Couple new CMBN videos cropping up....

[Sivodsi]

Since the vehicles were in a zone designated as a British responsibility, XIX TAC sat back "disconsolately" while 2 TAF launched a series of strikes that claimed almost 3,000 vehicles damaged or destroyed. On August 19, one Spitfire wing put in a claim for 500 vehicles destroyed or damaged in a single day; that same day, another Spitfire wing claimed 700.

Entertaining! How many vehicles did the Germans actually have in Normandy?

[dieseltaylor]

Soft-skins are one thing armour another. Anyway lets look at flyboy overclaims and this taken from The Dupuy Institute thread and the bits I have quoted from Chris Lawrence

The Bruno Meyer Story This story was first published by Hans Seidemann (VIII Air Corps commander at Kursk) in 1947 as part of his write-up he did for the US Army on air operations at Kursk.

It this story, he clearly identifies the time and date (afternoon of July 8), the location ("from the woods east of GOSTCHEVO station"), the unit ("4th Group/9th Antitank Ground Attack Wing"), the German air response ("in a short time, they were on their way to meet the enemy force"), the duration of the battle("after about one hour") and the result ("approximately 40 tanks had been knocked out") and its effect ("the remainder of the enemy force discontinued the attack and turned around"). Furthermore, he identifies elsewhere the strength of the antitank unit as 60 planes.

This story has the advantage of being specific enough that one can acually compare it to the opposing side's records (unlike most war stories).

There is some other confirming evidence for it in the German records. Primarily there is a claim in the VIII Air Corps records that they destroyed 84 tanks on the 8th, including 11 burned and damaged 21 tanks on July 8 and the comment for that day that the "The initial action by the antitank aircraft squadron was quite effective. Given the number of burning [enemy] tanks reported, it must be assumed that there was an even greater number that were just knocked out (more than 6 hits reported), Especially in the late afternoon attack from the northeast against SS Reich and the evening tank battle, the Russians were stopped and driven back."

The VIII Air Corps also reports the loss of two Hs-129s on this day.

against

The Soviet losses The 26th Tank Brigade as of 0700 July 8th has 26 T-34s and 15 T-70s. The attack also included one regiment from the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade, which may have included up to 20 Bren Gun Carriers. It was also supported by infantry from a Rifle Division.

The Corps reported losing 8 T-34s and 3 T-70s for the day, with effectively only two of its brigades engaged. The 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 July 10 reported having 22 T-34s and 12 T-70s. The Corps reports only losing Churchills on the 9th. From 0700 on the 8th to 0700 on the 10th, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline in ready-for action tanks of 4 T-34s and 3 T-70s, while the 4th Guards Tank Brigade shows a decline of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade's strength actually increases during this time. The Corps did have a coprs reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s located in Bubnovo on the 8th. This unit is no longer mentioned and may have been used on the 10th or 11th.

As the 4th Guards Tank Brigade clearly took casualties, this all points to the actual losses of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade being around nine tanks. Assuming that some were lost to German armor, antitank guns and infantry (both during the attack and during the German counterattack) then it would appear that the claim by the VIII Air Corps of "more than 6 hits" may in fact be high. The claim of 40 tanks killed appears to be off by an order of magnitude.

Just for fun Glantz is quoted:

The actual passage in Glantz states (page 135):

quote:

Burdeiny's 2nd Guards Tank Corps fared little better. It jumped off at 1200 hours, and after limited progress suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment, losing 50 tanks in the process. German aerial reconnaissance had detected Burdeiny's concentration of armor, and four squadrons of Henschel HS-109 aircraft, specially equipped with 30mm automatic cannon for antitank missions, broke up the Soviet attack, perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland. This unprecedented action, in which a tank attack was halted by air power alone, set a dangerous precedent. Indeed, throughout the battle, Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such lossees. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration.

Now, I have a number of problems with this passage....

1. They did not loose 50 tanks. The Corps probably lost as reported 11 tanks on this day.

2. I do not have confirmation as to whether the AT Air Group had 4 or 5 squadrons.

3. The planes were Hs-129s, vice HS-109s.

4. Not sure of the details about "perforating the thin overhead armor of the tanks and leaving a hideous, burning wasteland."

5. The actual description of the operations from the 2nd Gds Tank Corps operational report 182, 0700 July 9, 1943 (page Fond: 2nd Guards Tank Corps, Opis: 1, Delo: 32, Page: 187):

"26th Guards Tank Brigade cross the Lipovyi Donets at 1200 in the area of Visloye, along with 1 regiment/4th Gds Motorized Brigade and 89th Gds Rifle Division, attacked height 209.5. The brigade, despite heavy enemy fire, together with 89th Gds Rifle Division, took height 209.5, after which the enemy launched armored counterattacks, supported by aircraft in groups of 40-50 planes. 89th Gds Rifle Division fell back on Visloye and after an hour 26th Gds Tank Brigade's tanks, having taken losses, fell back on the eastern slopes of height 209.5, where they consolidated and continued to fight the enemy.

At 1800 on July 8 26th Gds Tank Brigade attacked height 209.5 for the second time, but was unsuccesful."

The SS records support this account. Therefore, I must take exception with the conclusion that "a tank attack was halted by air power alone".

Furthermore, this statement about halting a tank attack with air power alone is contradicted by Glantz in his second sentence where he states "suffered an unmerciful beating from German aircraft and Totenkopf's panzer regiment"

6. For number of reasons, I disagree with the conclusion that this "set a dangerous precedent." and that "Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night to minimize such losses. This in turn delayed the arrival of reserves to block the German penetration."

The thread is worth reading at TDI. Perhaps the final comment:

Niklas Zetterling

Senior Member

If we judge from the data on Normandy and the Ardennes, we can say that claims were about 10 times above reality. If German air crews were only 2 times off reality, then the performed substantially better in this respect. However, this is something that would warrant an explanation. Perhaps they did report more accurately, but 5 times better seems a little bit hard to swallow.

In any case, the shortage of hard data will make our assumption close to speculation.

[dieseltaylor]

Also at TDI blue on blue air attacks are discussed and listed in detail. Here is the preamble:

British Operations Research has been public for some time and even without a complete sample it is safe to say that unguided air weapons

were very inaccurate by today's standards. It also seems clear that the Germans sometimes tried to exaggerate the results of Allied air attacks

to justify defeat, hide their own mistakes, and downplay psychological effects like German panzer troops running away from perfectly good

tanks when Allied fighter-bombers appeared. We can be sure that was not advertised by Herr Goebbels.

