photon

This made me giggle:

Not buying the mass argument in the least.  Traditional military mass has gone to pieces completely in this war.  I do not think it would have mattered how much infantry the RA could generate - it did nothing for them at Bakhmut.  They had firepower mass at Severodonetsk and it mattered little.  They have overwhelming mass advantage in the North in the first month and it got stopped cold by a much smaller force.  Kherson, Kharkiv, mass ratios all over the place and none I can recognize.
One thing with respect to mass that does seem to matter is it 1) distribution, 2) its connectedness, and 3) its information empowerment.  We have seen again and again where the RA concentrates higher traditional military mass and gets hammered because of the ISR asymmetry.
If I was going to draw a lesson on mass for this war it would be “less physical, more effective information, more AI, more synthetic”.   The author of this piece is drawing exactly the wrong conclusions in my opinion.

An interesting look on the Oplot and its crews. Lots of of juicy snippets for the attentive. From the ever productive hromadske
 
 

Things are becoming hotter and hotter. I'm still struggling with time. But hopefully, it will improve shortly.
I believe you have seen the recent Prig video with the map. Based on what Prig stated, I decided to add a few notes to the map. Although it is Prig, it is really interesting, and I believe it will help you understand what is going on in the Bakhmut area.
It can be a little confusing and crammed at times, but if you examine each block carefully, it should be straightforward enough.
Number 1

Number 2

Number 3

Number 4

I have a few comments but due to lack of time I will post them later.

The Fleet in Being moves to deep strike.

It really seems like Russia has decided to speed run the Japanese strategy in the Pacific, and that the Ukranians have learned well from the American counter-strategy. The Russian strategy at Bakhmut mirrors the Japanese in the Solomons (a brutal attritional campaign for territory that was of very limited strategic value once the idea of a blitz was off the table), and the Ukranians, like the Americans, held on while simultaneously developing a second fighting force off the line.
The recent actions perhaps portend something like the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where the results of American corrosive warfare (both in the Solomons and the underwater blockade) became obvious for the first time.
In particular, the battle revealed the different first derivatives of pilot training and quality. It also revealed the effects of American ISR dominance, which increased the second derivative of the difference in pilot training and quality.
That battle collapsed the Japanese perception of their own option space, as it revealed the inability of their naval air arm to effect any strategic results. As the Americans realized this, the Big Gray Ball was free to maneuver strategically and force the sort of hard choices about dislocation on the Japanese that the Ukranians seem to be forcing on the Russians.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

It really seems like Russia has decided to speed run the Japanese strategy in the Pacific, and that the Ukranians have learned well from the American counter-strategy. The Russian strategy at Bakhmut mirrors the Japanese in the Solomons (a brutal attritional campaign for territory that was of very limited strategic value once the idea of a blitz was off the table), and the Ukranians, like the Americans, held on while simultaneously developing a second fighting force off the line.
The recent actions perhaps portend something like the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where the results of American corrosive warfare (both in the Solomons and the underwater blockade) became obvious for the first time.
In particular, the battle revealed the different first derivatives of pilot training and quality. It also revealed the effects of American ISR dominance, which increased the second derivative of the difference in pilot training and quality.
That battle collapsed the Japanese perception of their own option space, as it revealed the inability of their naval air arm to effect any strategic results. As the Americans realized this, the Big Gray Ball was free to maneuver strategically and force the sort of hard choices about dislocation on the Japanese that the Ukranians seem to be forcing on the Russians.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

On the one hand, this isn't super surprising. The US spends an arm and a leg maintaining up to date maps, and even then infrequently used ones can go a long time between refreshes. I once worked on a map update project where the most recent ones were from the 1960s. It's faster and easier now that there's abundant good open source mapping, but still time consuming and expensive.
That said, we did that map refresh because we thought we might have to intervene in a year or two in a particular country. The idea that you'd intentionally invade a country with thirty year old maps reveals a focus (like the IJN) on the cult of the shiny object, and not on the boring but essential things that make an army work.

