Impenetrable bocage.

[James Crowley]

I'm enjoying CMBN hugely but one area that I am not entirely comfortable with is the 'nothing, without exception nor under any circumstances, can get through any type of bocage without blasting through'.

I fully understand the need to create a claustrophobic battlefield where it is difficult to see and maneouver and where access is very restricted. Which the bocage country in Normandy was. But having what amounts to 'force fields' seems too severe a solution to apply in blanket fashion, IMO.

'Tall' bocage was undoubtedly a formidable obstacle to both tanks and infantry. Sherman tanks, it would seem, found it close to impossible to traverse them, so not allowing them to go through bocage in the game is a reasonable restriction. However British Churchill tanks certainly did clamber over 'tall' bocage on many occaisions and I don't believe that Commonwealth vehicles made use of 'cullin-type' devices at all. So will this allow a change in the first module?

Infantry also found them extremely hard going but I think I preferred the CMx1solution which, if memory serves, allowed infantry to go through but hung them up for several minutes, exposing them to fire and not allowing them to fire back. This course allows the player to take a much slower and riskier route but at least to have the option. After all, these were trained soldiers not girl guides on a berry picking outing; they would get through eventually and certainly within the time frame of the game.

My biggest gripe though is with so called low bocage. This is given as a 'chest high' obstacle - so, 4 to 5 feet at most.

Whilst this may well have been an impediment to tanks, I really cannot see that they would present the 'force field' that they do. Tanks were, after all, designed to traverse such obstacles and, if there was no other way, I believe that they should be able to do so.

Like wise, if not more so, with infantry, who were trained to straddle and overcome barbed wire obstacles. There is nothing as silly as having a bunch of infantry totally stuck in a field for thirty minutes because they have no breach team and are surrounded by low bocage or face instant death going through a targeted gate. They would get through one way or another.

I know there has been lots of posts on this subject but I am hoping there is perhaps some room for revision.

[dieseltaylor]

Tall' bocage was undoubtedly a formidable obstacle to both tanks and infantry. Sherman tanks, it would seem, found it close to impossible to traverse them, so not allowing them to go through bocage in the game is a reasonable restriction. However British Churchill tanks certainly did clamber over 'tall' bocage on many occaisions and I don't believe that Commonwealth vehicles made use of 'cullin-type' devices at all. So will this allow a change in the first module?

Source? I am a great fan of the Churchill but have never read any particular exploits in the bocage. Well I do recall some Crocodiles going into laager and flaming the field perimeter before bedding down. AFAIR they netted 45 prisoners.

And probably of all tanks the Churchill would have been most capable of clambering over. The downside of any clambering over is when the equilibrium changes and the front end comes crashing down being no fun for tank or crew. However my feelings on bocage, research, and feelings about the "plow" are long standing and written up in the Archive a few times : )

BTW I thought the British sector was reasonably free of bocage. However going for the Falais Pocket may have provided opportunity.

[Broadsword56]

Some good points here. People can debate whether this problem is the fault of the game, but I feel strongly that its largely a function of the mapping. Bocage fighting can make a great game, but only if the maps are done carefully and in the right way. I'm seeing maps where fields are totally enclosed by bocage and have no entrances or exits -- something that would be impossible on a real farm. I've noticed some glaring differences between some of the original CMBN maps that handle bocage very well (Huzzar) and some others -- especially QB ones -- that do it so badly that it has a seriously distorting effect on play. But, fortunately, CMBN has great editors and is moddable, so we the players will have to step up with more good maps of our own. Some of the most talented mappers have provided good advice on the forum. My favorite tip is: Every landscape has a story. Forget about the wargame and just stop and really look at the landscape. Think about WHY a particular feature would be there, and what role it would have played. Make maps of real places. Or, if you don't want to go that far, then at least look closely at the real places to understand how they look and work.

[James Crowley]

Source? I am a great fan of the Churchill but have never read any particular exploits in the bocage. Well I do recall some Crocodiles going into laager and flaming the field perimeter before bedding down. AFAIR they netted 45 prisoners.

And probably of all tanks the Churchill would have been most capable of clambering over. The downside of any clambering over is when the equilibrium changes and the front end comes crashing down being no fun for tank or crew. However my feelings on bocage, research, and feelings about the "plow" are long standing and written up in the Archive a few times : )

BTW I thought the British sector was reasonably free of bocage. However going for the Falais Pocket may have provided opportunity.

