor what the fire plans are around it.
That said, be very wary of the internet.  I see a lot of people talking about stuff they have no idea about, particularly in the “Russia sux camp”.  I do not go into my professional background too much for many reasons but I will say that one of my military incarcerations over a 34 year career is a military engineer, so take that into account if you like.
First, I doubt the veracity of the styrofoam claim very much.  Why?  Because it would take more time and resources to make a fake dragons tooth than to simply pour some concrete over steel bars.  I have heard nothing about Russia suffering a concrete shortage and this whole styrofoam theory sound like complete BS.
Second, efficacy of the Wagner line dragons teeth.  Dragons teeth need not be fixed or footed, particularly not the pyramidal ones I am seeing in this pictures.  They are designed to roll and catch the ground on their points as they do.  In doing so they can either belly up a tracked vehicle or de-track it.  Either way they act as caltrops for tracked IFVs and armor, looking for mobility kills but these are just the appetizer.
Third, these are clearly part of a complex obstacle.  The sorts of obstacles are designed to pull combat engineering and key armoured resources forward and expose them the fires.  If you can kill them then bull-rushing such a complex obstacle will likely yield in and around 70-80% casualties.  It isn’t how large the dragons teeth are, or how much they weigh, it is their placement.  I have heard a lot of “well we can just go in and tow them out” or “bring in a dozer and simply push them”.  Sure, but you are doing that in the middle of a 400m deep minefield while having ATGMs and artillery dropped on your head.  In fact the dragons teeth I have seen in that double row are likely the horizontal safelane markers as well.  As you would expect dismounting in the middle of a minefield with crowbars and chains is a good way to turn trained sappers into names on a memorial.
Finally, stuff like dragons teeth are hell on mine plows and rollers.  The get in between them and mess up the tank.  So this means engineers have to bring up technical vehicles like dozer tanks..which are very rare on the battlefield.  I have seen pics of these dragons teeth next to railways and embankments, which is really smart as that makes the mechanical clearing job that much harder.  About the only expedient way for this is explosive clearing - which I am not sure the UA even have - dragons teeth then should be fixed to avoid being blown aside.  But when combined with an AT ditch and some decent sighting that can even stump an explosive breach.
So no, there is nothing wrong with those Dragons Teeth as is at least as far as I can see from a picture, maybe not the most awesome I have ever seen but as part of a larger complex obstacle they will do exactly what they were designed to so long as that obstacle is covered by fire and observation.  The Russians are going to need about 100kms of these in a triple belt with KZs pre-sighted to get the effect I think they are looking for, which I do not think they can do and shame on the UA if they give them time and space to do this.
Remember that diagram I did up a while back, look both left towards effect and right towards capability when seeing stuff like this and always keep in mind the entire picture.  And avoid groups who are just seeing what they want to see at this point.

