Vanir Ausf B

They still don't get it. You need stockpiles that can sustain a full scale war for AT LEAST eighteen months. While we are at it we might consider making munnitions plants that are not 70 years out of date. 
 
 

Very bad day. We lost two experienced warriors
Dnytro Kotsiubaylo "Da Vinchi" - youngest volunteer who was awared with state rank Hero of Ukraine and unofficial award People's Hero of Ukraine. He started his war in 2014, when he was 17 y.o. in Right Sector volunteer unit. Since years he became a commander of 1st assault company of VUC (Volunteer Ukrainian Corps), known as "Da Vinchi Wolfs". Fearless commander, and strong leader. Since full-scale war began, his unit soon became a part of 67tn mech.brigade already as separate battalion (company "Da Vinchi Wolfs", company "Honor", medical-evacuation unti "Ulf"). He was officially promoted to jr.lt. rank but was battalion commander. Today he was lost during the battle for Bakmut.
  
Major Andriy Lukaniuk, battalion commander of 80th air-assault brigade. Was at the war also since 2014. Experienced commander. Was killed today in Chasiv Yar town SW from Bakhmut (probably Russians hit battalion command center)

Could a nonstate actor really blow up the pipelines?
 

I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. 
Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated?
I am ESL and perhaps we understand different things for the expression "to break through". Yet I do not think one can classify how the initial phase of the war played out as anything other than breaking through all axis but one, which has barely moved since February 2022. The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis. No major retrograde movements were appreciated in the south (the biggest success of the Russian armed forces, until they tried to reach out to Mikolayev and Kryvyi Rih, and became hopelessly overextended) and the NE (where they flanked the JFO forces covering the DNR and LNR proxies). Mariupol was devastated, surrounded, besieged, and conquered.
That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini!
On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. 
The Russian Army was still overextended after their initial retreats (or rout, I don't know it seemed quite touch and go)... and the dangerous thing for them was that they weren't aware of it. So they were surprised in Kharkiv and routed in what I consider was a masterful demonstration of the very same warfighting principles that lead to the smashing victory of the German army in very much the same area in May 1942. But, and this is a big one, the Russian Army managed to evacuate most of its personnel (yet not their material).
On the campaign for Kherson, I have mixed opinions. To my mind, that one clearly did not meet its most immediate objectives. The Russian Army was better entrenched and had (for the most part) better troops. But the logistics were not workable: it just took nearly two months for the Russian Army to realize that, aided by the progressive crumbling of their right flank, which was anchored on the Dnipro. 
I have the sense that the secondary offensive (Kharkiv) turned out to be the one that exceeded expectations. I think it is indicative that the Ukrainian forces didn't have reserves to further exploit all the way to Starobi'lsk. Which did indeed seem doable for a fleeting moment in September.
Yes, that is a fact that can be duly appreciated.
I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. 
I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully.
That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.
Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?
As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen.
On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere.
Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion.
Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 
Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.
Agreed. This is indeed the benchmark.
I recently finished reading B. A. Friedman "On Operations", and he made a very compelling case about the so-called "operational level" being something that has no purchase as an idea (that's now coming out with some balls). Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time.
From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance).
I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes. 

I like reading David Axe myself
David Axe (forbes.com)

I really do not get the Kofman hate. Apart from the initial asessment which was too favourable to Russians, and which he quickly corrected, he has been consistently close to what really happened during this war. It pains me to say, that he was closer to the truth that the majority opinion on this forum, which predicted Russians to collapse in summer of 2022, then in autumn 2022. If his credibility is low, then whose credibility is high? Maybe Ukrainians - but they do not say much in comparison. Among the analysts who cover the war the most solid ones are probably Kofman, Rob Lee, Konrad Muzyka, Jack Watling, Dara Masicot. They all pretty much say the same thing, so to single out Kofman as the low credibility guy is not fair.

