CM:SF and REAL force capabilities

[c3k]

Gents,

While happy, overall, with the new subject matter - as if I had any choice! - I am concerned with how unit and force capabilities will be modelled.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mission planning attitude of the U.S.A.F., combined with motivated, imaginative tactics by their adverseries, led to the first combat shoot-down of an F-117: that was NOT supposed to happen. The U.S. forces' capabilities were vulnerable in a way not imagined.

How will this be portrayed in CM:SF? It seems that the 105mm (?) armed Stryker vehicle has an autoloader. How frequently will it jam in dusy enviroments? How will the Syrian forces tap into the U.S. force location information?

Those are just some quick examples off the top of my head. However, I don't think any weapon system or force structure has ever quite performed at its hoped for levels. How will a future-based game take these unknowns into account?

Thanks,

Ken

[Denwad]

the Stryker vehicle is also extremely vulnerable to even the most antiquated direct fire kinetic energy guns.

i.e. those model 1944 85mm guns from the soviet union will be dangerous to strykers

[Scipio]

Something I asked to myself - maybe not important for the first release. In WWII, there were many 'field improvements' used, one of the most simple were sandbags on tanks, IIRC as protection against Panzerfausts, or to use tracks as addtional armor.

Will we see things like that?

[c3k]

Another thought: who predicted, prior to Black Hawk Down, that RPG's could be used with great effect against helicopters?

What unforeseen fallibility, and what unknown ingenuity, will be included in CM:SF?

Regards,

Ken

[Barrold]

What unforeseen fallibility, and what unknown ingenuity, will be included in CM:SF?

I think this is an interesting question, but what are the implications?

If they put in what would be a theoretical unforeseen fallibility, wouldn't this artificially nerf a weapon system? How would it's inclusion be justified?

BDH

[c3k]

BF.C,

Not slinging stones your way, but how will these areas be addressed? Or, are you satisfied that all weapons systems' characteristics have been sufficiently proven in the field?

Thanks,

Ken

[c3k]

Okay, more on this subject: I just read in another thread about the UNANTICIPATED use of (highly effective) Kornet ATGM's by Iraqi forces against U.S. forces. The Iraqi OOB was NOT supposed to have them. Hmmm, what will the Syrian forces have? I hope there will be some home-modified weapons, using more accurate fire-control than anticipated. I hope that French weapons will be used (we all KNOW the French are friendly with Syria and if they can make a buck selling weapons which will be used against the U.S., they'd love it).

Anyway, let's NOT make U.S. forces the best thing since sliced bread, while we simultaneously keep the Syrian forces in a tight little box of mediocrity.

Regards,

Ken

[SgtMuhammed]

One has to ask, how can they be addressed? Something unforseen is, by definition, something that no one thinks about. I have seen things in CM1 such as squads firing Fausts at AT guns and troops, not really something I thought they would do.

[c3k]

sgtgoody (esq),

Thank you!! That is EXACTLY why I'm asking BF.C to respond.

The Stryker concept intrigues me. It relies on technology as a force multiplier. What if the technology doesn't work as well as anticipated?

By going into a hypothetical field of conflict, BF.C is going to be open to some serious questions on how different assumptions are addressed. I'm trying to get a discussion going on that subject.

Technicals and civilian/fighter intermingling were seen in Somalia. What part of the OIF battleplan accounted for that? What about the seeming prevalance of IED's, both fixed and vehicle borne? Any simulation of OIF would NEED to give the Iraqi/Insurgent side access to those weapons, yet they were not present in an Iraqi OOB.

Therefore, extrapolating into the near future, if U.S. forces invade Syria, there will be something the Syrian forces use which will be "out of the box", unanticipated and effective.

French weapons? German night vision? U.S. electronics? Chinese weapons' trials? Innovative Syrian use of existing weapons/devices in manners unforeseen?

Ken

[Barrold]

I found a Wiki page on possible Syrian secret resources.

BFS5

[c3k]

Barrold,

Damn you! I actually clicked on that link. We all knew the secret resources would French products, but fromage?

