Couple new CMBN videos cropping up....

[LemoN]

http://www.battleofnormandytours.com/photos-op-luttich.html

Nice photos. Note pavement, widths of roads, etc

The Panther in picture 14 obviously wasn't knocked out by TacAir.

[noxnoctum]

Too bad you can't have CAS attack in a line...

[dieseltaylor]

lemomn - I agree with you in that it seems an unlikely hit because of the trees /undergrowth tight each side. However as I not trained on bazooka, PIAT, air to ground rockets, gun damage, I cannot be categoric. I must admit I would have thought a penetrating rocket would make a big mess with its HE once.

Also I would be unable to tell which nationality fired the rocket but fortunately the person who annotated it could. : )

The first operational use of the RP was in the Western Desert as a "tank-busting" weapon on Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIEs and IVs. The 25 lb armour-piercing heads were found to be ineffective against the Tiger I tanks coming into German service. With the example of the success of Royal Artillery gunners using high-explosive shells from the 25 pdr gun-howitzer, it was decided to design a new 60 pound semi-armour-piercing (SAP) head. These were capable of knocking turrets off tanks.

Soon after some encouraging results from the initial deployment, trials of the weapon were conducted against targets representing U-Boats. It was discovered that if the rockets were fired at a shallow angle, near misses resulted in the rockets curving upwards in seawater and piercing the targets below the waterline. Soon Coastal Command and Royal Navy aircraft were using the rockets extensively. The first U-Boat destroyed with the assistance of a rocket attack was U-752 (Kapitän-Leutnant Schroeter) on May 23, 1943 by a Swordfish of 819 NAS. One rocket punched right through the pressure hull; the U-Boat was rendered incapable of diving and was scuttled by the crew. On May 28, 1943 a 608 Squadron Hudson destroyed a U-Boat in the Mediterranean, the first destroyed solely by rocket.[5]

From then until the end of the Second World War in Europe, Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm used the rockets as one of their primary weapons (alongside torpedoes, which, to a certain extent they replaced) against shipping and surfaced U-Boats.

A typical RP-3 installation was 4 projectiles on launching rails under each wing. A selector switch was fitted to allow the pilot to fire them singly (later omitted), in pairs, or as a full salvo. Towards the end of the war some RAF Second Tactical Air Force Hawker Typhoons had their installation adapted to carry an additional four rockets doubled up under the eight already fitted.[8]

Possibly the best known action involving RP-3s was that of the Falaise pocket of mid-August 1944. During the battle German forces, retreating to avoid being trapped in a pincer movement by Allied ground forces, came under air attack. Amongst the waves of light, medium and fighter bombers attacking the German columns the Typhoons of 2 TAF attacked with their rockets, claiming hundreds of tanks and "Mechanised Enemy Transport". However, after the battle Army and 2nd TAF Operational Research Sections studying the battleground came to the conclusion that far fewer vehicles (17 in total) had been destroyed by rocket strike alone. What was clear was that in the heat of battle it was far harder for pilots to launch the weapons while meeting the conditions needed for accuracy. Smoke, dust and debris in the target areas made accurate assessment of the actual damage caused almost impossible.[8]

However, it was also clear that the rocket attacks were devastating to the morale of the enemy troops: many vehicles were abandoned intact or with superficial damage and interrogation of captured prisoners showed that even the prospect of rocket attack was extremely unnerving.[8]

Wiki

Both fighter-bombers had, for their time, prodigious weapons- carrying capabilities. Both could lug up to a 2,000-lb bomb load, one 1,000-lb bomb under each wing. Typically, however, both operated with smaller loads.

A P47 would carry an external belly fuel tank and one 500-lb bomb under each wing; many were also configured so that the plane could carry air-to-ground rockets, typically ten 5-in HVARs (high-velocity aircraft rockets). P47s on an armed reconnaissance mission would usually operate three flights, two armed with a mix of bombs and rockets, and the cover flight carrying only rockets. Over 80 percent of the bombs dropped by P47s during the European campaign were 500-lb weapons; less than 10 percent were 1,000-lb bombs, and the difference was made up by smaller 260-lb fragmentation bombs and napalm.

While acknowledging the spectacular effects and destructiveness of rockets, the AAF considered bombs more effective for "road work" due to accuracy problems in firing the solid-fuel weapons.

The British, on the other hand, preferred rockets, the Typhoon carrying eight having 60-lb armor-piercing warheads. Possibly this difference of opinion stemmed from launching methods; the P47s

--15--

used "zero length" launchers while the Typhoons used launch rails. It could be expected that the rails would impart greater accuracy, stabilizing the rocket immediately after ignition until it had picked up sufficient speed for its tail fins to stabilize it. (There is, however, an interesting report from Montgomery's 21st Army Group that questions the alleged success that British air-to-ground rockets enjoyed against tanks and motorized transport.)

