Questions about WWII infantry for CMx2

[dan/california]

Camo nets could be an effective solution though, because unlike trenches they are relatively cheap and easy for the defender. Furthermore they don't create ready made positions for the attacker when they are left unoccupied. So give the defender a lot more camo nets than he has trenches and you can keep the attacker guessing. They don't have mesh perfectly with the trench, they just have COVER it, or its absence.

[Runaway!!!]

Steve, you're confused again. I will discuss trenches with you. That doesn't mean I will have a personal discussion with you. Personal attacks are not welcome. Nor is your endless psycho-analyzing... you're extremely unqualified for it. It's not just me, how many pages did you spend on Redwolf in this thread while he excercised enormous patience in ignoring you? (Which you took as invitation to bother him some more, on personal scores again. lol.)

You have to get it through your head that you cannot solve arguments or disagreements by personally attacking someone or writing little essays about how people are obsessive or have ego's, or are too young and think time is endless, or whatever cockameemee crap you spout... anything but the substance of the issue. Which was what again? Trenches.

If you want to talk about trenches, go ahead and ask a little straight forward question and I'll answer you. But your personal analysis essays are not welcome nor impressive. And I think they say much more about the writer than the subject.

Flame war!!!

Hold off untill I get some popcorn and my 3D glasses. :cool:

[McIvan]

C3K,

Already answered on previous page It's basically the same as the "lid" idea. Definitely not going to happen.

Steve

Re the lid & camou net idea.......what if you just had camou netting over the trenches as a "flavour" object, with no other function than to make it quite hard for players zooming over the battlefield to see the trench underneath...obviously only really effective with trenches in cover. No flag re visibility or not, just an object like powerlines or whatever.

Not a solution, but an aid to immersion....and people casually looking over the landscape might well miss the trenches.

[Dietrich]

because of the weapons mix I expect that troops will have a lot harder time firing back effectively at someone firing at them with a MG.

It is reasonable to suppose that this is a matter of psychology as well as technology? In other words, a GI wielding his trusty M1 Garand in the face of short but frequent bursts of suppressive fire from an MG42 (which had been spotted only because of its muzzle flash) pops up from behind cover, snaps off two rounds at where he had seen the MG42's muzzle flashes, then ducks back down, in which amount of time the MG42 had fired about 15 rounds.

A US Army instructional film demonstrated the somewhat poorer accuracy of the MG34 and MG42 compared with the M1919 and the M2. The film showed a GI taking cover and thinking to himself about the MG42 heard firing in the near distance, "Well, so what if it has a high rate of fire?" I've heard it both ways: Some say that the MG42's reputation is more hype than anything else and that its high rate of fire yielded a waste of ammo to accomplish that which could be achieved with fewer rounds per minute, whereas others say the sound of it made them quake in their boots and its firepower pinned entire companies at a time (see the paraphrase of Sydney Jary earlier in this thread). As regards the average GI in Normandy taking cover while some nearby-but-yet-unspotted MG42 shreds the shrubbery, I think that likely what he actually was thinking was more along the lines of "Holy @#$%, that thing puts out a lotta lead!"

(I'm only going on about this because it pertains to infantry and to CMx2.)

The MG42, like the MG34 and Kar 98k, fired a round (7.92x57mm) that was slightly larger and heavier than the .30-06 Springfield round fired by the M1 Garand. As such, and with the MG42's much higher rate of fire than contemporaneous MGs (like the M1919 and Bren), I think it would be reasonable to suppose that it would be more capable of shredding light cover (as is simulated in CMSF by the gradual disappearance of trees and brush when under direct fire), perhaps even demolishing medium cover like brick walls and penetrating wooden house walls.

[Battlefront.com]

McIvan,

Not a solution, but an aid to immersion....and people casually looking over the landscape might well miss the trenches.

I doubt it For that to work they would have to be raised up off the ground, which gives them a 3D shadow (if that's on) or at least offers an easy way to see them from a camera angle like #4. Plus, the designer would have to put these down, not the player. There would also have to be TONS of them carefully placed in order to cover even a few trench lines.

It's not a bad idea, it's just one that consumes time and isn't likely to do anything to justify the effort.

Dietrich,

It is reasonable to suppose that this is a matter of psychology as well as technology? In other words, a GI wielding his trusty M1 Garand in the face of short but frequent bursts of suppressive fire from an MG42 (which had been spotted only because of its muzzle flash) pops up from behind cover, snaps off two rounds at where he had seen the MG42's muzzle flashes, then ducks back down, in which amount of time the MG42 had fired about 15 rounds.

Yes, exactly. This is already simulated in the sense that the soldier has to get into a firing position before he can use his weapon. If he uses it and is still getting torn up, he's not as likely to get up again for another shot. Or at least less likely. Contrast this with a soldier who gets up and puts a 40mm grenade near the MG and his buddies are all emptying their clips at the same time. Same amount of exposure time, probably different results.

BTW, that training video you speak of is a laugh a minute Good propaganda, but probably got a lot of newbies killed despite the vets saying "don't you dare believe a word that movie told you!".

It's no accident that all modern soldiers have automatic weapons of various types within the Squads and most have some form of reliable, easy to use grenade launcher. It's no accident that the Marines upped the ante with their M32. Firepower works

Steve

[c3k]

Lid: is there a difference if a "lid" (or camo net) is terrain based or vehicle based?

I know that your reasons for disallowing terrain lids are based on computation workload. But, it seems that that was purely an approach predicated on terrain. Meaning, everything in that approach was a piece of terrain, or a terrain mesh data point. My thought is to get away from making it a terrain item. The lid (camo net) can function like a vehicle insofar as the programming is concerned. Yeah, a vehicle with exceptions and special properties.

Right now, if the Blue team has an Abrams on the backside of a hill, I simply cannot see it. If it's on top of a brush tile, all I see is brush.

I'm talking about turning that on its head. If the "lid" is on the backside of a hill, all I can see IS the "lid" (camo net). I cannot see the trench underneath. Until, that is, I gain the top of the hill and get LOS to the "lid" then it is ID'ed and disappeared.