Nevertheless, after looking into the damages caused by friendly fire, I found that a fair number of Allied tanks were brewed up by Allied

fighter-bombers, so I would say that German panzer and panzer grenadier forces had good reason to fear air attack. Even when no hits were scored airstrikes could easily disrupt ground operations and cause panic, and this is confirmed by some of the friendly fire accidents recorded in assorted specialist publications

and unit histories of the Allied ground forces...

Here is a sample

8 June 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked the 175th Infantry Regiment, US 29th Division

on the Isigny Highway, causing 24 casualties. Balkoski, p.169.

10 July 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked the 4th Dorsets, 43rd Wessex Division

during a battle for Hill 112 in the Odon. At least two men were

seriously wounded. Saunders, p.118.

31 July 1944

At about 1845 hrs RAF Typhoons rocketed the staging area of the

Grenadier Guards (British Guards Armoured Division). Nicolson

& Forbes vol.I, p.82.

31 July 1944

At 2200 hrs RAF Typhoons attacked the Grenadier Guards for

the second time. As 1st Squadron tanks neared the objective, the

Typhoons dropped sixteen bombs on them, followed by eight

aircraft firing rockets. Fortunately this group of RAF pilots hit

everything but the targets, with no losses inflicted according to

Nicolson & Forbes, vol.I, p.82.

4 August 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked several half tracks of the British 43rd Wessex

Division near Jurques. Two men were wounded. Essame, p.63.

Not as deadly as the flyboys would have you believe then.

[Battlefront.com]

There are all kinds of reasons for the exaggerated kill counts from pilots. Even an honest pilot trying to do his best would often make errors because FoW. Oh, like he shot up something that looked functional but was already knocked out by another pilot or ground action. Blowing the crap out of a road and assuming he hit what he was firing at, only to find his bombs hit on the other side of the bocage. Etc.

If anybody here has played paintball or Airsoft... when done, count up the "kills" everybody is raving about and then compare it to the known size (not to mention casualties) of the other side. No doubt it will be statistically impossible for both to be correct

Steve

[gunnergoz]

Revisionists. Gotta love 'em. Believe what you will. I'm not saying every flyboy killed 100 tanks, nothing like that. But I'm also not buying into the story that Tac Air killed very few. Too bad Rommel's not around to ask about it. I've seen too many photos of the havoc wreaked by WW2 fighter bombers, both in the East Front and the West, to give credence to all this talk that their damage was insignificant and a myth. Read one too many memoirs of WW2 ETO GI's who walked past wrecked vehicles and AFV's for miles on end, particularly after Falaise, in places were there had been no land battles. Sorry, just ain't buying it.

[Johnsy]

Great Videos mate. Lots of big bangs.

[ChrisND]

Revisionists. Gotta love 'em. Believe what you will. I'm not saying every flyboy killed 100 tanks, nothing like that. But I'm also not buying into the story that Tac Air killed very few. Too bad Rommel's not around to ask about it. I've seen too many photos of the havoc wreaked by WW2 fighter bombers, both in the East Front and the West, to give credence to all this talk that their damage was insignificant and a myth. Read one too many memoirs of WW2 ETO GI's who walked past wrecked vehicles and AFV's for miles on end, particularly after Falaise, in places were there had been no land battles. Sorry, just ain't buying it.

And you realize that some memoirs and a few photos is a really bad standard of evidence for drawing a generalized conclusion, right?

No one here is trying to claim they were worthless. But there are some seriously exaggerated claims that don't match up to actual recorded material losses.

[Sivodsi]

Revisionists. Gotta love 'em.

Its only revisionist in the sense that we have such claims as: "Air power was devastating to ground forces, in particular tanks and other AFVs" being revised by lack of support from the historical record.

I don't think this is the sense of "revisionist" that you were trying to get, right?

There is no doubt that air power caused some losses, just not the kind of losses that pilots, and in particular air power fan boys, claimed.

[dieseltaylor]

Well gunnergoz given that the Blue air on Blue land who were not expecting to be attacked and were probably not as wise to air attacks the lack of kills per attack [ other then heavy bombers] seems significantly at variance with popular belief. I cannot find out who compiled the Blue on Blue list and I thought it came from this seven page thread

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum5/HTML/000010.html

which starts with:

Major General Michael Reynolds in his book “Steel Inferno, 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy” discusses a Operational Report on Allied airpower during the Normandy Campaign. General Reynolds sites several studies performed immediately following the campaign by both the British and American Armed Forces, which would imply German Tank casualties due to tactical airpower were minimal. This is a quote from his chapter on The Mortain Counter-Attack in "Steel Inferno".

quote:

“RAF pilots claimed a total of eighty four tanks destroyed and twenty one damaged, plus a further 12 other vehicles destroyed and twenty-one damaged.

The IXth US Tactical Air Command, which flew 441 sorties over the period of the 7th to 10th August, made claims of sixty nine tanks destroyed, eight probably destroyed and thirty-five damaged and 116 other vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Confirmed results on the ground were somewhat different. Between the 12th and 20th August 1944, operational research teams from both the 21st Army Group and Second Tactical Air Force conducted separate investigations in the battle area and than compared and collated their results. They found thirty-four Panthers destroyed, ten MkIV’s, three SP guns, twenty-three armored personnel carriers, eight armored cars and forty-six other vehicles.

Of the forty-six tanks they concluded that twenty had been destroyed by ground fire (sic. ATG’s, tank fire, etc), seven by air force rockets, two by bombs, four from multiple causes, and eleven by either abandoned or destroyed by their crews…seventeen additional Panthers were found in the area over which the LAH Panzer Division had operated, and of these six had been knocked out by Army ground fire, four by air force rockets and the reminder were destroyed or abandoned by their crews.”

The Allies apparently committed a huge percentage of their available tactical air strength against the German thrust around Mortain between August 6th and August 10th (458 Typhoon sorties were flown in the Mortain Sector on August 7th alone). Only 13 confirmed Air to ground inflicted tank kills.

As for the Blue info - so far- [and it looks like it is the kind of thing we could all add to]

I. AIR TO GROUND FRIENDLY FIRE ACCIDENTS -- RAF

June 1942

RAF Wellingtons pummeled the 4th County of London Yeomanry,

British 7th Armoured Division, during a two-hour raid. Data given

on losses was vague, although it was said much damage was caused,

the officers mess vehicle was destroyed with its priceless whiskey,

and one soldier earned a medal by saving many of the vehicles from

the fires. Graham, p.65.

June 1942

RAF Wellingtons bombed the British 3rd Hussars in error near

Mutrah. Losses not specified. See Bickers, Friendly Fire, p.95-96

October 1942

During the second battle of El Alamein, the RAF bombed the

British 10th Hussars in error during a four hour raid. Evidently

the Hussars did not know the proper distress signal and could

not contact their own planes. Losses were not specified. Bickers,

Friendly Fire, p.4.

