Combatintman

I'm with @The_Capt - it is a). in the same way that the strike on the training base in west Ukraine was a few days back, which many similarly interpreted as a bit of a waste of gucci ordnance.  I also wouldn't be too sold on the desperation angle either.  It could equally mean that the Russian political leadership still thinks it can win this so long as NATO stays out, hence sending a 'message.'

This expert made calculations for how many 'rounds' of artillery ammo Russian trucks can carry, a 'round' including both the shell and the accompanying charges. He calculated a six ton Ural can carry 40-50 152mm rounds, or some 80 122mm. That may help visualize the battlefield impact of a burnt-out truck wreck, assuming it was carrying ammo to your CM game. Also sobering to see that going from 122 to 152 has a 2x impact on the logistic tail.
 

Thank you!  This is the kind of breakdown I was looking for.  Most illuminating!

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

I don't know the answer to the whole question but if we go back to the Soviet era regimental artillery battalions and divisional artillery regiments.  Each battalion essentially had one truck allocated per firing system plus a couple spare.
2S1 Battalion had 6 x 2S1 and 6 x trucks (Ural-375) in each battery for a total of 18 x 2S1 and 18 x trucks.  There were another two on top of that for a total of 20 trucks (not counting small trucks like Gaz-66s, maintenance and POL trucks).
2S3 Battalion figures are the same 6 x 2S3 per battery and 6 x trucks for that same total of 18 x 2S3 and 18 x trucks plus two 'spare.'
BM21 Battalion figures are 6 x BM-21 per battery and 6 x trucks (bored yet  ) 18 x BM-21 in the battalion and (slight difference here) 36 x trucks in the battalion.  The extra 18 trucks, which is suspiciously similar to the number of launchers sit in the service battery, which the gun/howitzer battalions didn't have.
Taking a divisional artillery regiment alone then of 2 x 2S3 battalions and 1 x BM-21 battalion you are looking at 72 x trucks allocated for ammunition resupply.
For simplicity I have not counted the 36 trucks in the Regimental MT company because I don't know whether they would have been allocated to ammunition  resupply or not.
Now I have no idea how much 122mm or 152mm a Ural-375 can carry but there will be a gunner out there who can give some sort of answer.  I would hazard a minimum of two reloads and of course each 2S1 and 2S3 would have had a turret load of some description.  I think I'm on safer ground by saying that you'd get one BM-21 reload only on a Ural-375 and that seems to explain the presence of the service battery in that battalion to provide a second reload plus of course those that are already in the tube. 
Of course this is not the Soviet Army any more but the principle will be the same at the divisional level and below so one gun = 1 truck and 1 rocket launcher = two trucks for the big bangy bullety whizzbangy carrying malarkey.
 

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

I don't know the answer to the whole question but if we go back to the Soviet era regimental artillery battalions and divisional artillery regiments.  Each battalion essentially had one truck allocated per firing system plus a couple spare.
2S1 Battalion had 6 x 2S1 and 6 x trucks (Ural-375) in each battery for a total of 18 x 2S1 and 18 x trucks.  There were another two on top of that for a total of 20 trucks (not counting small trucks like Gaz-66s, maintenance and POL trucks).
2S3 Battalion figures are the same 6 x 2S3 per battery and 6 x trucks for that same total of 18 x 2S3 and 18 x trucks plus two 'spare.'
BM21 Battalion figures are 6 x BM-21 per battery and 6 x trucks (bored yet  ) 18 x BM-21 in the battalion and (slight difference here) 36 x trucks in the battalion.  The extra 18 trucks, which is suspiciously similar to the number of launchers sit in the service battery, which the gun/howitzer battalions didn't have.
Taking a divisional artillery regiment alone then of 2 x 2S3 battalions and 1 x BM-21 battalion you are looking at 72 x trucks allocated for ammunition resupply.
For simplicity I have not counted the 36 trucks in the Regimental MT company because I don't know whether they would have been allocated to ammunition  resupply or not.
Now I have no idea how much 122mm or 152mm a Ural-375 can carry but there will be a gunner out there who can give some sort of answer.  I would hazard a minimum of two reloads and of course each 2S1 and 2S3 would have had a turret load of some description.  I think I'm on safer ground by saying that you'd get one BM-21 reload only on a Ural-375 and that seems to explain the presence of the service battery in that battalion to provide a second reload plus of course those that are already in the tube. 
Of course this is not the Soviet Army any more but the principle will be the same at the divisional level and below so one gun = 1 truck and 1 rocket launcher = two trucks for the big bangy bullety whizzbangy carrying malarkey.
 

