Vanir Ausf B

Terminators doing forestry work.
 

Finally someone puting this in nice short writing. TLDR modern Abrams is not that different from Leopard in terms of logistics and sustainment:
 

Probably the best simple summary for non-Mil of Why NATO tanks are not going to be quick:
The 18 wheeler is the crux, eh. Not much use anything else if you can't get to where you are needed... 

In Ukraine against the Russians, very likely but when we are talking US/NATO next-war, this little shindig in Ukraine is the “sampler”.  You are basically describing the western doctrine that got us through the last 30 years of dominance.
Question is, “is that doctrine over?”
Problem #1 - Air superiority.  The war in Ukraine is what massive air denial looks like and it is very likely to get worse not better.  Against another nation or coalition with significant ISR (space to ground networks) and dispersed cheap air denial systems gaining air superiority is the lynch pin we may very well get stuck on.  If the answer is “we will never ground attack until we have air superiority” then we have just highly incentivized opponents to develop and field air denial capabilities.  And then there is the “air superiority below 2000 feet” problem.  The direction of things is favouring swarming autonomous systems capable of lethal effects.  Against that our current doctrine is weak as traditional air superiority means less, and massed conventional force is the opposite direction one wants to go.
Problem #2 - Our tanks need gas too.  Our western doctrine of conventional mass requires enormous effort to secure its LOCs under the old rules.  We saw insurgents cripple our supply lines for short periods of time.  Against a peer opponent our current LOCs are extremely vulnerable because we are massing and burning a lot of energy to achieve overmatch.    Take Problem #1 and project it into our rear areas and we might simply run out of gas before we can crush anything.
Problem #3 - We still think and act linearly.  I am getting the sense that against an opponent wired the same way we are, enabled the same way we are, we are in fact at a disadvantage.   The issue is that our doctrine still looks at the problem sets as linear manoeuvre problems.  Against an opponent that creates and projects a force that is fighting along a non-linear game plan we already know we are vulnerable - we saw this in COIN.  However when that opponent is a peer force, well it changes the game in ways we are not well set up for.
Problem 4 - Will.  The elephant in the room is not even a military problem.  Right now in police forces we don’t know who to trust if the problem at hand is along a divisive fault line.  And I am not talking about the US here, I am talking about Canada.  This is bigger than How We Fight but is directly going to impact both the inputs and outcomes.  So if we get into a peer war, I am not convinced our internal integrity will hold longer than theirs.  This is a precondition more important than air superiority and we do not even think in these terms while our opponents do.
So as an example to pull this all together in your western crushing offensive - in the East somewhere in ten years NATO/US face off against an unnamed peer adversary who counters your entire scenario with -
Ubiquitous ISR built on a backbone of space to sub-surface networks integrated into civilian architectures with enough ambiguity to make us pause and argue on legalities of hitting them.  They can see us, all of us better than we can see them because we are all formed up enmasse while they go a different way.
Air denial on a scope and scale that makes air superiority impossible.  The air space becomes a Wild West.
Employs fully autonomous systems (air/ground) with no human-in-loop while we are going to be stuck within our legal frameworks.  Swarming lethal unmanned clouds pollute the battle space.  
Focuses on deep system attacks going back through our LOCs, SLOCs and all the way back to industry.
Employs non-linear hybrid and dispersed warfare - we are the snow, they are the fog.  Think 21st century Mongols while we continue to fight in blocks and squares.
Has built in trapdoors and poison pills so deeply in our backfield that we funded the blind spots.  We start taking casualties and the cracks widen on the first day.
Russia is nowhere near playing at this level.  All it has is the nuclear equation, which is so last millennium.  However I can think of one nation that is heading in this direction, and it literally wrote the rules on on some of this over two thousand years ago.

This seems to me to be more a question of the resources available to the US Army than about the tactical merits of the tank.
If you have the luxury of being able to completely bomb the enemy into submission then you wouldn't even need tanks to break their lines.
Sure, if you have tanks, they will work well. If you have APCs they will also work. If you have just leg infantry, they will work, too. And if you really have the total air advantage, you might not even always need those. During Desert Storm, we saw the first cases of troops surrendering to drones.
I suddenly get the feeling that 500 years ago, people might have been arguing the same thing about the armoured mounted knight:
"Despite muskets, the knight is not dead yet, because a mounted charge still works - if you have enough infantry to completely surround the enemy force, and if you have an absolutely massive archer and crossbow support to hammer the enemy line and then send in huge numbers of knights to crush the disordered opposition".
 

And still it is "only" simulation.
This kind of talk always give me headaches. At the end of the day the US fought their last peer to peer war in WW2. Korea if we are very generous and that didn't end so well. The same is true for all other western armies. Vietnam was the last war a western army had to face significant losses. Vietnam also didn't end so well. Desert Storm while surely large in scale was nowhere near peer to peer.
We simply don't know how much advantage our technologically superior equipment and our doctrine would give us simply because it was never evaluated in live conditions. 
Really no offense meant, you do simulate that stuff for a living and if we all didn't love it we wouldn't be here. But as someone who's PhD was about evaluating the difference between simulation and reality (albeit in a totally different area) let me tell you that simulation is always only an abstraction that has limited predictive power. And the hard part is understanding what those limits are.
At the end of the day you may be right with what you say. But currently this prediction is based on a theory that you can't support with data and only with simulation that covers but one aspect of war. That is far better than nothing, sure, but not the whole picture.

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Interesting update from this retired U.S. tanker general on the supply of Abrams tanks:
 
 

😉
 
Terminator near Kreminna. Heavy fights are reported there.
 

Somewhere Eisenhower is spinning in his grave right now. 

Is this true? Might be a long time before they get to Ukraine. That or we manage to convince another operator to hand over their tanks.
 

Most likely, we are talking about the transfer of aircraft to Ukraine after the end of the war. The pilots will be trained now, but the planes will be sent after the war. If there are such problems with the supply of tanks, the transfer of aircraft is completely excluded right now

Mid of winter %)
Though, maybe this is autumn video, but several days ago we had temperature record for 143 years in Kyiv, +10 C
 

UKR soldier about three more scary things at the war - incendiary ammunition, airstrikes and tanks (on 1st place)
The tanky is most scary as for me, because the time for shot-hit very small, ammo is fast and fragments fly apart stout. Plus, the enemy has this sh..ty stuff fu...g many much, they can work daily from 5-7 km and they don't spare its. So, when I hear that "era of tanks is gone" I laugh hystericaly.