CMx1 to CMx2 recipe

[MikeyD]

"What I would love to see is a "Seek Hull-Down" or a "Get LOF to this point" command for infantry that would see your guys crawl forward until they have an eyeball on a point of your choosing."

What I do with both men and armor is get them moving then do a target command. I position the command cursor over the out-of-LOS point I want and hold it there (no clicking) til the line changes from black to grey to blue, then I cancel the movement order. Voila - movement until within LOS. Some may complain about having to baby-sit the unit during movement but I tend to only need this for the final 5-6m meters at the edge of a crest.

[Peter Cairns]

The problem with "Get LOF at this point" is that you are ordering people to stop when they see something that you know is there but they don't.

That could be a bit unrealistic.

Peter.

[Thomm]

Sorry, I have to share this:

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So how many dollars do I get exactly? :confused:

Best regards,

Thomm

[MikeyD]

I'm assuming radio chatter keeping them informed of unseen threats. "Brown 2-story building coming up on your right, movements reported. Keep an eye out"

[Secondbrooks]

Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Splinty:

Syrian NCOs aren't trained and grown like their Western counterparts. They're chosen for their reliability and toughness like in the old Soviet system. A typical Syrian NCO has the same training and experience as one of his squaddies, hell he probably was drafted in the same round of call-ups!

compare to Finns: glorious 6 months of training. smallest tactical unit is company. defense and attack starts at range of 100 meters. fire from hip when running. attack tanks with molotov cocktails. if enemy gets into your trench (heh) use axe. bounding overwatch is done on scale of two men (one man shoots the other dashes). such innate Western tactical & doctrinal superiority.

</font>

[Battlefront.com]

I'll try to clear up a few things that keep seeming to come around incorrectly.

1. The issue of splitting or not splitting has to do with the national doctrine. As has been stated there is a HUGE difference between a Western NCO and that of most other countries. Each soldier in a US Rifle Squad is trained to a much higher standard and they have a much larger number of NCOs in it than a Syrian Squad does. IIRC nobody in a Stryker Rifle Squad is lower than an E3 (i.e. no Privates or PFCs at all).

2. The leadership within a Squad reflects the intended use of the Squad itself. US Squads are purposefully divided into Teams with a NCO in charge of each and a third NCO in charge of coordinating the two. The Syrians, on the other hand, have a single NCO in charge and an assistant who is there to simply help the NCO in his duties, not lead independent of him. I'm constantly amazed that people ignore this extremely self evident reality... Western Squads are designed to act a certain way so they are staffed that way, Syrian Squads are designed to work differently and therefore are staffed differently. This isn't something that is debatable.

3. All Squads, including the Syrian ones, occupy more than 2 Action Spots, depending on circumstances and how many inherent Teams they have (MOUT has 3, everybody else has 2 or 1). Even though a Syrian Squad can not split into separate Teams, they do not all bunch up in one Action Spot.

Players have to understand that anything short of simulating each individual soldier as his own unit requires a certain level of abstraction. Adam1's call to revert to CMx1 style Squads doesn't get around this problem and, in fact, is worse than the current CMx2 system. Meaning, the same issues that some are complaining about now existed with CMx1. Don't believe me? Try simulating a German trenchline in 1945 where they had 1-2 men per foxhole with every foxhole being about 20m apart as they did in real life. Can't do it, can you? So please let's stop with the faulty line of argument since it doesn't help the discussion at all to have the rose colored glasses on.

It is extremely common to have gamers complain about the compromises and abstractions inherent in whatever game scale they are playing. Some want things to go down another level or two, others want it to go up another level or two. Pick any level and this same thing happens. Why? Because no game system can offer equal amounts of detail at all levels in all ways. It simply isn't possible. And there is no wargame that any of you can point to that is an exception to that rule either, which should tell you something.

