Grisha

ScottB, I believe that even from 1944-45 there were instances of Soviet tank units without sufficient radios for all their vehicles. It became rarer and rarer as the war was closing to an end, but Soviet tank forces were never amply supplied with vehicular radios. This makes Charles Sharp's statement on the predominance of radios in SU vehicles all the more intriguing, especially since he also states that tank forces were not similarly supplied.

Actually, I don't know much about the SU-76i, and it seems a bit odd now to use a quote for such a vehicle. SU vehicles were primarily direct fire platforms in WWII. Even many field artillery pieces were placed in a direct fire mode for an offensive. The reasoning was that direct fire was far more accurate, required less shells, needed none of the technical equipment for laying in an indirect barrage, and crew training was simplified. Of course, it also required that provisions be made to redeploy quickly too. However, SU vehicles were not assault vehicles per se, and were usually placed behind infantry and tanks as a base of fire. The whole radio thing is intriguing though. If these units were completely equipped with radios, then it must have been for a reason - especially if tanks were not as fortunate. The Soviets placed great importance on their artillery as a support weapon, and the SU's were considered close support direct fire artillery.

I read in Charles Sharp's Soviet OOB volume on self-propelled units that virtually all SU regiments/brigades had radios in every vehicle. He emphasizes this by saying that this was in contrast to tanks units which didn't always have radios. I posted in Valera's forum but have received no reply, though on the site's page on the SU-76i there is this: What is your take on this, and will it have an impact on Soviet SU vehicles wrt orders, etc.?

The idea that soviet strategic/operational skill was used to negate German tactical skill from 1943 onwards is an old myth perpetuated by so called “Soviet Experts”. Resources had a lot to do with defeating the Germans. Especially when considering how long the German didn't bother to go on a home front wartime footing. But, to call the effectiveness of Soviet operational/strategic skill a myth is amazing. I've never considered the lifework of people like Glantz as mythology. Frankly, I don't have anything more to say on that. On what basis would you make such a rash statement? And by the way, I do have proof to support my claim. [ March 20, 2002, 07:53 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Yes, Michael, the Soviets found that reconnaissance in force was not only a good method of determining any last minute changes in German defenses, but also it quite often could capture the first or second trenchline. This was because the Germans were now temporarily retreating to their second or third trenchline in anticipation of the Soviet artillery offensive, then reoccupying the front trenches as the barrage ended. In response, the Soviets initiated many attacks with either no artillery or a very short barrage, and usually in conjunction with the reconnaissance in force. Hence, the assault was in effect beginning with the initial reconnaissance, and the original assault force became the second echelon.

I agree with Richard. In fact, tank regiments in the Mechanized brigades were often centralized for decisive armor action, giving you roughly two tank brigades overall. There were more Tank Corps simply because it required less resources than a Mech Corps to build and maintain. Of the two, the Mech Corps was by far the more powerful.

A 3:1 Soviet numerical superiority wasn't reached until late 1944. 4:1 was never reached in the entire war. What has been attested to numerous times in German memoirs(and by historians of German perspective) is really the result of maskirovka, or the Soviet operational method of clandestine redeployment. Vistula-Oder was a masterpiece in this regard, achieving 5:1 to 7:1 operational odds, and easily up to 10:1 tactical odds(I believe in one sector 16:1 odds were attained). Basically, the Soviets figured out how to shift their numerical superiority(without effective German detection) around so that it could be put to maximum effectiveness. The process of effective maskirovka had begun in winter '42-'43, and by 1945 it was a well developed Soviet operational and stragetical method.

Well, if BTS wants info on Soviet ordnance, then I might be able to get them from Russian sources.

Guys, you want to fly ground support on the Russian front? Get Il-2, then As for CMBB, will Il-2s get PTAB-2.5's, and VAP-250's?

Very interesting. Thanks, rexford.

Soviets had two Polish armies, 1st and 2nd. The 1st Polish Army fought with distinction under Rokossovsky's 1st Belorussian Front during the Belorussian campaign in summer 1944.