One example is the battle of Caumont, 30 July and enshrined in the Cuneo painting.

The 'steeple chase' of the Coldstream Guards. In the words of Sir Mark Millbank, who commanded the No2 Squadron:

"The high banks, surmounted with scrub, made a cross country ride remarkably uncomfortable. One climbed slowly up the face of a bank, balanced precariously on the top, then warned the occupants to 'hold tight' as one launched forth down the other side. in several tanks, men were knocked senseless by the battering"

Not just a few tanks but a whole Regiment.

[SteveP]

Sherman tanks could apparently traverse most low hedgerows, though probably at some risk. However, there is no reason why the Germans would have chosen such vulnerable locations for defense. The Germans defended the high hedgerow areas.

Infantry could cut openings in the hedgerows, but presumably they could do this only where they weren't under fire while doing it. The infantry had to proceed cautiously next to hedgerows because the Germans would drop mortar fire on them if they did anything to draw attention to themselves.

Infantry advanced into defended bocage fields thru existing openings -- the same ones that the farmers used. There is no evidence that the Americans ever used explosives to create openings for infantry -- only for tanks, after they figured out how to do that. Demolition work was generally slow and dangerous, and was only done when the engineers could be given a lot of protection with suppressive fire.

IMHO, the biggest problem with the hedgerows in the game is that they do not give enough concealment/cover to the defenders. However, it is possible to come acceptably close.

[xian]

IMHO, the biggest problem with the hedgerows in the game is that they do not give enough concealment/cover to the defenders. However, it is possible to come acceptably close.

Really?! Bocage is probably the best protection in the game.

[YankeeDog]

One example is the battle of Caumont, 30 July and enshrined in the Cuneo painting.

The 'steeple chase' of the Coldstream Guards. In the words of Sir Mark Millbank, who commanded the No2 Squadron:

"The high banks, surmounted with scrub, made a cross country ride remarkably uncomfortable. One climbed slowly up the face of a bank, balanced precariously on the top, then warned the occupants to 'hold tight' as one launched forth down the other side. in several tanks, men were knocked senseless by the battering"

Not just a few tanks but a whole Regiment.

Ya, actually I think most tanks, including Shermans, at least sometimes in some locations *could* climb over the Bocage IRL. But as your quote implies, doing so was hard on the vehicle, hard on the crew, and the vehicle was dangerously exposed on whilst climbing over the bocage.

The questions is how to handle this in the context of a lower-level tactical game like CM... BFC has chosen to make "bocage" impenetrable to any unit, which I can live with because I think, in general, tankers would probably be very reluctant to take the risk, especially when in close contact with the enemy. At the least, the development of American tactics and technology for bocage fighting suggests that simply climbing over with tanks was not considered an acceptable option, even if it was sometimes technically possible.

I do agree with Broadsword's comments that long sections of bocage without at least occasional infantry passages are probably not realistic. And most fields would probably have at least one larger opening for wagons etc. to get through. It's also valid, I think, to place occasional breaks of hedge along the bocage, representing weaker sections that could be breached by a tank, or climbed through by infantry with a little effort.

[altipueri]

Parts of Devon and Cornwall in England have sunken roads and small fields very much like bocage country.

I was down that way last week and it really is claustrophobic with the hedge towering several feet over your head on either side. The idea of a hedge being something soft you could jump in quickly for cover strikes me as pretty unlikely too. These are thick banks of earth, stones, trees and shrubs. If you got caught in the road you couldn't get out the way quickly.

Next time I should take some photos, I should have done so in Normandy a couple of years ago.

It's brilliant for defenders; and I seem to recall reading about the Germans having multiple prepared MG positions. Fire from one for a bit then scamper off behind the hedge and fire again from a hundred yards away, then back again.

It must have been awful trying to assault it. Basically lead guy walks forward until he is shot at from who knows where. The chance of spotting someone hiding must have been close to nil.

[rune]

If you read this, even the Churchills admit nothing other then themselves would be able to cross where they did. i quote:

"After landing in Normandy we were encamped for a week at a small village, some four miles East of BAYEUX, named ESQUAY-SUR-SEULLES. At about 7.30 in the evening o Friday July 28th we were ordered to move at once South-West to the neighbourhood of ST. HONORINE DE DUCY - a village four miles North of the town of CAUMONT (7059). We were not expecting this, being at no particular notice to move, but by 9 o’clock we were off, in two separate columns, one of tracked and one of wheeled vehicles, on a difficult cross-country night march of 23 miles. It was not until two hours after daybreak that we finally reached our harbour area, which consisted of a couple of very dusty cornfields on a rather exposed slope (705648). Sherman tanks of the 11th ARMOURED DIVISION, passing through us, covered everything with thick white dust as we dug pits, washed and ate. Then we got down to some rest, which was somewhat disturbed by intermittent shelling.

Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer had been to get orders. We were to make a break-through South of CAUMONT on the following day to enable the armour to break out of the bridgehead.

CAUMONT stands upon the crest of a ridge 750 feet high which runs for two miles from East to West. From the summit one looks across five miles of small fields, orchards and copses to another ridge which runs up from South-East to North-West and culminates in two summits of over a thousand feet each. A Northern spur of this ridge forms a separate summit of 850 feet between the two. Radiating from CAUMONT two roads strike across this country - the one South-East to AUNAY-SUR-ODON (5182), and the other South-West to ST. MARTIN-DES-BESACES (6750) and VIRE (6331), each dominated by one of the summits of this Southern Ridge. The angle enclosed by these roads however is intersected only by cart tracks between high banks, crowned with hedgerows and sunken lanes. It is a country such as no vehicle but a CHURCHILL tank could hope to cross. (Bolded by Rune)

Briefly the plan was for the 15th SCOTTISH DIVISION to thrust through this triangle of “bocage” and seize the Southern heights, thus enabling the 11th ARMOURED and GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISIONS on our right to push down the road towards VIRE. The 43rd (WESSEX) DIVISION was to conform as far as possible in the difficult country to our left.

15th SCOTTISH DIVISION’s attack was to be made by 227th (H) BRIGADE with 6th GUARDS TANK BRIGADE in support, and these Brigades were to move up that evening to the reverse slope of the CAUMONT ridge. The following morning 2nd GORDONS, with a squadron of GRENADIER tanks, were to strike South-East, after some preliminary air bombardment, and clear a strong enemy position in LUTAIN WOOD (7158). Half an hour later the remainder of the GRENADIERS, together with 9th CAMERONIANS were to clear the hamlets of LE BOURG (7058) and SEPT VENTS (6957) on our right, in order to free the other road for 10th HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY and 4th COLDSTREAM GAURDS to advance towards ST. MARTIN-DES-BESACES. Meanwhile, in the centre, we were to advance due South through the “Bocage” in support of 2nd ARGYLL and SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS and, at about 11 o’clock, to attack the first slopes of the further ridge close to the village of LES LOGES (7054). From here, if all went well, we could push on still further with 7th SEAFORTHS (lent by 46th (H) BRIGADE) to the most westerly of the summits on the ridge ahead (Point 309). For the first phase of this attack we were to have the advantage of an air-burst barrage moving at the rate of a hundred yards every four minutes.

Of the enemy little was known and it was impossible to identify his position in the close “bocage” of the valley. One Field Division - No. 361 - was believed to be opposite to us, two “regiments” (i.e. brigades) up, and the 2nd PANZER DIVISION within easy reach. We expected to find a mine-field in LE BOURG and Anti-Tank defences in all roads and lanes.

We moved off in the evening of the 29th and harboured in some steep fields under the CAUMONT ridge and just East of the town. (The precise spot is beautifully illustrated in a double-page photograph in “The Illustrated London News” of August 12th). The night was warm and quiet too, except for our own guns; but at dawn some shelling and mortaring of the valley behind us made things uncomfortable for the infantry and eventually the ARGYLLS moved close up under cover of the ridge.

The attack on LUTAIN WOOD proceeded slowly and it was nearly 7.15 before we crossed our Start Line and began to descent the forward slope of the ridge. As we advanced, with Right Flank on the right and ‘S’ Squadron on the left, we encountered heavy fire from 15cm guns and 12 cm mortars. For the next quarter of a mile the strength of the enemy positions between LE BOURG and LUTAIN WOOD made fast progress impossible and at one time time Right Flank were deflected to support a Company of the 2nd GORDONS into the Western edge of the wood. At half-past nine we were still fighting in the LE BOURG-LUTAIN WOOD area and it became clear that unless we hurried the pace we should miss the barrage for the main attack. The Commanding Officer therefore ordered the tanks to move forward as fast as possible in spite of the opposition. This they did, dealing successfully with numerous enemy pockets on the way: but the result was that we outstripped the ARGYLLs who were unable to keep up over the rough ground.