Examples? Especially Chaikovskiy %). They were people of own time. Cancelling of Russian classics for "ukrainophobia" is the same sh...t like cancelling of J.Washigton and A.Linkoln by idiotic leftists for "racism". 
If we cancel old Russian culture for anti-Ukrainism, well, let cancel also Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewich for his "By fire and sword" - pure anti-ukrainian thing, and director Hofman - who filmed a movie.
We can cancel Chaikovskiy, but we can't cancel his contribution in world culture. So, why? In WWII also all German was under taboo. German philosophers, writers, musicians. This is just emotions of war. We must cancel all existing in Russian culture, who actively inspired the war, who sow a dirt and sh..t on brains and souls like Mikhalkov, Morgenshtern or Skabeyeva, but not Mendeleyev or Pushkin or to prohibit classical comedy movies of Haidai. Though, of course, we don't need parks of Pushkin and streets of Pushkin in each town and city. 

Probrbly this could be about this:
On LostArmor told UKR troops had an attempt of counter attack at the morning on 4th of March. Attacking force - 3 tanks and 10-12 light arnmor. Attack was repelled, UKR lost one tank (other one was damaged, but could retreat) and "about half of light armor", personnel losses they assessed in 20-30 men. Own claimed losses - destroyed tank, 2KIA (both tankers, driver has survived), 8 WIA. 
Probably from Ukr side participated 4th National Guard Rapid reaction brigade - at least abandoned BMP-1 was spotted with digits 3018 (4th brigade has digital code m/u 3018) 5шр (5th assault company)
 

Boots on the ground...
 

I don't think it's a thing of the past at all. Whether someone ends up a convicted war criminal or a decorated war hero depends entirely on which side wins.

Soldiers interviewed. Snippets taken out and quoted. Certainly not a great picture of the defense of Bakhmut. Ammo shortages, insufficient training, lack of heavy equipment and ammo, insufficient ISR.
https://kyivindependent.com/national/ukrainian-soldiers-in-bakhmut-our-troops-are-not-being-protected
 

That is supported by, inter alia, by people like Cheryl Rofer of Los Alamos fame. Nobody who really studies or has experience with Russian strategic forces (Rofer actually went on inspections) thinks they are not up to fighting a nuclear war. We shouldn't make the mistake of assuming that Russian fecklessness in conventional forces runs through their nuclear deterrence. There is no evidence that that is true.

Impossible.

Impossible.

I have no idea about Shock Force, but in Black Sea all Russian tanks use 3BM60 Svinets-2, and IIRC all Ukrainian tanks use 3BM42 Mango.

https://www.firstpost.com/world/german-defence-minister-says-his-country-cannot-protect-itself-in-war-12232132.html
 
This is concerning

Scrounging for tanks in Europe
__________
“The trend across the board in European armies has been cutting, cutting, cutting,” said Christian Mölling, a defense expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations. “But at the end of the day, many were on the same track as Germany: War is a theoretical thing. So we have theoretical tanks.”
Ulrike Franke, a defense analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said the struggle to find tank numbers raises questions as to where else European militaries face similar shortages and maintenance problems.
“Is it just bad luck that Spain has an issue with their Leopard tanks, but everything else works?” she said. “Or do they have the same issues elsewhere?”
“Does 10% of their equipment not work, or is it 50%?” Franke asked. “It would be a good idea for Europeans to look at this more closely.”
__________
https://www.yahoo.com/news/scrounging-tanks-ukraine-europes-armies-193032025.html

I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read
in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army.
I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle).
This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can  implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
 
 

Some updates from various sources:
-Situation in Bakhmut became critical- corridor is maybe 3-4 km wide by this moment, both main supply roads are under direct enemy fire.
-Russian are rushing everything they have in area- artillery, airforce and of course they try to swarm it with infantry. They also shell Konstantinovka this evening.
-Gen. Sirsky is near Bakhmut to oversee the situation-quite possible indication they plan to retreat. There are gossips that disagreements between various military leaders and politicians as to strategy regarding this city reached level of concious lack of coordination between units (still unconfirmed and ofc. prone to subjectivity, but many Ukrainians ask "why our boys are still there dying"). Hard nut to crack, as they clearly overinvested symbolically in defence of this place.
-If defenders will not counterattack soon and in numbers, the city may be sorrounded soon.
 

