Grisha

Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland

Jeez, Michael, you're in Port Townsend? I'm in Seattle, and Jeff Duquette's in Portland

Okay, I just finished the website for the Yassy-Kishinev deception maps. I've made a shameless plug for the book I obtained these from, but Col. Glantz is a truly amazing historian and deserves more credit than he receives. Btw, the site is at my friend's own private server, so while a little slow there is none of the hassle of ISP bandwidth, etc. I've also linked a Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception to the site - and don't worry the link is to my own site not a .mil site, so the Brits can have a crack at it too [Click here]

Okay, I just finished the website for the Yassy-Kishinev deception maps. I've made a shameless plug for the book I obtained these from, but Col. Glantz is a truly amazing historian and deserves more credit than he receives. Btw, the site is at my friend's own private server, so while a little slow there is none of the hassle of ISP bandwidth, etc. I've also linked a Leavenworth paper on Soviet deception to the site - and don't worry the link is to my own site not a .mil site, so the Brits can have a crack at it too [Click here]

Sure, Michael, I can do that.

Sure, Michael, I can do that.

Bruce70, You say you're an AI researcher. Does that mean you do code? If so, how far is AI coding these days? To what extent are neural networks used and is there anything else out there these days? Finally, how is AI coding not as taxing as before on a system, and is this due to more processer power or better code algorithms? Basically, I'm just curious as AI code has always fascinated me (in college was seriously considering robotics for a time). [ July 24, 2002, 03:13 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Will do, Andreas. Please give it 6 hours from now when I will be home from work. Sorry for the delay.

Will do, Andreas. Please give it 6 hours from now when I will be home from work. Sorry for the delay.

Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.

Now that I have a brand spanking new scanner, would anyone be interested in seeing some intelligence maps of the Yassy-Kishinev operation? Specifically, a German intelligence assessment map and a Soviet disposition map, both from Glantz' book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. These maps were derived by Glantz after going over a number of different maps from both German and Soviet archival sources.

A quote from Von Hardesty's book, Red Phoenix: Also Christer Bergström (currently has written 2 volumes of the planned 6 vol. set on the air war in the Russian front) has this to say about the quality of Soviet pilots [click here]. The Soviet air arm known as the VVS was totally subordinated to the Red Army, and operated within the combined arms doctrines that were developed before the war then refined with war experience. As such, the VVS didn't general go on fighter sweeps much like the Germans did or the USAAF did during the latter part of the bombing campaign. Because of this, the Luftwaffe was able to operate even to the end of the war in the East. Thus, the quality of Soviet CAS cannot be judged on such factors as you have stated, Greg. It was far more important to the STAVKA to focus everything on the ground campaign, because what was going to stop the war was occupying Germany, at which point there would be no more airfields for the Luftwaffe to operate anyway. As it was, the Luftwaffe made little impact on Soviet operations from 1944 on. Basically, the Luftwaffe could still operate after 1943, but usually not where there were major Red Army operations in progress. By 1944 in main Red Army advance sectors Il-2 Shturmoviks were going on unescorted small formation (2-4 planes) 'free hunts' in search of targets of opportunity, because the VVS owned the skies above.

Hayward's book, Stopped at Stalingrad, is very enlightening on the process of German CAS. The major proponent of it was Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen when he commanded Fliegerkorps VIII up until July 1942. Through his work, the Luftwaffe became quite adept at CAS. There are even incidents of air units communicating with air liaison personnel during Blau to inform them of enemy troops up ahead. Specifically, tactical communications about impending enemy troops mere kilometers away. These air liason personnel stayed with the spearhead of the advance in order to more effectively utilize CAS. von Manstein always requested von Richthofen's units for his operations after their brilliant cooperation in the Crimea in 1942. In House's Leavenworth paper Towards Combined Arms Warfare (he has since expanded on this paper and published it as a book) he states that US air-ground cooperation was poor until 'late in the war'. The main reason for such poor cooperation was AAF doctrine, which defined three priorities for tactical aviation: 1) air superiority, 2) "isolation of the battlefield", meaning air interdiction, and 3) attacks on ground targets "in the zone of contact" between opposing armies. CAS was always priority 3. And even by 1946 In the book Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Century, John T. Greenwood contributed an article, titled 'Soviet Frontal Aviation in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945', I included that last sentence to show that Soviet CAS wasn't perfect, but it was still very developed, and certainly more effective than their western allies' efforts.

