acrashb

At least we (the West) are having this discussion.  This is another reason Western forces are so effective: they swim in and are culturally influenced by open societies and so can adapter faster than their counterparts.
Having said that, it took several years in the second gulf war for the US military to a) recognize that it was now fighting an insurgency and b) issue FM 3-24 to support counter-insurgency doctrine (re-learning British knowledge from the Malaya Emergency and the US' knowledge from the Philippine-American war, among others).  One hopes we collectively learn faster from this war; I am heartened by the recent, relatively timely pivot (at least in public announcements) from highly asymmetrical warfare to more peer- and near-peer to peer planning, doctrine, and force structures.

This is the ENTIRE reason why in the past there was a large effort to eliminate IRBMs and tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons (and why my Army nuclear weapons secondary specialty is no longer relevant 🙂 ) They are destabilizing weapons. Back at the height of the Cold War when we had some 30,000 nuclear weapons to the USSRs 40,000, many, many of those were tactical weapons, and a fair number if IRBMs.
IRBMs are a problem because they naturally are closer to the the other guy, and therefore any warning time is much reduced, which means decision time (do we respond? what is this really?) is close to zero. No one thought back then that a it was possible to employ tactical/battlefield nuclear weapons and have it remain at that level, but rather than it would very quickly escalate to a full nuclear exchange. It was in both the US and USSR interest to eliminate them.
Which leads to the fairly recent hate and discontent about the IRBM treaty, which both sides accuse the other of violating, but more so the Russians violating. The administration's position was to just scrap the treaty rather than try to fix things, allowing more IRBMs, and reverting back to destabilization, rather than try harder to fix the issues. US objections were Russian tests of potentially nuclear capable missiles that violated the range limitations. Russia denied this but it's hard to hide missile tests. Russian objections were of our proposed ground based missile interceptors to be based in Poland (mostly). The objection was the launchers *could* be used as well for IRBMs. They were actually correct, even though there were no plans to do so. Pres. Obama received criticism for "removing" missile defense from Europe. However that missile defense did not yet exist - vaporware from the Bush admin - and replaced it with an immediately deployable and incrementally upgradable system, which also had the side benefit of eliminating Russia's objections.
Over the years there has been a lot of careful tiptoeing around nukes, all with the intent of making sure that they wouldn't be used carelessly (not sure that's the right word). Not to destabilize the balance that keeps them from being used. More recently there has been more belligerence over nuclear weapons, reinstating more tactical nukes, along with rhetoric indicating they could be used. Dangerous stuff that in the past was avoided.
None of which answers the question about whether Putin might use a tactical nuke or what the US might do in response - would we respond in kind by hitting a Russian column/depot, just over the border into Russia, in response to use against a country we technically, don't have an obligation to? That's uncharted territory, although, not for the US DoD, I'm sure. There are undoubtedly scenarios being discussed.

Dave
PS - most important thing I learned about nuclear artillery was how to safely blow them into little tiny pieces so that they wouldn't fall into Soviet hands as they overran us in Germany.

Sure you can, if you don't stay there for long. That's the whole purpose of mechanized forces. All fighting vehicles are NBC protected and should have no problem to roll through a contaminated area. It would be problematic for logistics though, that's for sure.
@Taranis But in other cases you mentioned, like direct targeting of NATO convoys or even some random use on chemical weapons (not much value to it apart from maybe Mariupol), NATO could react with conventional means. Not so much in case of tactical nukes being employed I think. The least they'd have do is to respond with own tactical nukes against Russian forces. But even if NATO would respond with conventional means, is still means a decision to get involved and risking being attacked themselves with tactical weapons, or risking  further escalation.
As for this war being a existential threat to Russia - if you equate the current regime with the country itself, as you might expect Putin to do, this war is very much an existential threat.

We'll get it when people finally learn the difference between ordnance and ordinance. 😜

From the article, "The cause of the fire is under investigation, the military department added." To briefly indulge in some fun, I suppose they are determining if it was a Harpoon, Neptune, or a thunder run by a John Deere. 