By 12.15 we had advanced well over a mile, killing many Germans with Besa and HE fire and causing a considerable number to surrender. But we were now so far ahead of the ARGYLLs that we were ordered to halt and wait for them to catch up. During this halt ‘S’ Squadron were worried by sniping from various cottages but Lieutenant HUMBLE and Lieutenant CUNNINGHAM silenced this with HE and later a number of corpses were found in the buildings. By 1.15. it was apparent that the infantry were so far behind that if we waited longer for them the chance of benefitting from the barrage and gaining the ridge without undue opposition would be gone. The Commanding Officer therefore obtained permission for us to push on with all speed alone. Moving with remarkable rapidity ‘S’ Squadron reached the left slope of the feature with has been described as forming a separate summit at 2.30 p.m. Right Flank, unable to pass through the village of LES LOGES without infantry support, were forced to turn left and follow them. The position was consolidated by 2.30 with Right Flank on the right, ‘S’ Squadron on the left and Left Flank in support. We were now ready to go on to Point 309 - the final objective; but permission to do so was refused and at about the same time, information was received that the attack upon our right had succeeded and that infantry mounted upon tanks were to be passed up the VIRE road to secure this hill. About the fortunes of the 43rd DIVISION on our left nothing was known and it was impossible to reconnoitre in that direction since CHURCHILLs were the only vehicle which had succeeded in crossing the rough ground.

Meanwhile the point which we occupied was a full four miles as the crow flies into enemy territory. If it was lost the door which had been opened towards ST. MARTIN-DES-BESACES would be closed again. An immediate German counter-attack, with Armour, was therefore to be expected and until such time as the infantry could get up with some Anti-Tank guns there was no question of our being able to withdraw. Unfortunately the position was so exposed to shell and mortar fire that the ARGYLLs were reluctant to come up further than the village of LES LOGES; so there was nothing to be done but remain where we were.

About 6 o’clock, just when the BBC News of the battle was coming over the air, the Germans put down a very heavy “stonk” hitting Captain BEESON’s tank twice - the second time killing him as he got out to rescue his wounded hull gunner. Five minutes later the long-awaited counter-attack arrived - but from an entirely unexpected direction. It began with a hail of armour-piercing shot from the depths of a thick wood some 300 yards to the left rear - an area which according to plan should by now have been cleared by the 43rd DIVISION. They were, alas, far behind.

The first three shots knocked out the whole of Lieutenant CUNNINGHAM’s troop, the guardians of that flank, thus clearing a path for the enemy attack. The force consisted of three enormous SP guns - Germany’s latest and most formidable, the JAGD PANTHER, until then never seen by the British in action. Two of these monsters, covered by a third, charged through the gap into the center of ‘S’ Squadron and then slipped out of sight over the ridge to the left front, leaving eight more flaming hulks in their wake. Their approach had been masterly, covered from the supporting squadron (Left Flank) by a cottage and some thick hedge; but they were engaged going over the hill and not without effect: for some time later, two of them were found, a few hundred yards away, their tracks leading back to the scene of the action. The hit on one, which was burnt out, approximated closely to a claim by Lieutenant BANKES’ tank.

Though over in perhaps five minutes, this counter-blow was a heavy one; the more so since Major CUTHBERT, the Second-in-Command, had chosen that moment to move over to look at the Left Flank. He must have met the enemy head-on, the tank being penetrated through its heaviest frontal armour, the ammuntion exploding and the turret leaping clean off.

At about half-past seven our own SP guns were at last got into position and at about 10 p.m. we were able to withdraw from the ridge to a “Forward Rally” near a burning cottage at the Eastern extremity of LES LOGES. We had been for nearly seven hours upon the ridge after a long and bloody attack following two almost sleepless nights. As we moved back in the dark to find a harbour area we fell in by good luck with Major Sir Charles MACLEAN and ‘A’ Echelon and turned aside into the nearest field. The cooks had a hot meal ready for us as soon as we had filled up with petrol, but most men were too tired to eat.