So we should help them by projecting enough energy into the environment it can be seen from space?  High energy solutions are problematic as they then need more high energy solutions to keep them alive.  And no one has solved for a 155mm PGM round, or HIMAR coming in at Mach 3+.
The fundamental flaw with some US (and most western militaries)thinking is that they are trying to citadel their existing structures and treating UAS/unmanned as something to be managed.  This was the overall strategy for ATGMs (detectors, smoke, manoeuvres, combined arms and finally APS), which was never really tested en masse but that did stop us from assuming that these ATGM counters would work.  Worse, we assumed that these counters would continue to work as ATGM tech marched on.
As the Russians have found out 1) next-gen ATGMs are incredibly hard to “manage” in fact for some they really can’t be and 2) UAS in combination with C4ISR are changing the fabric of the battle space.  This is not manageable, it requires some deep rethinks on how military power is projected in the future.  
Strapping high energy lasers on everything and then trying to do Bn TF manoeuvres just like we did in Iraq is going to lead to a really, really bad day…and to be honest most people in the biz know this already.  Protecting legacy systems will be required but it will only buy a narrow context of advantages in a narrower set of employment.  Point defence systems need to be just that “point” as in last minute “holy crap some got through” not “queue the Disco Star Wars soundtrack and start burning holes all over the sky”.  It is the other layers of the bubble that will need to be developed along with new types of organizations and TTPs.
But if I know military thinking we will see a 90 ton tank with so much crap slapped on it the damn thing won’t be able to stay upright.  Then we will have to do same with logistics and suddenly a viable BCT will weigh roughly as much as Pluto…because gravity does not care about your feelings, cap badge, investments or budgetary profiles

I do not know.  No one does and that is what is particularly scary.  We have not outlined a strategy in the West that includes a theory of a Russian defeat - at least not publicly.  All the O2 is taken up with “Ukraine can’t win” or “Ukraine can’t lose”, or how much support we need to push in order to make Ukraine achieve a “complete victory”.  Problem is that we have largely left the post-Russia issue up to the dice rolls.  Zelensky basically outline the Ukrainian position: “We do not care, so long as they are out.”  Which is very understandable, but the grown ups in the West can’t think that way, it is far too dangerous.  Worst case is Russia falls apart completely and descends into a violent break up.  This will immediately raise the nuclear question.  We have never had a nuclear power undergo a civil war or complete collapse.  The USSR folded but it was pretty organized, more rolling up shop - although it came within inches (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/20-years-ago-russia-had-its-biggest-political-crisis-since-the-bolshevik-revolution/280237/)
So a Russia in full free fall means that nuclear risk and regional instability goes up dramatically.  I am not sure what the Russia theory of defeat is, I am pretty sure Putin does not have one considering how tightly he has boxed himself in. I can only hope some power players in the backfield have got a plan B.

This is a really fascinating idea. There are different kinds of losing as well:
- Popular Destruction: the winning power exterminates the losing power's people entirely (common in the ancient world, less so today).
- Cultural Destruction: the winning power destroys or remakes the losing power's culture (USA -> Japan)
- State Collapse: the winning power dissolves the state of the losing power (Allies -> Germany)
- Regime Change: the winning power replaces the government of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 2)
- Military Defeat: the winning power demolishes the military of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 1)
Each side is attempting to impose one or more losses on the other side, and each side negotiates what sort of losses are acceptable for itself. For example, the Romans often targeted their adversaries with a regime change. Local elites will be replaced with Roman elites, or local elites will swear allegiance to Roman elites, leaving all the substrata more or less intact. If an adversary proved faithless in that, the Romans rapidly ratcheted up to imposing a cultural or popular loss.
 
For this conflict, the Russians have projected a wild variety of strategic aims, at times indicating that they want to impose a regime on the Ukranians, but also communicating that they want to impose either a cultural or popular loss. Conversely, Ukraine has to aim for more than just imposing a military loss (which they've either achieved, or are close to achieving), threading a fine line between the collapse of the Russian government and the collapse of the Russian state. The Russians ought to be aiming to contain the loss to the level of a military defeat, but their own rhetoric is making that harder to do, as they've couched Ukranian/NATO objectives as state collapse, popular and cultural destruction.

This is a really fascinating idea. There are different kinds of losing as well:
- Popular Destruction: the winning power exterminates the losing power's people entirely (common in the ancient world, less so today).
- Cultural Destruction: the winning power destroys or remakes the losing power's culture (USA -> Japan)
- State Collapse: the winning power dissolves the state of the losing power (Allies -> Germany)
- Regime Change: the winning power replaces the government of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 2)
- Military Defeat: the winning power demolishes the military of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 1)
Each side is attempting to impose one or more losses on the other side, and each side negotiates what sort of losses are acceptable for itself. For example, the Romans often targeted their adversaries with a regime change. Local elites will be replaced with Roman elites, or local elites will swear allegiance to Roman elites, leaving all the substrata more or less intact. If an adversary proved faithless in that, the Romans rapidly ratcheted up to imposing a cultural or popular loss.
 