This is the play. "Somebody" leaks hints that a Chinese military contractor could be supplying the Russian war effort so western media and hawks whip themselves up into a lather denouncing China as public enemy number one. Meanwhile the actual Chinese government releases an utterly milquetoast roadmap to peace that succeeds in saying nothing concrete whatsoever, while looking more-or-less reasonable to the casual observer, which includes most countries of the Global South. If Russia leans on a Chinese-brokered peace negotiation to get itself out of the war it is losing then it saves face for them because it won't be seen as a capitulation to the west. Meanwhile China can offer Ukraine a big economic carrot to help rebuild their country, with armies of Belt and Road construction workers all ready to roll.
In the end China looks like the adult in the room to the Global South, they extract their biggest military ally from a dumb war and they get their hooks back into Eastern Europe after losing some ground in Lithuania and (more recently) Estonia, Latvia and perhaps Czechia.
Whether this will succeed remains to be seen, but I think some of the dismissiveness on this thread of the economic relevance of BRICS and the mindset of people in the Global South is indicative of the kind of western hubris that propaganda merchants from authoritaran nations love to hype. Despite the fact that this is transparently a play for power and influence by the Chinese government, there is a chance it could succeed where a western-brokered peace might not. And that's the larger battle that is quietly being fought on the global scale. It's not one that will be won with a more efficient military or better weapons.

Video of a failed HIMARS missile. A bit into the video it shows the missile path through the roof, 3 levels and down into the cellar!
 

Two things: First this entire war, and maybe all wars consists of of little tiny engagements where one side or the other get a real advantage and utilizes it. In the engagement discussed in this post it was the Russians who had it together. In the somewhat larger engagement around Vuhledar recently it was the Ukrainians. The war is determined in large part by which side has more good days. The simple fact that Ukraine is still in this war, given the initial force disparities, implies that it has been them, so far. Going forward it is a contest to maintain an edge in combat power even as attrition continually wears units down. The very crude back of the envelope math is that two percent casualties per week mean a unit is literally gone in a year. So for Ukraine to win NATOs training complex has to produce units that are notably better than the Russian fast enough to stay ahead of that curve. Data from Allied forces fighting from D-Day to German surrender point out just how hard this is.
Second point, this engagement is a short form argument for why tanks are still worth having around. If the other side bleeps up and gives you a target rich environment nothing can do more damage, more quickly than a well handled MBT. The very badly handled ones flopping around the minefields around Vuhledar of course provide the counter argument. A bad crew can lose a very expensive asset very quickly. Which brings us back to the question of which side can produce TRAINED people faster.

Just found this footage from Kherson offensive: 
https://old.reddit.com/r/UkraineRussiaReport/comments/10muegb/ru_pov_a_single_russian_t72b3_with_artillery/
"The tank crew of a Russian T-72B3 from the 124th Independent Tank Battalion part of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division engages two Ukrainian motorized companies supported with a platoon of T-72M tanks moving in parallel with one another. This took place near the village of Kostromka.
Interesting to note that one of the Ukrainian crews of a YPR-765, out of panic and disorganization, begin shooting at their friendly column of BMPs moving in parallel with them.
The footage shows the Russian tank taking out 3 YPR-765 vehicles, 2 BMPs as well as a direct hit on a T-72M. Another 3 Ukrainian vehicles were destroyed in this engagement after the video ends. Afterwards, the Russian tank drove off to safety, leaving the battlefield."

I don't know the details, but I very strongly suspect that 'a small town in Ohio' *could* get aid if certain *cough*qanon*cough* senators and congressmen pulled their heads out of their asses.
It's not a financial binary - Ukraine or Ohio. It's a political binary - Biden doing good makes me look bad.