Pretty intense recovering a wounded comrade under fire
 

Ok, you keep mentioning this.  Moving several hundred thousand troops anywhere on an offence, even shoddily is incredibly hard.  You are really undersubscribing the difficulty of this under ideal conditions, now compounded by the UA who can see that entire line of advance back to the border from space.  Further the UA has precision fires and ATGM systems that are fire and forget out to 3+km hitting with 90% accuracy.  The fact the Russians got as far as they did should not be tossed aside so easily.  
You would have to back this up.  I have never heard anyone thinking this, nor the UA having the luxury to pull this off while being invaded.  What I saw was the UA adapting quickly with what they had and were likely surprised by the outcome as well.  That is one helluva assessment and I would need to see some facts before I bought off on it.  Have they learned how to exploit RA weakness over time, definitely.  But the idea that they specifically and deliberately tailored their operational and tactical approaches before the war because they knew exactly where the Russian suck is a reach with the info we have.
And here we fully disagree.  Would we have done better, likely.  Would it have been easy or would our strategic objectives be guaranteed..I am not sure at all for all the reasons I listed before.  Our logistics are just as vulnerable, for example how does one secure a 5km wide corridor for 100kms? Against dismounted infantry?  How does one hide mass and ours is just a big and hot as Russia’s.  In Iraq insurgents shut down US operational logistics with IEDs for days at a time, here we are talking an opponent with next-gen ATGMs and C4ISR - we would have to bake space to take out their assets, knocking ours out at the same time. UAVs everywhere, hell ISIS drove us nuts with Amazon drones and they  were nowhere near this level.  AD, we needed full stacks of SEAD for places like Libya let alone an opponent with next gen MANPADS plugged into a C4ISR system the UA have.  No, I am sorry but to say “we would be fine and the UA only won because Russia sucks” smacks of western hubris which is exactly what the European powers did with the lessons they observed in the wars leading up to WW1.
I could go on at length.  And even with setting pre-conditions and actually conducting joint targeting I am not convinced the west would have simply rolled through against an opponent armed, supported and fighting like the Ukrainians.  In fact we likely would have stuck ardently to our doctrine which would have gotten us into a lot of trouble when we also ran out of gas, let alone when the body count escalated.
 See western bias and hubris above.
I also do not think Russia would have won this if they “sucked less” because no one (or at least very few) predicted the impact the new realities of the modern battlefield would have.
I argue that while we fully agree on the Russian qualitative assessment, the outcomes do not lead to it being determinative.  Make the Russians better at combined arms, even joint fires and they they might have lost slower but they were not going to achieve their objectives because their entire system was built for a battlefield that does not exists anymore - giving them a faster horse is not going to make a difference against a bird in a vertical race.  Make the UA worse by taking away the advantages they had and their success does some into question, as it was back in 2014.  Those two factors alone point to the determinative factor as the performance of the UA in a modern environment driven largely by technological change and not the Russian military sucking (which again was definitely contributing).
Hell we can test some of this in CM right now for that matter - fight to emulate a proxy war with someone backed with China.  We can’t directly attack Chinese C4ISR and they have outfitted our opponent with all the bells and whistles (UAS, deep strike, PGMs and AD).  Let one side fight all modern combat armsy just like out doctrine says, and let then other fight like the UA, now that would be an interesting experiment.

 
 

This is a very good question.  Having spent a lot of time studying the Cold War - as one would hope, I think it depends on when.  The Soviet Army and it “scariness” is really time sensitive across what was a 40+ year period.  In the late 80s, say after 1984, my estimate is that “no” the Soviet military for multiple reasons would have failed gloriously in the ETO.  Western capability was far to advanced and integrated into an operational system that would have seen the Soviet forces die in significant numbers and achieve very little.
In the CMCW timeline ‘79 to ‘82/83 we have the point of last real parity.  In this timeframe I think the Soviets could have had a real shot and would have been pretty a pretty close run against the West.  Going earlier the Soviet chances get better through the early 70s as western militaries abandoned mass without on offset.  The the 60s get weird as western powers still had a lot of mass and the Soviet system was somewhat antiquated.  I think we might have even seen a western advantage in the 60s but again close to parity.  Post war and 50s by my estimate belong to the Soviets.  They had mass and the operational system on a scope and scale well outside the western powers.
So short answer “yes” and “no”.  I would say that one cannot compare the Soviet Army to the RA in ends, ways or means.  I am sure the Soviet military had corruption and poor leadership but they had so much capacity and depth back when it still really mattered.

Even if it were true there is no real statistical basis to make this statement really meaningful, I think. There haven't been many large scale modern wars around lately. On the contrary, we have repeatedly argued here that the current war is different than previous wars in many different ways.
We can only really say that currently Ukraine, equipped with western weapons, is better at fighting a modern war than Russia. There are only those two data points.
We have no clue where everyone else is on the "suckiness scale" because noone else has fought one. And so saying Russia sucks at modern war suggests there is meaningful sorting and comparing on this absolute (as in contrast to relative) scale while in fact, I think, there isn't.

Indeed. "Russia just sux" is the Anthropic Principle of the of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
In physics we have discovered that quite a lot of basic parameters of the universe had to be relatively precisely what they are in order for life as we know it to exist. The Anthropic Principle says that maybe the parameters are just coincidence and the fact that they are what they are is due to the fact that otherwise we just wouldn't be there to observe them (which maybe already happened an infinite number of times). How do I get to the Russians from here? Well, the Anthropic Principle, just like "Russia just sux" even if it is a valid answer, cannot be accepted because there could also be deeper mechanics at work and accepting it would prevent us from finding them.