Just…wow…seriously, we are going to be studying what the Ukrainian military pulled off in this war for the rest of the century.

This is a very good point but a couple clarifications that might help.  A lot of signatories have clauses built in, in the "case of self-defence war" and I do not think anyone would blame Ukraine for their employment in this case, so long as they are employed against legitimate military targets - which is basically any and all Russians on Ukrainian soil.
The US lead the planet on self-neutralizing scatterable mines and ICM, with things like 99.9% reliability, it is one of the reasons they did not feel they had to sign on, that and the Korean peninsula.  The US has done this for the exact reason you layout above, particularly after they saw the mess in Lebanon when the IDF used older US munitions.   So unless those are 80s era FASCAM and DPICM, we are not talking about massive RoW problems and the battlefield payoff is potentially significant.  
So the primary issue is really political and I have no idea what the spin on that will be.

Killed
Wounded
Destroyed
Towed

From the article, "The cause of the fire is under investigation, the military department added." To briefly indulge in some fun, I suppose they are determining if it was a Harpoon, Neptune, or a thunder run by a John Deere. 

Also for point of clarification, the Moskva attack. Im not familiar with the Neptune missile, is it hypersonic or in some way unusual? I read in a tweet they got two hits on three missiles? Seems like a pretty high rate of success if true. Should I take from this that Ukraine has next level ASuM or that the Russian CIWS sucks? Or maybe CIWS isn't all its cracked up to be?
Tbh just having a hard time processing this Moskva thing, IMO its one of the most wild things I've read here in a while. Want to talk about @The_Capt's 'oh ****' moments regarding what the UA can do, for me this is another one. 

From the article, "The cause of the fire is under investigation, the military department added." To briefly indulge in some fun, I suppose they are determining if it was a Harpoon, Neptune, or a thunder run by a John Deere. 

Actually at the end of the day we are a wargaming community with deep interest (and some expertise) in the history of warfare.  This is the first peer-on-peer conventional war of the 21st century and likely the most intense since the Iran-Iraq war back in the 80s, so you can understand why it is kind of a big deal.
As to the games, no small amount of effort you see here is to try and figure out how to make CM more realistic, particularly the modern titles.  So let’s call this game design in contact.   
Finally we are about analysis and assessment that cut through a lot of the noise out there, so we have seen a lot of people migrate here because we try and remain unbiased- as far as we can as we stand with Ukraine on this one- and offer a different picture than a lot of mainstream military analysis.  Moreover, we will toot our own horn as we have been noted as out in front of events thanks in large part to information sharing and a robust online debate.
We are also on the internet and get whackies, which have been warned and in some cases banned.  
That all said, do not worry BFC is still in the gaming business but right now they have their eyes on this history in the making.  They (and “we”: check out CMCW while you are in the gift shop!), will be back to making the game series you love shortly but right now the best good we can do is try and keep a clear eye on things and keep each other informed while supporting those of us in the middle of all this.

I can only speak for myself here but I registered on this forum because the way this war is covered in this topic is better than any other place I have seen on the internet or on mainstream media for that matter.
I have never played a CM game in my life but I will definitely be getting into the series in the future now that I see how passionate people in this community are about letting people understand the realities of warfare.
In the mean time I wish the Armed Forces of Ukraine all the luck in the world!