For this conflict, the Russians have projected a wild variety of strategic aims, at times indicating that they want to impose a regime on the Ukranians, but also communicating that they want to impose either a cultural or popular loss. Conversely, Ukraine has to aim for more than just imposing a military loss (which they've either achieved, or are close to achieving), threading a fine line between the collapse of the Russian government and the collapse of the Russian state. The Russians ought to be aiming to contain the loss to the level of a military defeat, but their own rhetoric is making that harder to do, as they've couched Ukranian/NATO objectives as state collapse, popular and cultural destruction.

This is a really fascinating idea. There are different kinds of losing as well:
- Popular Destruction: the winning power exterminates the losing power's people entirely (common in the ancient world, less so today).
- Cultural Destruction: the winning power destroys or remakes the losing power's culture (USA -> Japan)
- State Collapse: the winning power dissolves the state of the losing power (Allies -> Germany)
- Regime Change: the winning power replaces the government of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 2)
- Military Defeat: the winning power demolishes the military of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 1)
Each side is attempting to impose one or more losses on the other side, and each side negotiates what sort of losses are acceptable for itself. For example, the Romans often targeted their adversaries with a regime change. Local elites will be replaced with Roman elites, or local elites will swear allegiance to Roman elites, leaving all the substrata more or less intact. If an adversary proved faithless in that, the Romans rapidly ratcheted up to imposing a cultural or popular loss.
 
For this conflict, the Russians have projected a wild variety of strategic aims, at times indicating that they want to impose a regime on the Ukranians, but also communicating that they want to impose either a cultural or popular loss. Conversely, Ukraine has to aim for more than just imposing a military loss (which they've either achieved, or are close to achieving), threading a fine line between the collapse of the Russian government and the collapse of the Russian state. The Russians ought to be aiming to contain the loss to the level of a military defeat, but their own rhetoric is making that harder to do, as they've couched Ukranian/NATO objectives as state collapse, popular and cultural destruction.

This is a really fascinating idea. There are different kinds of losing as well:
- Popular Destruction: the winning power exterminates the losing power's people entirely (common in the ancient world, less so today).
- Cultural Destruction: the winning power destroys or remakes the losing power's culture (USA -> Japan)
- State Collapse: the winning power dissolves the state of the losing power (Allies -> Germany)
- Regime Change: the winning power replaces the government of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 2)
- Military Defeat: the winning power demolishes the military of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 1)
Each side is attempting to impose one or more losses on the other side, and each side negotiates what sort of losses are acceptable for itself. For example, the Romans often targeted their adversaries with a regime change. Local elites will be replaced with Roman elites, or local elites will swear allegiance to Roman elites, leaving all the substrata more or less intact. If an adversary proved faithless in that, the Romans rapidly ratcheted up to imposing a cultural or popular loss.
 
For this conflict, the Russians have projected a wild variety of strategic aims, at times indicating that they want to impose a regime on the Ukranians, but also communicating that they want to impose either a cultural or popular loss. Conversely, Ukraine has to aim for more than just imposing a military loss (which they've either achieved, or are close to achieving), threading a fine line between the collapse of the Russian government and the collapse of the Russian state. The Russians ought to be aiming to contain the loss to the level of a military defeat, but their own rhetoric is making that harder to do, as they've couched Ukranian/NATO objectives as state collapse, popular and cultural destruction.

This is a really fascinating idea. There are different kinds of losing as well:
- Popular Destruction: the winning power exterminates the losing power's people entirely (common in the ancient world, less so today).
- Cultural Destruction: the winning power destroys or remakes the losing power's culture (USA -> Japan)
- State Collapse: the winning power dissolves the state of the losing power (Allies -> Germany)
- Regime Change: the winning power replaces the government of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 2)
- Military Defeat: the winning power demolishes the military of the losing power (USA -> Iraq, round 1)
Each side is attempting to impose one or more losses on the other side, and each side negotiates what sort of losses are acceptable for itself. For example, the Romans often targeted their adversaries with a regime change. Local elites will be replaced with Roman elites, or local elites will swear allegiance to Roman elites, leaving all the substrata more or less intact. If an adversary proved faithless in that, the Romans rapidly ratcheted up to imposing a cultural or popular loss.
 
