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Reactive Armor for Strykers in 2010:


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The distance between the cage and hull is not inconsiderable. You've got to remember what you're looking at it almost the size of a school bus. I've seen an old photo of a soldier standing in the gap!

Well, unless someone with access to a Stryker is willing to pull out a measuring stick and give us exact measurements it's hard to know for sure. But based on the image you posted, and the crude measuring I can do on my computer screen, it appears to me that the gap between the slat armor and the hull is substantially below a full meter in most areas, and might be a full meter or more only in a few outlier spots, such as the top of the slat cage on the bow. I should also note that my figure of a meter is deliberately conservative; everything I've read suggests you actually need a stand-off distance of more than this to have any real effect on the penetration capability of most modern HEAT rounds.

Perhaps this stand-off distance would help against older or improvised shaped charges; I've heard of insurgents making crude shaped charges by packing plastique into metal cans. It might also help prevent casualties or damage in the interior of the Stryker from less sophisticated explosive devices that rely on simple blast power, rather than a HEAT penetration jet. In the case of simple explosive devices, any gap at all between the detonation and the hull dramatically reduces interior effects. But it's just not going to have enough of an effect to stop any modern HEAT round from penetrating the relatively light armor on a Stryker.

Again, just speaking of the stand-off effect here. The slat cage may have other effects that interfere with the ability of at least some types of HEAT rounds to either detonate, or effectively form a penetration jet.

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Greetings to all you Stryker people, and everyone else.

I have a question I would like to submit for your consideration:

Given that infantrymen are operating in close with the Stryker, would the application of ERA prove a hazard to the Infantry near the vehicle?

For example: Infantry are deploying from their Stryker when the vehicle is hit, the ERA activates, and explodes to neutralize the incoming round. Would the infantrymen deploying from the vehicle be in danger from a blast effect, or fragments?

I had read on FAS.org about the BMP-3: "A French SNPE ERA kit and others are available for use on the BMP-3. However, during dismounted troop movement ERA would be a hazard. Thus, passive armor is more likely and ERA application is doubtful."

Would this statement also apply to the Stryker?

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First generation Israeli-type ERA could certainly be lethal! I've seen picts of an impression of the backplate of an exploded ERA box impressed into an M48's armor! Later generation, especially Bradley-type ERA seems to have much less explosive force, only enough to get the job done. Here's an old pict of an exploded Bradley ERA box. It looks like the detonation didn't even blow the outer cover off.

BradleyvsRPG.jpg

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As I said earlier... the slat armor isn't going to do much against some types of rounds simply because whatever benefit early detonation gives it isn't enough since the armor is relatively thin. The way to think of it is this (I'm using very quickly got numbers from Google!).

Penetrating capability: 750 RHA

Underlying Armor: 250 RHA

When you look at my estimated numbers you can see that standoff distance would have to be better than optimal since you'd need the base armor to be more than tripled in effectiveness against the RPG-29.

Versus RPG-7V (original HEAT) it's easy to see why it works because the penetration capability is about 300 RHA, which means the slat armor has to do very little to be effective. The RPG-7VL (modern HEAT) is still within the realm of possibilities as it is 500 RHA. Bad approach angle, manufacturing flaws, solid hit on the slat armor... I can see it being effective. RPG-7VR (modern Tandem) is similar to the RPG-29.

You can see this all in the game by choosing better Syrians and going with the higher Equipment settings. They'll get things like the RPG-29 and RPG-7VR, while the bulk of Syrians get the older and less effective round.

BTW, here's an announcement of the ERA contract:

http://www.upi.com/Security_Industry/2009/05/27/GD-to-manufacture-Stryker-reactive-armor/UPI-58191243453991/

Steve

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You can see this all in the game by choosing better Syrians and going with the higher Equipment settings. They'll get things like the RPG-29 and RPG-7VR, while the bulk of Syrians get the older and less effective round.

I am a believer in that statement! i have played against the Syrians placed on "Normal" quality and for the most part both the Bradley and M1 can shrug off hits from RPGs. I recently played a QB with the Syrians on "Excellent". Lost 3 of my 4 M1s and in another QB I lost 2 Bradleys (w/ERA), one of which caused a catastrophic explosion killing several dismounted troops and a hapless BMP that had strayed too close! After both games I scowered the battlefield in search of this new secret super weapon only to find that they were RPG-7s! Needless to say I was suprised and am now the wiser.

It's always cool to see the extra detail that BFC puts into thier product. Even if I have to be on the recieving end to see it!!:mad:

Good job BFC!

Steve

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I still dont see how this will work.

The slat cage isn't just the slat cage. From what I can see in photos its the cage, then a stand-off panel spaced out from the hull, then MEXAS tiles under that (ceramic plate backed by soft steel), then the main armor, then an interior spall liner.

BUT, I understand the very first RPG to hit a Stryker penetrated it. January 30 2004 in Mosul. RPG detonated against the front cage. 90 minutes later the crew found the engine was overheating. The RPG jet had got between the ceramic tile joints, pierced the bow and cut engine coolant lines. The occupants weren't even aware of it!

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The slat cage isn't just the slat cage. From what I can see in photos its the cage, then a stand-off panel spaced out from the hull, then MEXAS tiles under that (ceramic plate backed by soft steel), then the main armor, then an interior spall liner.