On the first, as is often the case this doesn't need to be either/or, it can be some where in between, and I think your word "problematic" gets at that.  The Russian economy is being cratered; so has the North Korean one been for some time and they still maintain a large (although likely ineffective) armed forces.  But I agree that the RA will not be the same after this.
On the second, the chart and information you presented are persuasive - and my thanks for putting it forward.  I'll be using some of this to inform my corporate leadership about the advisability of re-entering the Russian market post-war - we drew down our limited business there shortly after it started.
This was directed to panzermartin - and I agree. Russia has been forming a narrative to justify aggression and has been fairly successful in using this to instill doubt in NATO societies - partly because, like every good lie there was a glimmer of truth in the sense that the West as a whole had become somewhat triumphalist with the collapse of the USSR.  The ISW has a tidy diagram, below, and an excellent article on this.
Narrative:

As I've said before, reviewing twenty years of Putin's statements leads me to believe that we could not have prevented both Russian expansion and war - it was one or the other.  Had we conceded the narrative, Russia would have created buffer zones and then adjusted the narrative to expand from there.
The way out?  Russia could have reformed its society and joined NATO.  But that ship has sailed.

 

BREAKING
Russian cruiser struck by Neptune and on fire in Black Sea.
Rumour/radio intercept.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

Here's something hopeful for those who believe human nature is irredeemably savage:
https://nationalpost.com/news/world/syrian-fighters-join-ukraine-against-russia-whose-troops-are-now-led-by-their-brutal-commander-dvornikov
Syrians helping Ukrainians, not bad.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

From the article:  
 
The costs of failure for the West are pretty high, the costs to Ukrainian nation could get a lot worse yet, regardless of their chances of victory.

And:
I know some on this forum are all for US/Nato intervention (even if just imposing a no fly zone) and I respect that view, but I stand on the side of thought that the west's strategy; that is, management of escalation, balanced against ensuring that Putin is defeated, is the prudent one.

Clearly though the dial has moved somewhat as we enter a new phase of the war. But equally at this juncture, Putin has also given the West an excuse to now recalibrate the balance of their strategic approach. I reason this because obviously we now know about war crimes; the murder of civilians in Bucha etc; use of cluster munitions in Kharkiv; and (with some assumptions at this stage) the use of a chemical weapon in Mariupol. In light of this, the best most immediate and effective response, but retaining the balance of both escalation and necessity to support Ukraine to maximise a Russian defeat, is for the US (by hook or by crook) to get those Polish MiG 29's into Lviv.

I know I'm repeating my own post here from 300 pages and 3-4 weeks back, but this move in my view is now the most proportionate response (if it wasn't before), and it's a move at a critical point in this conflict (as per the article and as we all aware) where it could be most effective to bring about a Russian defeat. 

I also considered the possibility that this action could give Putin an excuse to attack Poland, but I think that's highly improbable, given article 5 and the fact that Russia has not attacked UK, Germany or anyone else who has supplied lethal assets - those countries have already tested the water and Putin has done nothing. I can only conclude that Putin would be stumped for a response and would just have to suck it up.

EDIT: Just saw @DesertFoxpost about the Slovakian MiGs. A very apt coincidence. We'll add those to the offering too. That makes 40 in total.   

Thanks - luckily I know how to get through paywalls
"It used a complex chain of malware, including some custom-built to control utility systems" - that's the OT I mentioned.
"In recent weeks, American officials have warned that Russia could try to expand its cyberwarfare" - this is a correct statement, and is one of the reasons private companies have been hardening up.
"The attackers may have broken into the electrical company’s systems as early as February" - so it could have been an APT, an "Advanced Persistent Threat", something that hangs around waiting to be activated.  Nonetheless failed, maybe that's why (the article is not specific).  Sometimes an APT is discovered because it disrupts normal activity patterns over time and the SIEM and/or human threat hunters notice.
"since Russia’s invasion began,[...] three times as many attacks as it had tracked in the previous year" - this is consistent with my data feeds, but globally, not just in Ukraine.  
"Some analysts believed that Russia would back up its ground invasion with crippling cyberattacks and were puzzled when widespread hacking campaigns did not materialize during the early days of the war."  - more like _every_ analyst. 
Further to my previous lengthy post, in addition to other speculations I'm wondering if the Russian cyber warfare groups are as borked as the kinetic warfare people.  Someone pointed out earlier that NATO had threatened Article 5, but cyber warfare difficult to clearly attribute to a specific threat actor, and in any event the language used was “massive cyber attack”; we haven't even see significant pinpricks.  You'd think that messing up air traffic control at one of the Polish airports taking in Western aid would be a priority, but nothing, at least not in the public domain.
For those keeping track: 2022 Ukraine cyberattacks - Wikipedia
 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/12/pentagon-ukraine-weapons/?utm_source=reddit.com
I think whatever was left of the don't be too mean to the Russians faction in the Biden Administration has been conclusively routed.