Thanks for the laugh,

Ken

[juan_gigante]

I think it would be kind of cool if the "combat additions" increased over time. If, at first, everything your boys are using is straight stock. Then, they trade a few things around, throw on some extra sheet metal as armor, etc, until by the end, the vehicles used are noticeably different, in appearance as in performance, than from the beginning.

Which leads to another question that might have already been answered but I missed it - what is the length of the campaign. A week? A month? A year?

[Battlefront.com]

I've been researching Strykers since before their first deployment in Iraq. I've done the best I can to follow up on their real world performance since then. Same for a wide range of other weapons systems. I even attended a conference on Urban Warfare this past Spring that featured presentations from officers fresh back from Iraq or involved in behind the scenes stuff. Some of the material wasn't relevant because it was more about Peace & Stability and Counter Insurgency ops, but still very interesting. And if you guys remember the situation in An Najaf where an American officer had his men kneel down in front of a (supposedly) hostile crowd, you'd know that the caliber of the speakers for that officer, LTC Chris Hughes (BN CO 101st AAD), gave one Hell of a talk about a wide array of topics. Anyway...

All we can do is make the best calls with the information we have at our disposal. There are a lot of active and retired military working behind the scenes for the last 2 years to give us the info we need. We will continue to do this as we go forward.

One thing I would note... you'd be surprised at how NOT surprised the military is when something goes wrong. Very often someone has run a red flag up the flagpole before the situation came about for real. Blackhawks being shot down by RPGs and light ground fire was one such warning. Fortunately, by picking a near future engagement, as opposed to something further out, there isn't too much that should surprise us. There isn't much that Syria has that Iraq didn't have. Not completely true, but we're planning on holding some of that stuff back from you guys so you can be surprised just like the real commander would.

Steve

[Tero]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There isn't much that Syria has that Iraq didn't have. Not completely true, but we're planning on holding some of that stuff back from you guys so you can be surprised just like the real commander would.

How will you make sure the tech-spec is up to spec to accomodate any number of tactical situations your clientel is bound to come up with which have not been envisioned when the ordnance was being developed and deployed (like the use of RPG as anti-helo weapons) ?

[Battlefront.com]

How will you make sure the tech-spec is up to spec to accomodate any number of tactical situations your clientel is bound to come up with which have not been envisioned when the ordnance was being developed and deployed (like the use of RPG as anti-helo weapons) ?

Weapons in use today are fairly well known in terms of their capabilities. It doesn't take a lot of imagination or research to see how they can be used. And I'm not necessarily talking about inventing a new use for a weapon that someone else hasn't already predicted. The RPG vs. Blackhawk was a KNOWN threat before it happened. The only guys who were surprised were the poor bastards who were shot down.

Steve

[Tero]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Weapons in use today are fairly well known in terms of their capabilities. It doesn't take a lot of imagination or research to see how they can be used. And I'm not necessarily talking about inventing a new use for a weapon that someone else hasn't already predicted.

I take it you will you allow such standard stuff as tank main guns as well as ATGM's targeting helos. For example.

The RPG vs. Blackhawk was a KNOWN threat before it happened. The only guys who were surprised were the poor bastards who were shot down.

Were they briefed on the RPG menace and they forgot/ignored it or was the use of RPG known to the high command via Special Forces Afganistan briefs but not passed down to operational units ?

[aka_tom_w]

bump

[John Kettler]

c3k,

The RPG threat to helicopters should've been known and factored in since the Vietnam War. Somewhere around here I have a translated VC weapon employment guide specifically outlining RPG use against helicopters. I also saw stuff from our side describing the same sorts of tactics.

As far as the Syrians doing something nasty and unexpected goes, I have made post after post (search under my name) in this Forum describing a number of high leverage things the Syrians could do, using, in many cases,

tech going back to well before the 1980s/off the shelf/readily and cheaply buildable devices. Steve has pooh-poohed the lot, evidently consigning the Syrians to business as usual, unable to even semiinnovate, and trapped in their old ways.

