Rokossovski

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Do you know what the biggest threat to Ukrainian civilians is? . . . Russians.

Color me confused.  Various factions of liars hammered out a deal to resolve this situation and everyone is taking whatever agreement as gospel.  Color me sceptical now.   How does anyone trust anyone to see this deal through?

We are at HQ. 7:30 in the morning. Under [our] control military object of Rostov including airfield, airplanes that [are supposed] take off for combat work are taking off normally [implies they do not block these airplanes], no problems, medical airplanes take off normally, no problems. All we did we took control so assault avitaion [helicopters] do not strike us but UKR only. Main HQ-main point of troops control works normally, there is no problems at all, not a signle officer is taken from his duties. So, when they say to you that PMC Wagner disrupted the work [of HQ] and because of that something at front lines collapsed - [no] something collapsed at frontline not because of that. When we came here we again confirmed [discovered confirmation] a lot of new [things] [he clearly misspoke, it supposed to be - a lot of old thing]. A lot of territory is lost, a 3-4 times more [RU] soldiers dead than it is reported to higher ups [implies Putin], and what is reported is 10 times les than they say on TV [clearly misspoke again], medical losses [losses from all causes] in some days up to 1000 men per day. This is KIA, WIA, MIA + refusniks who refuse not because they are cowards but because see no other exit from situation. There is no ammo, there is no control . Chief of General Staff ran away from here as soon as he heard that we were approaching the building [let a woman pass greeted armed man who I believe is RU soldier not Wagnerite. The soldier impolitely turns away, Pri slightly humiliated turn to camera]

Is there a way to do a poll on this forum software?
I propose
A actual Putin speaking sense, at least by Putin standards
B Badly done deep fake
C Recorded speech about fertilizer production or similar
 

it is the same video. Here are main points
Evkurov and Alekseyv are old farts who decide nothings Prig - they shoot at us, we down them and will down everybody you would send because you are hitting civilians. You just destroyed a bus with civilians. you have no conscience [looks like they talk about RU helicopter attacks. Everybody is calm, MOD guys are calm and curious] Evkurov [a bit confused] - it is first time i hear it and [inaudible - some thing like let us..interupted as Prig turns toward Alekseyev] Alekseyev [in hilariously theatrical way] - I am not going to talk to you! Prig [slightly confused and humiliated old man turn to Evkurov] We were talking using You [plural - respectable form] why we started using You [singular - not respectable form]. Why do you talk to me using You [singular]?  Evkurov [confused] Nobody talk [to you] like that. I say do not generalize. Do you talk [to me] using You [plural] Prig - Yes, I talk to you using You [plural] Evkurov - so if we say [inaudible] Prig nodes. Evkurov - Let's think what we should do Prig - One more time, we came here to get [saying a bit theatrical] a chief of general staff and Shoigu. While they are not here...  Alekseyev [theatrically joking] take/grab them [like saying they, people of RU MOD, do not need these two, so Prig is free to take them]  Prig - While they are not here, we stay here and [continue to] block Rostov Evkurov [absolutely calmly, softly and politely but bit confused]- then I would like to ask you to get your troops out [inaudible] Prig - No! No way. Guys will stay here.  Evkurov - We also from this point of view... Prig - We do interrupt you from controlling the troops [in the field] Evkurov - Yes, certainly you should not interrupt anybody from controlling the troops [inaudible] Prig [calmly] Guys are dying because you are pushing them to be meat  Evkurov pickups ringing phone while saying to Prig - This is a question... Prig - This is not rhetorical question, because you are pushing them to be meet... no ammo, no thinking, without any plans   Evkurov to phone - hallo, yes [listens a bit, then looks confused and cancels the call - looks like some jornos called him] Alekseyev [calmly] - the biggest thing that upsets me most [inaudible something like you give Kiev something to celebrate with champaign] Prig - Nothing to worry about Evkurov [calmly drinks hot tea as if they are at old farts gathering] Prig - party at Kiev with champaign happens when you abandon Izum, Lyman and everything else. That's when party at Kiev happens for a whole week. And we are not running away from anywhere [Says man who ran away from Bakhmut]. Tha't why we came here to stop the shame of the country we live in. This is first [I  wanted to say] Evkurov [a bit ashamed] - [iaudible] are you were at [or ours something] Prig - Certainly, Yes, for this we Evkurov - [iaudible] why questions [could be to us] Prig [getting agitated] - listen one more time, if we would talk in normal tone, we would not come here on tanks Somebody behind camera - [iaudible something about shells - you promised us shells] Evkurov - [iaudible something like - you think Shoigy and Gerasimov to blame?] Prig [satisfied] - Yes, absolutely right. We save Russia The whole performance remind me old farts from last coupe (GKCHP) in 1991. The old farts pretending they know what they are doing and serving as cover for Yetsin rise. 
 

and the long term damage to Russia's economy continues
Russia's central bank sounds alarms on the economy as the falling ruble and record labor shortage add inflationary pressures (yahoo.com)
 

Looks good
 
 

The thing you won’t hear much in the analysis of the Biden administration is how unlike previous administrations this one is on Russia. For starters, they figured out that Putin was going to invade Ukraine, decided that the US was going to support Kyiv and began relentlessly pushing European allies *in April* of 2021. Why different? It’s not just the level of pre-planning, it’s also that Biden uniquely among recent American presidents had absolutely zero misconceptions about VVP, the strategic understanding of what a fallen Ukraine would mean and what a policy guy I know calls “**** it” old man energy. He’s a 78 year old guy who isn’t trying to set up some post Presidential foundation or get rich or whatever. He is just doing Ukraine right with all the tools at his disposal. 
He’s certainly an older guy but if this is what old guys who trip on sandbags are like, I’ll take it.

