Tactical employment of rifles/carbines in Normandy

[Dietrich]

Disclaimer #1: I am not a small-arms grog, nor am I an infantry tactics grog. I'm simply interested in how WW2 infantry combat actually happened (vis-à-vis how small-scale infantry tactics are described in manuals or depicted in movies).

Disclaimer #2: This thread is not for the purpose of arguing against any established principles (such as that most Western Front infantry casualties were caused by artillery) or promulgating much-ridiculed misconceptions ("MG42 wuz teh oober MG" =P).

German squad-level tactical doctrine held that the squad's MG was its primary weapon and most significant source of firepower and that the riflemen were to generally support the MG rather than engaging targets themselves. But does this mean that in actual combat Schützen/Grenadiere actually only rarely fired their rifles? True, it would take several squads' worth of riflemen to equal the firepower of a single MG42, but would the riflemen in any given squad generally refrain from firing their rifles aside from in the critical tactical circumstance of protecting the MG or the squad itself? Would a German rifleman's training make him disinclined to add a few aimed shots per minute from his 98k when the squad MG was meanwhile hard at work?

Just for shots and goggles (i.e., not with a view to supporting any claims about the weapon's capabilities or effectiveness), here's an MG42 video that some of you may not have seen: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N59msUnyy1g

I know much less about US Army or British Army squad-level tactical doctrine, so I won't presume to comment on such.

[SlapHappy]

One of the things often forgotten about the MG-42 is that in the heavy configuration they employed a 4x scope giving it some better level of firing accuracy at longer ranges.

https://www.mainemilitary.com/productcart/pc/viewPrd.asp?idcategory=160&idproduct=2421

[SlapHappy]

One historical book I read referred to the German infantry squad as nothing more than an oversized MG team with most squad members responsible for carting around extra MG ammo and providing security for the firer and loader.

Later, the squad added an additional MG. I'm hopeful that Battlefront will give the infantry squad the proper feel in the game to simulate this tactical doctrine.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

One historical book I read referred to the German infantry squad as nothing more than an oversized MG team with most squad members responsible for carting around extra MG ammo and providing security for the firer and loader.

Just as the entire US Army in WWII served simply to escort FO's from place to place.

[YankeeDog]

I think this is one of those questions that you can discuss for days, and in the end the answer will always be some variation of "it depends."

German doctrine certainly placed a much higher priority upon keeping the MG(s) operational and firing, and I certainly hope that the squad-level AI in CM:N reflects this. But I'm not sure I would say that the German rifleman should "rarely" fire his rifle. Less often than an American GI with a Garand, perhaps. How much less? It depends... what's the tactical situation? How's the squad ammo supply? How experienced is the soldier?

But, in general, when presented with a good target, and barring some other pressing assignment, I still think the German rifleman takes the shot.

[LongLeftFlank]

Veteran German units were also excellent at counterattacking and infiltration; the latter wasn't done piecemeal (single dude with knife in teeth) in the Russian or Japanese style, but often involved moving entire companies through a weakly secured perimeter (yes, the Russians and Japanese did this too, I know). Many an Allied platoon woke up after a hard day's fighting and a stressful night to find its newly won position isolated by MG crossfires and under close assault (potato mashers, SMGs). The Germans continued to bag a steady stream of Allied prisoners using such tactics well into 1945.

I am a little concerned that CM2's time-based program AI orders will actually be inferior to the CMx1 "capture the flag" based triggers at simulating the skill of the landser at spotting and ejecting overextended Allied units. I'd love it if "hidden flags" (i.e. player doesn't know he's triggered them until too late) could be (re)introduced to supplement the time-based orders.

[MikeyD]

U.S. in WWII had a hell of a time getting their infantrymen to fire their weapons. For one thing, there was often too much 'civilian' still in 'em to be comfortable shooting another man down. For another thing, in a high casualty environment a veteran rifleman soon learned that its not particularly healthy to attract undue attention. Not just due to enemy return fire. You pop a couple rounds at shadows from your foxhole at night and chances are half the company's going to get spooked and start area-firing in your general direction.

But lets not forget that solid 10-15% who will reliably use their weapon during an engagement, so it isn't entirely hopeless.

[Michael Emrys]

But, in general, when presented with a good target, and barring some other pressing assignment, I still think the German rifleman takes the shot.

I would add two points. One is that German riflemen were usually generously supplied with grenades and used them, so were not limited to a choice of firing their rifles or being passive spectators. Secondly, they were aggressive in close assault whether attacking or counter-attacking and used rifles, SMGs, grenades or whatever came to hand in the process.

Michael

[Secondbrooks]

But does this mean that in actual combat Schützen/Grenadiere actually only rarely fired their rifles? True, it would take several squads' worth of riflemen to equal the firepower of a single MG42, but would the riflemen in any given squad generally refrain from firing their rifles aside from in the critical tactical circumstance of protecting the MG or the squad itself? Would a German rifleman's training make him disinclined to add a few aimed shots per minute from his 98k when the squad MG was meanwhile hard at work.