I strenuously disagree with his position, indeed consider it shortsighted, dangerous, and potentially game limiting, never mind any potential Russian intervention scenarios which could be posited. Concerning the latter, though, recall that Russia was mobilizing airborne divisions for intervention in the Yom Kippur War.

It took the U.S. going to high nuclear alert to get the then Soviets to back down, after which negotiations hurriedly began. As you correctly note, Syria has long been a client of Russia, and Russia should not be counted upon to sit idly by and let the U.S. overrun her major client state.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Tarquelne]

I strenuously disagree with his position, indeed consider it shortsighted, dangerous, and potentially game limiting,

How about giving us some historical examples of the sort of thing you're talking about. (BTW, since warfare has become increasingly mechanized/computerized I wouldn't see a lack of examples as a slam-dunk for Steve's "poo pooing", but an example or two would help your case, I think.)

[Kip Watson]

I would have thought with a good Sim you don't need toexpicitly program in things like this. If the capabilities are well modelled, players will find out strengths and weaknesses for themselves, including some surprising ones.

One of the fascinations with BB and AK, is that they have made it clear why certain units acted the way they did. For example, conventional histories always implied that the British tankers in early desert war liked to charge with the enemy like a bunch of twits who thought they were still in the cavalry. Playing that period of AK made it obvious - the AP shot was useless against non armoured targets, and the only way to be effective against infantry and guns is to get into effective MG range. The tankers weren't so stupid after all.

I'm sure the world's CM strategists will bring a lot more grey matter to the table than the US would ever face from the Syrians in real life. There might be some interesting and unexpected outcomes. (pssst - don't tell the terrorists)

[Battlefront.com]

John,

Steve has pooh-poohed the lot, evidently consigning the Syrians to business as usual, unable to even semiinnovate, and trapped in their old ways.

Your arguments fell flat because the Insurgents in Iraq are extremely innovative, well funded and supplied, yet they haven't used any of the stuff you mentioned in that thread. Why is that? Can't be because they don't know about them. Can't be because they aren't motivated to think outside of the box. Can't be because they don't have access to the stuff. So why? And why would Syrian forces be any different? Unless you have some evidence to suggest that the Syrians will do the sorts of stuff you outlined, then I don't see any reason to include it any more than theoretical WWII tactics/weapons that were never used.

I strenuously disagree with his position, indeed consider it shortsighted, dangerous, and potentially game limiting,

I consider putting things into a simulation "just because" as being shortsighted, dangerous, and potentially game destroying. CM:SF is designed to simulate the LIKELY conflict between Syria and the US in the year 2007. If it can be shown that any of the stuff you mentioned is LIKELY, then yeah... it should be included if relevant (i.e. not insurgency type ops). Otherwise, it would be horribly incorrect to include it.

never mind any potential Russian intervention scenarios which could be posited. Concerning the latter, though, recall that Russia was mobilizing airborne divisions for intervention in the Yom Kippur War.

Those were different times. As for Russia getting directly, and militarily involved, that's less likely to happen than aliens from the Planet 10 coming to defend the poor Syrians. Not only would the Russians have to fly through NATO/US air defenses to deploy, but they would assure that the money tap to their struggling economy would be shut off. Oh, and a global war that would surly destroy them. Yeah... all to defend the Syrians who can't even afford to pay their Cold War bills... I'm sure it would happen

Steve

[ December 22, 2005, 08:49 PM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]

[John Kettler]

Tarquelne,

While I don't have ready access to my full library just yet, I can give you some.

Window aka chaff

Both the Allies and the Germans developed it, but after tests, the Germans were forbidden to use it until they developed an effective response to it.

Their concerns were fully justified when, in an attack on Hamburg?, large scale British use of it

completely unhinged the night fighter and flak direction network (flooded the radar screens with thousands of false targets), allowing the entire city to be torched in a firestorm, yet cost the RAF only a handful of bombers.

