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Crimea and Donbas
 
These territories were seized by Russia and then the population (especially Crimea) shifted by importing Russians. (This is why borders matter.)
Now, if Ukraine regained these territories, there is nothing to prevent them from copying Russia: allowing Ukrainians to flood in while allowing Russian separatists to go to Russia. 
Russia had 8 years to tilt the demographics. Let's do a poll of the territories 8 years after Ukraine regains their rightful borders. I'll bet it'll be pretty pro-Ukrainian.
 
Land is NOT people.  The one is immutable, the other is mobile and moldable.

Ukrainian society will curse and even overthrow anybody, who will agree to trade our lands for peace.  
There is no matter about relatively big part of Russia-TV zombified unloyal population, which wanted of Russia coming. Most of them will never rise a weapon by own will, because their passive soviet mentality.
Westerners always have rational point of view, which mixed with modern pacifism of many intellectuals. So, from here all this  messages to our government and president - "we support you, of course, but Russia is stronger and bigger anyway, your desperate resistance only caused new and new deaths and destructions. You have to save a lives first of all and stop the war. Rest can be resolved by negotiations ... Somewhere. And we want to trade with Russia - huge market, but your foolish resistance is just spoiling our idyll"
But for us, slavs, the question of "land of our fathers" will be always irrationally sacred. We can lost lands only after military defeat or betrayal of our leaders, but even in this case we will fight back early or later. 
All, who  incline our country to peace with concessions just don't understand, that this only  approve Russia in it neo-imperial ambitions. And through several years they again will come to "liberate" other Ukrainian territories. And not only Ukrainian. I bet if Russia invade to Baltic states, there will be discussions around "5th article" and many continental European countries will be search ways to avoid direct involvement. 
So, now the West has a chance to finish off with rashism, neo-imperialism and revanchism by our hands and our blood. We have 600-year experience of wars with Moskovia, so nobody can do it better. So, just give more weapon and ammunition and we will drive aspen  stake in the heart of neoSoviet walking dead, risen from own grave. All other hints about peace, "not humilitate Russia" summon question is really western world based on own claimed values, or this is just beautiful hypocritical words, which cover ugly face of rationalism, real politic and business as usual

Just a little comment on that range table above:
- M30/31 has at least 80km range (that's the marketed range of MARS II when firing those)
- 2S7 range with unassisted projectile is around 40 km, I'd stick to that as a practical range
Also an interesting piece of data: according to Wiki (but also other easily available sources), 2S7s barrel life is just 450 rounds. For comparison naval 8"/55 gun was good for 700+ EFC, and had an inner liner that could be replaced, and it was a significantly heavier ordnance than 2A44 on Pion.
Compared to 1800 EFC of modern 155mm/L52, it puts 8" guns at a considerable disadvantage in any prolonged conflict.

First off, great video, thanks for posting it.
I would urge caution on reading too much in to such a short clip. It could be proficiency flying by operational pilots, or perhaps even the return from an operational mission or flight testing ex-Bulgarian aircraft before returning them to service. I can say that the plane the video was shot from definitely looks like a single -seater, not an Su-25UB, judging by the canopy framing.
I'm inclined to agree with Calamine Waffles that the Su-25 isn't ideal for earlier phases of training, especially since from what I gather (I know Haiduk posted something on the subject a while back) Ukraine already does their equivalent to the lead-in fighter training phase on operational types. However, it is arguably no more complex than a lot of advanced and lead in fighter trainers (T-38 Talon, BAe Hawk, Kawasaki T-4, T-50 Golden Eagle, etc.) Also, the Su-25 has been used in a purely training role: the naval Su-25UTG is solely a two-seat deck landing trainer to teach carrier qualifications on, much like the T-2 Buckeye or T-45 Goshawk. I don't think there was ever much consideration to an operational naval Su-25 (it would be a bit like a "Sea Hog" version of the A-10, which I'm sure the Marines would love, but I can't see the Navy devoting funds or hangar and flight deck space to such an aircraft). Also, at the end of the Soviet era, a handful of Su-28s were built: a stripped-down, unarmed Su-25UB meant as a dedicated trainer.
So Ukraine probably could, in theory, shift some of the L-39 syllabus onto the Su-25, the question is whether any advantages in time saved or shifting hours onto a frontline type outweigh the operating economics and added difficulty at that phase. Cutting corners always has drawbacks: less experienced new pilots, suitable candidates washed out because of added time pressure, etc.

