LongLeftFlank

No doubt there's some anime film out there with various monuments coming to life and battling each other, controlled by sinister androgynous alien boy band types, or by leggy Japanese schoolgirls. ... Yup, thar she blows. I love the interwebz.

I carved out a rare evening to work on my Le Carillon master map and was playing with ditchlock to create wide vs gentle embankments for creek beds. Google Maps streetview was an invaluable resource. Btw, the answer for Basse Normandie seems to be 'both' - a 1:2 (<30°) embankment bottomed by a 1m steep sided trench containing the watercourse). Steep enough that no additional perimeter is required, and cattle don't crop the long grass at the bottom.

Some of it seems to be natural aging, the loss of our youthful 'plasticity' of intellect and (if we're lucky) its replacement with a 'crystalline' pattern, which really comes down to experience giving you a knack for knowing what works and what's a waste of time and (flagging) energy. Great article here about a 40 year old guy learning to play chess at the same time as his young daughter, and trying not to get his arse kicked every time....

There will be NO new steps! (Mr. Barry Fife, President, NSW Dance Federation)

Great find mate, though not much time to listen right now.... Look at how many residential blocks the JOKER 3 patrol routes covered! The concept was to be able to cut off and trap potshooters; they were not expecting an ambush by dozens of fighters, reinforced by local residents.

[snaps to attention] Sir, it is indeed an honor!!!! I will pm you.

Throughout OIF2, "Lioness" teams were routinely attached to US infantry units for cordon and knock (house search) missions, where physical search of female occupants was routinely required. These soldiers acted as frontline combat infantry in all material respects.

1. Guys, Pericles is *not* making stuff up; everyone who's played CM has had WTF! moments like this. So no need to jump on him so hard. He's trying to help. OTOH, Ian et al are also trying to help, so do let's keep it civil. 2. In CMSF, where BLUEFOR is (or should be) casualty-sensitive (to offset their massive FP advantages), losing half a squad to sporadic kamikaze behaviour may mean losing a game on vp. So this matters more than ever. 3. But it doesn't sound like a straightforward AI 'bug' fix either. The cover-seeking AI has always been a bit of a black box, but clearly: a. We *do* want unpinned squaddies to get out of a killzone, stat, not go to ground in place by default to get hosed down more. b. But we also *don't* want them overdoing it by dashing pell mell for the nearest 'safe' place that happens to be 100 yards away across a beaten zone. 4. My personal view (fwiw) is that abstracted hard 'micro' cover seems undermodeled in general, even though that hunch is tough to confirm empirically. In RL, it's unusual (and a memorable horror, think Omaha) when an infantryman doesn't have anything at all solid within a few paces that he can put between himself and bullets. That's why modern battlefields look 'empty.' Incoming fire should normally encounter sharply diminishing returns after the first few shots, even in 'open ground'. By boosting the number of perceived 'refuges' available to pixeljoes, it seems you could then reduce the chances of the TacAI choosing to run for a safe spot far away.

Noted. I'd expect cut off SAA units to quickly start looking like Uncons anyway, mounting SW under tarps on pickups, making lots of IED/VBIEDs, hiding their few remaining AFVs in barns, etc. (frankly, the latter are targets/bomb magnets more than weapons in such conditions). Can't help you much with QB strictures tbh....

Well, you don't always get to say nah, I won't fight here. Let's say your heavy mech is doing 'haul ass and bypass' to Damascus. But then a Syrian rifle company mixed with irregulars appears out of this dense farmland and shoots up a fuel convoy? You get put in command of a scratch force and get told to "go clear those bastards out asap". Which mostly means 'find them and then call in air/helo strikes'. You have insufficient forces to cordon off the area. So there's no alternative to going into the bush. The general wants the MSR secured, like yesterday! No more goddam burning fuel trucks on al Jazeera.... (I know you know this stuff btw, just shootin' the breeze. Don't want to sound preachy)

Of course, guerrilla-friendly terrain is in no way restricted to cities, even in the 'arid' Middle East. Consider a few square kms patchwork of vehicle-unfriendly marshy fields, dikes, walls and irrigation ditches unchanged since Assyrian times, with LOS broken up by unkempt orchards and palm groves, walled farmsteads and dense clusters of reeds. Look closely at the second map, or go to Google Earth. This is incredibly challenging ground to secure, even with overwhelming force available. Not quite bocage, but close. And as I've preached umpteen times, terrain is the "third player" in the game; it can equalize or cripple pretty much any force.

Those building textures are @Kieme(ITA)’s mods, not stock, correct?