And I would argue that the point you are missing is that on a strategic and operational level they took that “pretend force” and advanced deeply into the country they were invading and still hold over 20% of it.  We can slight their tactical capability all day (and do) and even though they have been a mess strategically and operationally there is nothing Potemkin or “cargo cultish” about the threat they pose or what they were capable of at higher levels of warfare, particularly at the beginning of this war.
It is as slippery a slope to under estimate the comparative tactical capabilities, as was demonstrated by many experts before this war.  They failed to downscale their strategic and operational assessments and we saw pretty quick the results on the ground quickly failed to meet predictions.  Hell three days into this thing we knew all of the higher level assessment were off because of what we saw on the ground.
Underestimating cuts both ways.  It is just as dangerous to try and take tactical shortfalls and upscale them directly onto the operational and strategic levels.  We have witnessed too many brilliantly conducted strategic campaigns with low quality forces in the VEO space to fall for that one.  Russian tried a form of combined arms that simply did not work; however, they still translated that into limited strategic/operational objectives.  
It was the Ukrainian way of war, supported by the west, and some emerging realities of warfare that broke the Russian system.  Ukrainian forces learned faster and better.  Without western support would we be talking about a Ukrainian offensive at all?  Without Ukrainian fast development of capability?  No, the RA was a hot mess and is a dumpster fire at this point but that was not the determinative factor in this war.  They had enough mass advantage, as ugly as it was, that if this was a battlefield of even a decade ago they might have pulled it off.  This is the biggest problem with the “Russia Sux” narrative, it is far too easy an answer.  It misses a lot of nuances and complex factors that we have literally been tracking right here.
The RA was a fumbling mess but it was at the gates of an enemy capital.  They still are resisting and will likely still be on occupied ground by this winter.  What I am on the lookout for are signs the Russians are actually learning.  For example, they bought a bunch of Iranian UAVs but they are using them as ersatz cruise missiles, not to improve their C4ISR game…which is a good sign they are still not learning.
Finally the biggest reason I am firmly against the “Russia just sux” narrative is that it encourages us to stop learning.  If that is the definitive unifying theory of this war then all phenomena can be explained by it, we have nothing left to learn.  This does nothing to inform us on the direction modern war is heading nor how we need to start thinking about it because it all boils down to “Russia Sux!”  Well 1) Russia is sucking but not everywhere, 2) that does not explain everything we have been seeing and 3) there are things happening in this war that “cargo cult” does not explain and we are way off if we start to thinking that way.

The harder part is getting the pixeltruppen to properly utilize a moving object as cover, especially spread out as they are instead of glued to the rear of the tank.

You are of course assuming the US or anybody truly understands modern warfare at this point.  I think Ukraine understands it better than any nation on earth and there are even things they are stumped by.
If you look at the performance of the RA across all three phases of this war I do not see a bunch of pretenders flailing - I think the steady diet of tactical vignettes is skewing the viewpoint on this thread.  I do see the RA attempting to fight according to the logic of their capabilities; the problem is their capabilities.  For example:
- Phase I - they had a lot more armour and air power as well as sea control as well as the element of multiple avenues of approach.  They went in looking a lot like the US did in Grenada with respect to a disconnected but attempt at a joint fight.  They were using position advantage and the speed /shock to try and overwhelm Ukrainian resistance before it could form up.  They were not counting on the UA having access to Western ISR and an ability to hit their entire operational system - in fact no one was. They were instead expecting a front-edge fight which they had advantage upon.  They then tried attritional warfare but were severely overstretched and did what made sense and narrow axis of offence to the south.
Phase 2 - given that the pretty much destroyed their leading edge in phase I and armour was not (and still is not) working like it should.  They had to switch again to a heavily attritional systematic grinding offensive around Severodonetsk using freakishly high density of artillery with infantry follow up.  This bought them some ground - again they are focusing on ground and not UA capability, which is old thinking - as they tried to smash their way to something they could call a victory.  By end Jul it was clear that they were running out of gas and due to the introduction of HIMARs in combination with Western backed C4ISR they could not sustain the offensive anymore.
Phase 3 - The RA has clearly gone on the defensive, they have mobilized for defence and are aligning their defensive objectives to the capabilities they have left.  Hell they are even conducting what looks like a withdrawal operation in Kherson right now.
None of that was conducted with a qualitatively good military - you get what you pay for - but it was/is not illogical.  The fact that the RA has lasted until now demonstrates that they can and have adapted. They just cannot do it apace with the UA. I propose that their major issue is not that “they suck”, although they definitely have quality issues, it is instead that the military they brought was prepared to fight the wrong war.  Again roll back the clock to 1991 on both sides and relook at how things could have gone, and the RA starts to make more sense.  They still did not have enough infantry and their logistics was not great but their advantages of mass would have likely worked much better.  They were in short fighting in the wrong war.  The final nail in the cargo cult theory is that if the RA was in fact simply pretending then the UA in their current condition should be at the pre-2014 border by now.  No, the RA is conducting a defensive operation, pretty messy and ugly but the cargo cult as described could not start landing planes if they suddenly showed up, the Russians still are.