@Battlefront.com
This is near Synychyne village, Kahrkiv oblast, 9 km SE from Izium. Reportedly position of full Grad battery (6 launchers) and 7 ammo trucks were completely destroyed. 
40th artillery brigade like and other artillery brigades operates by separate batteries along all front. So, some units can be in Kherson oblast, some in Zaporizhzhaia oblast, some in Kharkiv oblast. 

Enemy artillery destroyed a section of the second bridge to Siverodonetsk. Their artillery tried to do this more than a week, could hit bridge several times, but only slightly damaged it. And now they have success. The last bridge remained, but it was in bad conditions already before a war. This puts again a question of city defense expediency. 
The defense of Siverodonetsk is obviously political decision, so in society there is many criticism about this and demands to Armed Forces Command "don't listen Zelenskyi and to withdraw our guys to Lysychansk immediately". Though, looks like Siverodonetsk like and Rubizhe previuosly now playing a role of "meat grinder". Main forces, that ae storming the city and villages around are not Russians, but 2nd and 7th motor-rifle brigades of LPR + some battalions of conscripts rifle regiments. Russians probably represented with Kadyrov's forces and 31st air-assault brigade. 
Inside the city our troops hold industrial zone and quarters around it. LPR/Russians occupies NE and E parts of the city. All other space is just a place of artilery and airstrikes and deadly "counter-strike" games, as told commander of "Legion of Freedom" - one of the unit, holding the city. This is volunteer unit under Nationmal Guard comamnd, mostly of members of political moderate nationalist party "Svoboda" ("Freedom")

 

Russian artillery.
As I've stated (horn-tooting), their artillery MUST be attritted before Ukraine has a chance to successfully regain, and hold, its lost territory. Otherwise, Ukraine would just attack only to be pounded.
According to this site  https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/karl.wikland/viz/RussianmilitarylossesinUkraine2022/RussianmilitarylossesinUkraine2022
...Russia has lost ~625 artillery "systems" (tube and rocket?) since they invaded Ukraine. We're about 100 days in, so let's just call that about 6 tubes a day. Further, let's stipulate Russia cannot replace what gets lost with new production or old war reserves.
In the Lysychansk (<- my spelling of Ukrainian cities is not great. I studied Russian language for a year and barely scraped by: not a strength. So, forgive any mistakes in that regard)...anyway, near that city, the above-stated ratio is 7:1 with Russia having 900 tubes. That puts Ukraine near 128 or so. 
For artillery parity, purely based on numbers (not range, weight of fire, accuracy, etc.), that means Ukraine needs to eliminate about 772 tubes around there. At 6 per day, that's a bit over 4 months.  And, that assumes no Ukrainian arty losses (in that area).
Obviously, there are a LOT of external factors that adjust that calculus. Ukraine needs longer-ranged systems, that are accurate, with ISR/spotting, and a relatively stable front, to enable them to attrit the Russians down. The 155L52 systems coming online are great for counter-battery work (gotta outrange the Russians to do so effectively). Long-range GMLRS would be better...especially with submunitions.
That is a simplistic comparison, but shows the amount of work needed to overcome the Russian artillery numbers.

So been pondering this one as well:
- UA does not need to destroy every RA arty piece in order to create operational effect/outcomes.  They need to degrade the RA artillery system to a point that it is no longer effective at accurately massing fires. 
- There a a number of routes to this objective that range from killing/attriting trained crews and FOs.  To hitting RA logistics to the point it cannot get ammo or fuel to all those guns. To finally hitting those guns and their prime movers themselves.
- It depends what everyone's guns are shooting at and how well.  I will take 128 UA guns if they are mostly M777s linked into western ISR and are hitting the RA artillery systems with high accuracy and effect.  Versus 900 RA guns all focused on smashing UA infantry to take ground they do not need.
UA does need any and all deep strike capability we can give them.  What we have not seen are NLOS ATGMs/self-loitering - of course the problem with some of these will be EW but western systems are supposed to be set up for that.  Or next gen more autonomous unmanned systems that don't need a ground link.