All the spotting routines would be identical to the current methodology of spotting vehicles. The terrain action spots would not change.

Drawback: a gamey player could plot movement points everywhere until he found one that disappeared. So what?

Anyway, is it possible to use a "lid" (man, I really like "camo net" better - it gives a more accurate feel), and have it function like a vehicle rather than change the terrain system?

Thanks.

[dan/california]

The M32s seem to inflict a vast percentage of the total casualties. Marines Module was worth it for that alone.

[Dietrich]

This is already simulated in the sense that the soldier has to get into a firing position before he can use his weapon. If he uses it and is still getting torn up, he's not as likely to get up again for another shot. Or at least less likely.

When you say "getting torn up", do you mean having rounds hit near him (near enough for a possible wounding ricochet) rather than being hit per se? If yes, makes sense to me.

Contrast this with a soldier who gets up and puts a 40mm grenade near the MG and his buddies are all emptying their clips at the same time. Same amount of exposure time, probably different results.

This implies that he fires off the 40mm while the MG's crew is being suppressed by his squadmates' "rock and roll", which is tactically sound. In other words, in this case it would be the MG experiencing greater suppression due to the volume of fire, even if that fire is of relatively small/light rounds (i.e., 5.56mm versus 7.62mm).

From what I understand, evidently the amount of lead on target has a more or less direct correlation with the degree of suppression. Hence the at least purported effectiveness of the MG34 and MG42 in this regard -- higher rate of fire equals more lead downrange.

BTW, that training video you speak of is a laugh a minute Good propaganda, but probably got a lot of newbies killed despite the vets saying "don't you dare believe a word that movie told you!".

Yet I continue to hear -- though not per se in the BFC forums -- dismissive, curiously snide comments (largely from guys who, as far as I can tell, are American) about how the MG42's high rate of fire translated actually into ammo wastage rather than significant firepower. However, I have read a certain US Army assessment from December 1944 (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/firepower/index.html).

(BTW, even Gunny R. Lee Ermy figures that the tests in that film were "weighted in our favor", as he says in a Mail Call segment about the MG42.)

It's no accident that all modern soldiers have automatic weapons of various types. ... Firepower works

Likewise, it was no accident that in December 1941 the Germans were dismayed to encounter ski-borne Red Army soldiers zooming out of the mist, hosing them with their handy little SMGs, then disappearing again.

[Lanzfeld]

I really like Dietrichs idea of a few guys in CM:N being able to break off from the MG team and run back to a MG bunker to get ammo and resupply the forward MG. I hope there are some stockpiles in CM:N. Shouldnt be a problem. Kinda like the Strykers now.

Dietrich, what did you mean when you asked about different TacAI responses depending on nationality? I am curious.

[Dietrich]

Lanzfield,

I was referring to how the TacAI would reflect squad-level tactics of different armies, in this case the Wehrmacht versus the US Army.

The German Gruppe (squad) was based on the MG (MG34 or MG42). The Gruppenführer (squad leader) directed the two-man MG team (gunner and loader), spotting with his binoculars and specifying targets. The riflemen were supposed to refrain from firing unless there appeared a more immediate and close-range threat than whatever the MG was engaging or unless given specific orders by the Gruppenführer or otherwise told to "fire at will." Thus, I reckon, in CMx2 terms a German squad would fire with just its MG under most circumstances, but if the guys in the squad spotted enemy troops nearby (within, say, 50m), the riflemen would open fire at that nearer threat, along with perhaps the Gruppenführer and his SMG. I'm not sure, though, what would be reasonable as far as how many of the squad's weapons in addition to the MG with Target versus Target Light. I suppose it would make sense for the riflemen to hold fire unless there's a enemy close by, since the MG is supposed to account for the lion's share of the firepower.

By contrast, the US Army rifle squad was based on the rifle -- ten men with M1 Garands, one with a Browning Automatic Rifle, and the squad leader with (typically) a Thompson SMG. In CMx2 terms, a US Army squad's TacAI would involve (I suppose) as many of the guys with LOF to enemy units firing at will (without targeting orders) or all firing at a specific target (with targeting orders).

[JasonC]

I have few dogs in this discussion, as (1) I've already pointed out the way to get unhidden field works to preserve some fog of war (provide more than needed, so their presence does not indicate an occupied position), and because (2) fog of war foxholes are still possible and would cover much of what is required beyond the workaround in (1).

But I do have quibbles with some of the points made in passing about firepower vs. field fortifications and what spotted enemy does and doesn't imply, the level of battlefield recon one can expect in Normandy conditions, the effect it had on allied firepower arms, etc. And a related issue that is important for this concerns purely protective infantry shelters ("dugouts"), as distinct from exposed fighting positions. Which ties in with previous discussions about log bunkers etc.

I return to the example position in front of St. Lo. If you bother to actually count them, you will find the defending battalion position has a little more than 350 dugouts indicated in the scheme, along with a little under 350 separate rifle pits, and a dozen or so heavier weapon pits. The dugouts are not just foxholes. Rifle pits are, those are exposed from above and meant as fighting positions. Some of the dugouts have MG fire indicators, those are effectively log bunkers. But many, the majority, do not, and they are protective positions with their own associated rifle pits or other fighting positions (along a hedgerow, a sunken lane, etc).

Why do they have both? Because the dugouts are proof against 105mm artillery from above. I've explained the standard all armies used to protect infantry against 105mm artillery since WW I. It works, men in cover that prepared can ride out a shelling by 105mm artillery (or 81mm mortars etc), without suffering any appreciable casualties. At worst, an occasional position will be buried and require assistance from friends to dig out of. Such positions are *not* proof against a *direct hit* by *155mm* or large shells. But operationally, that is of no consequence. I will demonstrate why shortly.

The defenders can be in one of two basic postures. They are either manning their rifle pits, with at least 1 man each, or they are in their dugouts, with typically 2 men in each.

How exposed are they in either case, to enemy artillery fire falling on the position?