The basic idea was that MG kept firing enemies as riflemen get closer, on offence. Based on German squad leader's guidebook riflemen had to/was preferred to get into charging distance without firing a single shot, while MG remained behind and kept suppressing enemies. From there on riflemen would try to finish the fight with SMGs, rifles, hand grenades, bayonets and stuff. If they had to start engaging their targets sooner, forexample as selfdefence or just because they wanted, their possibilities got much weaker. I would guess this is concept which easily gets understood so that MG is only shooter in squad... Which it is to certain point, but only to spare riflemen's ability to close in, to perform successful charge and finally emerge from close combat as victorious. However i'm not sure how it went in practice, how often supporting elements (including squad's LMG) were able to suppress opposition and grant riflemen possibility of closing in enemy safely. And how often riflemen were actually forced to fire their rifles earlier than preferred.

It isn't anything unique and atleast to me it seems that every nation's small unit tactics basically followed and still follows the same idea. German's just happened to have their beltfed LMGs which were pretty suitable for that job.

About infiltration, as LongLeftFlank said, Germans did try to find openings and used infiltration in bigger units. They rarely if ever tried to infiltrate small units close to enemy, but instead preferred more less subtle methods. I once read point's of view of one German ww2 General who served in ww1 in some crack stosstrupp-unit and he mentioned that he never did see/experienced infiltration at work with small units.

[scottie]

really interesting stuff guys, i could listen too you all day. Wish i knew enough to contrubute to be honest ! loved that MG42 vid too, makes the hairs on the back of the neck stand up !

[MikeyD]

Based on German squad leader's guidebook riflemen had to/was preferred to get into charging distance without firing a single shot

Huh, you've got to admit that pretty acurately mirrors CM. If your assaulting infantry starts exchanging fire from a distance the assault is basically doomed. The ideal situation is springing on top of a supressed enemy. These are of course offensive tactics where the MG supports the (primary force) infantry. The question is on the defensive is the MG considered the primary force and the infantry a support element?

[scottie]

just happened to catch a documentary on the history channel this evening talking about the effectiveness of MG42 fire during Pointe De Hoc 6th June 44. Tobruks and fields of fire were all laid out but because of pre-raid bombing and naval arty drastically changing the landscape the filed of fire were reduced to 2 , 5 , 10 metered at best .... MG42 was near useless against advances from small squads with small arms fire and lots and lots of cover .... granted i guess this was a special case that didnt happen that often.

[Secondbrooks]

Huh, you've got to admit that pretty acurately mirrors CM. If your assaulting infantry starts exchanging fire from a distance the assault is basically doomed. The ideal situation is springing on top of a supressed enemy. These are of course offensive tactics where the MG supports the (primary force) infantry. The question is on the defensive is the MG considered the primary force and the infantry a support element?

Yeah it's true. For pixelriflemen good assault seems to be pretty easy job. I must admit i fail pretty often to suppress opposition so well that riflemen wouldn't be forced to shoot back

There's not much talk about use of different squad's weapons in defense. In short: company's HMGs/LMGs are backbone of defense. Squad's LMG covers closer distances which artillery and HMGs can't, and that everyone in squad starts to fire enemy when it starts to attack (possibly means charge). Riflemen are naturally used in counterattacks, while some LMGs could be used as "silent guns" waiting enemy to be exposed and opening fire from very close ranges. And that's about it.

Overall guidebook seems to be pretty LMG centric and it discusses of squad leader's relations to squad's LMG pretty much. So MG is quite clearly German squad's main weapon.

[JonS]

It's somewhat anecdotal, but Jary relates an failed attack near Mt Pinchon in which his entire bn was halted all day by six HMGs (presumably MG42s), that were never spotted. I don't recall him mentioning any rifle fire, just crushing MG fire. (I don't think cas were all that high. Basically his bn all went to ground then stayed there through the rest of the day ... very un-CM-like )

[LongLeftFlank]

U.S. in WWII had a hell of a time getting their infantrymen to fire their weapons. For one thing, there was often too much 'civilian' still in 'em to be comfortable shooting another man down. For another thing, in a high casualty environment a veteran rifleman soon learned that its not particularly healthy to attract undue attention. Not just due to enemy return fire. You pop a couple rounds at shadows from your foxhole at night and chances are half the company's going to get spooked and start area-firing in your general direction.

But lets not forget that solid 10-15% who will reliably use their weapon during an engagement, so it isn't entirely hopeless.

Any sources, other than the "now-utterly-discredited-and-savagely-stomped-to-death-on-these-boards-and-many-others" S.L.A. Marshall? If you think I'm joking, do a forum search on his name, or Google SLA Marshall discredited.... Kind of liked the guy's observations in "A Soldier's Load", personally, but take him with a HUGE grain of salt.

[JonS]

Any sources, other than the "now-utterly-discredited-and-savagely-stomped-to-death-on-these-boards-and-many-others" S.L.A. Marshall?

Yes.