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

@kraze - five medals isn't 'that many medals' however ...

And I never shot anybody ... just got shot at a bit and blown up once.

Well for all those that moan about moving large numbers of vehicles down roads in CM as being a tedious and drawn out exercise at least now know that CMBS delivers hard core realism.

Well for all those that moan about moving large numbers of vehicles down roads in CM as being a tedious and drawn out exercise at least now know that CMBS delivers hard core realism.

Well for all those that moan about moving large numbers of vehicles down roads in CM as being a tedious and drawn out exercise at least now know that CMBS delivers hard core realism.

Suvorov's writings are at best debatable - in fact Glantz, who is reputable scholar of WW2 is very critical of Suvorov's writings about that war.  Others are, albeit less so, critical of his works on the Cold War era.  As an intelligence professional I certainly do not assess Suvorov as credible.  As to agents of the Carpathian Military District reporting every movement of Chieftains - a quick look at a map has to tell you that this is a dubious claim.  Image below shows the distance between the HQ of the Carpathian Military District and HQ 1 (BR) Corps.

 
That sort of data would more likely be tracked by fused IMINT and ground reporting by SOXMIS which reported to GSFG/WGF and not the Carpathian Military District.  In the case of the latter, I worked for seven  months at the desk in BAOR that monitored SOXMIS touring activity and I'll tell you for free that it could not and did not track 'every movement.'

Yes you brainwashed NATO imperialist fool ... 😉 I'll let that one stand for the sake of harmony but the targeting issue that you raise is certainly one that merits discussion.
Starting simplistically and I know I'm preaching to the converted so this is for the wider caucus - targeting, when done properly, should attack the centre of gravity which doctrinally is the thing from which the enemy derives strength.  It can be targeted directly or indirectly by stripping away key capabilities.  Personally I dislike the methodologies used to analyze this that are found in many Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace pamphlets and Military Decision Making Process pamphlets so my analysis is not according to the accepted templates but informed by the fact that I am a qualified targeteer.
Taking our contested 😉 AVLB as an example, it is only going to be candidate for the HPTL, JPTL if the enemy needs to cross a gap or lots of gaps to get from where they are to where they need to go.  This then set me thinking as to what the HPTL/JPTL for the Ukrainians might look like now for the battles around Kiev.  This 'operational pause' which seems to be marked by the Russians stonking the city leads me to an HPTL with artillery at the top, followed by fuel associated logistics then artillery associated logistics with HQs bringing up the rear.  Mind you I'm not dying in a ditch over it, the logs could actually be right at the top.  Going back to centres of gravity and key capabilities, it seems that the Russians are now favouring the employment of artillery in order to shape the subsequent assault by manoeuvre assets on the city by attrition.  By stripping away the guns and their ammunition you are denying that shape effect.  By attacking fuel-related logistics you limit the freedom of action of the manoeuvre assets and cause general headaches all round for the whole force and by targeting HQs you are disrupting the ability of the Russians to come up with a 'Plan B' as well as all the other coordination stuff that goes on in HQs - albeit this has been fairly lacking to date without too much outside interference ... hence why I put HQs further down the list.

Yes you brainwashed NATO imperialist fool ... 😉 I'll let that one stand for the sake of harmony but the targeting issue that you raise is certainly one that merits discussion.
Starting simplistically and I know I'm preaching to the converted so this is for the wider caucus - targeting, when done properly, should attack the centre of gravity which doctrinally is the thing from which the enemy derives strength.  It can be targeted directly or indirectly by stripping away key capabilities.  Personally I dislike the methodologies used to analyze this that are found in many Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace pamphlets and Military Decision Making Process pamphlets so my analysis is not according to the accepted templates but informed by the fact that I am a qualified targeteer.
Taking our contested 😉 AVLB as an example, it is only going to be candidate for the HPTL, JPTL if the enemy needs to cross a gap or lots of gaps to get from where they are to where they need to go.  This then set me thinking as to what the HPTL/JPTL for the Ukrainians might look like now for the battles around Kiev.  This 'operational pause' which seems to be marked by the Russians stonking the city leads me to an HPTL with artillery at the top, followed by fuel associated logistics then artillery associated logistics with HQs bringing up the rear.  Mind you I'm not dying in a ditch over it, the logs could actually be right at the top.  Going back to centres of gravity and key capabilities, it seems that the Russians are now favouring the employment of artillery in order to shape the subsequent assault by manoeuvre assets on the city by attrition.  By stripping away the guns and their ammunition you are denying that shape effect.  By attacking fuel-related logistics you limit the freedom of action of the manoeuvre assets and cause general headaches all round for the whole force and by targeting HQs you are disrupting the ability of the Russians to come up with a 'Plan B' as well as all the other coordination stuff that goes on in HQs - albeit this has been fairly lacking to date without too much outside interference ... hence why I put HQs further down the list.

