Grisha

Keke, Regarding your doubts about the superiority of Soviet Operational art versus the Blitzkrieg at the operational-strategic level, I suggest you email Col. David Glantz about his opinion on that. If you don't wish to disturb him, then might I suggest the following books, all from Frank Cass Publisher:</font> Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War(over 700 pages, btw)</font> Soviet Military Intelligence in War</font> Soviet Military Operational Art</font> Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver</font>

Very interesting clarification, Steve. Thanks!

It's 0300hrs 11 January 1945, and in a frontline trench opposite a certain Soviet bridgehead centered around a city called Sandomir, two German soldiers try to stay warm - and awake ... Yeah, it's going to be rough for BTS. Ahh, but the perk$$$$$ Bring it on!

"To argue that Germany might have swung the balance during the summer of 1943, more than a successful conclusion for them of Zitadelle is required." - Zetterling & Frankson, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis "Even more ominous, if unbeknownst to the German command, on the night of 15 July, the 27th and 53rd Armies of General I.S.Konev's Steppe Front, accompanied by the fresh 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps(with almost 400 tanks), began closing into assembly areas around Oboian' and northeast of Prokhorovka, while lead elements of 47th Army closed up behind Shumilov's 7th Guards and Kriuchenkin's 69th Armies." - Glantz, Battle of Kursk [ May 07, 2002, 11:48 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Klink, When you consider that the Soviets had never stopped the Germans in a summer offensive this victory was huge, even when considering the tremendous losses in men and equipment absorbed by the Red Army. One has to remember this was the German Army, now reinforced with an entire SS Panzer Corps, and the Germans were still very much in their prime. The plan for operation Zitadelle was to eliminate the Kursk salient and deprive the Soviets of the initiative and any offensive capability in summer of 1943. The Soviet plan was to allocate sufficient forces to stop the German offensive while planning for a general counteroffensive that would start from just south of Velikie Luki all the way down to the Black Sea coast with the objective set at the Dnepr line. In the final analysis, the Germans did not penetrate the tactical depths in the northern pincer and barely penetrated the tactical depths in the south pincer before calling off the operation. The Soviets successfully defended the salient then launched their counteroffensive, eventually establishing two very large bridgeheads along the Dnepr. In the two most exhaustive studies done on Kursk, Glantz and Zetterling both state that even if the Germans had penetrated through the operational depths in the southern pincer, its effects would have been negligible. [ May 07, 2002, 01:15 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I'd only add to Skipper's post that Soviet low level unit commanders were reporting their misgivings about further exploitation, seeing the German 'withdrawal' for what it really was, but the STAVKA was so swept up in success that these warnings were discounted. After this second Kharkov fiasco, the STAVKA finally woke up to the dangers of overextension.

Guys, you are looking up the wrong tree for explanations of Soviet victory. Unlike the Germans, Soviet operations determined Soviet tactics. In other words, successful Soviet operations (which were increasing in frequency and scale by mid 1943) set the stage for successful Soviet tactics. Stop thinking that the Soviets had the same corresponding values in military art that the West had. They did not. If anything, the Soviets proved that successful military operations do not have to be grounded in field command 'initiative' or 'responsiveness'. And to say that the Soviets won by numbers only reveals a lack of knowledge in Soviet operational art, which is not some vague concept, but a sophisticated and comprehensive system of conducting war, using methods that we all understand but would not use in the same manner in the West. Like Skipper says above, read Glantz especially his books from Frank Cass Publishers. [ May 06, 2002, 04:01 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

I think at the tactical level parity will be few and far between in terms of combat power and effectiveness. The reason is that the Soviets never placed as much importance on tactical initiative as the Germans, because their operational methods didn't rely on it. Far more important to the Soviets was the manipulation of intelligence to isolate German sectors of their choosing in order to plan elaborate operations that verged on surprise attacks at the operational level. By stacking the deck in their favor, the Soviets had less need for versatility - at least until the exploitation phase. And that was alleviated to a degree by wide usage of forward detachments. [ May 03, 2002, 06:00 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

That's an involved question, Chris. It all depends on the year, since there was so much change in Soviet tactics(and operations) during the war. In 1941, there would on average be 1-2 Rifle Battalions per km, but in 1942 that jumped to 2-4 battalions per km. However, in 1942 Rifle Divisions attacked in single echelon with a single battalion as divisional reserve. By 1943, Rifle Battalions in attack would have a frontage of 500-700m. This didn't change much in 1944-45, but what did change was the overall divisional frontage which virtually shrank by a factor of two. The result was deep attack formations that were given the task of penetrating the entire tactical depths of the enemy. As for reserves, Soviet combat regulations usually assign 1/9th of the formation as reserves. Incidently, the smallest formation to be split into fire and maneuver groups was generally the company. Platoon and squad commanders were expected to be within close communication with their entire unit. One of the things to bear in mind is that a well planned mid to late war Soviet operation might make, at the tactical level, for a very poor scenario. The reasons are:</font> Soviet intelligence was very comprehensive and thorough. Thus, most German positions in the first line of defense would be identified on the map.</font> Soviet deception operations(maskirovka), combined with intelligence, created very favorable conditions for operational planning staffs. This was because though the German OOB for a selected sector was generally known, and positions identified, the Germans themselves were kept guessing by and large, and many times they never detected half, or more, of the actual Soviet force deployed before them. By creating this level of advantage for themselves, the Soviets were able to mass tremendous odds in their favor on a tactical level, anywhere from 8:1 to 16:1 on the level of CMBB.</font>Still, it would be historically accurate, just very poorly balanced. [ May 02, 2002, 09:18 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Thanks for correcting me, Skipper! I just checked on this and found out that the song I associate as the national anthem of the Soviet Union(and now Russia this year) is known as the 'Song of Stalin'. It became the national anthem on March 15, 1944, and 'Internationale' was dissolved. So, my two favorites are "Song of Stalin" and "Sacred War". Frankly, I find 'Victory Day' a little too light-hearted.