Read the whole thing - it's very interesting - then follow that up with a dash of French (Raising Churchill's Armies) and Harrison-Place (Military Training in the British Army) to find out more about who Wigram is/was.

[Battlefront.com]

One of the primary reasons a rifleman wouldn't fire his rifle is a rather simple one... LOS/LOF works two ways Which means that if a rifleman took up a position and spent the time aiming, this meant that the enemy could be doing exactly the same thing. It's the same reason why a whole battalion could be held up by a couple dozen men firing a half dozen MGs. Even brave soldiers understand that the odds of being hit are irrelevant because you never care about the 9999 bullets that miss, only the 1 that hits. If you're unlucky, the 1st bullet could be the last you, as an individual, ever experiences. Smart soldiers shape the odds to be in their favor as best they can. This in turn requires caution, and caution often meant not firing one's weapon at a particular time.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

Yes, I am very familiar with the Wignam essay, which makes sense to me. I was referring to the oft-cited SLAM "statistic" about only 15% of GIs ever firing their rifles in action which has been generally disproven. The "gutful" men Wignam speaks of who do the bulk of the killing speaks to a different (more accurate) dynamic. This is the "union road crew" efffect -- 3 guys work, the rest watch ("provide covering fire") from cover.

The participation of the "sheep" is much as described by Steve - dependent on the perceived level of personal danger. I'm sure 8 out of 10 unwounded squaddies will happily pour rounds into a routed enemy.

[Ron]

It's somewhat anecdotal, but Jary relates an failed attack near Mt Pinchon in which his entire bn was halted all day by six HMGs (presumably MG42s), that were never spotted. I don't recall him mentioning any rifle fire, just crushing MG fire. (I don't think cas were all that high. Basically his bn all went to ground then stayed there through the rest of the day ... very un-CM-like )

This reminded me of something else - SMOKELESS powder and will it be simulated in CM Normandy?

[JonS]

Yes, I am very familiar with the Wignam essay, which makes sense to me. I was referring to the oft-cited SLAM "statistic" about only 15% of GIs ever firing their rifles in action which has been generally disproven. The "gutful" men Wignam speaks of who do the bulk of the killing speaks to a different (more accurate) dynamic. This is the "union road crew" efffect -- 3 guys work, the rest watch ("provide covering fire") from cover.

AFAIK, SLAMs work hasn't been disproven, as such. More that his methods have been shown to be, er, highly creative. I actually felt that Wigram's letter supported SLAMs conclusions rather well - his 'six gutful men' is quite similar to the number of active participants SLAM proposes. Wigram's is more nuanced - he talks about the flat out useless, the gutful men, and the ones in the middle, but overall I thought they were quite complimentary.

[LongLeftFlank]

I see where you're coming from, but you could only equate the two if you assumed Wigram's "middle" group never fired (i.e. are part of that 85% of SLAM "non-firers"), just follows the "gutful" group passively, which is not what Wigram said exactly.

Six gutful men who will go anywhere and do anything, 12 `sheep' who will follow a short distance behind if they are well led, 9-6 who will run away.

"Following behind" isn't a recipe for effective participation, granted, but it doesn't mean they won't ever fire if the opportunity arises. In fact, his suggested "battle drill" in which combat sections were to be built around Brens and reliable men suggests he thought that the "sheep" could be motivated to be more active fighters (at the end of the essay he recommends the cowards simply be left out of battle).

[AslakH]

Never had the problem of "non shooters", at least not from my experience.

Might be different with Mausers and Garands.

[JonS]

... you could only equate the two if you assumed Wigram's "middle" group never fired ...

... OR if you assume that SLAM over-egged his pudding to make a point.

SLAM viewed soldiers as binary entities - either they participated fully everytime, or not at all ever. Wigram didn't see or describe that kind of on/off duality, I don't really believe it, and the studies on combat exhaustion don't support it.

[Wodin]

I read a novel called Beardless Warriors written by a USA WW2 vet...thats where I first read that not all soldiers fired their rifle and the ones that did only a few where aimed shots...

Yes I know it's a novel but I expect he used his own wartime experiences...until then I always thought that all soldiers would have fired away....

Anyway it's a damn fine novel for anyone who fancies a read...and I dont usually get my info from novels or films either...so don't start

[Alchenar]

Mark Hastings makes the obvious point in that even if the work in combat was done by about 10% of the soldiers, the other 90% need to be there to soak up enemy fire so that the 'gutful' guys can do their thing.

Can you model this in CMx2? Um... possibly, given that the aggressive guys are usually going to be located in the same squad and you can fiddle with stats fairly easily that way however the rest of the game doesn't really model well the kind of things that result in these people making a difference.

At least, not unless you want to adopt a plethora of changes along the lines of '90% of units cannot be issued target orders only 'face' orders' and so on. But then your game stops being a game and starts being a procedurally generated video.

If you want the 'gutful men' experience go buy Men of War. Actually go buy Men of War anyway, it's a great game. But if you want Company Level command then you have to start averaging things out.