Pentagon buys terminals and services from Starlink for Ukraine. That should stop any shenanigans from Musk (in this area...).
 

Oh I don't know. He has been good enough on his feet to arrange the destruction of the Russian military with only 4% of the US military budget, thoroughly pantsed the GOP on the debt limit fight and Americans 25 to 54 are working at their highest rate since 2001.
If that's not fit, I'll take more unfitness please.

Two thoughts:
(1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
(2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!

Two thoughts:
(1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
(2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!

Norman Friedman wrote a 2009 book, Network-Centric Warfare, tracing the idea back through naval examples, starting with the Royal Navy in WWI. A battleship admiral of 1900 could only affect the battle that he could see—maybe twelve miles—but once cruisers started carrying high-powered radios, the Admiralty could direct ships clear on the far side of the globe. By mid-WWII, air battles and antisubmarine operations are all about sensors and tactical data systems.
To your point: Friedman very much dislikes the term "network-centric warfare," and wishes instead that people had called it "picture-centric warfare." Talk about networks, and the issues immediately collapse into discussions of hardware and technical capabilities. Talking about a picture, now you can discuss the quality of your own picture, and you can plan to degrade your enemy's picture.

Two thoughts:
(1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
(2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!

On ISR as a force multiplier:

I generally think the term "force multiplier" itself is a bit suspect, because it presupposes reducing combat strength to a single value, and then affecting that value with modifiers, which is a gross simplification. A useful fiction, perhaps, but shrug.

As to the self-evident utility of ISR though, this (or any other enabler) were described by Clausewitz, in "Operating against a flank"
 
 
Essentially, any enabler doesn't actually achieve anything by itself. I can put myself on your flank, but if I can't actually do anything with that, I'm not achieving anything. If I have perfect ISR, but no means to prosecute that, all I've learnt is exactly how screwed I am.

So we are talking conventional peer (or near peer) warfare in this context.  How well it translates into unconventional conflict is a very big question.  One of the big issues we had in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan is that our entire ISR enterprise was built for this war and not those ones.  So we brought ISR designed to find an opponents center of gravity and tried to apply it to a COIN setting where centers of gravity are totally different.
ISIL also found out the hard way that if you fight in the manner we are built for, it is bad.  Now if we meet someone who fights like Ukraine, more distributed, hybrid and unconventionally, we could face similar challenges as we had against the Taliban.  The UA is a far more conventional force than the TB but I can see how future conflict may drive opponents deeper into the unconventional space because they have observed what happens in an fully illuminated fight.
On our end, we need to learn to fight in that entirely illuminated battlefield, first step will be to take a hard look at our structures, which were built and designed in WW2.  What we take from this conflict as anomaly and what is trend is probably the biggest unknown of this war. 

The RUSI report that was linked several pages ago (here) has a nice summary of what Ukraine did from 2014 to 2022 that helped them enormously (and sometimes inadvertently), as well as how both home grown and wester ISR helped them at the start.  I'm only partway into the report, but it's an excellent summary.  They're often more generous to the Russians than we tend to be here (and I think they're accurate), but they also highlight the major failings of the Russians very well.  One thing about what Ukraine did from 2014 to 2022 that I marvel at is that Russia had *exactly the same opportunity* and squandered it. Russia was on the opposite side of the lines the whole time and gained far less from the experience.

Two thoughts:
(1) The discussion of how the Ukrainians have leveraged Western (and presumably some home-grown) ISR information to overcome the Russian's advantage in traditional mass has reinforced my view that Putin's choice to try to consume Ukraine in two bites (2014, and then 2022) doomed his effort.
The 2014 attacks and subsequent low-boil conflict prompted the Ukrainians to improve and rethink their defenses, and it must have fostered close working relationships with Western intelligence services. Ukraine had almost eight years of conflict in the Donbass in which to field-test the use of Western ISR on the battlefield, to develop protocols for sharing that information up and down the chain, and for even low-level commanders to become accustomed to working with such information. I don't have any specific insight into how far along that process had advanced by February 2022, but the results suggest that the time was not wasted. The year-plus since that time would appear to have advanced the process further.
Western nations have a lot of ISR assets to share with allies, but absent the sort of relationships, protocols, and practical experience that Ukraine had years to develop after 2014, I'm not sure those assets could be put to such full use.
(2) I'm also wondering about the limits of Western ISR assets in less conventional conflicts (i.e., Afganistan, against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, etc.) or with partners with whom information sharing could be complicated by concerns about the penetration of the command structure by elements hostile to our efforts. A conflict such as this one in Ukraine could be a best-case scenario for the power of ISR, much as the 1991 Gulf War could be seen as a best-case scenario for air power. In short, I'm wondering if we should be on guard against expecting its evident importance in this conflict as necessarily translating into it being quite so central in future conflicts that have different contours.
Side note: I haven't chimed in for several months on this mega-thread, but I've been following it closely. I really appreciate the great analysis folks from around the world and from so many backgrounds have been contributing. Thank you!

Perhaps the lack of “live” patronage is simply related to men who fear being “snatched” as it were in those places just resorting to “safer” modes of entertainment?