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Vanir Ausf B

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Everything posted by Vanir Ausf B

  1. Rarity cost = base cost x rarity multiple. Anything that increases the base cost of a unit will also increase its cost in rarity points.
  2. The model detail level setting adjusts this to a limited extent but the difference is not dramatic.
  3. Turkey has no means of moving large combat formations into Ukraine. Individual member states would likely contribute materiel or intelligence but NATO as an organization will not go to war over Ukraine.
  4. Direct NATO participation or not? Those are two very different conflicts. If you are imagining an operational level wargame in which politics and economics are non-factors and NATO is a bystander then Russia could theoretically do lots of things. With an investment of 36,000 - 55,000 troops they could seize a land corridor to Crimea within a couple of weeks, although securing the major population centers such as Mariupol would take longer.
  5. From a former US Green Beret who was there: "My relationship with the British military is not diminished and I would go into combat with their soldiers anytime. My respect for British soldiers is immense and undying." http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bull****-bob.htm http://www.michaelyon-online.com/death-in-the-corn-part-i-of-iii.htm
  6. I would be fine with a panic reaction to non-penetrating hits resulting in retreat or even abandonment of the tank if it were limited to crews with low motivation ratings. While it did (and still does) happen it is the exception.
  7. The air force and various spetsnaz units could be moved within a few days, the naval vessels in a few days more. Aside from that Russia doesn't have enough in Syria to be of much consequence in your scenario. Armenia and Tajikistan each have larger contingents of Russian forces than Syria.
  8. There is the "crew shocked" game mechanic that I mentioned but also the crew communication delay spoken of by Baneman which would not be dependent on penetrations. For a Panther tank the time between the TC spotting a target and the gunner firing at that target was typically 20-30 seconds. With the current in-game rates of fire that would allow 3 to 4 shots from the Sherman even if none of them penetrated.
  9. T-33 is not in the game right now and won't be until the timeline is extended (it will become available in March). It's M82 @ 2650 fps in October and M82 @ 2800 fps in November through February, with HVAP showing up in January (I'm surprised no one else has commented on the appearance of HVAP since it was not in the game at all prior to the patch). Penetrations of the glacis plate at 1000m are probably weak point penetrations, which become less rare on late model Panthers because of flawed glacis plate modeling.
  10. For example, in the video posted you'll notice the Panther begins to slew its turret towards the Sherman the instant it's hit. In CM1 there was a "crew shocked" game mechanic that would freeze crew actions for a brief time when the vehicle was penetrated but that doesn't happen in CM2. A 5-10 seconds delay (for example) would have allowed for a 3rd shot. EDIT: Ninja'd
  11. It is true that tank ROF could be faster in some situations where no aiming or shot adjustment is necessary. As a practical matter it would come into play only occasionally such as a very short ranges where both vehicles are stationary. Another change that would be beneficial in the situations described in would be to eliminate tanks' instant reaction speed to new threats. That would have a positive impact on a broad range of scenarios. BTW, in CM tank rate of fire is modified by the crew experience rating.
  12. The movement rates for ATGs are very abstracted. They move at exactly the same speed on every terrain and ground condition, uphill or downhill. And the crews never tire. They can push that gun all day I'm not saying they could not be improved, just something to keep in mind.
  13. What exactly did I write that is "nonsensical"? That protecting ethnic Russians would be merely a pretext with the real objective being the discreditation of the NATO alliance? Or that any subsequent real ethnic strife used as post facto propaganda? Or that Russian leadership may not feel wedded to their casus belli? Nothing you wrote addresses any of those contentions. As for your points, withdrawing forces would not save a few thousand Russian troops. If we are assuming that NATO would go to the mat for the Baltics, withdrawing would save the bulk of the Russian conventional forces from destruction. And to say that Russia would lose "all control of its fate" is obvious hyperbole. Germany and Japan lost all control of their fate at the end of WW2. Russia's position, while bad, would be a far cry from that. Agreed that Ukraine could take back the Donbas with the USAF flying cover. If Russia had any foresight at all they would have withdrawn at least most of their troops from Syria and Transnistria, but any still there would be hit (BTW, Transnistria is a breakaway region of Moldavia rather than Romania and has it's own little army but that is neither here nor there). Georgia retaking South Ossetia or Abkhazia is fantasy. Of course this is not a good outcome for Russia which is why I agree there is little chance of it happening. I'll reiterate my previous points that the least improbable scenario is a very limited incursion into one of the Baltic states instead of an attempt to conquer them outright even for a limited time.
  14. Yes, but remember that in all likelihood protecting ethnic Russians would be merely a pretext with the real objective being the discreditation of the NATO alliance, with any subsequent real ethnic strife used as post facto propaganda ("see, we told you they were being oppressed!"). In that scenario the Russian leadership may not feel wedded to their casus belli 'til death do them part.
  15. That is a very good point. It does seem that all of these hypothetical scenarios assumes Russia would fight to the bitter end over the Baltics once they invaded but in many ways it would be more sensical to declare mission accomplished and leave. They could be in and out within a few weeks. The only reason I can think of to stay would be if Russian internal politics required it, e.g. to protect oppressed Russian minorities. But I do think that in the pantheon of crazy "Russia attacks!" scenarios the "Russia overruns the Baltic states then digs in to take on all comers" is the craziest and therefore the least probable.
  16. Yes, but the thing is these forces are not deployed along the Russian border. The portion of the ERI ABCT in the Baltics is based in Lithuania. By the sounds of it NATO wants to add another battalion in the Baltics but you can bet it will also be in Lithuania to avoid creating a security dilemma.
  17. From a wargaming perspective a full-on Russian invasion of the Baltics is a lot of fun but in reality is one of the least likely conflict scenarios. A more probable (albeit still remote) scenario would be Russia seizing a small chunk of land bloodlessly, thereby presenting NATO with the politically uncomfortable proposition of shooting first followed by the militarily difficult task of fighting Russia on Russia's own border. Again, not likely to happen but a less stupid way for Russia to challenge NATO's legitimacy than sending 30 battalion tactical groups hurling towards Poland.
  18. I can't reproduce it. Shaders are ON every time I start. Win7 64-bit, Nvidia GPU.
  19. That NATO could eventually muster sufficient firepower to retake the Baltics is not in question. What is in question is if there would be political will to do so. The Baltic states are not comparable in importance to West Germany, Belgium, France ect. in coldly-calculated strategic terms and it's debatable if NATO would collectively be willing to risk nuclear escalation in the same way they were during the Cold War. And Russia could be punished in non-military ways. But I agree that this is more about reassurance of nervous eastern NATO members than any belief that Russia is really going to invade (the US portion of the build-up is actually called the European Assurance Initiative).
  20. The US is also considering the permenent return of one armored brigade combat team to Europe, which is in addition to the ABCT rotating through as part of the European Assurance Initiative and the prepositioned equipment for a 3rd ABCT that could be put into action within 10 days notice. In other words, while the article's headline is true it probably won't be within 2-3 years.
  21. Feature. I presume the change will be in the other titles when they are updated.
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