Russian artillery.
As I've stated (horn-tooting), their artillery MUST be attritted before Ukraine has a chance to successfully regain, and hold, its lost territory. Otherwise, Ukraine would just attack only to be pounded.
According to this site  https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/karl.wikland/viz/RussianmilitarylossesinUkraine2022/RussianmilitarylossesinUkraine2022
...Russia has lost ~625 artillery "systems" (tube and rocket?) since they invaded Ukraine. We're about 100 days in, so let's just call that about 6 tubes a day. Further, let's stipulate Russia cannot replace what gets lost with new production or old war reserves.
In the Lysychansk (<- my spelling of Ukrainian cities is not great. I studied Russian language for a year and barely scraped by: not a strength. So, forgive any mistakes in that regard)...anyway, near that city, the above-stated ratio is 7:1 with Russia having 900 tubes. That puts Ukraine near 128 or so. 
For artillery parity, purely based on numbers (not range, weight of fire, accuracy, etc.), that means Ukraine needs to eliminate about 772 tubes around there. At 6 per day, that's a bit over 4 months.  And, that assumes no Ukrainian arty losses (in that area).
Obviously, there are a LOT of external factors that adjust that calculus. Ukraine needs longer-ranged systems, that are accurate, with ISR/spotting, and a relatively stable front, to enable them to attrit the Russians down. The 155L52 systems coming online are great for counter-battery work (gotta outrange the Russians to do so effectively). Long-range GMLRS would be better...especially with submunitions.
That is a simplistic comparison, but shows the amount of work needed to overcome the Russian artillery numbers.

Biggest mistake western analyst make regarding Ru artillery is counting number of Russians tubes thinking they produce the same firepower per tube as western ones. It is not the tubes you need to count but round expenditure per gun. Soviet/Russian arty love to exaggerate the firepower by inflating number of tubes while decreasing available rounds per gun for engagement.
They love to say we have ****load of tubes per km of front or we just engaged enemy target with ****load of tubes, go, there is nobody alive there (RU infantry goes, UKR infantry climb out of dugouts and shoots RU infantry to pieces - rinse and repeat until some parts of RU artillery finally zeroes on actual UKR firing points then UKR infantry retreats to the next defensive line). But if you look at actual expenditure per gun the picture is different.
For example, during Goose Green battle UK 3 tubes expended 900 rounds. That is 300 rounds per gun per engagement. Battle was bloody but it was won.
On other hand during the battle for hill 776 the VDV 10 SPGs expended 800-1200 round (depending on the period you take). That is 120 rounds per gun per engagement. The result - two pieces got broken, at least 40% of own troops got hit by friendly arty fire, defense collapsed, and company was overrun and destroyed. 
On paper 3 UK tubes vs 10 RU tubes in support look bad. In reality though...
According to reports small drones like quadcopters are not that useful against artillery - range, time and wind issues. What is needed is a bigger one (akin to airplane not copter) comparable to Orlan. 

Obvs I did - the clue's in the username 😉.  I must say I am surprised that Dovhenke brought things pretty much to a juddering halt.  I seem to recall saying that it would consume at least a BTG but there are plenty of images and videos of the place getting malleted or having been malleted by assorted gunnery which should have got the Russians over the line.  That said, that is also when the shenanigans started on AAs 3 and 4 on my original schematic and manoeuvre stopped on AAs 1 and 2 ... well to be honest not a whole lot happened on AA 1.
I am disappointed that I haven't been able to track this as closely as I was in April but unfortunately the day job has intervened ... it is an interesting summer in Afghanistan.  Regrettably I now only have time to check in and keep up with stuff on this thread.  Your coverage and links are particularly helpful in that regard.

At this point, I want to ask for a moment of silence (looking at you, Eurosquabblers!) for the heroic defenders of Dovehnke.
And yet another kudos to our own @Combatintman who flagged this innocuous looking (to we lesser mortals) bit of ground as a key barrier to the RA advance from their hard won Izyum bridgehead to Sloviansk.
....On that same note, I'd like to revisit another astute post of CIMan in mid April, where he ID'ed various attack axes for the Russian 'pincer, and then predicted the Russians would end up getting forced onto the hardest, bloodiest paths.