October 1942

After a series of mistaken attacks by the RAF Desert Air Force,

the commanding officer of 1st South African Division told them

"...if you've GOT to bomb my trucks, you might at least hit them!

You've missed them every bloody time..." Bickers, Friendly Fire, p.4.

6 June 1944

RAF fighters bombed and strafed the HQ entourage of 3rd Parachute

Brigade (British 6th Airborne Division). At least 15 men were killed

and many others were wounded, including Brigadier James Hill.

Shilleto, p.108-109, Crookenden, p.260-261.

8 June 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked the 175th Infantry Regiment, US 29th Division

on the Isigny Highway, causing 24 casualties. Balkoski, p.169.

10 July 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked the 4th Dorsets, 43rd Wessex Division

during a battle for Hill 112 in the Odon. At least two men were

seriously wounded. Saunders, p.118.

31 July 1944

At about 1845 hrs RAF Typhoons rocketed the staging area of the

Grenadier Guards (British Guards Armoured Division). Nicolson

& Forbes vol.I, p.82.

31 July 1944

At 2200 hrs RAF Typhoons attacked the Grenadier Guards for

the second time. As 1st Squadron tanks neared the objective, the

Typhoons dropped sixteen bombs on them, followed by eight

aircraft firing rockets. Fortunately this group of RAF pilots hit

everything but the targets, with no losses inflicted according to

Nicolson & Forbes, vol.I, p.82.

4 August 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked several half tracks of the British 43rd Wessex

Division near Jurques. Two men were wounded. Essame, p.63.

7 August 1944

RAF Typhoons fired rockets at two 3-inch guns of the US 823rd

Tank Destroyer Battalion, killing one man and wounding several

others near L'Abbaye Blanche. Featherston, p.135.

7 August 1944

RAF Typhoons shot up the Service Company of the 120th Infantry

Regiment, US 30th Division, causing several casualties, including

Major James Bynum who was killed near Mortain. The officer who

replaced him was strafed by another Typhoon a few minutes later

and seriously wounded. Featherston, p.135.

7 August 1944

RAF Typhoons strafed 'B' Company/US 120th Infantry Regiment

on Hill 285, killing the driver of a weapons carrier. Featherston, p.136.

7 August 1944

RAF Typhoons strafed a squad from 'F' Company/US 120th Infantry

Regiment, near Hill 314. Two men were killed. Featherston, p.111-112.

7 August 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked the Cannon Company of 120th Infantry

Regiment, US 30th Division, near Mortain although losses if any

were not mentioned. Featherston, p.135.

8 August 1944

RAF Typhoons rocketed two Sherman tanks from 'C' Company, US

743rd Tank Battalion near Mortain. Casualties were unclear but the

resulting inferno and smoke subsequently attracted fire from nearby

US artillery units. Folkestead, p.56.

8 August 1944

Two Shermans from 'A' Company, US 743rd Tank Battalion were set

ablaze by friendly aircraft near Mortain, although it was not specified

whether this was caused by RAF Typhoons or USAAF Thunderbolts.

One tank crewman was killed. Folkestead, p.56.

9 August 1944

RAF Typhoons shot up units of the British Columbia Regiment

and the Algonquin Regiment, 4th Canadian Armoured Division,

near Quesnay Wood during Operation TOTALIZE. Later that day,

the same units were mistakenly fired upon by tanks and artillery

of the 1st Polish Armoured Division. Cassidy, p.80-83.

12 August 1944

RAF Typhoons fired rockets at Shermans of 'A' Company, US 743rd

Tank Battalion, causing damage to one M4. Folkestad, p.58.

13 August 1944

RAF Typhoons attacked 'B' Company of the 4th Wiltshires, British

43rd Wessex Division near La Villette. Losses if any not specified.

Essame, p.80.

14 August 1944

RAF heavy bombers hit Allied troops in error during Operation

TRACTABLE causing about 490 casualties including 112 dead.

The bombings also wiped out 265 Allied vehicles, 30 field guns

and two tanks. British anti-aircraft guns opened fire on the RAF

bombers and some may have been hit. Bickers, Air War Normandy,

p.122, Gooderson, p.251.

14-18 August 1944

The South Alberta Regiment of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division

was attacked six times by RAF fighters during this period and other

units had similar experiences. A number of vehicles were set ablaze

and in some cases the yellow smoke used for signalling friendly planes

was ignored by RAF Spitfire pilots. Out of frustration, at least one

officer of the South Albertas wanted his Crusader AA tanks to shoot

at the Spitfires attacking his HQ. Graves, p.122-138.

16 August 1944

The 51st Highland Division was jumped by RAF fighters near the

River Vie, "...and then the usual trouble began. The Camerons

actually had to stop advancing because Spitfires had knocked out

every wireless vehicle in their establishment..." Salmond, p.166.

17 August 1944

RAF fighters shot up elements of British 7th Armoured Division

and caused about 20 casualties, including the intelligence officer

of 8th Hussars who was severely wounded. The colonel riding

along was badly shaken when their jeep crashed. Verney, p.224.

17 August 1944

RAF fighters attacked the Norfolk Yeomanry anti-tank regiment of

British 7th Armoured Division. Three guns (M10 Tank Destroyers)

were knocked out and other vehicles set on fire. Verney, p.224.

18 August 1944

RAF fighters attacked troops of the Queen's Royal Regiment

(British 7th Armoured Division) near Lisieux. "...the battalion's

few casualties were caused mostly by our own Spitfires, which

twice strafed the main Livarot road..." Foster, p.378.

27 August 1944

RAF Typhoons of 2nd Tactical Air Force mistakenly attacked and

sank the British minesweepers BRITOMART and HUSSAR. The

minesweeper SALAMANDER had to be written off and the JASON

was damaged. The British trawlers COLSAY and LORD ASHLEY

were also shot up by RAF fighters. The result was 227 casualties

including 78 men killed. Kemp, p.54-65, Bickers, p.128-130.

1 September 1944

"...the afternoon had passed quietly near Arras, disturbed only

by two British fighters, which machine-gunned the area and set

a Welsh Guards lorry on fire. 'Vive la RAF' had been chalked

on several vehicles by overjoyed civilians: After this incident

the divisional commander's ADC, Capt. the Hon. A.D. Tyron,

walked over to his scout car and added the words 'except two

Spitfires'..." Nicolson & Forbes, vol.I, p.107.

12 September 1944

RAF Typhoons destroyed two Sherman tanks of the Governor

General's Foot Guards (4th Canadian Armoured Division) in the

vicinity of Maldegum...