First, we can dispense immediately with the notion that exact location of an specific dugout or rifle pit matters in the slightest. The size of barrage beaten areas the attackers are going to use are 200 by 200 meters minimum, with 400 by 400 meters much more common. The entire position is 1000 meters by 1250 meters. The field fortifications systematically avoid field interiors and the shells cannot do so. Very large portions of the shells fired are going to fall in open areas and do nothing, whether the attackers know where the defenders are, or not.

Suppose the attackers toss 155mm shells into the entire 1000 x 1250 area at random, while men are in their dugouts. Assume the vulnerable footprint of a single dugout is 6 square meters (3 by 2) for a direct hit. Then the chance of an individual 155 shell hitting any dugout directly is 1 out of 625. The attackers might have the support of a single 155mm howitzer battalion, which might fire 500 shells a day. But be generous and double both figures (2 battalions, 1000 per day each), and then fire for 2 days, as well. They will hit 6 or 7 dugouts and kill 12-14 men. Competely inconsequential losses to a full infantry battalion, entirely incommensurate with the ammo expenditure, not anything the attackers will voluntarily repeat, etc.

If the attackers are also supported by 4 battalion equivalents of 105 (div arty and cannon companies of 2 regiments) each firing much more often, 2500 rounds a day, it won't raise the losses at all really, since the men are by hypothesis in 105mm proof cover. Maybe a handful of additional losses, 20-25 men, for a huge firepower expenditure.

Now instead suppose the men are in their fighting positions. Supposed that they are somewhat exposed through time, such that any 105mm round landing within 5 meters of their specific hole has a 50% chance of causing a casualty. Then the portion of 105mm shells close enough will be 1 in 45 fired, and the losses half of that. Even without the 155mm support, the 105mm support postulated above will be enough to inflict 110 casualties per day, 220 over the two day period. The defending battalion will bleed to death on the position, its morale likely breaking in days and certainly bled to ineffectiveness within a week. Being no further located than in the right grid-square.

Moral of the analysis - 105mm proof dugout cover is not foxhole cover. 105mm proof dugout cover *defeats* firepower-only attacks. Trumps them cold.

But located and manned fighting positions can be bled white on a time scale of days using firepower based attacks.

Moral - the purpose of combined arms attacks by infantry are to force the enemy to man his actual fighting positions and get out of his bomb-proof dugouts.

Note that the defender can achieve the same relationship by simply denuding his front line of more than a token 10th of his force at once, in any region not pressed. If his rear area positions are completely unlocated they don't even need to be shell proof. But cellars and such will generally be both unlocated and shell proof, if far enough from the front line. Again the threat of attack by maneuver arms is required to force the enemy to expose himself enough, that firepower arms have anything to "bite" on.

For these tactical relationships to hold in a game, the following are essential.

(1) artillery needs to be a blunt intrument, hitting wide areas not individual point targets.

(2) shell proof forms of cover must exist. They need not be positions one can fight from, for more than a few heavy weapons bunkers. But positions that protect ordinary squad infantry from 105mm caliber artillery, *totally*, need to exist. (Cellars, bunkers, dugouts, caves, call them whatever).

(3) It is *not* necessary that all forms of cover be unspotted by the attacker. He has to *not know* whether any given cover type that *is* vulnerable to artillery, is actually *manned* or not, or not know where it is. This can be accomplished by giving the defender more than enough of such forms of cover, or by making them hidden, or any mix of the two.

Artillery *could* destroy concentrated defenders on an entire grid-square, without muss or fuss, *if* and *only if* those defenders lacked overhead cover against a 105mm round.

In practice, German defensive schemes in Normandy worked and kept allied firepower arms to about 1/3rd of their war-long average effectiveness, by employed thinned schemes from side to side across the frontage. What do I mean by a thinned scheme? I mean real positions interspersed with dummy positions and obstacles.

Sector A has a position like the nose depicted in the diagram. Sector B is just mined and has mortars registered over it. Sector C is flooded. Sector D is mined and has a less extensive infantry position behind it. Sector E is empty on the same depth, but has a minefield a half-kilometer further south. Sector F parallels E but with a full infantry position again. Etc.

If the Americans try to use artillery ahead of infantry across all sectors, half of it will be utterly wasted on sectors with no infantry defenders present, to speak of. If they advance broad front on all sectors with infantry, they will be chopped to pieces on a third of the frontage where they hit full positions, breaking up inter-unit coordination. They will only be delayed and annoyed on the other portions, but will at best lap around extra sides of the full position "blocks". Meanwhile another such staggered positions of reals and dummy will be built 1-2 km further south, and the whole game repeated on a time scale of 2-5 days.

That sort of thing needs to be possible. But can probably be accomplished by (1) hidden foxholes plus (2) some form of dugout-cellar-log bunker cover allowed plus (3) when trenches are present, giving the Germans way more of them than needed to hold their manpower.

Fog of war was implemented decently with just dummy counters before computer double-blind was practical. Extra field fortifications can do the same.

But, big but, there needs to be some way to put an infantry squad in something that will let it utterly ignore a wide 105mm barrage, and emerge unscathed from it, to hit infantry following the barrage.

For what it is worth.

[C'Rogers]

Wow, between this and the 'what does the picture of a Tiger mean' thread, quite a lot of fast paced discussions/arguments over very little about CM:Normandy.

As a note to people who are concerned about multiplayer competitiveness with visible trenches, why not just have more bunkers, less trenches? It isn't like the trench was the be all/end all defense in CMx1 and the defender couldn't hope to play without it.

Anyone else looking forward to when they post the first picture of a Bren?

[ASL Veteran]

Seems like there is a lot of 'tilting at windmills' going on in this thread. Steve has already answered the questions as to the feasibility of having FOW with trenches and foxholes. Everything that followed after his initial answer to that question where he explained what was feasible and what wasn't is really just a waste of bandwidth and a bunch of whining imo . It's really just a matter of if a person that is contemplating the purchase of CM: Normandy will decide to still purchase it or not after hearing the explanation that was given. After the individual gamer sits down and makes that decision then just live with that decision and be done with it.