The harder part is getting the pixeltruppen to properly utilize a moving object as cover, especially spread out as they are instead of glued to the rear of the tank.

UKR soldier, drone-recon instructor tells about battle for Bakhmut. Really, battlle for Bakhmut can be bloodiest in this war.
I've just turned back from Bakhmut. And I need to Bakhmut again. There is fuc...g s...t around Bakhmut.
I completely don't understand, how our mlitaruies in Bakmut still alive. Really, they should die by all laws of logic. There just a fu...g hell. Those, who live in Bakhmut are Titans.  93rd, 53rd [I suppose, he misspeled and there should be 58th], Skala [eng. Crag, volunteer recon battalion] and other. You are Titans. Everybody. All.
Guys, if somebody says that ****..g hell around Bakhmut is not just ****...g hell. This means, you can die, making extra step. This means, that you have skirmishes on "zero line" ALWAYS. This means five minutes without shelling is exclusion.
This means that people have been dying. That one tank of rusnya [derogatory name of Russians] can make incapacitate whole rifle company. That one katsap's [derogatory name of Russians] battery can kill 20 men for own ammunition load. That means that we have been burying people. Friends. Nearest.
Bakmut still stands. By the cost of people. Bt the cost of best childen of Ukraine. 
 
Further he answered about whey General Staff doesn't send there more troops:
 
Because there just mathematically more of rusnya. Because there no opportunity to deploy more our troops. Because there are more Russian assets, than "helmets". Because no opportunity. General Staff did everithing to keep Bakhmut standing
 
 

You are correct, but sadly this will not stop me calling every Russian .50 a DShK.

The harder part is getting the pixeltruppen to properly utilize a moving object as cover, especially spread out as they are instead of glued to the rear of the tank.

CMRT all along...of course cut propaganda video, but still interesting they use tank riders this way.

Except the one in CMBS has much lower dispersion 😗

First appearance of T-62M on Krasnyi Yar range (Transbaikal region). Tanks equipped with 1PN96MT-02 gunner's sight with thermal channel and LRF. In 2019 this sight was mounted on the batch of upgraded T-62 for Uzbekistan
1PN96MT-02 has detection range 2000 m and angle of view 9 degrees and 3 degrees for 6.5x zoom 

In short no objective account.
I found  numerous on-line accounts of this action. Many of them would appear to be based on, or heavily reference, an account published on Battlefield.ru which could be found at the link below though it appears its now broke...
The Soviet view of the Ogledow action referencing primary sources:
http://www.battlefield.ru/royal-opponent.html
A slightly more detailed overview of the Ogledow engagement and includes some original sketch maps showing the locations of KOd tanks. It appears to be heavily based on the original Battlefield.ru account
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/07/king-tigers-at-ogledow.html
Discussion querying loss rates in this action:
https://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=11435
 