"...while so deployed the tanks were suddenly attacked, in

mistake, by several Typhoon aircraft. Lt. Middleton-Hope's

tank was badly hit, killing the gunner Gdsm. Hughes, and the

tank was set on fire. Almost immediately Sgt. Jenning's tank

was similarly knocked out by Typhoon rockets. Meanwhile

the Typhoons continued to press home their attack with

machine guns and rockets, and, while trying to extricate the

gunner, Lt. Middleton-Hope was blown off the tank. In this

tragic encounter Gdsm. G.E. Baker, Barter, and Cheal were

seriously wounded..." Jessup, p.144, Graves, p.204.

23 January 1945

RAF fighters strafed the assault gun platoon (105mm Sherman tanks)

of US 743rd Tank Battalion, near Sart-Lez-St.-Vith. Folkestad, p.88.

II. AIR TO GROUND FRIENDLY FIRE ACCIDENTS -- USAAF

15 March 1943

USAAF bombers accidentally hit Allied troops during a raid on

Cassino, causing about 300 casualties. Gooderson, p.251.

18 July 1944

During Operation GOODWOOD, a stray bomb dropped by

a USAAF B-26 Marauder hit 'B' Squadron of the 23rd Hussars,

British 11th Armoured Division. Two men were killed and

one wounded. 23rd Hussars unit history, p.69-70.

24 July 1944

USAAF bombers hit US troops in error during an abortive airstrike

near St. Lo, causing about 155 casualties. Blumenson, p.138

25 July 1944

USAAF bombers remounted their raid from the previous day. This

time the operation was not cancelled, but US positions were again

plastered by bombs causing about 600 casualties including Lt. Gen.

Lesley McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces who was

killed. Another 200 men were battle fatigue cases and at least one

US tank was knocked out, an 'A' Company Sherman of 70th Tank

Battalion, 4th Infantry Division. Blumenson, p.139, Hall, p.75.

26 July 1944

USAAF P-47s attacked the US 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion

near Periers. Losses if any were unspecified. Unit Diary, p.20.

2 August 1944

USAAF P-47 Thunderbolts strafed elements of the 2nd Fife and

Forfar Yeomanry of British 11th Armoured Division, near Vassy.

Evidently the P-47 pilots were not informed about the yellow

recognition smoke normally used to signal RAF fighters, or they

ignored it. Losses if any were not specified. Delaforce, p.84.

4 August 1944

USAAF P-47 Thunderbolts bombed, rocketed and strafed various

elements of the British 11th Armoured Division. At least one man

was killed, some vehicles of the 8th Rifle Brigade medical unit

were hit and a half-track was destroyed. Delaforce p.89. The 23rd

Hussars unit diary, p.100.

7 August 1944

USAAF bombers returning from a raid jettisoned some bombs in

error over territory held by Allied troops. Some of the load landed

on an area recently occupied by 51st Highland Division, causing

some 360 casualties. This is the first time I've read about this one

and I found it odd that such a disaster was not mentioned in J. B.

Salmond's unit history of 51st Highland Division. Bickers, Air War

Normandy, p.120.

8 August 1944

USAAF heavy bombers hit Allied troops in error during Operation

TOTALIZE. 83 vehicles and seven field guns were knocked out,

although there seems to be a discrepancy in the casualties reported.

Roughly 375-460 depending on whose figures you believe. Bickers,

Air War Normandy, p.121. Gooderson, p.251.

13 August 1944

USAAF P-47 Thunderbolts shot up elements of the Grenadier

Guards of British Guards Armoured Division near the Vire-Estry

Road. Three men were killed and one wounded. Nicolson & Forbes,

vol.I, p.99.

14 August 1944

Elements of US 3rd Armored Division were attacked near Ranes.

"...One of the unfortunate incidents of war occurred when a P-47,

attempting to attack German forces one field ahead of American

tanks, accidentally dropped a bomb short. Several GI's were

wounded seriously and one killed outright. Another bomb fell

within fifty yards of General Hickey's command post, also injuring

a number of soldiers. Faulty release mechanisms on the airplanes

were believed to be the chief reason for these occurences..."

Spearhead in the West, p.79.

16-18 August 1944

USAAF P-38 Lightnings attacked the Seaforths and the Camerons

of 51st Highland Division on several occasions near the River Vie.

Salmond, p.166.

17 August 1944

Units of Combat Command 'A' US 3rd Armored Division were

driven out of Fromentel by USAAF P-38 Lightnings, which had

been dropping bombs too close for comfort. When CCA returned

to the village, they were again bombed by P-38s and the men

began to duck for foxholes whenever they saw the twin-boom

fighters approaching. Spearhead in the West, p.80.

18 August 1944

USAAF P-47 Thunderbolts dive-bombed and strafed the British

Columbia Regiment of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, fatally

injuring Major Jack Worthington and Trooper A. Hallmark. Unit

diary, Chapter VI.

17 September 1944

USAAF P-47s strafed a group of US paratroopers from the 502nd

Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. Lt. Col. Robert Cole,

a Medal of Honor winner in Normandy, ran out into a field to signal

the friendly planes and was killed by a German sniper. Bando, p.35.

21 September 1944

USAAF P-38 Lightnings attacked the US 644th Tank Destroyer

Battalion near Brest. Losses if any were unspecified. 644th unit

diary, p.22.

29 September 1944

A USAAF P-47 strafed elements of the US 602nd Tank Destroyer

Battalion near Bathlemont. No one was hit and the pilot broke off

his attack after passing over the column. 602nd unit diary, p.12.

23-26 December 1944

"...there were a few occasions when American planes had attacked

(the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion) and it was never determined

exactly whether they were being flown by American pilots..."

McGrann, p.69.

25 December 1944

USAAF P-47s bombed and strafed elements of the US 740th

Tank Battalion and 119th Infantry Regiment of US 30th Division.

One tank from the 740th was knocked out and three men were

slightly wounded near Petit-Coo. Rubel, p.70 and p.240-43.

14 January 1945

USAAF P-47s strafed a group of US paratroopers from the 502nd

Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. Lt. Col. John Stopka

was killed. Ironically, Stopka had replaced Robert Cole, who was

involved in the earlier friendly fire accident with P-47s, which led

to his death. Bando, p.121.

9 April 1945

USAAF bombers accidentally hit Allied troops during Operation

BUCKLAND, causing about 160 casualties. Gooderson, p.251.

23 April 1945

USAAF aircraft of unspecified type knocked out an M5 Light Tank

of the British 17th/21st Lancers, near Gallo, Italy. Two men were killed.

Two other armoured regiments in the area were also attacked by the

same group of aircraft. ffrench Blake p.222-23.