Centimetric radar vs. U-boats at night

The Germans developed a passive intercept receiver which could detect early Allied radar early enough to allow the U-boat (surfaced to recharge batteries or make a high speed run) to dive before the radar could detect it. Everything changed when centimetric radar arrived, for now the first indication of trouble was when the ASW plane, hot on final run in, switched on a powerful light, blinding the deck watch and opened MG fire before dropping bombs or depth charges set shallow. By the time the Germans developed a centimetric radar intercept receiver, it was too late, and the U-boat arm would never be the same. So clueless were the Germans that for the longest time investigations were mounted into a cascade of complaints from surviving crews about their defective intercept receivers!

The deadly tail-warning radar Monica

In an effort to significantly reduce bomber losses from marauding German nightfighters, many radar equipped, the British thought it would be a good idea to fit a radar set covering the vulnerable 6 o'clock position. This was duly done, but it had an unfortunate, unexpected to some, deadly consequence. Though things seemed better initially, Operations Research types monitoring bomber losses soon noted that Monica equipped formations sustained statistically significant higher loss rates than those not yet fitted. The OR types reasoned, correctly as it turned out, that the Germans were homing on Monica. Bomber Command would have none of it and refused to pull the device out until it could be concretely shown that the Germans had a Monica intercept receiver.

Many months went by before a confused German nightfighter landed in England by mistake, and it was found to have the Monica homing device. By then hundreds of RAF heavy bombers and their crews had been needlessly shot out of the sky.

Soviet/Russian Conclusions of Value of Surprise

Surprise in warfare can, if memory serves, increase the effective strength of a given force by some 50%, based on a stack of Soviet General Staff studies, with an effective duration measured in weeks or sometimes months. In that time, Soviet analysts concluded, decisive operational and strategic objectives can be achieved.

Surprise and its effects were and are a major topic of study and ongoing investigation and analysis in Russian

staff colleges. Further, they've looked at the effects of surprise based on a variety of criteria

and at a bunch of levels, to include the effects of the sudden introduction of new equipment

(viz T-34 and Katyusha, Suvorov's Cold War assault guns and monkey model concept in which the good stuff is never exported; tricothecene maskbreaking toxins in Afghanistan), new tactics (integrated Soviet style Egyptian SAM and gun defense in 1973 war covering the Suez Canal exacts such a heavy toll that the IDF ground units can no longer call in CAS; operational maneuver groups), putting large armored formations through "impassable areas" (August Storm, Manchuria 1945),

and at the top of the military food chain, strategic surprise, such as Churchill's bringing the U.S. into World War I after the Lusitania sinking (British sent liner, under ordered reduced speed, into known U-boat zone, then ordered naval escort away--~30 Americans killed and over 100 British); intercepted, decrypted and passed to Americans Zimmerman telegram showed Germans offered part of American Southwest to Mexico if Mexico became a German ally; publication caused a furor. Churchill's comment? "Supreme excellence in strategy lies in the sudden, unexpected introduction into the war of a powerful ally." To this list should be added things like the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

Since immediately after World War II, there has been a concerted effort to identify fundamentally new and unknown to the foe scientific techniques and principles (see Grechko's MARXISM,LENINISM, WAR AND THE ARMY in the Soviet Military Thought series and the unabridged, revelatory quote in Bearden's FER DE LANCE (search for weapon slides in table of contents) at URL listed below. It has taken the U.S. decades to even semigrok the situation, but some people at least are awake now. See then-SecDef Cohen's 1996 comments on advanced technology for weather and tectonic warfare here www.cheniere.org While we try to hit missiles with missiles, the Russians

have what any SF fan would call force fields and related tech deployed. Airline crews saw them in use during the Afghanistan War, as did muj in the Hindu Kush looking into Russia.

Other examples include a family of high altitude, hypersonic antiship cruise missiles so potent we had no effective counter in 1980 for one introduced in 1962, the ice operating Typhoon boomer, the Oscar SSGN designed to eat carriers

with cruise missiles and kill survivors with 65cm wakehoming torpedoes.

Elsewhere in this Forum, I described how old 60s vintage Soviet responses to a never built American tank program at a stroke completely negated the earlier M-1's armor scheme, forcing us to spend cubic dollars not just on uparmoring but on virtual across the board antiarmor system replacements, having found through trials that almost all of our stuff couldn't penetrate their armor.