Nailed it, mate.
1.  AA1 promptly bogged down in the open country, and that sector now seems increasingly dominated by UA artillery. No blitzkrieg for you, Popov!
2. AA3 worked ok at first, up until it hit Lyman and then it took 3-4 further weeks of costly fighting to clear that town and the forests behind it, and secure the S-D River line.
3. AA2 hit a dead stop at Dovhenke, as noted and has had to take the hard way around.
4.  AA4? has basically stopped on the start line at Sieverodonetsk.  Ivan is beating his head against a stone wall and getting counterpunched.

Bolded part. That's the question and that's why the laser systems are so attractive. Ignore the initial outlay. (Because the system is either fielded or it isn't.) What then is the per-shot cost? And, what is it's capability?
If it can shoot down anything from a small quadcopter to Predator drone to a mortar shell...and do it endlessly (given electrical generation capability), then, yeah, the cost per engagement is just pennies.
Ditto the electronic jammers that cause drones to land where they are.
Using directed energy systems (lasers, focused electromagnetic waves) is the future of counter-drone units.

This is one "advantage" of being a nuclear engineer. I am pretty much bilingual in unit systems. All the physics I learned was early on Imperial, but when getting into nuclear/atomic physics, then metric. Heat transfer, thermodynamics an fluids mechanics were always taught in Imperial units. Radiation effects, health physics are always in metric/SI. As far as I know there are no Imperial units for that, at least not that are used by anyone. The odd thing about that is that there are "metric" units for radiation dose/exposure like rem, millirem, etc, which is what I am more used to, spending my career associated with the Navy Nuclear Program, and then there are SI units, Seiverts, Grays, etc. Both are based on the same base quantities but at different levels. (ergs/g). So for example you average yearly background dose is 300 millirem, or 3 milli Seiverts.  (which I don't care for because it makes it sound psychologically like you are allowed much less radiation  🙂  ) Had to become more fluent in SI radiation units when I went to England to help with their submarine program for a few years.

Dave

You are reiterating my point: The problem isn't with NATO and Turkey; it's with Erdoğan and Islamism.
Ever since Erdoğan was elected out of obscurity to become the mayor of Istanbul with the promise of converting the Hagia Sophia into a mosque [competing votes were split between two centre-right and two centre-left parties that squabbled among each other] and stated on record: "Democracy is like a tram. You get on where you need to, and you get off where you need to," it was obvious that him and the Islamists had to be nipped in the bud. Instead, both within Turkey and internationally, various factions thought they could draw him to their side, until he became all-powerful. When I stated that Erdoğan was bad news at a leading US university in 2008, I was called an 'elitist' and accused of opposing 'democratization'. Everyone was talking about 'Liberal Islam', and telling me Erdoğan's Islamists were just an Islamic counterpart to Europe's Christian Democrats. If we have made any progress at all, I hope that discourse has now died, and there will be zero tolerance should Islamism rear its ugly head anywhere else. Some Russian (Solzhenitsyn?) said "Russia was crucified on the cross to show the world the evil of Communism;" Turkey was impaled on the stake to show the world the evil of Islamism.
RE: Tensions in the Aegean
The danger is that Erdoğan has every reason to start a phony war, and then use it as an excuse to declare martial law and cancel elections. He does not even need the Turkish military to engineer a provocation since, like a certain someone, he now has his own military organization, who swear allegiance personally to him.
Now, facing Erdoğan's machinations, we have the Greek military who, along with a certain segment of Greece's ruling elite that they are close with, would also love to see Erdoğan start a phony war with Greece. When Erdoğan tried to get cozy with Russia, they responded by killing 37 Turkish soldiers; when he then tried to switch to China, they demanded Turkey extradite all Uyghurs. Therefore, should Turkey lose its ties with the West as well, it would end up more isolated than North Korea. With this reasoning, even if the Greek military does not engineer the first provocation, it would gladly reply to any provocation by Erdoğan with an escalatory provocation, and Erdoğan knows this as well. Thus, you have two actors who would both benefit from a phony war, but these actors aren't nation-states.