The way I read various threads on Soviet tank command/control here, in the first period there will be a serious deficiency on being able to give orders to tanks in a timely manner. During a Soviet offensive, or with an impetuous Soviet commander on defense it could be a nightmare. For example, I'm the Soviet commander on an offensive mission. Tanks need to be in sight with each other to stay within command. Soviet experience levels will generally be low, resulting on long delays before acting on orders even when in sight. Should any tanks lose sight during an order change, order delays skyrocket. If orders get too fancy, delays also skyrocket, so they must be simple. What this means to me is that should any unexpected situation arise the Soviet player will have great difficulty in responding in a timely manner. All it takes is a German player that knows how to feint left - go right really. Unless the Soviet player has reserves, the danger of being picked off in midstep will be great.

But I did...see my comments re: Berlin above. I haven't had a chance to read that chapter in depth, to be honest. Oops! My bad Actually, you won't find it in any book. Glantz just spoke about it last year at a seminar at University of Northern Texas. The reason for the delay of Berlin was that once Stalin was assured of its possession, then he switched his forces south to take Vienna. All of this was done with the future in mind. Stalin was going for as much land as he could grab in Europe before war's end. Of course, this is no surprise, but the fact that Berlin could've been taken in February with far fewer losses is. And that Stalin would actually delay the war for a better postwar position is also a bit of a stunner. It's interesting to think what might have happened if Berlin was taken in late February. Where were the western Allies at this point? [ March 03, 2002, 06:34 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Wow, Michael, I'm a bit surprised you didn't find my previous reply worth responding to. Frankly, I think the whole idea of the Berlin operation being delayed for 3 months for political reasons immensely interesting - with many possible unseen angles from several national directions. Regarding 'archival' sources and When Titans Clashed, please bear in mind that books published by Voenizdat(the Ministry of Defense publishing house) were generally classified, and thus not available until after the fall of the Soviet Union. Finally, to my mind I can think of three people who have probably done more to balance the history of the Russian front(by presenting the Soviet point of view): Erickson, Glantz, and Zaloga. All historians have a point of view, it's just that wrt the Russian front the traditional pov has long been German. Frankly, we will need more historians from the Soviet perspective, if we're going to have any chance of balancing this tremendous conflict historically. [ March 03, 2002, 01:09 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

One of the more recent findings by Glantz was that Berlin was originally planned to be taken in February 1945, and there is nothing in his research that doubts it could very well have happened - and with far fewer Soviet losses too. The fact that the Berlin operation didn't occur until May was due to political maneuverings by Stalin. The Yalta talks were in Februrary, which is exactly when the Vistula-Oder operation was finally halted. The gist is that originally Berlin was to be taken by mid-February per Stalin's orders. However, with Yalta Stalin realized he could get a guarantee from the West that the Soviets would have Berlin. Once Stalin had this assurance, he rescinded his Berlin order, then redirected forces for the taking of Vienna. Once Vienna was taken, Stalin then resumed planning for Berlin. This gave the Germans 3 months to fortify the Oder line. Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovsky(all front commanders in the Berlin direction) were quite angry with the halt on Berlin in February, since the loss of life for the Soviets three months later was much higher. Of course, this is just Glantz' word right now, but he bases this on archival and unexpurgated Soviet sources. I look forward to a published work on this, though nothing is in the works right now. [ March 02, 2002, 01:21 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Jeff, whatever are you talking about? CMBB would handle all the combat aspects. My suggestion was only meant to facilitate calculation of maneuver between or after contact, as well as logistical concerns. But, you knew that - you bum

Have you considered making use of the QJM algorithms developed by the Trevor Dupuy Istitute? They may come in quite useful for determining movement rates, and basic non-combat attrition. I believe it also addresses the effects of 'friction', or the corelation of combat with movement. Do you intend on allowing players to determine the overall scale of the game?