Note that in a relatively small sample of mistaken attacks against Allied

armor, Allied fighters managed to knock out seven Sherman tanks and

three M-10 Tank Destroyers. The British OR conclusions that bombs

and rockets were generally inaccurate is valid, but there may have been

more exceptions to the rule than was implied by their findings. The ORS

was quoted to suggest that aircraft rocket hits on tanks were usually not

survivable, but many Allied tank crewmen escaped after their Shermans

were hit by Typhoon rockets.

Also noticable is the staggering loss of Allied vehicles and field guns after

being plastered by RAF heavy bombers during Operation TRACTABLE.

Only a fraction of the bombs fell short yet the damage was severe, possibly

because the Canadian forces were concentrated and not dug in.

This compilation is definitely a work in progress because I have not

looked at a large portion of the American, British and Canadian unit

histories published after the war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balkoski, Joseph, Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division

in Normandy, 2nd Edition (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).

Bando, Mark, The 101st Airborne, From Holland to Hitler's

Eagles Nest (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1994).

Battalion Committee, The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, (1945).

Blumenson, Martin, The Battle of the Generals: The untold story of

the Falaise Pocket - the campaign that should have won World War II

(New York: William Morrow, 1993).

Bickers, Richard Townshend, Friendly Fire: Accidents in Battle from

Ancient Greece to the Gulf War (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).

Bickers, Richard Townshend, Air War Normandy

(London: Leo Cooper, 1994).

Cassidy, George, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment,

1939-1945 (Toronto: Algonquin Regt. Veterans' Association, 1948)

Delaforce, Patrick, The Black Bull: From Normandy to the Baltic

with the 11th Armoured Division (Stroud, UK: Alan Sutton, 1993).

Division Committee, Spearhead in the West, 1941-45, The Third

Armored Division (Frankfurt am Main-Schwanheim: F.J. Henrich, 1945)

Essame, Hubert, The 43rd Wessex Division at War: 1944-1945

(London: William Clowes & Sons Ltd., 1952).

Featherston, Alwyn, Battle for Mortain: The 30th Infantry Division

Saves the Breakout: August 7-12, 1944 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1998).

ffrench Blake, Robert Lifford Valentine, A History of the 17th/21st

Lancers, 1922-1959 (London: MacMillan, 1962).

Folkestad, William, The View from the Turret: The 743rd Tank Battalion

During WWII (Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 2000).

Foster, R.C.G., History of the Queen's Royal Regiment, vol.VIII,

1924-1948 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1953)

Gooderson, Ian, Air Power at the Battlefront, Allied Close Air Support

in Europe 1943-45 (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998)

Graham, Andrew, Sharpshooters at War: The 3rd and 4th

and 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry, 1939-1945

(London: Sharpshooters Regimental Association, 1964).

Graves, Donald, South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War

(Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1998)

Hall, Chester, History of the 70th Tank Battalion, 1940-46 (1946).

Jessup, A.R., The Regimental History of the Governor General's

Foot Guards (Ottawa: 1948)

Kemp, Paul, Friend or Foe, Friendly Fire at Sea, 1939-1945

(London: Leo Cooper, 1995).

Martin, Hugh Gray, The History of the Fifteenth Scottish Division,

1939-1945 (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1948).

McGrann, Roy, The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion: April 10, 1942

to December 7, 1945 (Elizabeth, PA: 1946).

Oliver, Bertrand, History of the 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion:

March 1941 to November 1945 (East Lansing, MI: 602nd Tank

Destroyer Association, 1990).

Nicolson, Nigel, and Forbes, Patrick, The Grenadier Guards in the War

of 1939-1945, Two Volume set (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1949).

Regimental Committee, The Story of the 23rd Hussars, 1940-46

(Aldershot: 1946).

Regimental Committee, The Story of the British Columbia Regiment

1939-1945. Written in field manual format, undated with no author,

publisher or page numbers listed. Likely printed in Vancouver, 1940s.

Rubel, George Kenneth, Daredevil Tankers: The Story of the

740th Tank Battalion, US Army (1945).

Salmond, James Bell, The History of the 51st Highland Division, 1939-1945

(Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1953).

Saunders, Timothy, Hill 112: Battles for the Odon. 'Battleground Europe'

series (London: Leo Cooper, 2000).

Shilleto, Carl, Pegasus Bridge & Merville Battery: British 6th Airborne

Landings in Normandy 6th June 1944. 'Battleground Europe' series

(London: Leo Cooper, 1999).

Verney, Gerald Lloyd, The Desert Rats: The History of the 7th Armoured

Division 1938 to 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1954).

[winkelried]

Major General Michael Reynolds

was looking for this one - faintly remembered it. thx.

the effectiveness air power as combat air support in WW2 is overestimated today. their main effective use was interdiction i presume. just to give another example for the (in-)effectiveness of air-power in WW2:

at Bir Hakeim in the North African Desert in May/June the Axis flew around 960 sorties (approx 500 Stuka, approx 300 Ju-88) and dropped something between 700 and 900 tons of bombs against the well entrenched Free French Brigade. Accordingly to French reports, they lost 2 Bofors (QM Leborgne & 2em Maitre Canard) and 1 47mm ATG (22 CNA) to air-power.

Now compare this to a laser-guided JDAM in CM:SF ...

btw accordingly to the Germans at Bir Hakeim: "Im Laufe des Tages 2 Stuka-Angriffe auf Bir Hacheim. Selbst aus der Entfernung war das Geheul der Jericho-Sirenen an den Stuka-Maschinen eine Belastung. Im Stillen ist jeder froh, nicht selbst im Angriffsraum zu sein." from a personal German account. ("Even at distance the sound of the Jericho-Sirens on the Stukas was stressing. Quietly happy for not being in the area of the attack").

[Narsus]

"The British OR conclusions that bombs

and rockets were generally inaccurate is valid"

Funny, if I am reading it right.

[gunnergoz]

I never defended the idea that all pilot-claimed kills were actual kills, only that there were significant losses to Tac Air attacks from fighter bombers, particularly in France after the breakout. Now it is being made to sound like the entire Tac Air campaign was bogus, worthless and fruitless because, as "everyone" knows, one A/C pass could not possibly be very accurate.

I beg to differ. Air power WAS devastating, when it connected and in the crowded confines of the Falaise in particular it connected often.

Somehow, I doubt the Soviets would have built 42,000 purpose-designed Il-2's if Tac Air and strafing was ineffective as some seem to think it was.

One poster mentioned the psychological effect - terror, more accurately - instilled in the Germans by the threat of Jabo attacks. That had a basis in fact. Drive by a burn out hulk with smoking human remains in it right after a Jabo attack and that just might affect the old morale. Such stories are not out of fairy tales.

I spent some time looking on the web last night and found ample contemporary documentation about the subject, that even during WW2 was doubting the extent to which pilot ground attack kill claims could be proven, but at no time was it ever said that the attacks were fruitless or useless.