The rational argument of the threat from NATO for Russia is that NATO has shown a willingness to engage in wars that are not the result of attacks on members.
President Clinton's decision to ignore the stipulations of the War Powers Resolution and bomb Serbia into an ethnic partition is when NATO stopped being merely a defensive alliance, and became a way for the U.S. to present the veneer of an international imprimatur for aggressive military foreign policy.
Not even the lack of Congressional authorization is going to stop a U.S. President from using NATO to enact regime change where it seems viable, and in our 'national interest' (we can debate the 'human interest' in what Libya has endured a decade since Hillary cackled about a dictator's death - the Brits did a nice report on the lies and poor assumptions).  Our Nobel Peace Prize winning President went along with the neocons in his cabinet and we got to see open air slave camps on CNN.
Which brings us to the idea of how NATO can be perceived as a threat to Russia.  Russia who watched largely helpless while NATO carried out months of bombing on a historical/cultural ally.  The ethnic partition and formation of Kosovo driven by NATO (read: the U.S.) isn't even recognized today by all NATO members (nor all of the EU members).
Imagine it's 2035, and NATO has welcomed Ukraine to the fold.  Further imagine Erdogan is still pursuing his pan-Turkic and after dreams and is stirring Islamic separatists in the Russian backwaters against Moscow (surely these things don't only happen in Syria, or Libya, do they?).  Moscow, as it has in the past, taps their inner General Sherman and starts stomping mudholes in the civilized patches of their backwaters. 
Is it crazy to imagine NATO (read: the American President who could use a distraction, or just really likes the storytelling of the neocons who manage to festoon every cabinet) rides to the rescue of the media's ratings?  We're clearly witnessing the relative weakness of Russia in a conventional war with the West.  Would it make sense for them to leave themselves only hope that NATO wouldn't risk that nuclear threats aren't bluff.  That they would trade the possibility of smoking craters in place of Moscow and St. Petersburg over some Kazakh border regions?
Factoring the demonstrated willingness of NATO to intervene in civil wars, and the history the U.S. has in fomenting civil wars for policy ends, I would think having NATO on your border makes you more susceptible to an intervention by NATO.
I can understand why Russia would rather see Ukraine under some kind of guaranteed neutrality like Austria was in the Cold War rather than in NATO.

(Last of my drone comments, I promise.     )
Anything that uses rotary 12.7mm  has my vote.      Think of the opportunities to use it against non-aerial targets. 

Love that humour:
 
 

All good points, but you missed the first two:
1. Should the forces in question be concerned...at that time...if there is a drone monitoring them?  Meaning, what forces, where, and when, should be in a drone-countermeasures posture?
2. Once that force is determined to be in an anti-drone posture, you've got to FIND the drone, if any.
Only then will the rest of the points you've made come into play.
Steps 1 and 2 are non-trivial.

Yes, but how about a laptop that he can play newest CM titles on, or a demanding FPS  

Ok you got to back that one up...please.  I mean that is one helluva story but it sounds like myth. 
Edit - and I want it to be true.

And you don't exactly see EU countries reinforcing Baltic borders much. Only one country does that and it's the one overseas.
Not to mention that most European countries refuse to do that "2% minimum of GDP" thing (actually only UK and Poland do it). And it's possible that certain countries would rather happily trade with the enemy as it steals territory from their allies.
Hence why any military alliance without US and UK in it isn't worse a damn.

