Grisha

Michael, I've gone to Tom's site(no-frames), but am unable to locate the GUI download.

Michael, I was a hardcore SL fan back in the late seventies, early eighties. Are planning on making an SL("Cross of Iron") GUI for CMBB? I'm going to see about getting your present SL GUI mod for CMBO.

I'm thinking "Young Ned of the Hill" transcribed into a symphonic score and given Great Patriotic War Russian lyrics would have the workers and peasants among us screaming in battlelust as we closed heroically with the Fascist Invaders. Smert' ili Pobeda!

I like it

Fionn, Anything stirring from the Pogues would be good

Sacred War or Soviet National Anthem sung by Red Army Choir. Both songs are enough to send me into fanatical status

Beevor has a tendency to place too much focus on the Soviet political situation than on the military aspects. He also tends to 'suggest' opinions that cannot be substantiated. "Rapes in May of 1945 in Berlin" versus "Racially-based atrocities(rape, murder, slavery, imprisonment, inhuman experimentation) throughout Russia from 1941-1944." These things happened which is why the Soviet-German War was such a different conflict in WWII. It was a war of culture and ideology as well as a political contest. Frankly, I would prefer Ryan's book on Berlin. The late John Erickson assisted Ryan greatly with this project.

German author? [edit]Yes, German author. Still, it should prove helpful with German night technique. [ May 16, 2002, 10:12 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Aacooper, the situation you describe above was often the result of Soviet operational art. In 1944, right before the opening of Bagration most of the Panzer divisions were deployed down south opposite 1st Ukrainian Front in anticipation of the offensive starting there. Why was that? Because of Soviet operational art, primarily through the use of deception. The Soviets already knew the Germans expected the offensive to begin there, and did everything they could to keep them believing this. Meanwhile, forces were secretly redeployed along the northern Belorussian area, while fronts in the Baltic(3rd Baltic Front) and south Ukraine(2nd & 3rd Ukrainian Front) regions were kept active and visible to keep German attention focused away from Belorussia. Then the Karelian operation began, further distracting German attention up north. Finally, the Belorussian campaign began along with the Baltic fronts in earnest. A month later, 1st Ukrainian Front started its operations. One last point I should make is that each time the Germans' attention was drawn away from the Belorussian area German reserves were sent away from the Lvov area(opposite 1st Ukrainian Front) to reinforce an area they thought was soon to be attacked. When the big attack finally did happen, more reserve units from the Lvov area were sent up to the Belorussian area, but arrived too late to stem the tide. And that's when the 1st Ukrainian Front began its Lvov-Sandomir operation, opposite a reduced German force - as planned. [ May 15, 2002, 12:47 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Fionn, Regarding work on a Soviet military art project, my email's posted(meaning, yours isn't) if interested.

Keke, I can't say really, only guess. It could have been the result of poor razvedka, at least to the operational depths. One thing is certain, it sounds like a campaign definitely looking into with more detail. Not because I doubt your claims, but more that there had to be an explanation for all this, whether military, or political. The Soviets of 1944-45 were an entirely different army than the one of 1939-42, with a very sound military art(and science). It is strange to me as well what happened. Even Glantz hasn't covered the Continuation War. I really think someone needs to start accessing the Soviet archives, looking for explanations wrt the Continuation War. Only by hearing the Soviet side will you be able to piece it all together, Finnish & Soviet.

Keke, By 1944 most VVS aircraft possessed both radio receivers and transmitters. By late 1943, the use of RUS-2 radar sets was becoming widespread, capable of detecting aircraft from 80-100kms. Training had also improved, but given the very high attrition rates in combat aircraft units(something all air forces experienced - USAAF combat units had a higher percentage of casualties than the USMC, for example), experienced crew were rarely higher than 50%, even among Guards units. Munter, Please, I can speak for myself. If I wanted this discussion to end, you'd know in no uncertain terms

tero & Keke, Thank you for the discussion! It has left me with a greater appreciation for the Continuation War. I will have to study this aspect of the Soviet-German War in more detail because of it