Guards units were pretty much kept up to strength. Soviet units that tended to perform poorly were rarely kept up to strength. In fact, Front commanders were given permission to devise their own TO&E for their Rifle divisions, which meant that poor divisions might only have 2 companies per battalion, and 2 platoons per company even. Shock Armies were your Rifle Armies that were beefed up with lots of artillery and separate tank brigades/regiments(usually heavy tanks). Basically, the breakthrough element in the offensive. The Siberians were not special troops, just well equipped, fresh, and fully complemented. Morale was also a tad better among the Siberians in winter 1941. Razvedchiki were the precursors of the Spetsnaz. However, this means they were never used in large numbers, but sent out instead on long range recon missions for either intelligence, combined operations with partisans, or special objectives. Most rifle and mechanized/motorized units had razvedchiki from battalion level up. And yes, unit performance varied widely especially in the first period of the war. Many units were very poorly trained, but some were quite good - even amazingly so. Katukov's tank brigade(forget unit designation) fought with great elan in 1941(Katukov went on to command the 1st Guards Tank Corps, then the 1st Guards Tank Army). Even one of the hastely formed 'destroyer' divisions formed from civilians in Moskva fought so surprisingly well, that it was given Guards status in 1941/42. But generally, in 1941/42 Soviet units should be depicted as very eager to fight, but poorly trained. I should add another point about Guards status. This was given due to exemplary performance in combat. Most Soviet units that performed well in combat were usually left alone for the simple reason that 'if it ain't broke, why fix it'. Thus, one could generally make the observation that Guards units were, in fact, better units than the average Soviet unit. Thus, Guards units should receive higher experience/morale levels in CMBB than the average Soviet unit. They may not be elite, but they were generally good enough to blunt the German juggernaut - even early on.

I'm from Guam. When I was a kid, I used to work on my grandfather's ranch in Chalon Pago, about midpoint of the island. We found all kinds of stuff, since that area used to be an ammo depot in WWII: rockets, grenades, bullets from .30 to .50, and the pellets that make up artillery 'powder'. Once near where I lived I found a .50 bullet that had been fired and ricocheted.

While the German General Staff objected to Operation Barbarossa, it had more to do with the fact that a ex-WWI soldier who had been gassed was giving the orders, rather than an accomplished General. Once the operation was in planning, the vast majority of German officers were very optimistic about the campaign in the Soviet Union. As Glantz had pointed out in a lecture, the general German impression was that they were on a 'crusade' against the Bolshevik threat to Western civilization. Hence, it was a culture-krieg. Combine this with Germany's astounding combat performance to date, and it's easy to see how infectious such an impression could be. I remember reading where one German commander even gave the amazing quote of something like one month would be all it would take to implode the Soviet Union.