I am trying very hard to catch up on this thread, but for now I'm still responding to points that were raised several days ago (I'm sure I'll catch up eventually).
My own 2 cents on the "how willing are countries to sustain casualties" issue is that, as far as I know, it is pretty normal to be shocked by the high casualty rates at the start of a major war. The recurring narrative I keep hearing about the opening stages of WW1 always includes a certain degree of shock by the public at the immense casualty lists, ditto with the American Civil War. But shock can only last so long. If the casualty rate remains constant, people become used to it. Shock can be sustained if each battle is exponentially bloodier than the last. But once it levels out, people become used to it again.
What is unthinkable now can become very thinkable later (one of the tragedies of human psychology). We are used to <10 casualties per day now because that was the casualty rate of the low intensity conflicts of the last 20 years. But if it came down to a major war with China, I think we would find ourselves more willing to endure hundreds of casualties per day than we might think right now. I do not want to discount the importance of context/stakes of course. The willingness to endure high casualties is clearly much greater when the stakes are higher than when the stakes are lower (if the stakes are existential we may be willing to endure any casualty rate, even thousands a day, to avoid annihilation, whereas any casualties at all may be too much if there is no tangible benefit to our interests). And duration seems to matter as well, though perhaps only because the stakes themselves change over time (what seemed important five years ago may no longer be important, so while the casualty rate may no longer be as shocking, it may nevertheless be less worth enduring), and/or because other costs to the society increase over time (being on a full war footing for several years is not great for an economy, so the standard of living of a population may visibly decrease over the course of a war, decreasing their willingness to tolerate the war).
The Dictator's Handbook (fantastic book if you are interested in politics) even argues that democratic countries are actually far more willing to endure long wars than autocratic countries, due to the differences in the incentive structures of democratic regimes as opposed to autocratic regimes (which is another point in favor of Ukraine winning a long war, on top of the economic considerations, and difference in stakes (existential for Ukraine, non-existential for Russia)). They are more casualty averse in the sense that they put a greater amount of effort into keeping casualties down, but not in the sense that high casualties are more likely to make them quit the fight. Both democratic and autocratic leaders are primarily interested in holding on to power. The difference is that autocratic leaders need money to maintain power (to pay off their key supporters), and wars cost a lot of money. Whereas democratic leaders need popularity to maintain power (to win elections), and conceding defeat in a war is usually very unpopular.

Sorry to disappoint but I am not Russian veteran. I was planning to become one and participated in two year study program of one of top Russian military college (Actually It was and still is top Russian military technical university) but instead of "graduation" (you would have to study technical disciplines few more years) I decided to quit because of my observation of how the system really works and what it can do.
If you study real Russian military history Bucha massacre will not come as surprise. Actually, it was not even the main event. Concentration camps with torture and execution conveyer would come later. 
After quitting I made sure that my medical records were corrected, and my mobilization level was severely restricted. Russian corruption is a feature, not a bug. Then after a couple of years I decided to leave completely. Obviously I have connections inside Russia and keeping an eye on what's going on there.

Hi
Just to say hallo. I was lurker in this topic for last 450+ pages and must say I am impressed by what I read here; it's probably one of the best discussion boards regarding this war on anglophone net. Being forced to work for several years on different social platforms like Fb or Discord one cannot appreciate enough old Forum form. Lengthly posts, experts, culture of discussions- kudos, gentlemen.
Anyway, I wanted to draw your attention to this article in New Yorker that is really worth reading.  https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-fight-to-survive-russias-onslaught-in-eastern-ukraine
Beside veristic accounts on being under artillery barrage, the reporter spoke with deputy commander of Ukraine forces in Donbass gen. Tarnavsky and mayor of Kramatorsk, so really "big fishes". Some takes:
-Improved Russian tactics “If before they simply marched in large columns, now they have started to actually fight,” he said. The Russian Army has split its forces into smaller groups, which it uses, along with a sizable fleet of drones, to identify and target Ukrainian positions, hitting them with artillery and air strikes. When a particular zone or village has effectively been levelled, ground troops—a mixture of regular Russian soldiers, Wagner mercenaries, and fighters mobilized from the Russia-backed separatist territories in Donetsk and Luhansk, Tarnavsky said—move in to try to seize the rubble."
-Accounts of massive bombardments, sometimes even (hard to believe) of small Ukrainian squads being targeted by several Tochka missiles. Regular artillery advantage is 7:1, after which follows infantry in advantage 5:1 (mind you, it's general so probably best source around). Seems interesting in the light of changing balance between mass-firepower-manouver hypothesis by Freeman.
-Very heavy Ukrainian lossess, especially among regulars and specialists. “They are replaced by doctors and mechanics. We have manpower, but much of this core is dfead or wounded”
-Kramatorsk is being fortified in case enemy come. Mayor has no illusions- the city will become a battleground sooner or later.“We shouldn’t expect any miracles,” he told me. “It’s clear that the longer this goes on, the more territory Russia will gain.” His voice was both jovial and grave. “Let me give you my professional opinion as mayor: if we don’t get heavy weapons in two or three weeks, we’re ****ed.”
So here are rather grim conclusions, different than those from for example ISW.
 
Oh, just spotted other user posted article. Anyway, some of these takes may be interesting.