That is interesting, and may indicate an attempt made by the STAVKA to compensate for the unexpected turn the operation took. Though the Soviets were 120kms closer to the 1940 borders, they found themselves in nearly the same situation as before the initial assault, facing a prepared defensive line. The whole reason for conducting the operation was to put themselves deep in the Finnish operational depths, where such possible chaos could result that the Finnish gov't. might be pressured into unconditional surrender. This didn't happen due to the Finnish operational withdrawal, and that left the Soviets with two choices: a) continue to attack in such unfavorable conditions, or begin plans for another operation. The Soviets chose (a), but probably tried to offset the poor odds with more support assets. Anyway you look at it, the Finnish operational withdrawal was the perfect response for the given political-military situation. Atari!

tero, Thanks for your reply No, generally razvedka/maskirovka were geared to enhance the initial breakthrough-period of an operation. However, razvedka did indicate likely enemy reserves and their most probably routes. Also, maskirovka could be conducted to a diminished degree through the extensive use of forward detachments, but in cases where advance routes were limited or the objective could be determined with a high degree of certainty, then the effectiveness of this method would be negligible. [edit] No, it didn't extend into the exploitation phase as much. Also, forward detachments were part of exploitation. Not so much the Finnish defense capabilities, but that it was assumed the Finns would try to hold the line at all costs - rather than pull back 120 kms to another defensive position. [ May 11, 2002, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

tero & Keke, I understand how close this issue with the Continuation War is to both of you, so I'll keep my comments civil and respectful. I ask the same of you. After looking over a few websites(Finnish & Russian) these are my initial observations:</font> The Soviet Karelian operation's political objective was to force unconditional surrender at the negotiating table(something Finland never agreed to). Militarily, this operation was to restore the border to the 1940 line.</font> The Finns undermined the Soviet operation through an extended withdrawal after buying some time to allow for Finnish units up north to redeploy to a designated defensive position 120kms to the rear, next to Vyborg. 3/4's of this defensive line was also along a river line, making for a particularly difficult situation for the Soviets.</font> Soviet operations were predicated upon thorough intelligence of enemy defenses and deployment, combined with extensive deception to obfuscate enemy intelligence. By planning an operational withdrawal, the Finns rendered any advantage gained by razvedka/maskirovka moot for the operation.</font> Soviet resources were taxed at this point in the war, and it was expected that a Karelian resolution would be forthcoming, thus freeing up Soviet forces on this front to be used in the Baltic and Berlin operations. Logistics had only been arranged for the one operation as well. The Finnish operational withdrawal upset the entire timetable, forcing Soviet forces to conduct an extended operation without sufficient preparation or resources. Basically, the Karelian Front had to make do with a bad situation until some resolution was forthcoming on the negotiating table.</font>In the end, the Soviets did not achieve their political or military goals in this operation, but had to compromise with both. The Finnish plan was largely responsible for this result. The Finns took a gamble, but realized where the real Soviet direction lay - Berlin. [ May 11, 2002, 02:46 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Thanks, Andreas!

Very interesting, Keke. I'll have to look further into this. Many interesting inconsistencies, especially wrt Soviet military art. Thanks to Tero and yourself for pointing out this operation. I'll need to find out the political angles as well.

Yes! I most certainly do, Keke! I failed to notice the amount of time that had passed between the two. My apologies You say this battle began a day after the line was reached? Very uncharacteristics of the Soviets in '44 to press an operation after meeting a defensive line in the exploitation phase, unless there were other reasons afoot. I've often wondered if Russian-Finnish relations could be compared to close, but often feuding relatives ... maybe nothing so familial, but you get my drift I certainly have no answer for Soviet conduct in such unfavorable circumstances. Edit: It may have been politically motivated to force the Finns to sign. [ May 10, 2002, 05:59 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]

Fionn, I think what amazes me about NATO/US countermeasures to Soviet intelligence control is that it took them until the late '70s, early '80s before they realized what was needed. Now that's what I'd call a successful maskirovka operation