Quite honestly with Adam and Steve going at it .... wow. I mean, Steve at least has a horse in the discussion as he put a lot of blood sweat and tears into making the thing over the course of the last ten years. Adam? I don't honestly know what your horse is here. What is it? $45 and a few years of wargaming enjoyment? The reality is, Adam, that if you check what tactical combat simulators are on the market right now you will probably not find anything that comes close to Combat Mission x1 or x2. Now you can take a break and play company of heroes for a while and have some fun with that, or you can take Steve's explanation of the possible and the impossible and accept it. I assume that you enjoyed CMx1 since you seem to rave about it so at some level you have to believe that Steve, Charles, and yes even Dan and the rest have produced some quality products in the past. Why you don't account for the years of fun that you have already had with CMx1 products and say something along the lines of "okay Steve, I've really enjoyed your games and I accept your explanation of what's possible and what's not possible so in light of our discussion here I'm going to take a pass on all things CMx2 until this issue is addressed." You like CMx1? Great, just keep playing it then. I think that's why Steve is getting frustrated. You like CMx1 so just play it. He's explained what the limitations are. Accept the limitations for what they are and move on.

I didn't buy Shock Force until just a few months ago. I heard that it was real time and so I opted out. I didn't hang around the forums whining about it. I just kept playing CMx1 and Total War, along with some other stuff. I checked the forums later and saw they had We Go back in so I bought it. See, it's pretty simple stuff. Steve doesn't owe you anything. BFC makes a game and you can choose to buy it or not - it's entirely up to you. Steve is certainly not holding a gun to your head and stealing 45 bucks out of your pocket.

Now then, regarding the FOW keep in mind that it is only Trenches and Foxholes ... only. Steve indicated that there will be improved sandbagged positions as well as bunkers / pill boxes that can be used in defense that DO have FOW. So, you could spend your time merrily bombarding that unoccupied trench line and then stumble into a hidden bunker. Ouch. Anyway, I just want to mention to Steve that I think sometimes you defend the game a little too vigorously. Sometimes I wish you would just answer Adam's question and be done with it. Let others continue the discussion as far as that goes because others will carry the discussion forward. If someone keeps asking repetitive questions maybe just a simple "Asked and answered" would be fine .

Incidentally, I would also like to add that if any of you have been to other game forums the level of interaction we have with the guys doing the ACTUAL CODING is probably damn near unprecedented. In case anyone thinks I'm a Fanboi, just look in the archived threads and you should see that Steve and I have had some disputes - I was even forced to acknowledge he was right one time and I did actually apologize to him on the forum . Yet, overall I still think my larger point was actually correct - he did get me on the smaller point so I had to admit it (it was regarding targeting and hit probability in one of the accuracy threads).

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[McIvan]

etc etc.....I think that's why Steve is getting frustrated. You like CMx1 so just play it. He's explained what the limitations are. Accept the limitations for what they are and move on....etc etc

Impossible is just a big word thrown around by small men who find it easier to live in the world they’ve been given than to explore the power they have to change it.

Impossible is not a fact. It’s an opinion. Impossible is not a declaration. It’s a dare.

Impossible is potential. Impossible is temporary. Impossible is nothing.

In other words, quite seriously, if you make enough noise about a problem, sometimes sufficient thought gets thrown at it to come up with an unexpected answer.

Sometimes it doesn't.

But don't ask, don't get. And what we want to get is the best damn Normandy simulator ever made, and one that is fun to boot.

[Battlefront.com]

Dietrich,

When you say "getting torn up", do you mean having rounds hit near him (near enough for a possible wounding ricochet) rather than being hit per se? If yes, makes sense to me.

Yes.

This implies that he fires off the 40mm while the MG's crew is being suppressed by his squadmates' "rock and roll", which is tactically sound. In other words, in this case it would be the MG experiencing greater suppression due to the volume of fire, even if that fire is of relatively small/light rounds (i.e., 5.56mm versus 7.62mm).

Yes. What I was saying is that a big difference in WWII is when something like a MG42 opens up on a US Rifle Squad the firepower they have to return on that MG42 isn't great per second of exposure. Compare a Marines Rifle Squad in CM:SF given the same situation against an PKM. Vastly different volume of fire coming from the Marines Rifle Squad.

Yet I continue to hear -- though not per se in the BFC forums -- dismissive, curiously snide comments (largely from guys who, as far as I can tell, are American) about how the MG42's high rate of fire translated actually into ammo wastage rather than significant firepower. However, I have read a certain US Army assessment from December 1944 (http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/firepower/index.html).

Oh, there were definitely problems with the MG42's relentless appetite for ammo. The Germans noted this during the final phase of the war when training standards weren't as high as before. A jumpy gunner could go through a lot of ammo really quick! The Germans post war downgraded the RoF to about 900 rpm IIRC. Still much higher than other MGs of similar class, but lower than the MG42's 1200 rpm. The reason was they figured 900 did what it needed to do with lower ammo usage.

Lanzfeld,

I really like Dietrichs idea of a few guys in CM:N being able to break off from the MG team and run back to a MG bunker to get ammo and resupply the forward MG. I hope there are some stockpiles in CM:N. Shouldnt be a problem. Kinda like the Strykers now.

Unfortunately, this gets us onto a slippery slope of sorts. However, it's entirely possible that we'll allow something like this.

Steve

[akd]

I return to the example position in front of St. Lo. If you bother to actually count them, you will find the defending battalion position has a little more than 350 dugouts indicated in the scheme, along with a little under 350 separate rifle pits, and a dozen or so heavier weapon pits. The dugouts are not just foxholes. Rifle pits are, those are exposed from above and meant as fighting positions. Some of the dugouts have MG fire indicators, those are effectively log bunkers. But many, the majority, do not, and they are protective positions with their own associated rifle pits or other fighting positions (along a hedgerow, a sunken lane, etc).

Why do they have both? Because the dugouts are proof against 105mm artillery from above. I've explained the standard all armies used to protect infantry against 105mm artillery since WW I. It works, men in cover that prepared can ride out a shelling by 105mm artillery (or 81mm mortars etc), without suffering any appreciable casualties. At worst, an occasional position will be buried and require assistance from friends to dig out of. Such positions are *not* proof against a *direct hit* by *155mm* or large shells. But operationally, that is of no consequence. I will demonstrate why shortly.