Schrullenhaft, Actually air-ground coordination in the Russian Front was generally superior to the Western front. The Germans under Richtofen(?) developed very good close support systems during 1942. The Soviets by 1944 actually had air liaison personnel(w/radio) at the tactical-operational level. Both side's air force was tactical in nature, unlike the USAAF or RAF. [ July 23, 2002, 06:20 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Commissar, I don't know why, regarding the Guards badge. None of the banners had anything other than their unit names. Runyan99, 'Pobeda' is Russian for 'victory'. killmore, I haven't seen that movie, but I did buy a video of a new WWII film that just came out in Russia called 'Zvezda' or 'Star'. It's a remake of an older movie, which itself was an adaptation to a novel. The movie is about the razvedchiki, or special reconnaissance troops who were the forerunners of Soviet special operations troops, more commonly known as 'Spetsnaz'. The movie was great, and unlike the original film, was more faithful to the novel.

freaky, The dioramas are actually paintings for the most part. Massive paintings, but still paintings. It's only the very foreground that is 'real', so your initial impressions were correct All, I should also point out that some of those cathedrals have been around since the 13th century, and one (or is it two?) of those cathedrals contain the tombs of much of the royal lineage of Russia. I really wanted to see Ivan the Terrible's tomb, but his wasn't publically accessible.

Dang! You can only place 7 pics, not 8 as listed. Oh, well, at least I copied the text this time. Here's the last one Finally, some Russian culture. Beautiful cathedrals within the Kremlin walls.

This is my second retyped post after the first blew up, because I had one more than the maximum 8 pics. Thought I'd help keep the CMBB fire alive and do my part. Enjoy T-34/76. These tanks should be fun to drag race across the CMBB battlefield. Latter T-34 w/85mm. Makes the drag racing still fun later in the war. What will most likely be every German players nightmare, ISU-152. Tiger, pillbox, building, the 'animal hunter' just doesn't care. IS-2. Can you say 'Pobeda'? Banner of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, initially commanded by Katukov. This excellent tank commander went on to become commander the 1st Tank Corps and then the 1st Guards Tank Army. The banner reads, "Death to the German Invaders, 1 Guards Tank Brigade." A couple of nice dioramas from the Museum of Victory. This one depicts the Moscow winter counteroffensive. Kursk diorama. Brutal.

John & Andreas, Posting good data here, many thanks. Regarding replacements and TO&E, two things should be kept in mind as well. 1) As John stated, better units ('better' meaning better combat performance) were kept at official Shtat levels, whereas poor units were sometimes reorganized drastically to 2/3s of Shtat TO&E. This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.

John & Andreas, Posting good data here, many thanks. Regarding replacements and TO&E, two things should be kept in mind as well. 1) As John stated, better units ('better' meaning better combat performance) were kept at official Shtat levels, whereas poor units were sometimes reorganized drastically to 2/3s of Shtat TO&E. This brings me to the second point, 2) that Front commanders were given control of actual TO&E for their rifle divisions. In other words, the Front commander could reorg his rifle divisions as he saw fit.

Determinant, "Plodding like herds of sheep?" This might have been the case in some instances in 1941 or even 1942, but by and large Soviet troops did understand such concepts as tactics Soviet tactics were pretty much like everybody elses really, it's just that they didn't have the same level of command control or initial training. Experienced Soviet troops were every bit as adept at their job as the next nation, but just went about it in a different manner. By mid-1943 assault tactics came under great scrutiny, resulting in the devising of ad hoc combined arms assault groups tailored to the needs of the situation. These assault tactics were based on experience as well. Soviet losses were also the result of their inability to rely on on-call indirect artillery to assist in a new development on the battlefield - or bail them out of a bad spot. Their own solution to this was to have many more self-propelled assault guns (SUs, ISUs) on hand for infantry support, but it wasn't quite the same thing as a barrage of incoming. Kind of the difference between the USMC and the US Army, the former relying on their own organic firepower, the later, on additional assets, i.e. artillery and air power.

Determinant, "Plodding like herds of sheep?" This might have been the case in some instances in 1941 or even 1942, but by and large Soviet troops did understand such concepts as tactics Soviet tactics were pretty much like everybody elses really, it's just that they didn't have the same level of command control or initial training. Experienced Soviet troops were every bit as adept at their job as the next nation, but just went about it in a different manner. By mid-1943 assault tactics came under great scrutiny, resulting in the devising of ad hoc combined arms assault groups tailored to the needs of the situation. These assault tactics were based on experience as well. Soviet losses were also the result of their inability to rely on on-call indirect artillery to assist in a new development on the battlefield - or bail them out of a bad spot. Their own solution to this was to have many more self-propelled assault guns (SUs, ISUs) on hand for infantry support, but it wasn't quite the same thing as a barrage of incoming. Kind of the difference between the USMC and the US Army, the former relying on their own organic firepower, the later, on additional assets, i.e. artillery and air power.

The deception operation of the Yassi-Kishinev operation also contributed greatly to success. German intelligence situational maps had the 7th Mech Corps placed in the operational rear behind 5th Shock Army when in reality it was across the Dnestr bridgehead within the 37th Army sector, prepared for exploitation. A discrepency of over 60km.

The deception operation of the Yassi-Kishinev operation also contributed greatly to success. German intelligence situational maps had the 7th Mech Corps placed in the operational rear behind 5th Shock Army when in reality it was across the Dnestr bridgehead within the 37th Army sector, prepared for exploitation. A discrepency of over 60km.

It's not just America. Ubisoft hails from France.