This link takes you to an account which attempts to debunk the whole action, I’ve added it here for err, ‘interest’:
https://elgri.livejournal.com/10845.html
What happened to the captured Tiger IIs from Ogledow
http://www.battlefield.ru/was-tiger-really-king.html
My own notes and summary:
German tank losses in this action – three Tiger IIs destroyed - on the 12th August are confirmed by German records, but further losses in the next day or so are more challenging to reconcile with Soviet claims. That’s not to say the Soviets did not KO or capture the tanks they claimed they did, just from my research it is difficult to corroborate these claims. Thomas L. Jentz (‘Panzertruppen Vol 2’) states that 501st had 45 Tiger IIs on strength by 7th August 1944 and in ‘Germany’s Tiger Tanks – Tiger I & Tiger II: Combat Tactics’ page 153 gives a situation report that shows by the 21st August the unit had ‘only’ lost six Tiger IIs as total write offs, whilst 12 were in need of repair. Schneider in ‘Tigers in Combat I’ on page 46 confirms that the 501st lost three Tiger IIs on the 12th August 1944 and indicates that on the 13th August – “Heavy fighting and further losses. 1 tank – Tiger 002 – is captured intact by the enemy.” The German losses are noted and challenged in the Battelfield.Ru article where the author notes –“Jentz's figures are doubtful. On the battlefields near Ogledów, Mokre, and Szyldów, twelve King Tiger tanks were left behind. From the [Russian} archive records currently available, it appears that the 501st Battalion was routed…”
It is worth noting that the German records for the 501st would appear to be contradictory as several authors provide slightly different numbers for the 501st for the end of August 1944. For example, Dennis Oliver in Dennis Oliver (‘Tiger 1 and Tiger II’ page 5) gives 501st as having 41 Tiger IIs on strength with 26 combat ready by the end of August 1944 having lost 4. Whilst Thomas L. Jentz (‘Panzertruppen Vol 2’) states that 501st had 45 Tiger IIs on strength by 7th August 1944 and in ‘Germany’s Tiger Tanks – Tiger I & Tiger II: Combat Tactics’ page 153 gives a situation report for the 31st August 1944  as 13 complete write-offs; 14 operational; and 18  in need of repair for  total of 32 Tigers. Reconciling kill claims and operational tanks is always a challenging (futile?) exercise given the various factors common to both sides such as over inflated kill claims, incorrect reports, vehicle accounting systems combined with different definitions of when a tank is ‘knocked out’.
 
What is clear is that the combat record of the 501st during this and subsequent actions in the Sandomierz bridgehead was generally unimpressive. Possibly due to the original battalion being all but destroyed attempting to hold back Soviet attacks during Operation Bagration. Such catastrophic events would mean few of the experienced crews would survive to help form the cadre for the new unit to be rebuilt around. 
The 501st was reconstituted on the 14th July 1944 with the new Tiger IIs but this only gave the whole unit around a month to reform and train on the new vehicles, and as a combat unit, before being sent into action – perhaps therein lays the reasons for the lacklustre performance of the new tanks and their crews through August 1944: 
•    after the heavy losses in June 1944 the reformed 501st  consisted mainly of new recruits without combat experience and lack of thorough training due to the short time between being reformed and sent into combat;
•    serious technical problems with the new Tiger IIs (final drives in the vehicles being especially prone to failure, especially if the driver was inexperienced);
•    lack of experience with the new tanks and their strengths and weaknesses combined with overconfidence and overestimation of what the weapon system could achieve, especially the thick armour, often resulted in poor reconnaissance measures and a resultant poor tactical handling.
The 501 st’s record through August 1944 was so poor that on the 22nd August 1944 Major von Legat was relieved of his command. It is also reported that he had links to the 20th July 1944 conspiracy to kill Hitler. On the 21st December 1944 the battalion was redesignated as schwere Panzer-Abteilung 424.
It is worth mentioning that the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Corps did not have significant numerical superiority during this action. Referencing Battlefield.ru’s account – “It had the following operational tanks to face the German III Panzer-Korps assault: nine T-34-76's from the 53rd GTBr (GMc Note: Oskin’s tank appears to have been a T34-85 according to most accounts), and nine T-34-76's and ten T-34-85's from the 52nd GTBr. The 51st GTBr, positioned to the north, had eleven T-34-76's and four T-34-85's. At Staszów there were eleven JS-2 heavy tanks, and one JS-85 heavy tank from the 71st Independent Guards Heavy Tank Regiment.” 
Crucially and in marked contrast to their German opponents from the 501st all their crews were seasoned and experienced armoured combat veterans. The high level of professionalism of the Soviet tank crews ensured they made excellent use of reconnaissance, took full advantage of the terrain and the tactical opportunities it afforded and ensured excellent tactical handling at all levels of the unit. 
Hope this helps?