To elaborate, the "dugouts" marked on this map are likely shelters and firing positions dug into the hedgerows themselves. Hedgerows could provide three levels of defense, all taking advantage of their natural structure.

(note that the core was not soil, but rock and roots)

The first level would be simply lying prone in the shallow 1-2 ft. deep ditches in between the hedgerow and its enclosed field or a road, or taking up positions in the de facto "trenches" (drainage ditches, wagon paths) that might exist between two adjacent lines of hedgerows.

Hasty firing positions could be assumed looking over the top of the hedgerow through gaps in the vegetation.

The next level would be digging foxholes into the bottom of the ditches and cutting firing steps into the hedgerow itself. This would effectively create a series of firing positions connected by a shallow slit trench.

The big disadvantage to both of the above would be vulnerability to artillery and--especially--mortars air bursting overhead in the trees and vegetation on top of the hedgerow.

The only way to avoid this was the third level of defense, tunnelling laterally into the hedgerow itself. Given enough time, sleeping shelters and even fighting positions could be constructed this way. I've only seen reference to German positions with this level of fortification.

The rolling terrain between the Douve and Merderet was Normandy hedgerow country at its worst. Except for the flat marshy bottomlands along the rivers and a few small wooded areas, the entire countryside was cut into small pastures, fields, and orchards, each with its inevitable hedgerow border. The hedgerows consisted of solid earth banks several feet high and mounted by another four or five feet of hedge-a mass of bush, vine, and bramble. Frequently there was a double hedgerow, with a drainage ditch between, thus forming a natural trench. The enemy made good use of the hedgerows, building up his resistance line directly behind them. Each hedgerow formed a natural breastwork high and thick enough to provide cover, concealment, and good fire positions. Adequate protection against mortar and artillery fire could be obtained with an L-shaped foxhole dug into the embankment and laterally along the axis of the row. Automatic weapons were usually emplaced at the corners, where they could cover the open field in front and enfilade the hedgerow lines of approach.

Each hedgerow became a separate objective, each enclosed field a battleground, and the line of advance was often determined more by the configuration of the hedgerows than by the contour of the terrain. Observation was limited to a few hundred yards or less. Antitank guns had poor fields of fire. Control was difficult to maintain, and the maneuver of units hard to coordinate. Tanks could move across country only if preceded by dozers punching holes in the banks; and because of the tightness of these defenses, attacking infantry often had to advance to the very hedgerow behind which the enemy had established his defense in order to get at him. The battle was thus often joined at ranges of a few yards, and grenades had to be used to rout the enemy.

UTAH BEACH TO CHERBOURG

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 1990

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/utah/utah.htm

The 2d Division Takes Hill 192

The attack on this hill, only one part of the larger operation east of the Vire directed at St-Lo, nevertheless tended to overshadow all other achievements of the first day's battle. This was due to the success of the 2d Division against what had become the most noted strongpoint in the German defensive lines facing First Army. On 12 June, the 2d Division had reached the Elle River, one mile away from the hill, and had launched a drive halted during the next two days by fierce resistance of the 3d Parachute Division. On 16 June, the 2d Division had tried again, in attack by all three regiments abreast. The 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry drove the enemy halfway up the forward slope of Hill 192, but was withdrawn when it could not dislodge the Germans from their well dug-in positions. The attacks had cost the 2d Division 1,253 men. Since then, this dominating height had remained a thorn in the flank of First Army's salient toward Caumont. Its tactical importance lay in giving the enemy observation over the whole countryside from the Vire to Caumont, including all approaches to St-Lo, as well as the rear areas of V Corps as far as the beaches. Any successful attack on St-Lo would have to deal with this position. (See Map 10.) During the period 16 June to 11 July, the 2d Division had worked on plans for capture of Hill 192, whenever attack might be ordered. Intensive training in infantry-tank tactics had been carried through and elaborate preparation for artillery and air support had been made. Artillery fire plans were based on numbered grid squares 100 yards to a side, designed to insure coordination of the supporting fires with infantry advance.

A tank-infantry-engineer team was devised for dealing with the hedgerow problem. The teams were trained to advance as a coordinated unit, each hedgerow representing a new line of departure. When the engineers had blown a hole for the tanks to pass through, the tanks would enter the field, fire their 75-mm guns into the corners, and spray the lateral hedgerow ahead to cover the infantry scouts advancing (in this case) along the axial hedges. These scouts would also be covered by BAR men. Two of the four demolitions men followed behind, and the engineers and the leader of the infantry squad would choose the best place for the tank to go through the next barrier. Special EE-8 phones were installed on the rear of the tanks and connected with the tank's interphone system for tank-infantry communication during action. Two engineers would stay with the vehicle to protect it during advance, scanning and firing at side hedgerows to keep down enemy bazooka teams. In the area close to the line of departure, hedgerow embankments were carefully scooped out on the American side, leaving a shell which the tanks could push through on the day of attack.

The terrain difficulties to be expected in the coming battle were essentially those normal to hedgerow fighting; Hill 192 as a "hill," presented no special problems other than the enemy's opportunity for observation from the higher ground. The slopes were gradual, rising about 150 feet in the 1000 yards from the 38th Infantry's line of departure to the flattish top. A large diamond-shaped woods lay on the southeast side, near the crest, and might be expected to figure prominently in the enemy's defensive plans. But the main advantages for the German defense lay in the ordinary dissection of the hill slopes and their approaches by an intricate pattern of hedgerowed fields and orchards. (For an example of this on the eastern slopes, see Map II.)