Funny you should bring that up. That's what I'm working on right now. Wanna help?

tero, Interesting post. I don't know much of the Continuation War, since my focus has always been Soviet-German. Since Soviet operations were highly dependent on a combination of intensive intelligence(razvedka) and deception(maskirovka), it sounds as if Finnish forces were able to temporarily render Soviet control of intelligence useless by a lengthy withdrawal from frontline positions. After a withdrawal of 10 days time, the Finns then established a defensive position that they were determined to hold. At this point what Finnish forces would've been contacting would be Soviet exploitation formations. These formations would not have the capability of taking prepared/defensive positions. Of course, now that Finnish forces were at a position from which they would not retreat, it's fortunate that a ceasefire was agreed upon. Otherwise, a Soviet assault from these new positions would've been no different than against the Germans. Do you understand my point?

Fionn, First, I'm glad to see your posts gracing the forum once again. I came into CMBO a little after your time here, but your articles were very informative and instructive. Generally, I have to agree with your reply on decision loops and Soviet operations. It did require versatility from Army and Front command in such situations, since upon execution, time was of the essence. I would only qualify your statement on speed with a note on forward detachments. By mid-1944, the Soviets had figured out that the use of forward detachments only worked well in numbers, resulting in even ordering Rifle Armies(and their subordinate units) to send out forward detachments. With this checkerboard array of mobile formations streaking across the map, maskirovka was re-established, albeit a thinner version. And while the numbers of formations sent out alleviated a great need for versatility and initiative, the Soviets did tend to form these ad-hoc units from experienced units/commanders. Another thing I just remembered was the level of intelligence collected before an operation began. Operational(Army-Front level) intelligence was responsible for determining possible reserves in the area(should maskirovka have failed to influence their redeployment). Armed with this knowledge, Army-Front command staffs would be better able to plan most efficient/deceptive exploitation routes. But it really does all go back to the breakthrough, and since no plan ever goes completely as intended, Soviet command staffs at the Army/Front level would have to possess versatility as well.

While generally I agree with this statement, the reference to 'decision-making cycle' is misleading. Terms like 'decision-loops' are a western idea, revolving around the German-based concept of versatility & speed. The Soviets were much more interested in creating illusions and cloaking movement than working inside an enemy's decision-loop. It would be more accurate to say that from June 1944 the Soviets effectively misled and deceived German intelligence to the degree that German military reactions played into the hand of Soviet operations. Incidently, Andreas, that is a fascinating quote. I'm not familiar with Lt.Gen. Plato. Was he in the Wehrmacht? If so, could you direct me to the source of this quote? It could be useful for a project of mine.

Very true, Keke. It also applies at the operational level. However, one has to remember that this is only with respect to a timeline, namely, that Soviet operational art(along with so much else Soviet) while based on excellent, well-thought theories took very hard experience to match in practice. When the final product did arrive(circa-1944) it was matchless, as an operational-strategic form, to anything at the time. In contrast, German operational/strategic art(Blitzkrieg was really a way of combining operational art into strategy - the short, decisive war, so to speak) was only as good as its tactical element and the mind of its overall operational commander. Another thing to realize is that Soviet operational art determined Soviet tactical methods. I don't want to go too much into detail right now, but this is crucial to understanding the Soviet method of war. For example, let's say it's 1944, and we're playing a Soviet assault in CMBB. If this assault were part of a main operational direction, these would have to be the conditions for it to be historical:</font> The map would have to have anywhere from 50-70% of German positions and weaponry labelled/landmarked. That means trenches, pillboxes, minefields, barbed-wire, and gun emplacements.</font> Soviet forces would have anywhere from 8 to 16 times the points to use than the Germans for units.</font>As you can see tactical versatility, or expertise, is somewhat redundant under these conditions. But what one must realize is that such conditions were the direct result of Soviet operational art, which 'created' these battlefield conditions at the outset.