Besides their bomb and rocket payloads, the P-47 and the Typhoon both boasted powerful gun armaments. The Typhoon had four 20mm Hispano cannon. The P-47 carried eight .50 cal. machine guns with 400 rounds per gun, and it proved "particularly successful" against transports. The machine guns occasionally even caused casualties to tanks and tank crews. The .50 cal. armor-piercing bullets often penetrated the underside of vehicles after ricocheting off the road, or penetrated the exhaust system of the tanks, ricocheting around the interior of the armored hull, killing or wounding the crew and sometimes igniting the fuel supply or detonating ammunition storage. This seemed surprising at first, given the typically heavy armor of German tanks. Yet Maj. Gen. J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins, Commander of First Army's VII Corps, was impressed enough to mention to Quesada the success that P-47s had strafing tanks with .50 cal. machine gun fire.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-H-DDay/index.html

And yes this is the famous claim for tank-busting HMGs

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Firstly as pointed out previously averages can only take you so far.

that's naturally true.

What is BF and players are most interested in is what is the likelihood of a single CAS mission destroying a tank and given the Mortain sortie rate the answer must be vanishingly small - but not impossible.

heh yes. the trials and battlefield reports are quite clear that things like rockets are far too inaccurate to hit individual tank size targets. the highest hit % i have ever seen for rockets is 2% (besides the 5% on field trials), and it's usually given to be aroud 0.1-0.5%. though when you have a number of planes firing full salvos at tank concentrations the inaccuracy may not matter that much.

if someone wanted to have historical CAS effects in CM, the CAS should just make non-veteran crews abandon their tanks. i am sure this would drive most players crazy, so i can't blame BFC if the crews don't behave in that way in CM

[Sgt Joch]

On the effectiveness of Tac Air and the overclaims of pilots, I will refer you to this article. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Russians sent survey teams to Iraq to determine the effectiveness of U.S. Air Power and its implications for the future.

As we all know from CNN, 50% of all Iraqi tanks were destroyed by air power, the truth was a bit different:

The Russians studied the Persian Gulf War and understand that the Iraqi Army prepared 700 artillery firing positions and 750 antiaircraft artillery positions (and occupied 200 and 250 of them respectively). The Iraqi army built entire reserve and dummy positions in the strongpoints of their motorized infantry and tank units. Iraqi radar operated from dummy SAM positions. The Iraqis built fiberglass mockups of weapons systems. They coated these with metallic paint and equipped them with heat emitters. The Iraqis also deployed inflatable mockups which have radar and thermal signatures analogous to the real systems. The Iraqis claim that up to 90 percent of the air strikes in the first week of Desert Storm were delivered against dummy positions and that the coalition had to conduct special training for flight crews during the war to improve their ability to differentiate between real and dummy systems.8 Deception efforts, employing dummy equipment and dust, can aid in drawing off PGM fires.

Interviews with U.S. officers and captured Iraqi officers indicate that the bulk of Iraqi ground combat vehicles were destroyed during the ground offensive. They were destroyed by helicopter-delivered PGMs, A-10 close air support aircraft and ground systems. The exception was the Iraqi 52d Armored Brigade which was caught on the move by A-10s on 12 January, before the ground offensive, during the attack on Khafji. There are solid indications that battle damage assessment (BDA) figures of aircraft kills against dug-in vehicles were exaggerated

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/deserted/deserted.htm

This is with modern fighters using PGMs flying over a desert.

As others have stated Tac Air destroyed few if any AFVs during Normandy:

1. pilots had great difficulty spotting stationary/camouflaged AFVs from the air and the Germans would often protect them with AA guns, making it a dangerous quarry to hunt;

2. the Germans would generally move at night when no air was around;

3. Tac Air preferred to patrol the rear areas where they could bag softer, easier targets like trucks or trains;

As many accounts show, the major effect of Tac Air was to delay the arrival of reinforcements and supply to the Normandy area, which had an operational, but not tactical effect. German Panzer divisions were able to get most of their AFVs to the front lines, most losses being due to breakdowns.

Even in the great Turkey Shoot in the Falaise gap, most of the AFVs that were found had been abandoned and destroyed by their own crew after they ran out of fuel or were caught in a traffic jam.

This is not revisionism, it is the consensus of all historians who have studied the empirical evidence.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

the primary effect was of course things other than destroying tanks. i don't think anyone is saying otherwise.

arguments become revisionism when "empirical evidence" is distorted to support conclusions about subjects it does not deal with.

for example none of the studies quoted deal with the subject of CAS probabilities to hit or damage tanks. i would understand some of the arguments if the quotes were from the more detailed studies (for example the similar WW2 era reports in "Air Power at the Battlefront" contain remarks about the effects of 500 kg bombs to tanks at different distances from the bomb craters) or from studies dealing with the actual subject (e.g. theoretical & recorded accuracy & effects of various CAS methods).

but as is the arguments draw their conclusions from data that does not deal with the subject. it's just like saying that M16 is so inaccurate that your chance of hitting a man size target is 0.001%, because it took x number of bullets per dead enemy in Vietnam.