I'm not sure we know this, tbh. There's a lot of fog of war still as to Russian units and I'd suspect enormous differences in leadership, supply and motivation with supply being especially dependent on krysha. I could easily see where a minority of reasonably well supplied, well led units supported by unreliable mobiks would be quite hesitant to attack but still be quite ferocious on defense. In short, my bias would be to avoid any sort of essentialism about Russian military culture and wait to get better information on actual circumstances.

Unfortunatelly, not much beyond what I wrote, except his team was chased by single RU tank at the outskirts of Kupyansk and they need risky "cat and mouse" play to avoid it, since they were separated or otherwise lost their AT weapons (take note, it is recon team not specifically tank hunters). Overall his team had some bad experience with AT weapons, being insufficent, broken or too valuable to loose; when in previous interview journo being overexcited asked "So how many tanks you destoyed with your Javelins?" (media workers...) he needed to school him there are no "silver bullets" in real war and using  even Javelin is difficult in present conditions, as it is entire separate combat mission- AT teams need to have good positions, cons of fire, escape routes etc.. He specifically mentioned "carrousel tactics" is now used by muscovites:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/russias-new-tank-carousel-tactics-have-been-around-ages-185151
Yup, those guys are tip of the spear, and together with SSO and Tank crews considered elite in UA army. Interesting thing is they were actually not numerous, and followed by mechanzied troops from the start. It seems destroyed RU equipment they met on roads was previous work of artillery, drones or UA aviation rather than special teams alone.
He still refused to provide many details how exactly they broke the front, except they have "their own ways" and focusied on small tactics in his sector; I suppose it was connected to advanced ISR and tapping of famously shoddy Russian comms.
His view here is connected to his tactical profiling (recon) and specific front, and indeed when asked "What Ukrainians think of mobilization?" he respond they will greet them as before and are not scared by any means. But he has no illusion they will need to pay in blood for increased Russian presence especially in urban combats, as "even Afghan teenagers can shoot kalashnikov and are deadly in right cicumstances".  Note you are most probably right from strategic point of view, but soldier who need to assault a village infested with Russians would probably still prefer to meet 3 Specnaz guys than 10 mobiks. RU Artilery fire also does not seem to decreased judged by his words, but it can be an issue on his sector only. From other sectors and Russian channels we know Russians lacked heavy ammo quite often; but not at Kupyansk- they were able to chase single teams with massive barrages. Also fires by Russian aviation did seem to play significant part there, just as muscovite milbloggers reported.
Also interesting are his thoughts about Russian armour; he claims they did not lack good eqiupment or tactical skill, but due to lack of infantry Russians were forced to ram their lines in doomed assaults.

So, German-supplied IRIS-T got own batize of fire in Ukraine. Today was spotted parts of missiles of theese SAMs in some forest near Kyiv, so likely they have been participating since yesterday in defense of Kyiv.
Here the video of yesterday stirke on our district thermal power plant, incoming Kh-101 was shot probably with Iris-T. First hit (where smoke) was reportedly because Shakhed attack, but it might be and cruise missile (alas, three employees of power plant were killed by explosion)
Today two Kh-101 were shot down over Kyiv. There were two booms, last one enough loud - this missile was intercepted already over the city. First missile shot down a fighter jet.
Two other missiles, incoming to Kyiv from NE were shot down in 70 km from city limit in Chernihiv oblast
Remains of shot down Kh-101
 
Except 4 Kh-101 Air Forces claimed for today 10 Shakheds. Alas, two missiles and probably some number of Shakheds successfully hit power infrastructure objects in Vinnytsia and Ivano-Frankivsk oblast