Special ops have received not only a great deal of study but enormous resources. Remember the tracks on the seafloor in sensitive Swedish harbors, or how about the evidence of Spetsnaz intrusion and caches in Alaska near the Trans Alaska Pipeline? The Russians know full well the leverage afforded by a single, well-placed attack. De La Penne's Maiale "pig" assault completely changed the correlation of forces in the Med for months, and Soviet analysts were appalled that the U.S. failed to identify the absolute essentialness of a single German plant producing dibromoethane (can't make avgas without it) and bomb it during World War II.

In my view, the U.S. has had it way too easy too long in a military sense. We haven't had to fight

an even proximally equivalent foe in many decades.

We take CAS, deep strike, C4ISR and much else as our birthrights, are accustomed to fighting opponents who have poorly maintained old to obsolete equipment and ammo

(steel HVAPFSDS instead of DU), and then only after years of sanctions, weapon embargoes or weeks on end of bombing, battlefield isolation

(semistarvation and thirst) and psyops. American ground troops have not come under real air attack since World War II.

I could go on and on, but it seems to me that, given even the present foe clearly groks asymmetric warfare, and given that some pretty exotic stuff is already being used in Iraq, it is wise indeed to think seriously and soberly about some very cheap, high leverage options open to the Syrians and anyone benefiting from a potential U.S. humiliation in the region. FM 100-5 Operations back in the mid 80s already was teaching drop drills when under attack by beam weapons, to include microwave. As a for instance, an air defense radar, directed against ground troops, would make a lovely field expedient high power microwave weapon. The Soviets used to kill jackrabbits at hundreds of meters with the FOXBAT's radar. Eyeball frying is even farther away. When at Hughes, a buddy of mine calculated that a fighter pilot over Europe at altitude would, with the known ground radars switched on, be subjected to the same radiofrequency flux density as in a microwave oven! I'm not talking pie in the sky here, but very real, readily implementable actions which could have huge consequences at a variety of levels. And this discussion is predicated on none of the good stuff being supplied, by the Russians or anyone else, let alone skilled operators.

It doesn't always take fancy tech, either. In the Yom Kippur War the Egyptians operationally blindsided the Israelis with high power water pumps which in mere hours, breached the great defensive sand berm supposed to buy time to bring up reserves, allowing the Egyptian Army to rapidly cross the Suez Canal

on Soviet PMP pontoon bridges so effective we later copied them and adopted them into service.

Hope this helps illustrate my concerns.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ December 23, 2005, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

[Battlefront.com]

John,

I could go on and on, but it seems to me that, given even the present foe clearly groks asymmetric warfare, and given that some pretty exotic stuff is already being used in Iraq, it is wise indeed to think seriously and soberly about some very cheap, high leverage options open to the Syrians and anyone benefiting from a potential U.S. humiliation in the region.

I agree completely. The problem is selecting those things which MIGHT be used instead of those that theoretically could be used. It is critically important to pay attention to the difference, otherwise one finds oneself learning the wrong lessons from the wrong circumstances. Again, many of the weapons I saw you illustrate in the other thread could in theory be used now, last year, two years ago, or even at the very start of hostilities in Afghanistan. Yet they have not. That indicates such things are not as likely to be used as you suggest. Could they be? Of course. Predicting the future isn't something any of us can do.

And just so you know, we are including a few things in CM:SF that aren't currently seen being used against Coalition troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan. So obviously we don't subscribe to "the next war will be fought exactly like the last war" way of thinking. We just don't subscribe to "the next war will be fought unlike any war before, especially a contemporary one currently being waged next door."

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

Your prior response deserves a thoughtful, detailed response from me, but I've temporarily shot my bolt answering Tarquelne. I will say, though, regarding this post from you, that I believe the weapon choice driver so far is that the average Arab officer or trooper, jihadi or even jihadi commander has no background in any energy weapon nastier than a laser pointer or similar, if even that. Misuse of that tech has already caused major upsets in civilian aviation circles, though. Deliberate employment as an asymmetric weapon could cause real havoc.