I think the basic building blocks haven't changed since SF1: 1. put a huge vp penalty on BLUEFOR losses to drive realistically conservative behaviours (and increase RED degrees of freedom). ... Of course this also means you can't whack BLUE right away with an unavoidable hi-cas ambush (unless you provide a vp cushion that provides for it). I generally just assume that on turn 1 the Big Bump has already happened, humvees are burning, etc. 2. Suitably constricted/compartmented terrain where BLUE can't instantly converge/call in their overwhelming fire superiority (*yawn*). Hard cover remains undermodeled, so in the absence of robust strongpoints RED has got to be able to break contact and rally.

Great thoughts and data here, @domfluff! You need to join @Sgt.Squarehead, @Combatintman, @sburke and myself (when work allows) in the Urban Asymmetrical Warfare scenario skunk works.

Fixed that for you, Pericles.

Many thanks for the encouragement. Yes, I'm basically an amateur historian who uses CM as a medium to get in the boots of the tactical (infantry) commanders. So I'm drawn to very thoroughly documented actions, whether JOKER 3, Le Carillon, Eliane 2, or Makin. The only semi-fictional stuff I put any time into was Baba Amr 2012, and even there I tried hard to approximate reality by watching hundreds of videos. Work doesn't leave much time for it these days, alas.

One last tidbit: this officer sets the intellectual stage for Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh. "Islands of Resistance". I want to put in one plug in support of General Gavin's theory. There weren't many of us who fought in Asia. I feel positive, without being too predictable, that in 50 years we will fight in Asia. There are no roads, there are an awful lot of big rivers, and the only way to get in there is not to walk in as we did but be flown in. You will be forced to fight for railroad junctions, ferry crossings on rivers, and interior cities. A thousand miles from the coast line, you will be air dependent and you will be air supplied. I agree with General Gavin - you can go in the jungle, you can walk in, but it is better to fly -in. I predict that we must be prepared to fight what I call "Islands of Resistance." Independent divisions must have an all-round defense in the future. We are not going to fight on a big, broad front in Europe. You are going into the centers of communication and the centers of industries and hit where they are weakest, as quickly as you can. If we don't conceive a division that can do that job, then I agree with General Gavin - we are looking back instead of to the future. I have looked over my shoulder for 5 months in the jungle, and it is not fun to sit around and not have a reserve element. You have got to have 4 elements

Because I am leading two deals right now and don't want to lose my job over CM. All in good time. Enjoy!

The 1946 source pdfs linked in the above essay also make fun reading: There was a requirement In all theaters for a security element and Military Police at each regimental post Many divisions organized a combat and reconnais­sance patrol unit of 1 officer and 15 men in each rifle battalion to meet the combat patrol and reconnaissance requirements over and above that performed by the rifle companies Communications personnel in the signal company and in the communications platoons were not adequate in the following categories; switchboard operators, field linesmen, and radio operators Heavy machine guns could not be kept far enough forward for close support in the attack The rifle squad almost never employed tactical maneuvers in the attack, i.e. the Able, Baker, Charley, elements of scouts, base of fire, and maneuver in World War 2. The light machine guns and rocket launchers were habitually attached to the rifle platoon The organization of the 75mm gun squad does not provide sufficient men to keep both guns in operation in the attack The infantry regimental commander habitually commanded more men and had a greater responsibility than Brigadier generals in the US Army and other armies Forward observer parties provided in the Tables of Organization for Field Artillery are not adequate in number. Additional personnel had to be taken from the firing batteries to meet the requirement of one FO party for each rifle company, Direct fire support was frequently reinforced by fire from Corps Artillery A 50% increase in volume of fire can be obtained by adding two guns and their crew to each firing battery, at a cost of about 10% increase in personnel* Presence of full track vehicles in an infantry division requires an increase in ordnance maintenance personnel and equipment. Here are some comments by General Bradley. I love the last one especially.... I thought in general our organization was sound. I am sure that the squad is too large. With rapid promotion due to casualties you sometimes find yourself with people commanding squads who are having a pretty hard job commanding that large a squad. In my opinion the number of infantry is pretty small. Maybe it is large enough. With better weapons, it might be best not to have too many on one team. Figure on the present division of 3,240 actual rifle­ men. That is where the casualties are heaviest. Out of 2,000 casualties per division 1,500 are riflemen. Some people advocate more riflemen. The division becomes weak in riflemen after not too much fighting. Concerning a replacement battalion in each division, I am not sure. Personally, I think.it can be handled through a mere effective replacement depot system. I think our division needs more communication troops. I think that the com­munication set-up should be given a very thorough going over to set the actual number of. bands that can be used. Increase the whole T/E of communication. The details of the organization of smaller units is going to depend on weapons. Practically every commander I talked to said that he does not believe the cannon company in the regiment carries its weight. All are very strong for mortars. We had several battalions of them, but all commanders wanted 4.2" mortars. Many times we had much more artillery than we could use, but whether or not you are always going to be faced with that ammunition supply problem, I don't know. When you want real shooting you can always use it. One day we supported one divi­sion with 30 battalions of artillery. It gives you a greater mass of fire to have a great.number of guns. It is an economy of personnel to have 6 instead of 4. You get wider dispersion with six. I think every infantry officer and NCO should be taught how to adjust artillery in case of an emergency. Casualties among the observers were very high. I think that there is no man in the battery more valuable than the forward observer. We had one very excellent example of that in Tunisia on hill 609. The Germans launched a counter-attack just about the time when things were critical. The forward observer was killed and an infantry officer by one correction brought down six battalions on the counter-attack. It broke up the counter-attack. We went into the Normandy invasion with 10 or 15% infantry overstrength per division so we had the same idea you had in mind. Otherwise strength decreases quickly. Any landing operation should be 10 or 15% overstrength in infantry, certainly in riflemen. We found in cases the officer replacement had higher casualty rate than the men. The only thing we could figure out was that knowing when to duck and not to duck. When officers duck at the wrong time, it is not so good. A lot of youngsters were afraid to duck at the wrong time and didn't duck when they should. We tried to send officers up with a division other than the one they would be assigned to. Sent them up for a week or so and then brought them back to a pool and assigned them out. Most of us are scared the first time anyway. That is a little point that may be interesting to you.