In general, it was plain old arrogance in their 'superior' capabilities. The Germans had just pulled off a lightning campaign in France, and they had seen how badly the Soviets fared in the Winter War, and even the annexation of eastern Poland. A few other examples of the surprising lack of interest, or consideration, for all things Soviet was:</font> That the Luftwaffe was rudely surprised by the numbers of Soviet fighters they encountered in June of 1941. Sure, VVS pilots were poorly matched against the experienced veterans of the German air force, but that still doesn't discount the fact that German intelligence made either the wrong assessment, or more likely, no mention of the amazing numbers of Soviet fighters that were operational - and fighting.</font> German intelligence had all the information they needed to correctly assess Soviet wartime production capabilities, but for whatever reasons discounted it, deciding instead that the Soviet Union was one step from collapse, and ripe for attack.</font> [ February 18, 2002, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Jeez, Alan Clark, why don't you tell me what you really think Obviously, this is an area rife with fanaticism - as Clark's invective clearly displays. Like most things in life, it's never quite white, never quite black. Just shades of grey. What people don't realize is that Polish resistance was comprised of many factions besides the AK. It's just that the AK had western backing - as the Lublin group had Soviet backing. The real people to suffer were those who fought in the uprising and died when it failed. The Warsaw uprising was a politically motivated ploy orchestrated by the AK that failed miserably due to outrageous assumptions and lines of logic. Somehow, the AK thought it could pull off an uprising preemptively, and thereby beat the Soviets to Warsaw, so to speak. If it had been pulled off, then maybe the result of such a situation would have justifiably resulted in condemnation of the Soviets, since they would've never accepted this chain of events. However, it was not only started preemptively, the uprising was premature. Apparently the AK - who controlled the who mess - screwed up on their intelligence, or simply had no clue of the stopping power of a major river and SS Panzer divisions against a very extended and understrength Soviet force. Still, Rokossovsky tried to seek communication with AK leaders in Warsaw, but was repeatedly ignored. Only when the uprising was in serious trouble did AK leaders seek Soviet assistance - by opening communication via London! Why on earth you would have such a bass ackward communication line when in the middle of a crucial battle can only point to a political agenda on the part of the AK. In fact, it brings into question the very intent of the AK wrt the uprising, and whether it was merely a means to an ends. Sort of an attempt to grab Warsaw under the Soviets' noses, but if it fails - Heck! - we can just blame the Soviets. So, did Stalin want Poland? Yes. He intended on turning eastern Europe into a buffer zone against future aggression from the west - Barbarossa had that deep an impression upon the Soviets - and Stalin. But, did the AK plan on using the uprising as a ploy to either, a)usurp control of Warsaw from the Soviets, or failing that, blame the Soviets for not helping(by making sure that little to no aid from Soviet forces would reach Polish insurgents)? Yes.

Jeez, Alan Clark, why don't you tell me what you really think Obviously, this is an area rife with fanaticism - as Clark's invective clearly displays. Like most things in life, it's never quite white, never quite black. Just shades of grey. What people don't realize is that Polish resistance was comprised of many factions besides the AK. It's just that the AK had western backing - as the Lublin group had Soviet backing. The real people to suffer were those who fought in the uprising and died when it failed. The Warsaw uprising was a politically motivated ploy orchestrated by the AK that failed miserably due to outrageous assumptions and lines of logic. Somehow, the AK thought it could pull off an uprising preemptively, and thereby beat the Soviets to Warsaw, so to speak. If it had been pulled off, then maybe the result of such a situation would have justifiably resulted in condemnation of the Soviets, since they would've never accepted this chain of events. However, it was not only started preemptively, the uprising was premature. Apparently the AK - who controlled the who mess - screwed up on their intelligence, or simply had no clue of the stopping power of a major river and SS Panzer divisions against a very extended and understrength Soviet force. Still, Rokossovsky tried to seek communication with AK leaders in Warsaw, but was repeatedly ignored. Only when the uprising was in serious trouble did AK leaders seek Soviet assistance - by opening communication via London! Why on earth you would have such a bass ackward communication line when in the middle of a crucial battle can only point to a political agenda on the part of the AK. In fact, it brings into question the very intent of the AK wrt the uprising, and whether it was merely a means to an ends. Sort of an attempt to grab Warsaw under the Soviets' noses, but if it fails - Heck! - we can just blame the Soviets. So, did Stalin want Poland? Yes. He intended on turning eastern Europe into a buffer zone against future aggression from the west - Barbarossa had that deep an impression upon the Soviets - and Stalin. But, did the AK plan on using the uprising as a ploy to either, a)usurp control of Warsaw from the Soviets, or failing that, blame the Soviets for not helping(by making sure that little to no aid from Soviet forces would reach Polish insurgents)? Yes.

Not exactly The Poles invaded in 1920, taking Kiev. The Bolsheviks responded, pushing them all the way back to Warsaw before it all ended in an armistice in October 1920.

Not exactly The Poles invaded in 1920, taking Kiev. The Bolsheviks responded, pushing them all the way back to Warsaw before it all ended in an armistice in October 1920.