The enemy had not been neglecting his opportunity for organizing this terrain. As usual, he made no attempt to maintain a continuous defensive line, relying rather on a number of strong-points that could support each other by interlocking fires on all gaps. Alternate positions and support positions were prepared to the rear, making possible an elastic defense and the organization of counterattacks. On Hill 192, as elsewhere, the hedgerow dikes made field fortifications easy. Often these embankments were thick enough to allow the Germans to dig in and then tunnel laterally, providing shelter and living quarters for several men underneath the hedge. Nearby fox holes could be dug along the hedgerow, stepped for firing positions. Sunken farm roads crisscrossed the hill, making movement of armor difficult; the only feasible way for our tanks to cross these obstacles-often protected by antitank guns-was to use a dozer to push dirt from the near bank into the road, then cross and cut through the far bank. Four small villages-Cloville, le Soulaire, St- Georges-d'Elle, and la Croix-Rouge-lay on the slopes of the hill, and might be expected to contain nests of organized resistance in the attack zone. St-Georges-d'Elle had already changed hands several times in the earlier fighting, and except for the southern outskirts was now in American hands. South of it on the road leading into the Bayeux-St-Lo highway, scattered farmhouses served as positions for enemy automatic weapons.

With plenty of time to map his fires, the enemy protected all important tactical areas by mortars and antitank guns. Heavier artillery, and possibly armor, was located south of the St-Lo highway. The defenses of Hill 192 were manned by troops of the 3d Parachute Division. Initially, the three assault battalions of the 2d Division were faced by two enemy battalions-the III Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment, which opposed the 38th Infantry, and the I Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment, a portion of which faced the 23d Infantry. The west boundary of the III Battalion, 9th Parachute Regiment, was the north-south road close to St-Andre-de- l'Epine, close to the divisional boundary between the 2d and 29th Divisions. The boundary between the 9th and 5th Parachute Regiments ran south-southwest out of St-Georges-d'Elle.

ST-LO

American Forces in Action Series

Historical Division

War Department

Facsimile Reprint, 1984, 1994

CMH Pub 100-13

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-13/st-lo_0.htm#cont

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

(1) artillery needs to be a blunt intrument, hitting wide areas not individual point targets.

(2) shell proof forms of cover must exist. They need not be positions one can fight from, for more than a few heavy weapons bunkers. But positions that protect ordinary squad infantry from 105mm caliber artillery, *totally*, need to exist. (Cellars, bunkers, dugouts, caves, call them whatever).

(3) It is *not* necessary that all forms of cover be unspotted by the attacker. He has to *not know* whether any given cover type that *is* vulnerable to artillery, is actually *manned* or not, or not know where it is. This can be accomplished by giving the defender more than enough of such forms of cover, or by making them hidden, or any mix of the two.

Agreed. This is, fortunately, easy to achieve.

Artillery *could* destroy concentrated defenders on an entire grid-square, without muss or fuss, *if* and *only if* those defenders lacked overhead cover against a 105mm round.

Not necessarily. Depends on the amount of artillery coming down for the defined area, of course, but don't forget that the major advantage of being dug in is that you're below the fragmentation envelope. Direct hits on positions are needed for the sort of artillery used in Normandy (i.e. no VT Fuse yet). So even 155s wouldn't have much of an effect if the density of shell impacts on a given area weren't enough to produce favorable odds of hitting positions.

Overhead cover, however, has the benefit of protecting the soldiers under it from debris coming down. A significant concern, especially when a bombardment is concentrated.

(coincidentally, I saw a MythBusters a couple of weeks ago where they proved that if you are on the ground a grenade is less lethal for the same reason)

In practice, German defensive schemes in Normandy worked and kept allied firepower arms to about 1/3rd of their war-long average effectiveness, by employed thinned schemes from side to side across the frontage. What do I mean by a thinned scheme? I mean real positions interspersed with dummy positions and obstacles.

And positions abandoned due to manpower shortages. Let's not forget that these were often battles of attrition for the German defenders. So as Allied attacks took casualties they were sure, at a very small tactical level, to reconfigure their defenses to optimize for the force still in fighting condition.

If the Americans try to use artillery ahead of infantry across all sectors, half of it will be utterly wasted on sectors with no infantry defenders present, to speak of. If they advance broad front on all sectors with infantry, they will be chopped to pieces on a third of the frontage where they hit full positions, breaking up inter-unit coordination. They will only be delayed and annoyed on the other portions, but will at best lap around extra sides of the full position "blocks". Meanwhile another such staggered positions of reals and dummy will be built 1-2 km further south, and the whole game repeated on a time scale of 2-5 days.

Correct. Which gets back to my earlier point that knowing where the enemy might be is not the same as being able to get a good result from using your artillery prematurely. I remember many a CMx1 battle where the other guy pounded a position he suspected I was in and all he got was a truck or a LMG because he popped his artillery off at the first area he saw something.

But, big but, there needs to be some way to put an infantry squad in something that will let it utterly ignore a wide 105mm barrage, and emerge unscathed from it, to hit infantry following the barrage.

We already have that functionality, so it's just a matter of picking what form it takes within the game.

Steve

[akd]

One more reference, this one from St-Lo, as well:

There were just three ways that our infantry could get through the hedgerow country. They could walk down the road, which always makes the leading men feel practically naked (and they are). They could attempt to get through gaps in the corners of the hedgerows and crawl up along the row leading forward or rush through in a group and spread out in the field beyond. This was not a popular method. In the first place often there were no gaps just when yon wanted one most, and in the second place the Germans knew about them before we did and were usually prepared with machine-gun and machine-pistol reception committees. The third method was to rush a skirmish line over a hedgerow and then across the field. This could have been a fair method if there had been no hedgerows.

Usually we could not get through the hedge without hacking a way through. This of course took time, and a German machine gun can fire a lot of rounds in a very short time. Sometimes the hedges themselves were not thick. But it still took time for the infantryman to climb up the bank and scramble over, during which time he was a luscious target, and when he got over the Germans knew exactly where he was. All in all it was very discouraging to the men who had to go first. The farther to the rear one got the easier it all seemed.

Of course the Germans did not defend every hedgerow, but no one knew without stepping out into the spotlight which ones he did defend.

It was difficult to gain fire superiority when it was most needed. In the first place machine guns were almost useless in the attack because about the only way they could be used was to fire from the hip. If you set them up before the advance started, they had no field of fire and could not shoot the enemy. If you carried them along until you met the enemy, still the only way to get them in position was to set them up on top of a hedgerow bank. That was not good because the German was in the next bank and got you before you set the gun down. Anyway, it had to be laid on the bank, no tripod, just a gun barrel lying unevenly on its stomach. On the other hand the Germans could dig their guns into the banks in advance, camouflage them, and be all set to cover the roads, trails, and other bottlenecks our men had to use.