Here's something hopeful for those who believe human nature is irredeemably savage:
https://nationalpost.com/news/world/syrian-fighters-join-ukraine-against-russia-whose-troops-are-now-led-by-their-brutal-commander-dvornikov
Syrians helping Ukrainians, not bad.

As much as I try to do minimal politics, if that team (Hilary and Co) was as aggressive about a Ukraine takeover as they were when Ambassador Stevens was killed, Putin could have personally flown to Kiev, shot the Ukraine president, sat on his chair, and nothing would have happened.
I think more likely the issue was a less-prepared / modernized Russian Army, or a lower sense of urgency, or both.

This one I can begin to address; it is part of my day job. 
Pre-war, about 4-6 weeks in advance, the usual authoritative clearing houses (like the US' CISA and Canada's CCCS) were warning of a significant uptick in cyber attacks / reconnaissance.   This uptick has been sustained, but not materially increased, since the war started.  It is mostly or perhaps almost entirely directed at critical infrastructure.
I have worked in critical infrastructure, and the state of OT (Operational Technology, e.g., the tech that runs a pipeline) that I've seen is appalling - software so out of date that there are hundreds of known vulnerabilities, and no possibility of patching because it is attached to aged and non-replaceable hardware that can't take more modern software.  The only technical hope here is a hard shell around the OT and highly-segmented internal architectures to limit the spread of introduced malware.  I'm over-simplifying for discussion.
Then there was the successful Colonial Pipeline attack and others; I thought that the war would bring massive cyber-initiated infrastructure disruption, but it hasn't.  There have been a few impacts mostly located in Ukraine but some have spilled out (e.g., the Viasat KA-SAT communication network in Europe was hit Feb 24 and is still in trouble).
Post-war analysis will figure this out; my thoughts: people ignore security until something happens; many probing attacks by state and state-affiliated actors have generated, in the last few years, a sense that something is happening; budgets for cyber security as a result have been increasing; security on critical infrastructure is specifically monitored and promoted in major nations (e.g., the US' NERC CIP compliance regime for electricity generation); various agencies have developed strong cyber attack / counter-attack capability.  So critical infrastructure may be better protected than we all thought and/or the counter-attack capability is so strong, and so well communicated to our adversaries, that they are terrified of starting something (maybe).
Had state actors kept their powder dry and lulled the world into a false sense of security, I think things would have been different.
In addition, organizations globally have implemented breakneck-speed hardening programs since the war started.  For example, my organization is concerned about Russian and affiliated (e.g., Fancy Bear) attacks; the war has caused us to increase the rating of our threat model and we have taken many (exact number is classified) actions to protect our ability to deliver service to our customers, pausing other activities in an organization-wide effort.  Our attack surface and overall risk profile has significantly improved in the last six weeks (it was good before, now it's better).
Regarding cyber attacks on mil infrastructure, that's a different beast and I have no specific insight.  Civvy crit infrastructure is part of war, however, so worth diving into.
 
In the visible spectrum, agreed.  I wonder that other frequencies, passive and active, are available to UAVs and how well they get through leaves.

As much as I try to do minimal politics, if that team (Hilary and Co) was as aggressive about a Ukraine takeover as they were when Ambassador Stevens was killed, Putin could have personally flown to Kiev, shot the Ukraine president, sat on his chair, and nothing would have happened.
I think more likely the issue was a less-prepared / modernized Russian Army, or a lower sense of urgency, or both.