Yes you brainwashed NATO imperialist fool ... 😉 I'll let that one stand for the sake of harmony but the targeting issue that you raise is certainly one that merits discussion.
Starting simplistically and I know I'm preaching to the converted so this is for the wider caucus - targeting, when done properly, should attack the centre of gravity which doctrinally is the thing from which the enemy derives strength.  It can be targeted directly or indirectly by stripping away key capabilities.  Personally I dislike the methodologies used to analyze this that are found in many Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace pamphlets and Military Decision Making Process pamphlets so my analysis is not according to the accepted templates but informed by the fact that I am a qualified targeteer.
Taking our contested 😉 AVLB as an example, it is only going to be candidate for the HPTL, JPTL if the enemy needs to cross a gap or lots of gaps to get from where they are to where they need to go.  This then set me thinking as to what the HPTL/JPTL for the Ukrainians might look like now for the battles around Kiev.  This 'operational pause' which seems to be marked by the Russians stonking the city leads me to an HPTL with artillery at the top, followed by fuel associated logistics then artillery associated logistics with HQs bringing up the rear.  Mind you I'm not dying in a ditch over it, the logs could actually be right at the top.  Going back to centres of gravity and key capabilities, it seems that the Russians are now favouring the employment of artillery in order to shape the subsequent assault by manoeuvre assets on the city by attrition.  By stripping away the guns and their ammunition you are denying that shape effect.  By attacking fuel-related logistics you limit the freedom of action of the manoeuvre assets and cause general headaches all round for the whole force and by targeting HQs you are disrupting the ability of the Russians to come up with a 'Plan B' as well as all the other coordination stuff that goes on in HQs - albeit this has been fairly lacking to date without too much outside interference ... hence why I put HQs further down the list.

Yes you brainwashed NATO imperialist fool ... 😉 I'll let that one stand for the sake of harmony but the targeting issue that you raise is certainly one that merits discussion.
Starting simplistically and I know I'm preaching to the converted so this is for the wider caucus - targeting, when done properly, should attack the centre of gravity which doctrinally is the thing from which the enemy derives strength.  It can be targeted directly or indirectly by stripping away key capabilities.  Personally I dislike the methodologies used to analyze this that are found in many Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace pamphlets and Military Decision Making Process pamphlets so my analysis is not according to the accepted templates but informed by the fact that I am a qualified targeteer.
Taking our contested 😉 AVLB as an example, it is only going to be candidate for the HPTL, JPTL if the enemy needs to cross a gap or lots of gaps to get from where they are to where they need to go.  This then set me thinking as to what the HPTL/JPTL for the Ukrainians might look like now for the battles around Kiev.  This 'operational pause' which seems to be marked by the Russians stonking the city leads me to an HPTL with artillery at the top, followed by fuel associated logistics then artillery associated logistics with HQs bringing up the rear.  Mind you I'm not dying in a ditch over it, the logs could actually be right at the top.  Going back to centres of gravity and key capabilities, it seems that the Russians are now favouring the employment of artillery in order to shape the subsequent assault by manoeuvre assets on the city by attrition.  By stripping away the guns and their ammunition you are denying that shape effect.  By attacking fuel-related logistics you limit the freedom of action of the manoeuvre assets and cause general headaches all round for the whole force and by targeting HQs you are disrupting the ability of the Russians to come up with a 'Plan B' as well as all the other coordination stuff that goes on in HQs - albeit this has been fairly lacking to date without too much outside interference ... hence why I put HQs further down the list.

Never used to be - in the Soviet era - tank laid bridges were regimental assets so I would see it as a brigade asset these days.

Well for all those that moan about moving large numbers of vehicles down roads in CM as being a tedious and drawn out exercise at least now know that CMBS delivers hard core realism.