You and I both know how good terrorist, let alone military groups, are at cross-pollinating one another (P-charge attack vs. German banker's armored Benz in 80s becomes P-charge vs. armored Hummvee in Iraq today, and that's a very slow spread example), so what's really missing is trained cadre--one person who figures out/is taught how to do it, then teaches others, a la the Palestinian et al. bombmakers. Do the Syrians have one competent electronic engineer, or can they find one? Heck, almost any hacker or electronic tinkerer (like a HAM operator) would do. If so, we need to be concerned. Let someone start teaching this stuff in the training camps, and it's Katie bar the door.

I can tell you for a fact that the U.S. military is on the ball on dazzling/blinding laser threats (learned the hard way by repeatedly being on the receiving end; ask some P-3 and Nimrod crews), at least for AFVs (those funny colored vision blocks) and for aircrew protection. Binos are similarly protected. Am not sure about the infantry, though.

I believe the ballistic goggles are treated against common laser threats. If not, here's a cheap weapon option for the Syrians--laser

pointers!

IMO, Steve, all it's really going to take is for someone to do something high profile and nasty with any kind of purpose built or expedient RF weapon, at which point the aha! light will go on throughout the Arab world and elsewhere. It may well go on all by itself anyway, considering that such devices have repeatedly shown up in both movies and hit television series. The simple computer crasher built from Wal-Mart and Radio Shack components is as close as the right volume of Congressional testimony, and is doubtless on the Internet, too, and if the broadband other one (acronym starts with "T") isn't already, it soon will be. These would be my first concerns, were I in your shoes. With them, I believe the Syrians and any friends could do all manner of mischief, such as fricasseeing those annoying low altitude drones, zapping TOCs and mobile HQs, ambushing march serials and convoys, wrecking thermal viewers large and small, including the huge one on the LRAS. These two weapons would be Level One RF

weapon threats. Were I attacking, I'd expect them from the start, as I would radars as field expedient antipersonnel weapons.

Level Two RF threats would include nonnuclear EMP bombs, electrically salted FAE, and small purpose built RF weapons--obtained from the usual suppliers. Even an outlay of a few 100K could have enormous impact if used wisely and at the right time. Frraaapp!!!

Level Three RF threats would include nastiness like high powered jammers (Russians preeminent) designed to wreck JSTARS, tracked HPMs to fry tactical avionics/vetronics/troops wholesale, etc.

Would require advanced tech transfer and training

or "loan" of devices complete with crews (much like Russian manned SA-2s in North Vietnam. The gear would fit nicely in a single jet transport.

Level Four threats could include manportable scalar weapons (see Bearden material) and/or firing of scalar weapons from Russia into Syria in support of Syrians. The latter would be highly deniable, especially since its firing signature is undetectable without special apparatus and the effects can be made to look like any number of things. Did you know a stroke of "lightning" destroyed the ammo stockpile of an entire Soviet fleet during the 80s and that there were a number of such incidents? The devices used weren't ours.

We had help, fortunately, seeing as how it derailed a Soviet plan to hose us with an array of scalar weapons. A scalar strike could be used to a) fry all electronics and vetronics in a defined area, detonate the ammo in the strike zone, c) flash freeze the vehicles and crews, d) disable or kill the crews while leaving the vehicles intact.

Airpower sanitization is another obvious option.

Granted, Levels Three and Four are a bit much (would certainly tone down the I'll take U.S. and stomp you faction, though), but I believe that Levels One and Two are frighteningly real, eminently doable by the Syrians, and can and should be in the game, at the very least as optional weapons for scenario designers to play with (and cold shakes and nightmares for the U.S. player).

Regards,

John Kettler

[MikeyD]

"...combined with motivated, imaginative tactics by their adverseries."

You may just get some of that when you play quickbattles against a human opponent. The guy playing the Syrian side is going to know there are Abrams down the street so we're liable to see some mighty unexpected uses of available weapons by our desperate Syrian QB opponent. Then again, if the AI were to start using goofy weapons combinations during a battle the board is likely to start screaming that the games buggy!