Now, does that mean CMx2's handling of the 1:1 soldier simulation is perfect? Not any more than I'd ever argue that CMx1's abstracted squad system was perfect. Each have their shortcomings. The question is which one is overall more valuable to the game as a whole. 1:1 has so many more advantages that it's not a question we even ask any more even if we had the ability to change direction and go back to the old way.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

BTW, there are entire books written about why it is that the West has such better inherent leadership and C2 than other nations, especially those in the Middle East. It's a complex study. One of the many elements, besides the obvious ones (which have already been listed), is cultural. The West encourages, and in fact thrives on, individual responsibility and decision making. Most of the world does not and, in many cases, actively opposes it.

There are some who argue that Darwin's laws apply equally well to Human populations. Meaning, you can't have a group of people unaffected by having the best and the brightest leave, killed, frightened, or become a part of the ruling elite without affecting the overall capabilities of that population. It's as much about genetics as it is learned behavior. When both are suppressed and purposefully tailored to subjugation... well... it's hard to imagine how strong independent, thoughtful leadership can emerge as spontaneously as another population which does exactly the opposite.

Put another way, the West's militaries spend a ton of money actively cultivating the best and the brightest to become better and brighter. They are lavished with expensive tools to further extend these capabilities. They are also given incentives and further opportunities to stay with the profession and to continue to improve. In theory those who do not show good aptitude are "washed out" sooner or later, and to a large extent this is what happens in reality. Compare this to a regime like Syria. Night and day different.

Not taking this into consideration would make the game less realistic, not more realistic. Comparing a Finnish unit with a Syrian one without taking these factors into consideration will not yield anything useful in terms of comparison.

Steve

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[Secondbrooks]

Steve... From my part it was just poor joke. I don't oppose this 'Syrian inability to work in teams', as i don't much use it (Yup-yup! No leadership of anykind in me)

So i'm sorry from my behalf. My sense of humor has been guite bad this day (almost as bad as my typing).

Btw. haven't got any answer to my earlier post conserning Trident Valley (like someone actually did care... Laughing), but reasons for those events, mayhem for Syrian SF, are still unknown to me (Opps! That tells what kind NCO i am! A stupid and slow one, dang!) But when i made my own scenario with same distances while US is on road in middle of open, Syria in forest and trenches and result is that Syria rips a new one to US (while using buildings they are mostly wiped out). Can it be buildings and their negative effect on something like C2 of Syrians and/or building's vulnerability to 25mm grenades and maybe even easiness of spotting inside builsings by US, when comparing to trench in high ground and forest surrounding troops? As US returned fire alot slower (had problems in spotting Syrians in forest), their fire was scattered and some Bradleys didn't fire atall.

Just some thoughts, that's all. As i quite purely don't get it.

[ April 07, 2008, 01:47 PM: Message edited by: Secondbrooks ]

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

While I am fully behind what you have said, it does raise a couple of issues that i would welcome your opinion on, particularly as they may come up in future games or modules.

The first is; Could there not be certain circumstances where the "Russian" model works better or as well as the US/western one.

I remember reading about soviet doctrine of disembarking at 200-300m and advancing with support in assault.

It might be a dodgy tactic, but in those circumstances would the western organisation really give much better results, after all advancing across open ground is advancing across open ground.

Secondly if we had a force like the New Iraqi Army where they adopted US training and organisation, but weren't up to it for any number of reasons, could they actually be at a disadvantage.

I possible case of this might be the performance of the ARVN v the NVA, where the one which followed "our" model didn't have the quality or motivation of the one using "theirs", or where because of relatively poor quality on the part of each the more rigid structure worked when people given flexibility couldn't handle it.

I suppose what i am getting at is a bit like an F-15 being better than a F-16, but it being a different story if it's a Saudi F-15 and an Israeli F-16.

Peter.

[Battlefront.com]

Adam1,

What are the best ones on the cultural differences regarding individuality?