My terrible regret will be that I'll be in Moscow come 22 June 2002. Are you guys really planning on releasing it on that date? I'd sure love to get my hands on this game before heading to the Motherland.

Well, the two I consider the most powerful Soviet songs are, Internationale(also, the current anthem of Russia), and Sacred War. I have both I believe - with and without the chorus.

There is a paper there on Soviet night operations as well by Major Claude Sasso.

Another thing I'll need to check on is whether 76mm and 85mm HE rounds are supersonic.

I agree, Rokossovsky was very probably the Soviet Union's best operational(Front) commander in WWII. And, incidently, that he had just been released from imprisonment in 1940, speaks of the conviction of his decision to not repeat a wasteful counterattack. I do think that Sharp's statement on German tank losses in July-August 1941 is quite telling wrt Soviet antitank artillery capabilities. It begs the question, could 76mm/85mm HE rounds be responsible for 1500+ German tank losses in July-August 1941? However, the Soviets wasted away way too many resources counterattacking the Germans, but that's hindsight talking. [ April 24, 2002, 12:02 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

ftp://160.149.109.31/carl/glantz1.pdf Panzerleader, just remember it's from the Combat Studies Institute. You'll always find it in google.

True, effective Soviet combined arms attacks in June/July of 1941 were rare, but effective defenses were not. Glantz writes in When Titans Clashed: In Rokossovsky's memoir, he says this about the battle: Charles C. Sharp says this about the type of Soviet AT guns used during this period: Also: Definitely, something to think about.

Rex, One thing that can take a lot of time is scenario design and testing. You need a lot of OOB data, map data, and then need to playtest extensively for play balance. Also, it's the last thing done in most development, so who's to say how much longer CMBB has to go?

Kip, I understand your feelings on this, as I feel the same way on this issue(Hard-core Red Army groupie here). What I've heard regarding vehicle C&C sounds good. And when you think about the end effect of poor C&C or training/experience it usually comes down to time really. What is commonly referred to in these modern times as the 'decision loop'. If BTS penalizes Soviet units that try complex maneuvers by adding on time for said maneuvers, then it's not very far from the truth, since this will restrict the Soviet player to simpler, and possibly more costly, actions. I do agree that by mid-1943, this sort of characteristic should be gone, except for the use of penal battalions, but then that should be the case for German penal battalions as well.

Do you think a KPV might qualify as a modern ATR? They've been around a long time, at least since the 50's.

M Hofbauer, Didn't mean to get you all riled up I never stated ATRs would be effective against tanks, only lightly-armored vehicles. A hole in an engine block is never a good thing. Neither is a 14.5mm round passing through a truck/APC bed full of troops. True, my reference to AT units has little importance wrt ATRs, but I guess it was partly to brace German players for 76mm and 85mm guns with AP rounds in mid-late '41 scenarios. What the ATR would do in this case would be to keep the German APCs away to some extent, forcing either an artillery response or, more preferable, a German armor response. Then the 'CRASH - BOOM' guns would have a chance to do their work. Thanks for the German correction. My forte is Russian

I think the Wehrmacht crowd is panicking maybe a bit much. Even for the PzIII, the ATR will need a close range shot to do any substantial damage, like immobilization. For the German halftracks, the German player will need to have his troops dismount, then support the tanks as they both attempt to locate and destroy these ATR nests. Of course, in 1941 the Germans lost a lot of tanks due to Soviet AT units(something like 1500 in 1941). This was due to the unique combination of ATR, 76mm field gun/85mm AA gun pressed into AT use, and liberal usage of AT mines. So, if a Wehrmacht player runs into a well-placed Soviet subunit from an antitank regiment/brigade, then it's going to be rough for die Heer.

Jarmo, An AT rifle was certainly no heavier or bulkier than a .50 mg, and was probably more like a medium mg when transporting it. I'd be surprised if it was represented as a gun.

Interesting post, Jeff. Thanks for putting it up.

Would you mind to clarify - who was the head of this team and within which institution did it work? Also, what happened to them? Actually, rocket-propelled launcher was clearly far from the top of terchnological priorities list during the war. Like a "nice to have, but can do without" kind of thing. In the first half - because it was not something that could be made fast; in the second half - because artillery and armor was in ample availability, and infantry AT capability provided by existing weapons (AT rifle and grenades) was deemed sufficient to keep RPG off the priorities list.</font>