BUT, I understand the very first RPG to hit a Stryker penetrated it. January 30 2004 in Mosul. RPG detonated against the front cage. 90 minutes later the crew found the engine was overheating. The RPG jet had got between the ceramic tile joints, pierced the bow and cut engine coolant lines. The occupants weren't even aware of it!

I know what a slat cage is :-)

There are things, that I cannot discuss, that would really limit reactive armor from happening.

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SD_Smack,

Glad you liked getting your butt kicked. Fortunately there isn't a need for expensive therapy for that sort of thing :D

Clavicula_Nox,

Yup, the commander with more tools in his toolbox generally can handle a wider array of jobs better than one who has a choice between a hammer and a pair of pliers :D Even if the hammer fixes 60% of the problems out there (with duct tape to fix the fixes :D) and the pliers 20%, you're still looking at a significant slice where neither are going to work well. If the project at hand calls for a torque wrench... well... good luck with that :)

Plus, as much as it may seem sometimes, the thing in need of the tools doesn't decide what part to break based on what tools are not available. In warfare that is exactly what happens. You have a philipshead screwdriver? Well, then it's a flathead screw that needs to come off. Have a flathead screwdriver? Well, then it's a hex bolt that has to come off. Got a US socket set? Then it will be a metric head :) That's the benefit of the capabilities the US military, in particular, has amassed. It can not only handle more challenges from the enemy, but it can pose far more challenges than the enemy can deal with. I even include counter insurgency when speaking of the direct military implications.

Steve

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How well do you think the US military would perform against a task-organized pseudo-conventional army (like Hezbollah). I mean, especially when mentioning Hezbollah, in 2006, we saw the first ever defeat of a Western style conventional army at the hands of what was essentially a light infantry force. Do you think we would screw up the same way they did?*

*By "they", I don't mean the fighting man (and woman) of the IDF, who achieved every mission and objective handed to them, I, of course, mean the leadership who carried the idea that war on the cheap vis a vis air strikes was the right way to go.

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I paid close attention to the fighting in the summer of 2006 (June, IIRC) because we were still making CM:SF and it was the first time something like that had happened. I think the IDF did as well as their leadership, training, and expectations would allow. There was some pretty poor tactical decisions made based on bad strategic directives. But I think more than anything, over confidence in their own abilities and under appreciation of the enemy caused most of the tactical level problems. The US Army, if it went into that environment in 2000, would have probably done no better. The US Army now... big difference. IDF now, also a big difference. The news is out that the supposedly weak can do quite a bit of damage, suffer a lot of damage, and still remain capable.

Hezbollah was a nasty foe to tackle. They had been preparing for years in every way imaginable. Especially weaponry and training. They goaded Israel into attacking on their terms and, unfortunately, Israel took the bait thinking that they could squash them flat. The worst thing you can do is walk into a trap over confident that you're going to be able to get out of it. That's presuming that the IDF knew it was a trap. I don't see how they couldn't have known. I mean, Hezbollah all but put up posters and billboards saying so!

Steve

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Yeah, I was pretty busy at the time and didn't pay attention, but I've been trying to catch up and read about the whole thing. One of the things that I have consistently read was that the IDF's reservist system was unable to meet the demands placed on it, that the leadership was unwilling to commit troops, and that, like you said, Hezbollah had completely and totally prepared for the war (and it showed).

I was pre-occupied with school, but do you have any idea how the Hezbollah campaign contrasted with the recent Hamas campaign?

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Thanks for reminding me about the political/social problems with the reserve system. The US military has that a little bit, as it should, but apparently in Israel it seems it basically means reserves are second line unless it's a do-or-die conflict.

I haven't read any detailed 3rd party expert accountings of the move against Hamas. However, clearly Hamas was not as well prepared as Hezbollah. Not surprising given the various factors of time, money, and opportunity between the two. The operation overall, however, failed to better the situation for Israel since it is a symptom of the problem only. Obliterating massive amounts of already impoverished civilian infrastructure doesn't win any hearts and minds inside or outside of the territories. But as a military op it appeared to go much better than Lebanon, but it was a totally different fight.

Steve

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All in all, Steve's about right. Hamas wasn't as well armed and prepared as Hezbollah, and it seems they bought into their own propaganda and over-estimated their capacity to cause the IDF damage. In addition, the IDF was far better prepared mentally for the fight. The head of the armed forces, Gabby Askenazi is a former infantry man, as opposed to the then head, Dan Halutz, a former fighter pilot. They did not go in thinking they could just bomb their way to victory. In addition, the overall commitment of forces was far more immediate and overwhelming, no staggered deployments, trying to win it on the cheap. For the IDF this was a lot about regaining respect and deterrence.

Another big factor was that there was absolutely no restraint put on the IDF by the political tier in terms of civilian casualties, as opposed to the 1996 war in which the IDF started out careful (until they gradually lost all restraint, peaking at the despicable dropping of cluster bombs in the last days of the war, for absolutely no real military purpose). This time around, from the very top, all the way down, the message to the troops was "don't let civilians stand in the way of you being safe or of your mission being completed". This has since been verified time and time again in the Israeli press (especially Haaretz), and by reservists and even some regular army soldiers. This accounts for the massive civilian casualties and for phenomena like the usage of WP shells in a densely populated city.

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WP is not classified as a chemical weapon by the Chemical Weapon Convention, but still, it is an incendiary. Its use for illumination, screening and destruction of enemy elements is absolutely legal. It is its deliberate use against civilians that is prohibited by the Geneva Convention.

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