Books, you mean? Well, off the top of my head I'd recommend "Arabs at War" for something specific to this particular setting. However, as for generalized discussions about cultural emphasis and application of Darwinian laws... can't think of any good ones off the top of my head. Most of it is just commonsense coupled with comments that I've seen all over the place. Most recently from vets who have worked with Iraqis in military and police units. There is a significant problem with getting leadership at all levels even when it's being actively encouraged (even demanded of) by their Western trainers. This is part of the larger blindspot in the so-called neo-con plan for reconfiguration of the ME. One can topple a government easily enough, but trying to counteract culture is a process that takes decades even under the best of circumstances.

fwiw, I asked for any fundamentals that were still broken to be pointed out and Jason found one in regards to the squads. I'm not dead-set in favour of any particular solution, just acknowledgment of that problem.

Well, it depends on what is being labeled a "problem" JasonC's point about discernible ID'ing of enemy units is a problem to some, but I suspect would kill enjoyment of the game for the bulk of players. So that's one that is in the eye of the beholder, and is certainly an issue for every wargame I can think of.

The issue raised about moving around individuals as individuals isn't a problem in my opinion. It's just something that has to be accepted in order to make the game viable as a game. "Scope creep" (as I should have called "design creep" on the previous page) is one of the quickest ways to break a game system. CMx1 was based around Teams/Squads, so is CMx2. No difference in terms of scope. Whatever shortcomings may be seen in CMx2 vs. real life are seen in CMx1 plus others. This is why going back to a CMx1 system (which of course we aren't going to do) doesn't fix anything but instead makes some of them worse.

So yeah... CMx2 in its current form, and even future forms, won't be perfect. But I don't agree at all that the infantry in it is neutered or that CMx2 is a vehicle based game with infantry as a side show. In terms of effort... the time spent simulating vehicles was far less than the time we've spent simulating infantry. If it appears that vehicles in CMx2 are closer to the real thing than infantry, that's simply a function of how easy/difficult it is to simulate each. Vehicles inherently easier to do. Which is why there aren't many developers interested in attempting a detailed treatment of infantry at this low level tactical environment. You guys should be thankful that we're dumber than most in that regard

Secondbrooks,

So i'm sorry from my behalf. My sense of humor has been guite bad this day (almost as bad as my typing).

My comments were not aimed at that joke of yours, so no worries

Btw. haven't got any answer to my earlier post conserning Trident Valley (like someone actually did care... Laughing), but reasons for those events, mayhem for Syrian SF, are still unknown to me (Opps! That tells what kind NCO i am! A stupid and slow one, dang!) But when i made my own scenario with same distances while US is on road in middle of open, Syria in forest and trenches and result is that Syria rips a new one to US (while using buildings they are mostly wiped out). Can it be buildings and their negative effect on something like C2 of Syrians and/or building's vulnerability to 25mm grenades and maybe even easiness of spotting inside builsings by US, when comparing to trench in high ground and forest surrounding troops? As US returned fire alot slower (had problems in spotting Syrians in forest), their fire was scattered and some Bradleys didn't fire atall.

It's always difficult to comment on someone's game experience without actually seeing the game itself (I haven't had a chance to play Trident Valley) play out. But here is a guess...

Bradleys can easily punch through buildings. Give them a chance to punch walls and pretty much anybody inside will be shredded. Trying to hit guys in a trench or at ground height is inherently more difficult because the rounds have to hit right on target or they don't do any good. Buildings act as sponges. I also would imagine that the firing signature of an RPG-29 out a window at 100m would be pretty damned hard to miss by someone in overwatch.

My semi-informed guess is that the two different situations you saw are fairly accurate in a vacuum. Had there been a larger firefight distracting the Bradleys, or if the RPG-29s opened up on different Bradleys, or if they had been deployed in ways that made it more difficult for any one Bradley to engage more than one RPG team quickly, or something else... perhaps things would have turned out differently. Then again, I'm not so sure that a US commander would find a tradeoff between 1 Bradley and 3 RPG-29s to be as bad of an exchange as you feel it is

There is a video that made the rounds early on in Fallujah 2. It was of a Bradley pumping rounds into the 2nd story of a building probably no more than 30-50m away while driving backwards (computer aimed/stabilized guns don't suck, that's for sure!). By the looks of it nobody would have survived that blast in a combat effective way.

Peter,

The first is; Could there not be certain circumstances where the "Russian" model works better or as well as the US/western one.