Speaking nearly a year later of this battle, the Commander of the 2nd ARMY, Lieutenant General DEMPSEY, described it as one of the most important in the whole war: he considered that after it had been fought a victorious end to the campaign was a certainty and was only a matter of time. It is known that our attack wiped out a complete “Regiment” - or Brigade as we should call it - of three battalions belonging to the 361st DIVISION. The enemy did not apparently suspect that tanks could be employed in such country. Unsupported by Anti-Tank guns, they were completely demoralised by the CHURCHILLs’ fire power and offered little or no opposition to the infantry following up. Our own heavy tank casualties emphasised the lack of some form of reconnaissance vehicle that can keep up with CHURCHILLs over bad going. "

Rune

[SteveP]

I do agree with Broadsword's comments that long sections of bocage without at least occasional infantry passages are probably not realistic. And most fields would probably have at least one larger opening for wagons etc. to get through. It's also valid, I think, to place occasional breaks of hedge along the bocage, representing weaker sections that could be breached by a tank, or climbed through by infantry with a little effort.

I suppose people who design scenarios will differ on the objective. It seems to me that sections of bocage hedgerows that were more accommodating to the attacker would not have been defended by the Germans. Or they would have been defended with deep mine fields or something else that compensated (usually too expensive in CMBN). I can understand how players prefer to have more options for attacking thru the hedgerows, but I question the supposition that this makes the map more realistic as a tactical problem.

[SteveP]

Really?! Bocage is probably the best protection in the game.

I wasn't comparing them to other defensive options in the game (and I suspect that other defensive options are pretty weak). I was comparing them to what the hedgerows were like IRL. The Germans were able to dig into the hedgerow foundations and create something akin to thick walls in which they were virtually invisible. The attacker had to fire blindly into the defenses because they couldn't see where anyone was (the Germans helped by always putting their MGs in the corners, but that was about it).

Later, when the Americans figured out how to successfully attack a defended bocage field, they had to follow up with hunting parties to search for Germans still hidden in the bypassed hedgerows.

In CMBN, you can spot anyone behind a hedgerow within about 30 seconds if you are within 150m of them (haven't checked this in 1.01, btw, but it's probably the same). You can also kill anything there with 60mm mortar fire, and most small arms at a decent range. Thru most of June, sniper fire was reported to kill up to 50% of an attacking force, but snipers are easily spotted once they open up in CMBN. Etc. Etc.

I think what we get in CMBN (especially in many scenarios and QB maps) is something closer to the hedgerows that the Americans trained to fight in, in England, and which they expected to find in Normandy. It was a real shock to discover what the Normandy hedgerows were really like.

[Broadsword56]

Yes, as much of a raving fan of CMBN as I am, I must admit the unrealistically weak hedgerow defensive effects are a significant disappointment in the game -- because they affect the tactics and the gameplay so fundamentally.

Is there, or could there be any fix coming for this one day? Or does BFC consider them fine as they are? Or is the problem recognized, but is just a limitation of the CMx2 engine that we'll all have to live with for the forseeable future?

[Fuser]

As an amateur scenario designer, I have to be really careful with bocage. It´s kind of gamey to fill the map with bocage (yes, I know, Normandy was full of it) as it works as kilometres long trenches for the defender. So I have tried not to use it, since as a player I was annoyed by the tremendous concealment and defense it provides. Even a sharpshooter behind bocage can keep your Shermans firing for two or three turns....you see the shells landing one meter away from him, and he stills stands up and ...shoots.

[jambai]

Yeah nerf bocage so annoying. Though I can imagine the RL commanders didn't like it that much either

[Praetori]

The only thing that REALLY bugs me is that engineers proceed to the next waypoint after a blast/breach command which often gets them killed for no good reason.

It's not a problem in RT but when playing turn-based it's a real showstopper.

[Blackcat]

The only thing that REALLY bugs me is that engineers proceed to the next waypoint after a blast/breach command which often gets them killed for no good reason.

It's not a problem in RT but when playing turn-based it's a real showstopper.

Place the blast point on the friendly side of the hedge then give them a quick move order away from the breach. The engineers will then not go through the gap.

[JSB]

[Praetori]

Place the blast point on the friendly side of the hedge then give them a quick move order away from the breach. The engineers will then not go through the gap.

I think I know what you're getting at. I've tried it a couple of times in CMSF to no good effect but I'll try again. tnx

[Blackcat]

I think I know what you're getting at. I've tried it a couple of times in CMSF to no good effect but I'll try again. tnx

I never got the hang of it in CMSF either, but a couple of months back someone, and I am ashamed to say I can't remember who, posted specific instructions on here and they work like a charm.