Revisionists would have you believe that Tac Air kills were minimal and I'm just not buying into it. I'm not sure what the payoff is for taking the revisionist stance is, but it is no closer to the truth than are the pilot claims of .92 targets hit per mission, which is what some wartime squadrons were (wrongly) claiming. Even if it was 1/3 or 1/4 of that number, it was massive in terms of overall casualties to the Germans. One German general in the documents I was reading last night estimated "30,000" German logistics trucks were destroyed from D-Day to the Rhine. The Germans knew best of all what those Jabos were doing, and were capable of.

[ChrisND]

Even if it was 1/3 or 1/4 of that number, it was massive in terms of overall casualties to the Germans. One German general in the documents I was reading last night estimated "30,000" German logistics trucks were destroyed from D-Day to the Rhine. The Germans knew best of all what those Jabos were doing, and were capable of.

Trucks. Exactly. That's been the whole point of this. It's impossible to deny the effect that airpower had on logistical trains and the moving parts that made that up, which is just as well because no one is denying that. It's with tanks and armored combat vehicles, especially in a tactical combat setting, that claims begin to wildly diverge from reality.

[sburke]

While I am from the school of "air power has been over rated in it's attacks on armor" I do not for one moment underestimate their capability to disrupt operations nor to inflict serious harm to the soft logistical tail. An out of fuel tank is as good a kill as any.

I see that however as a task accomplished prior to a CMBN battle (the logistical tail part). The disruption is something I think we will still see in CMBN and something to take advantage of if possible (immobilizations, damaged optic, radios etc) while halftracks, trucks etc should be very vulnerable.

In terms of Falaise I certainly believe the air attacks were devastating to German columns. but hitting the transport columns is still devastating to a modern army. Artillery was also a major contributing factor as the Poles fought tooth and nail with the Wehrmacht for Hill 262 as an observation point.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falaise_pocket

[JonS]

I doubt the Soviets would have built 42,000 purpose-designed Il-2's if Tac Air and strafing was ineffective as some seem to think it was.

Well, the Soviets also built 5,000 x BT-7 and 10,000 T-26. I'm not sure that quantity-built is a particularly valid proof of anything good.

[JonS]

pilot claims of .92 targets hit per mission, which is what some wartime squadrons were (wrongly) claiming. Even if it was 1/3 or 1/4 of that number, it was massive in terms of overall casualties to the Germans.

That's true. If it were only 1/3rd to 1/4th that number it would be massive.

Sadly it was 1/10th to 1/100th.

Earlier threads on CAS:

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=93394

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=87069

[Cymru]

One of the significant, though non-quantifiable effects, probably was a general slowing down of all traffic. If you are constantly scanning for FBs, and avoiding whatever actual damage was on the road, average speed was almost certainly well below what it would have been otherwise.

[JonS]

One of the significant, though non-quantifiable effects, probably was a general slowing down of all traffic. If you are constantly scanning for FBs, and avoiding whatever actual damage was on the road, average speed was almost certainly well below what it would have been otherwise.

Also conducting most major road movements only by night tends to slow the overall average speed down too

Some words I wrote on this a number of years ago. (Edit: the first couple of posts from that thread are re-pros of the relevant ORS reports - they're well worth reading in the context of this thread)

[Battlefront.com]

(JonS just posted while I was writing this. Since the point has been made many times and apparently overlooked, I guess repeating ourselves is necessary)

Yes, as has been stated many times... the effect of air power on German operations was very significant. It caused material damage, true, but that was the lessor effect. The greater effect was on inhibiting movement, hurting morale, and causing delays when movement was attempted. Think about the latter.

Let's say there's a 10 truck supply column desperately trying to reach the front. Even if one truck is shot to pieces that's a 10% reduction in whatever was being transported. And if that was the only truck with a particular type of ammo, that could be 100% of a particular needed material. From a vehicle kill tally standpoint, knocking 1 truck off of 10 doesn't sound that impressive, but the effects for the Germans could have been devastating for that particular tactical environment.

So what did the Germans do? They either moved at night or during days when air support was unlikely. Moving at any other time was very risky and therefore planning had to take that into account. Imagine sitting in a tank repair shop and having to wait until the next day for some rather insignificant sized, but critical, part to get a tank running. That's a whole day that tank isn't doing anything, which gives the Allies one more day to overrun the tank repair depot.

Yes, the power of air support should not be underestimated. But it should also not be overestimated either. Physical destruction at the hands of aircraft was generally overstated for the entire war in all aspects. According to Strategic Air Command the Germans were bombed back into the stone ages, yet after the war they found out German production actually increased during the period of the heaviest bombing. huh...

Steve

[gunnergoz]

Well, the Soviets also built 5,000 x BT-7 and 10,000 T-26. I'm not sure that quantity-built is a particularly valid proof of anything good.

That's plain bogus, Jon, since those were all built before the war or before production could be altered to more modern designs, while much of the Russian wartime air production was devoted towards building those Il-2's - for good reason...they were effective killers of German assets on the ground.

[gunnergoz]

I'm not sure all this will go in, but here's something to chew on:

My source:

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=1488&REC=3

The Ninth Army qualified this, stating that "The air attacks have not generally achieved the desired degree of neutralization. The expected degree of neutralization, however, — has usually been achieved." They list the following reasons for failure to be all that was desired: "(1) too little air effort available for a specific job; (2) inaccuracy; and (3) the time lag occurring between the end of a major air attack and the assault on the objective by the ground unit."

In evaluating the effectiveness of air attacks against specific targets, the comments received from ground units agrees in general with the observations made by air units.

Attacks against troops varied in casualties inflicted. While the percentage of dead and wounded was frequently not high, temporary casualties due to shock and demoralization resulted in large numbers in most cases. General Bayerlein reported that fewer men wounded by air attack returned later to duty than those wounded by ground weapons. He also stated that "strafing is more unpleasant for ground troops than bombing, because of better and more exact results, even in trenches. An increase in this type of attack would have been advantageous."

Trucks and other unarmored transport were particularly vulnerable to air attack, as the claims (see Part I-A) indicate. There is more difficulty in assessing the effectiveness against tanks and armored vehicles.

The Ninth Army reported that "Excellent results have been obtained when tanks have been hit or a near miss has been scored with 500 pound bombs". Most units reported that the aircraft rocket was the best weapon against tanks although a direct hit, involving high

35

Part I-B Evaluation

accuracy, was necessary. Instances of claims against tanks have been questioned by some ground units (26th and 29th Inf. Divisions) but many other instances have been proved where air attacks have disabled or destroyed many more tanks than were claimed. P/W's have also reported a high rate of loss of tanks due to air attack and confirm the effectiveness of rocket fire.