The artillery was the major fire support weapon. But it suffered certain handicaps. In the first place it had to be adjusted from the front line by forward observers. These sometimes had difficulty knowing just where they were, and the trees frequently delayed adjustment because of the short vision. If you found the enemy in the next hedgerow he was frequently less than 100 yards from you, and that was too close for artillery fire, particularly since short rounds would probably burst in the trees over your men in your own hedgerow. If the enemy was two or more hedgerows ahead of you, that wasn't so good either, because the mere delay in getting to him through that last hedgerow just in front of him gave him time to rise up and smite you after the artillery lifted. The mortars were effective providing you knew just what to shoot at and where it was, but the infantryman still had the delay and exposure of getting through the last hedgerow.

The Germans, being on the defensive, profited by these minor items of the terrain. They could dig in, site their weapons to cover the approaches, and prepare tunnels and other covered exits for themselves. Then when our men appeared, laboriously working their way forward, the Germans could knock off the first one or two, cause the others to duck down behind the bank, and then call for his own mortar support. The German mortars were very, very efficient. By the time our men were ready to go after him, the German and his men and guns had obligingly retired to the next stop. If our men had rushed him instead of ducking down behind the bank, his machine gun or machine pistol would knock a number off. For our infantrymen, it was what you might call in baseball parlance, a fielder's choice. No man was very enthusiastic about it. But back in the dugout I have often heard the remark in tones of contempt and anger: "Why don't they get up and go?"

The tanks are no better off. They have two choices. They can go down the roads, which in this case were just mud lanes, often too narrow for a tank, often sunk four to six feet below the adjacent banks, and generally deep in mud. The Class 4 roads were decent in spots, but only for one-way traffic, with few exits to the adjacent fields. An armored outfit, whether it is a platoon or an armored army, attacking along a single road attacks on a front of one tank. The rest of the tanks are just roadblocks trailing along behind. When the first tank runs into a mine or an 88 or 75 shell, it always stops, and it usually burns up. And it efficiently blocks the road so the majestic column of roaring tanks comes to an ignominious stop.

The next step is to try to find out where the enemy gun or tank is, and wheel up a tank or so to shoot at him. The only trouble is, that probably only the men in the first tank saw his gun ash, and they aren't talking any more. The tanks trying to get into position to do some shooting are easily seen and get shot before they can do much about it. I have seen it happen. In the hedgerows it is almost impossible to get firing positions in the front row, and in the rear you can't see the enemy anyway so no one bothers. Usually the tanks waited for the infantry to do something about it.

Instead of charging valiantly down the road, the tanks may try to bull their way through the hedgerows. This is very slow and gives the enemy time to get his tanks or guns where they can do the most good. Then he just waits. And in the solution, there is always a minor and local problem to be solved, a problem which caused a certain amount of irritation, and that is, who is going over the hedgerow first, the infantry or the tank? It is surprising how self-effacing most men can be in such situations.

Anyone who actually fought in the hedgerows realizes that at best the going was necessarily slow, and that a skillful, defending force could cause great delay and heavy losses to an attacking force many times stronger. This, because the attacker can't use his fire power effectively and because he can't advance rapidly except on the road where he is quickly stopped at some convenient spot.

There were a number of other factors which contributed to the difficulties of fighting through the hedgerows. The area was merely a succession of small enclosed pastures with a few orchards, likewise enclosed by hedgerows. Seldom could one see clearly beyond the confine of the field. It was difficult to keep physical contact with adjacent squads, platoons, or larger units. It was difficult to determine exactly where one was. Unlike conditions in open country, flanks could not be protected by fields of fire. All these contributed to the difficulties of control and caused a feeling of isolation on the part of small units. All this meant that the front-line troops thought their neighbors were nowhere around. They could not see them, they were not in the adjacent field, therefore they were behind. Often this feeling of being out on a limb would cause the leading elements to halt and wait for the tank units to come up (and sometimes these were ahead).

German counterattacks in the hedgerows failed largely for the same reasons our own advance was slowed. Any attack quickly loses its momentum, and then because of our artillery and fighter bombers the Germans would suffer disastrous loss. In fact we found that generally the best way to beat the Germans was to get them to counterattack- provided we had prepared to meet them.

[JonS]

Not necessarily. Depends on the amount of artillery coming down for the defined area, of course, but don't forget that the major advantage of being dug in is that you're below the fragmentation envelope. Direct hits on positions are needed for the sort of artillery used in Normandy (i.e. no VT Fuse yet). So even 155s wouldn't have much of an effect if the density of shell impacts on a given area weren't enough to produce favorable odds of hitting positions.

Time fuzes have been around for a long time.

[Apocal]

Time fuzes have been around for a long time.

I don't believe that mechanical time fuzes were (are?) viable for opportunity fire that most of CM's artillery is. That being said, if it were something like a preplanned barrage, that would be historical, yes?

[JonS]

I don't believe that mechanical time fuzes were (are?) viable for opportunity fire that most of CM's artillery is.

What a curious statement.

[Battlefront.com]

ASL Veteran,

Quite honestly with Adam and Steve going at it .... wow. I mean, Steve at least has a horse in the discussion as he put a lot of blood sweat and tears into making the thing over the course of the last ten years. Adam? I don't honestly know what your horse is here.

Well, I understand it pretty well and it's partly our fault. We have a community here where the designer (moi) interacts directly with the gamers. This gives the customer a viable and immediate way to influence the shape of the games we make in a very fundamental way. Some take this to an extreme and behave as if we work for them personally, to the exclusion of all others.

The reality is that we can't make every single individual customer happy or equally happy, so very frequently we have to make decisions that won't appeal equally to all people (to say the least!). Most accept this, others refuse to. In their minds if we can only do 100 things for a game it should be their personal list of 100 things, no exceptions. And when we refuse to give in, they declare Jihad. (it's actually a very good analogy). And why not? No ramifications for them since they have nothing to lose.