Essentially, give your engineers a waypoint exactly one action spot away from the bocage that you want to blow. Then give the bast order to the friendlly side of the bocage (i.e. in the adjacent action spot) then give them a quick move order away from that spot. Press "go" and, voila, you have a neat hole and a safe team of engineers back under cover.

[womble]

I never got the hang of it in CMSF either, but a couple of months back someone, and I am ashamed to say I can't remember who, posted specific instructions on here and they work like a charm.

Essentially, give your engineers a waypoint exactly one action spot away from the bocage that you want to blow. Then give the bast order to the friendlly side of the bocage (i.e. in the adjacent action spot) then give them a quick move order away from that spot. Press "go" and, voila, you have a neat hole and a safe team of engineers back under cover.

It also seems to help get the hole in the right place if you can arrange to have the Blast move approach the obstacle from 90degrees. Can help avoid confusing the Blasters if they've got two potential things to blow (e.g. you want to go into the farmouse, not out through the farmyard wall).

[DavidFields]

I never got the hang of it in CMSF either, but a couple of months back someone, and I am ashamed to say I can't remember who, posted specific instructions on here and they work like a charm.

Essentially, give your engineers a waypoint exactly one action spot away from the bocage that you want to blow. Then give the bast order to the friendlly side of the bocage (i.e. in the adjacent action spot) then give them a quick move order away from that spot. Press "go" and, voila, you have a neat hole and a safe team of engineers back under cover.

Thanks, I will have to try this. Somehow, I had it in my mind that the blast point was supposed to be on the far side of the bocage.

[General Lee Irked]

Thanks, I will have to try this. Somehow, I had it in my mind that the blast point was supposed to be on the far side of the bocage.

My memory which is sketchy at best... seems to remember the manual/tutorial telling me to place charges on the far side of the bocage.

But what do I know...

I cant even remember if I have washed my hair in the shower.

Cheers

[Michael Emrys]

I cant even remember if I have washed my hair in the shower.

At last! Someone more senile that I am!

(Actually, there is someone in the Peng Challenge Thread, whom I won't name here [but whose name begins with 'S'], who is far more mentally decrepit than both of us put together.)

Michael

[sburke]

I do agree with Broadsword's comments that long sections of bocage without at least occasional infantry passages are probably not realistic. And most fields would probably have at least one larger opening for wagons etc. to get through. It's also valid, I think, to place occasional breaks of hedge along the bocage, representing weaker sections that could be breached by a tank, or climbed through by infantry with a little effort.

As one currently engaged in a PBEM with Broadsword that I think might be on one of the maps referred to, I would have to agree. There are a few fields on the map that are completely sealed in. Both the Germans and the Allies are required to purchase engineers in order to take advantage of that space. For the Allies it becomes more difficult as you have to buy them or find your self limited to a few chokepoints. I suspect (though I don't know for sure yet) my opponent likely had to buy quite a few engineers. It may be that the author intended that, but in a QB setup that is kind of a skewed perspective. It will be interesting after the fact to see what impact that had on play balance.

It is one thing to struggle with terrain layout to build a credible defense/offense. For those really into the immersion factor however one of the aspects of the new quick battle configuration we anticipated was a much better map selection than in CMx1. While they are definitely better, I think we are spoiled on how good they could be. Time and map makers will provide that.

*edit - What was the expression you used Broadsword - Spatial Humanities?

As to whether the Hedgerows are weaker than expected for defense. I am not sure I agree yet. Will have more commentary after we finish our current PBEM. How's that for psyops Broadsword? (says the guy who just lost an StuG when not realizing the action point I just set it to hunt to was on the OTHER side of the hedgerow..sigh.)

[sburke]

Yes, as much of a raving fan of CMBN as I am, I must admit the unrealistically weak hedgerow defensive effects are a significant disappointment in the game -- because they affect the tactics and the gameplay so fundamentally.

Is there, or could there be any fix coming for this one day? Or does BFC consider them fine as they are? Or is the problem recognized, but is just a limitation of the CMx2 engine that we'll all have to live with for the forseeable future?

I am under opsec regulations at the moment ( ), but I suspect that part of the perceived weakness of hederows is tactical. It might help this discussion if we delved into exactly how the Germans used the hedgerows. Not saying I know, but from what I have read it wasn't simply that they just dug in. If that theory is correct then the next question is can we emulate that behavior in CM. I have my own pet theory and am trying to apply it, but it is too early to say if it is effective.