From unit commentaries, part II of same source:

XIX CORPS. "Column cover for the 2 Armd. Div. was vectored to a troop concentration at A780444. Bombed with good results and controller asked if they could strafe the woods where other enemy troops were. Our troops at that time were 200 yards away and the planes were ordered to strafe in one direction only. They worked over the woods and 100 prisoners came out with their hands up to surrender. Controller said it was the closest cooperation they ever saw.

"Another instance of the effect of a strafing attack was a wooded hill strongly defended by MG, AT guns, and small arms. A squadron of F/Bs bombed the defenses but still the light tanks attacking the hill could not advance. The squadron was asked to come down again and strafe the positions after which the position was taken. PW's said the bombing was not so bad, but when the "Jabos" strafed them they lost all will to fight and tended to make the men scatter for protection regardless of orders. Many were found hiding below the ground and they didn't offer much resistance. Many were killed at their guns and in their foxholes by the strafing."

Ill CORPS. "The use of fragmentation bombs on enemy troops in woods west of Nancy, France, produced a great slaughter. One company commander reported that about nine tenths of his company was destroyed and the remainder rendered unfit for combat."

COMBAT COMMAND "B" 4TH ARMORED DIVISION

5 October 1944

SUBJECT: Unit Commendation.

TO: Commanding Officer, 409th Fighter Squadron, 9th Air Force.

THRU: Commanding General, 4th Armored Division, APO 2 54, U. S. Army.

1.

The Commanding General, Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division, desires that the 409th Fighter be commended for outstanding and exemplary action in the vicinity of Fresnes-en-Saulnois, on 24 September 1944.

2.

Planes from this squadron in close support of the Combat Command succeeded in relieving a tense situation in which our ground troops were under heavy enemy tank and artillery attacks. They succeeded in pressing home strong attacks under the most adverse weather conditions and in the face of concentrated enemy AA fire which cost them one of their planes.

3.

As a result, six enemy tanks were knocked out by the air and the enemy attack was broken up.

4.

The Commanding General, Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division wishes to convey his congratulations to the personnel of the 409th for their courageous flying and tactical skill in this engagement.

S/S H. E. Dager,

H. E. DAGER,

Brig. General, U. S. A.

Commanding.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO: The Officers, Men and Women of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), APO 374 U. S. Army.

(snip)

4.

A most severe obstacle to your performance of duty has been the interminable weather on our front which has made every mission a hazardous one. In defiance of freezing conditions, poor visibility, uncertain winds, and treacherous snowstorms, your medium-bombers have attacked key targets with repeated success. During the period from 21 December 1944 to 6 February 1945, your bombers conducted over 9300 sorties, and dropped more than 6200 tons of bombs. In these operations, 148 locomotives and 1893 railway cars were destroyed. Over 500 military vehicles, including 61 tanks, were knocked out. Fifteen bridges were completely destroyed and railway lines were cut in 301 places. The relentless bombardment, which was carried out in the early stages of our operation against the Colmar pocket, was in keeping with the finest tradition of the Army Air Force; and the demoralization of the enemy, which resulted, greatly assisted the First French Army to attain a major victory.

5.

The ground units of your Air Force have also shown outstanding devotion to duty, by maintaining your aircraft and your airfields with such efficiency that your pilots have always been able to answer our calls for assistance on a moment's notice.

6.

Your achievements in the past have brought you the highest credit, and I am confident that your efforts in the future will continue to win for you the everlasting thanks of myself, my officers and my men. I commeno you and congratulate you on your inspiring deeds.

S/S Jacob L. Devers

Lieutenant General

(3) German Comments. Lt. Gen. Bayerlein, Commanding the Panzer Lehr Division, stated that "Lightning (P-38): Unpleasant for ground troops because of its quiet, almost noiseless approach, its maneuverability and speed, its heavy armament and bombs, exact aiming and hitting. Particularly effective against tanks. Direct or near hits destroy the tank.

"Thunderbolt (P-47): Armament and bombs; noisier, easier to identify from the ground, also very maneuverable and fast. Otherwise, same effect as Lightning, probably lighter bombs. (I, myself, was hit by Thunderbolts five times). Direct or close bomb hits destroy the tank. Weapons penetrate all tank armor except that of the "Koenigstiger".

"Spitfires and Mustangs (P-51): Have not impressed me particularly in their effect."

More from Bayerlein's debriefing (he is referred to as "P/W" i.e. Prisoner of War)

The 27th dawned "wonderfully quiet", as it seemed to P/W. He had gotten 14 tanks together, just in time for an attack which came about 0900 with no artillery preparation, but was again preceded by swarms of fighter-bombers, which led the way. P/W's CP at Dangy was repeatedly raked byfighter-bombers, and by noon it was necessary to pull out. US tanks appeared in front of him in strength for the first time at Dangy.

About 1600 or 1700 a messenger rushed up and reported that US tanks were within 300 yards of the CP. The fighter attacks had ceased as the tanks approached; further evidence of what P/W notes as obviously close cooperation between air and ground forces. P/W walked, keeping to woods and byways, almost to Percy, until he ran into a German mobile radio station and was able to report to corps that of his Panzer Lehr Division nothing remained. Its armor was almost completely destroyed, its combat personnel killed, wounded, captured or scattered, all the headquarters records, papers and equipment were lost. Its general had escaped with nothing but the clothes he stood up in, and even these were in a sad state.

On the 27th, Gen. Bayerlein got together the remnants of his division, pioneers, signalmen, repair-shop workers, and the like, and recovered some 8 tanks, mostly from the shops. On the 29th he reached Percy, on the 2/3 August, Vire, slowly moving east with a front to the south against Patton's speeding tank columns.

On Sunday, 13 August, the "Kampfgruppe Panzer Lehr", as the remains of the original division were called, was near Habloville, some 10/11 km. northwest of Argentan and P/W had his headquarters in a

small house on the outskirts of the village. Traffic was in a terrific snarl in the village, moving north and east to get out of the Falaise-Argentan trap. Many vehicles were parked in woods and orchards on all sides of it. There had been severe attacks on road traffic east of the town the night before, and this had added to the confused condition.

Punctually at 0900 on the morning of the 13th came the fighter-bombers. They swept in very low over at least 250 motor transport, trucks, cannon, and nebelwerfer on the roads in and around the village and in nearby fields and orchards. They hit a truck train of rocket ammunition right off the bat, and this started exploding and throwing rockets in all directions. The streets were littered with burning autos. Gen. Bayerlein's wire and radio communications went out, and he got out of there, diving into a slit trench in a nearby orchard. This went on until 1300 practically without interruption. P/W then wormed his way back into town, but with no communications he could exercise no command functions, and at 1400 when the fighter-bombers returned he was glad to dive back into the trench.