Thanks, John, interesting piece. The author writes fairly dense Pentagonese; the original 1946 transcript was easier reading. But here's the meat of it. Not sure I agree with the conclusion about adding 3 'cyber warriors' to each squad though. 1. The members of the Infantry Conference observed that infantry squads typically operated below full strength during World War I... an infantry rifle squad had to be able to survive and retain effectiveness after some attrition. Consistent with this rationale, the committee decided on the nine-man squad as the most survivable construct that a squad leader could control with voice and hand-arm signals in combat. 2. during World War II “the rifle squad almost never employed tactical maneuvers in the attack, i.e. the Able, Baker, and Charley elements of scouts, base of fire, and maneuver.” In his lecture on infantry organization, Connor stated that “wars are won by platoons” and added that “in combat, fire and movement is a platoon job. 3. veterans believed it would be easier to train and integrate conscripts into the new nine-man squad than the twelve-man World War II squad simply because command and control over inexperienced conscripts would be better in the smaller squad. 4. at Aachen, "Casualties were still eroding the fighting power of the rifle companies. Within a few days, most were operating at half or two-thirds strength. Each night, personnel officers fed brand-new replacements into the companies. This kept the rifle companies in operation, but they were always understrength, in constant need of reinforcements" 5. “future wars are almost certainly going to be fought mostly in cities.... urban environments will increase attrition of personnel, equipment, and ammunition. 6. Technology and automation seem to have increased the workload of the squad on contemporary battlefields, with more equipment for the same nine people to manage and operate in addition to legacy warfighting functions.... adding another team to the squad could optimize it for unmanned armed reconnaissance, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities Oh, and the boys of the "Bloody Bucket" would have loved to have a few of these gizmos humping ammo up the Kall trail between 81mm mortar bursts.

Hi Mum!!!

Poor blighters....

Another futurist thought to kick around is for BFC to slowly 'merge' engine 2 CM Families to keep things fresh and interesting without all new projects as their focus shifts to engine 3. So e.g., they update force sets and TOE for CMSF2 to 2020, then drop the barrier between it and CMBS to create a single modern warfare family taking in both temperate and arid. So Russians fight Uzbeks, Germans intervene in Latvia etc. Or e.g. CMRT Berlin builds in a gate that allows paid up licensees to import select CMFB and CMFI forces and terrain sets, without needing to do separate end of war modules for the latter. Then you can get 'what if' Patton v Zhukov too. Yeah, yeah I know, all easier said than done, based on what was supposed to be a 'simple' modernization of CMSF. But it's either that or they ditch the 'islanded' engine 2 families altogether while we all wait on engine 3. Fresh meat!

The word of the Mord! RESPONSE: Thanks be to Bunker

@Elvis closed this out for me. It seems my activation codes for BN and CW were made for a Windows install and needed a small tweak by him to work on a Mac 3.0 upgrade installation. So all's well that ends well.