For this conflict, the Russians have projected a wild variety of strategic aims, at times indicating that they want to impose a regime on the Ukranians, but also communicating that they want to impose either a cultural or popular loss. Conversely, Ukraine has to aim for more than just imposing a military loss (which they've either achieved, or are close to achieving), threading a fine line between the collapse of the Russian government and the collapse of the Russian state. The Russians ought to be aiming to contain the loss to the level of a military defeat, but their own rhetoric is making that harder to do, as they've couched Ukranian/NATO objectives as state collapse, popular and cultural destruction.

About two thousand pages ago I suggested that the best analogical comparison to the Russians was the Japanese. The Russians really do appear to be emulating the Japanese playbook, which puts us somewhere after Pearl Harbor (the failed attempt to decapitate Ukraine and win in three days), the Solomons campaign (analogical to the attritional summer Bakhmut offensive), after the beginning of Cartwheel and the push up the Marianas (the one-two punch of the Ukrainian fall offensives), and around the time of the battle of the Philippine Sea, when the declining quality of Japanese aviators really began to tell (perhaps Vulhedar and that failed river crossing). The Russians even appear to be attempting gyokusai-like assaults in the Donbas.
To me the open question is how to convince the Russians to abandon a war that they've already lost. It took firebombing, nuclear weapons, and the undersea blockade to get the Japanese leadership there, and that almost resulted in a civil war. How does the west communicate to the Russians that they've lost without similar loss of life?

About two thousand pages ago I suggested that the best analogical comparison to the Russians was the Japanese. The Russians really do appear to be emulating the Japanese playbook, which puts us somewhere after Pearl Harbor (the failed attempt to decapitate Ukraine and win in three days), the Solomons campaign (analogical to the attritional summer Bakhmut offensive), after the beginning of Cartwheel and the push up the Marianas (the one-two punch of the Ukrainian fall offensives), and around the time of the battle of the Philippine Sea, when the declining quality of Japanese aviators really began to tell (perhaps Vulhedar and that failed river crossing). The Russians even appear to be attempting gyokusai-like assaults in the Donbas.
To me the open question is how to convince the Russians to abandon a war that they've already lost. It took firebombing, nuclear weapons, and the undersea blockade to get the Japanese leadership there, and that almost resulted in a civil war. How does the west communicate to the Russians that they've lost without similar loss of life?

About two thousand pages ago I suggested that the best analogical comparison to the Russians was the Japanese. The Russians really do appear to be emulating the Japanese playbook, which puts us somewhere after Pearl Harbor (the failed attempt to decapitate Ukraine and win in three days), the Solomons campaign (analogical to the attritional summer Bakhmut offensive), after the beginning of Cartwheel and the push up the Marianas (the one-two punch of the Ukrainian fall offensives), and around the time of the battle of the Philippine Sea, when the declining quality of Japanese aviators really began to tell (perhaps Vulhedar and that failed river crossing). The Russians even appear to be attempting gyokusai-like assaults in the Donbas.
To me the open question is how to convince the Russians to abandon a war that they've already lost. It took firebombing, nuclear weapons, and the undersea blockade to get the Japanese leadership there, and that almost resulted in a civil war. How does the west communicate to the Russians that they've lost without similar loss of life?

So, my thesis is that the Russians are trying for a speed run of Japan's WWII strategy right now. Phase 1 was a replay of Pearl Harbor but aimed at Kiev - an attempt at a decisive victory that hinged on the opponent giving up. Phase 2 was the incremental march in the Donbas; a grinding attritional campaign that mirrors the fight in the Solomons. Phase 3 was the loss of strategic initiative and transition to static defense against an adversary who can attack on two axes; the Hollandia campaign and the Marianas campaign. All throughout, the quality of Japanese equipment and training faded while the quality of the USN improved. Japanese strategic thinking ossified to a policy of inflicting suffering while dying.
If we think of war as communication, it took the annihilation of the IJN, the undersea blockade, the firebombings *and* two nuclear weapons to break through to the one person we had to communicate our resolve to. When Hirohito decided for surrender, the war ended (though this was a close run thing).
I think what no one has identified in Ukraine yet is how to communicate to the Russian equivalent of Hirohito that our resolve is such that the war should end on terms unfavorable to the Russians. We also aren't sure that there is a decision maker in Russia who could end the war. If Putin signaled surrender, would it stick? The Ukrainians don't have signaling tools equivalent to what the Allies had either, which is tricky.