The streets of the town were so littered with the burning remains of trucks and equipment as to be impassable, yet the fighters kept on until it was practically dark, after which 2-motored bombers came in and bombed intermittently all night long.

The group was then at last withdrawn to Heilbronn for refitting.

At Heilbronn, then, at the end of September, Gen. Bayerlein got together some 5000 of his rear echelon troops, practically all that was left of the original complement of 17,000 men of the Division. Of the 8000 combat troops originally with the Division, far fewer than 1000 were left, and the 1000-odd combat troops he had with him at Heilbronn were practically all new replacements.

In this connection, P/W notes that his losses from air attack had this further ominous note — that far fewer of the men wounded by air attack returned later to duty than those wounded by ground weapons. Of those wounded in air attacks, he estimates that 80% never returned to duty, whereas in the case of ground attacks it was only 50-60%. This he explains by the heavier caliber of airplane machine-guns and cannon, and the decompression effect of large high-explosive bombs, as compared with light machine guns and artillery shelling on the ground.

[gunnergoz]

If you read this source, and other contemporary documents evaluating Tac Air effectiveness, you will for certain find that they knew even then that pilot claims of strafing kills were exaggerated. But there was ample evidence that Tac Air was having an extremely negative effect upon the enemy. Not only were assets being destroyed, but German operations and even strategy at high levels were being affected.

Even if one grants that not every Tac Air sortie resulted in a kill, enough were flown, often enough, that over time serious materiel casualties were inflicted on the Germans in the months following D-Day. And that is my point. This revisionism would have it seem that the Germans actually shrugged off the Tac Air offensive since it did not really hurt them that much. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even apart from the significant morale and C3 impacts the strikes were causing, they were steadily depleting the numbers of German combat assets available to fight with and the logistical tail to support the combat assets was similarly being eroded.

BTW, that's my final post on the subject since I can't set it out any plainer than I have.

[JonS]

I'm not sure all this will go in, but here's something to chew on:

Why on earth would you think it hasn't been chewed?

The Ninth Army qualified this, stating that "The air attacks have not generally achieved the desired degree of neutralization. The expected degree of neutralization, however, — has usually been achieved."

In other words; less effective than advertised.

Attacks against troops varied in casualties inflicted. While the percentage of dead and wounded was frequently not high, temporary casualties due to shock and demoralization resulted in large numbers in most cases.

In other words; ineffective in the way wargamers tend to measure these things.

Trucks and other unarmored transport were particularly vulnerable to air attack, as the claims (see Part I-A) indicate.

Firstly, claims are worthless. Secondly the effectiveness of attacks against logistics links has never really been disputed.

There is more difficulty in assessing the effectiveness against tanks and armored vehicles.

Heh. That's funny. It was difficult mostly because they couldn't find many examples.

The Ninth Army reported that "Excellent results have been obtained when tanks have been hit or a near miss has been scored with 500 pound bombs". Most units reported that the aircraft rocket was the best weapon against tanks although a direct hit, involving high accuracy, was necessary.

That's about as useful as saying that a pistol is a perfect antitank weapon, as long as you get a hit in the right place. No one is disputing that a 500lb bomb or 60lb rocket hitting a tank is going to result in a really bad day for the occupants. The problem is that accuracy of air-to-ground weapons in WWII was abysmal.

Instances of claims against tanks have been questioned by some ground units (26th and 29th Inf. Divisions)

Heh. No kidding.

but many other instances have been proved where air attacks have disabled or destroyed many more tanks than were claimed.

And those instances would be ... ?

XIX CORPS. "Column cover for the 2 Armd. Div. was vectored to a troop concentration at A780444. ...

"Another instance of the effect of a strafing attack was a wooded hill strongly defended by MG, AT guns, and small arms. ...

Ill CORPS. "The use of fragmentation bombs on enemy troops in woods west of Nancy, France, produced a great slaughter. ...

Great examples. Expect they have nothing to do with tanks.

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO: The Officers, Men and Women of the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional), APO 374 U. S. Army.

... medium-bombers ...

Medium bombers have nothing to do with CAS.

148 locomotives and 1893 railway cars were destroyed.

Pilot claims are worthless, and trains have nothing to do with CAS.

including 61 tanks

Pilot claims are worthless.

(3) German Comments. Lt. Gen. Bayerlein, Commanding the Panzer Lehr Division, stated that ... Direct or near hits destroy the tank.

No kidding. Unfortunately, getting a hit was highly improbable.

... More from Bayerlein's debriefing ...

On Bayerlein generally, it's worth pointing out that as a matter of course he grossly overstated the material effects of air attack. Compare, for example, what he had to say about air attacks during the march up on June 6 and 7 1944 compared to the actually losses suffered by his division. Much the same is evident regarding his comments post the COBRA aerial attack (neither of which, incidentally, have much to do with CAS anyway)

Regards

Jon

[womble]

Even if one grants that not every Tac Air sortie resulted in a kill, enough were flown, often enough, that over time serious materiel casualties were inflicted on the Germans in the months following D-Day. And that is my point. This revisionism would have it seem that the Germans actually shrugged off the Tac Air offensive since it did not really hurt them that much. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even apart from the significant morale and C3 impacts the strikes were causing, they were steadily depleting the numbers of German combat assets available to fight with and the logistical tail to support the combat assets was similarly being eroded.

I think the key here is that there were a lot of missions flown. So the 'revisionists' as you call them are correct in their assertion that air power wasn't that damaging, if you read an implicit 'per sortie' onto the statement. Which is what matters for the game.

This lack of individual, tactical effectiveness, if properly modelled, should make 'em cheap-as-chips, points-wise, but the sheer scale of the operations means that they should have a high rarity cost... Maybe.

[sburke]

If you read this source, and other contemporary documents evaluating Tac Air effectiveness, you will for certain find that they knew even then that pilot claims of strafing kills were exaggerated. But there was ample evidence that Tac Air was having an extremely negative effect upon the enemy. Not only were assets being destroyed, but German operations and even strategy at high levels were being affected.

And that is my point. This revisionism would have it seem that the Germans actually shrugged off the Tac Air offensive since it did not really hurt them that much. Nothing could be further from the truth.

When you say revision, it isn't clear what you are directing that at. I think actually no one so far has disagreed with the above and no one has said the Germans shrugged off the air offensive (or maybe I missed that). I think the only disagreement is the impact directly on armored vehicles has been found to be very overstated. The overall impact on German operations however I think all would agree was severe. Everything from transport and supply columns, artillery batteries, supply dumps, HQ units, bridges, crossroad towns etc was at the mercy of TAC AIR.