What is really sad about this whole thing is that it's all for nothing. The more hostile they are to us, the more irrelevant they become. And that means the more we ignore them. Yet in the end they will purchase our games anyway, if the topic pleases them, because so few are interested in making wargames (with "loyal" customers like that... big surprise, huh?). Honestly, I wish I could prevent some of the most vicious of our detractors from purchasing our games... but on the other hand what better proof could I ask for of their hypocrisy?

The reality is, Adam, that if you check what tactical combat simulators are on the market right now you will probably not find anything that comes close to Combat Mission x1 or x2. Now you can take a break and play company of heroes for a while and have some fun with that, or you can take Steve's explanation of the possible and the impossible and accept it.

We make games, people buy them if the want, and we succeed/fail based on the net results. It should be an impersonal relationship. Instead, some people feel that if they can't have fun with something then nobody should. After all, if it isn't appealing to them then it can't possibly have value, now can it? And they call me an egomaniac

I assume that you enjoyed CMx1 since you seem to rave about it so at some level you have to believe that Steve, Charles, and yes even Dan and the rest have produced some quality products in the past. Why you don't account for the years of fun that you have already had with CMx1 products and say something along the lines of "okay Steve, I've really enjoyed your games and I accept your explanation of what's possible and what's not possible so in light of our discussion here I'm going to take a pass on all things CMx2 until this issue is addressed." You like CMx1? Great, just keep playing it then. I think that's why Steve is getting frustrated. You like CMx1 so just play it. He's explained what the limitations are. Accept the limitations for what they are and move on.

Yes, that is definitely it. I know some of the old CMx1 crowd I respect a lot don't like CM:SF for either the setting or the direction of the game engine. They had a choice... throw tantrums and/or try to humiliate us in public... or respectfully keep in mind the years of joy they got from our products and make a graceful exit until such time that they decide we have something they want to purchase. Obviously the choice people made says volumes about their core personality.

Anyway, I just want to mention to Steve that I think sometimes you defend the game a little too vigorously. Sometimes I wish you would just answer Adam's question and be done with it. Let others continue the discussion as far as that goes because others will carry the discussion forward. If someone keeps asking repetitive questions maybe just a simple "Asked and answered" would be fine .

Adam asks questions mostly as a vehicle to complain about CMx2 in some way, shape, or form. At some point behavior like this becomes a distraction from critical discussion, not an aide to it. I restrain myself from calling a spade a spade for as long as I can, but some people (like Adam) keep coming back for more.

Incidentally, I would also like to add that if any of you have been to other game forums the level of interaction we have with the guys doing the ACTUAL CODING is probably damn near unprecedented. In case anyone thinks I'm a Fanboi, just look in the archived threads and you should see that Steve and I have had some disputes - I was even forced to acknowledge he was right one time and I did actually apologize to him on the forum . Yet, overall I still think my larger point was actually correct - he did get me on the smaller point so I had to admit it (it was regarding targeting and hit probability in one of the accuracy threads).

Thanks. I find that our most vocal detractors state, emphatically, that we don't listen to customers unless they tell us what we already wanted to hear. Adam states that below and he's stated it before. The last time I answered that by posting the release notes of CM:SF which have HUNDREDS of user suggestions, some of which made radical changes to the game. But the mountain of evidence doesn't mean much to those on the outside looking in. Again, if we aren't listening to them AND acting on it as our top priority, then it's the same as us not listening at all.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Adam,

I'm not really sure what I did wrong.

I don't believe that for a second. I've told you exactly what you did wrong, and so have others. It's the same thing you do wrong each time you flame out like this. At least a half dozen times already I'd guess.

I said that I thought CM Normandy would be worse than AK at simulating Normandy because of the trench issue and then got Steve attacking me personally.

Ah... the "I'm innocent, Steve is a big meanie defense". Typical, but only those who have invoked this for themselves are likely to buy into it. Based on the feedback here and in the other threads of late, many have seen you being the one trying to pick a fight... not the other way around. And of course, you never got even a little bit personal about this. Right.

Quite honestly, I don't feel like I'm wanted around here. I agree that I am quite critical. I don't know how that justifies the personal attacks I get for saying how I feel. I didn't personally insult anyone, I said that trench FoW was a huge issue. The most negative thing I said was that the trench problem had to be resolved if you want a "shred of realism." That's not really a horrible thing to say as far as I know. I don't think it justifies the way Steve makes it into a personal flame fest.

Adam, you know as well as I do that there's a pattern with you here. You post increasingly more and more aggressively, going further and further to an extreme, until it can't be ignored. Then I call you on it, you unleash your pent up angst, swear off the Forum, and then come back to start the cycle all over again. I expect at some point you really will leave, and maybe now is the time.

I have never called you a horrible person, but I have genuinely questioned why it is you spend so much time on a game you so clearly dislike. It seems to me counter productive and I've said so the last half dozen times you've got your knickers in a twist because you were called on some over-the-top statement or another. And not by just me. Before I responded to you others had already noted your poor attitude was showing (and not just in this thread either, I must add).

And the usual "we don't tolerate negative opinions" claptrap when someone can't post effectively and then self destructs. This thread is FULL of people expressing opinions about game features they want to see done differently. That is criticism and it is taken VERY well when the attitude is left out of the equation and the poster shows himself interested in being reasonable. Which is why I've got into not a single tussle with anybody else in this, or the other, thread DESPITE the critical look at the game features. Since you apparently can't see the difference, you're absence will actually increase the quality of discourse here because we can focus on discussing things in a constructive way.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

JonS,

Time fuzes have been around for a long time.

Quite right! I'll rephrase

Not necessarily. Depends on the amount of artillery coming down for the defined area, of course, but don't forget that the major advantage of being dug in is that you're below the fragmentation envelope. Unless there are airbursts in the mix, direct hits on positions are needed for the sort of artillery used in Normandy. Without the VT Fuse available in Normandy, airbursts weren't as easily achieved. So even 155s wouldn't have much of an effect if the density of shell impacts on a given area weren't enough to produce favorable odds of hitting positions.

How's that?

Steve