[JonS]

... it's just like saying that M16 is so inaccurate that your chance of hitting a man size target is 0.001%, because it took x number of bullets per dead enemy in Vietnam.

That's actually a good analogy. The M16 might not be inaccurate as a rifle, but the system of < rifleman carrying an M16 > (or any other rifle) is wildly inaccurate.

In the case of CAS, bombs and rockets were effective when they hit tanks, but the system of delivering them was wildly inaccurate. Against softer targets that inaccuracy was somewhat mitigated by the area effect of HE weapons. But tanks are specifically designed to resist HE are effects.

[JonS]

for example none of the studies quoted deal with the subject of CAS probabilities to hit or damage tanks.

That's not entirely true. Gooderson's book deals with this, as do some of the OR reports, and various authors in addition to Gooderson have tackled this also.

[JonS]

For example if you look at the numbers gathered by the operations research teams around Mortain (as quoted earlier in this thread), of all found panzers the CAS was the cause of loss in 19.6% and 23.5%. :eek: for ground fire it was 43.5% and 35.3%. so the ratio between CAS and ground fire was 1:2 and 2:3. :confused:

of course Mortain would be an exceptional case, because of the high number of CAS sorties etc, but those numbers are still very high and i don't understand why they are used as examples of CAS ineffectiveness vs tanks.

Mortain is quoted because the pilots came back with extraordinary claims - many dozens of tanks destroyed in a single day by air attack alone. Those claims are utter nonsense, but it is nevertheless those claims that made it into a generation or two of post-war books, built the myth of the "Day of the Typhoons," and shaped the perception of the effectiveness of airpower against tanks at the battlefront.

(see also p.32-33 here)

[undead reindeer cavalry]

That's actually a good analogy.

it's nonsense, pure and simple.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

That's not entirely true. Gooderson's book deals with this, as do some of the OR reports, and various authors in addition to Gooderson have tackled this also.

well, perhaps i missed some quotes, but the OR study on Mortain does not deal with it (at least the version i have, perhaps it's not full, i need to check it out).

those claims that made it into a generation or two of post-war books

luckily it's 2011

and shaped the perception of the effectiveness of airpower against tanks at the battlefront.

heh, you give way too much credit to it. various misconceptions of airpower predates those books and 1944.

(see also p.32-33 here.

seems ok to me. of course the kill claims are too high, but it's to be expected.

[JonS]

well, perhaps i missed some quotes, but the OR study on Mortain does not deal with it (at least the version i have, perhaps it's not full, i need to check it out).

Reading a single report then trumpeting that it doesn't cure cancer and solve world hunger doesn't make for a particularly compelling argument.

No.2 ORS produced a whole slew of reports, not just one on Mortain. They've been compiled into this book. There were also other OR teams roaming about the place producing their own reports, and plenty of other authors and writers* - though not populist authors - have written on this too, over the last 10-5 years.

luckily it's 2011

Sure. but we still have muppets roaming about the place claiming Wittmann was killed by a 60-lb rocket Historical inertia is quite hard to shift.

seems ok to me. of course the kill claims are too high, but it's to be expected.

Sure. Excerpt that it's the official history. Except that the kill claims drive the conclusions. Except that that conclusion gets repeated ad-nauseam. But other than that; yeah, it's ok.

Jon

* Johnson's Spring 2000 article D+20 000 ; Still Fighting the Normandy Campaign is a good, though now decade-old, overview. See especially the section entitled "The Effect of Air Power", and the embedded references to additional reading.

[MikeyD]

I just got a chill down my spine. You guys aren't planning to argue about every scenario in the game being insufficiently 'typical' and 'representative', are you? Small unit actions, by their nature, are not 'typical'. They're specific to the circumstance. You can start complaining about 'typical' and 'representative' after you've averaged-out the results of the first dozen battles.

[JonS]

Noodling around for something else, I came across these two theses:

http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape17/PQDD_0013/MQ33804.pdf

http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ50093.pdf

Which are relevant to the "Real Ultimate AirPower is teh Bomb!" debate.

[crowbar]

sorry but I think the consensus view that CAS couldnt hit anything worth while (talking armour not softskins ) is overstated

tanks dont have to be completely or even physically incapacitated - take the case of platoon leader, first company, schwere panzer abteilung 503. By the logic so far anyone in a kingtiger in normandy would be pretty safe, but since tank commanders would really need to be unbuttoned on road marches Hans Fendensack is surely not the only tank commander mortally wounded by jabbos

[JonS]

anecdote != data

Also, are you honestly trying to claim that there was nobody to replace the object du jour of your affections, and the entire platoon was destroyed by the loss of the platoon commander? Further, are you honestly trying to make the case that tanks shot up - but not damaged - as part of a road move is in someway relevant to the contention that a/c were actually useless at destroying tanks in a tactical environment, even though the pilots claiming they destroyed (not damaged, not incapacitated, destroyed) hundreds?