The Soviet model was designed to work better at a higher level, so outside of a small tactical battle I would say yes. If you want to put a million men under arms and keep them that way "on the cheap"... the Western model is definitely not the way to go. The Germans lost the war largely because of this. Not much good having the best tank and tank crews in the world if he closest friendly tank is a few KM away while the enemy's pouring over your trenches with "inferior" tanks!

Likewise, the German units that suffered through the Soviet centralized artillery quickly forgot about the times when they didn't worry about artillery at all because of the scarcity of its employment and suboptimal execution.

I remember reading about soviet doctrine of disembarking at 200-300m and advancing with support in assault.

It might be a dodgy tactic, but in those circumstances would the western organisation really give much better results, after all advancing across open ground is advancing across open ground.

Actually, I would think that given good morale the Soviet system would be superior for a number of reasons. As you say, crossing open ground is crossing open ground, so would you rather take 90 casualties with a proportional 9 NCOs or 90 casualties with a proportional 27 NCO casualties? Likewise, if you are fighting on the defensive and can't afford to lose ground, would you rather have a much larger army that is less capable of maneuver or a smaller "professional" force that lacks the numbers necessary to hold the ground required?

There are tons of situations that can be thought up that show that the Soviet system isn't as terrible as some think it is. The problem is that the West has an imperfect system that they try very hard to keep at its maximum optimal state, whereas most other countries have an imperfect system that is imperfectly executed. The Soviets almost lost the war in 1941 because they had a big gap between theory and practice even though their theory turned out to be the better one for that particular fight compared to the Germans'.

Secondly if we had a force like the New Iraqi Army where they adopted US training and organisation, but weren't up to it for any number of reasons, could they actually be at a disadvantage.

See previous comments about it generally being better to have a flawed concept performed flawlessly than a flawless concept performed with significant flaws. That being said, I would think a flawed implementation of Western concepts would yield better results than a flawed implementation of Soviet type concepts.

Steve

[JasonC]

Dirtweasle - thanks for the data point, I'll check it out. Uber snipers would be really cool to use, and an infantryman's friend.

On the abstraction at bottom bit, and the player god fog of war limits bit, I agree. I think this specific issue was less noticable in CMx1 because of the generous way the low percent exposure ratings handled the abstraction of "cover".

Arguably, the effect of well placed big HE if the men were all right at the unit icon, is more accurate in CMx2, in the sense of correctly deadlier, if they were all there. While CMx1 had a 25m or so range in which area fire could make the men duck, and 15m or so in which is was dangerous, and this effectively meant the squad location was "smeared out" below the 20m size. As was the terrain, pretty much (small shacks excepted).

See, if you think you've upped the precision of placement of the individual men, it appears to justify an decrease in their "blurredness", and a decrease in the net typical effectiveness of cover vs. big enough HE, or HMGs strong enough to punch holes in the material involved. But that means a firepower increase from just pointing more accurately at the "sub-blur".

I'll also point out that the issue was still noticably there in CMx1, it just kicked in for the larger HE calibers, especially stuff at or above the 150mm line. That gave noticably "uber" effectiveness in CMx1, compared to reality, and high absolutely. And the direct fire versions of it, the most. Because you were placing pretty accurately a round powerful enough to encompass such "blur" as their was, within its KZ radius.

It was also there, somewhat less noticably because of the randomness already involved, in the aim points of artillery missions always being the center of their fall of shot, instead of the center of the fall of shot being itself "drifted" off that chosen aim point. The point being, the player picks the *intended* center of the fall of shot, but in the real world the fire directors do not have as perfect info as the player has in game, etc.

One possible solution would be to simply "nerf" HE somewhat, and to be a bit less generous about heavier MGs and light cannons penetrating cover. In both cases, simply to reflect not all of the men being at exactly the peak of the danger zone, when the incoming arrives.

You can also approximate it by making all forms of fire suffer from slightly more "scatter" than you'd think from ballistics alone - reflecting the aim point itself actually being off "center of mass", in reality, when the game shows the units exactly where that center of mass is. There does appear to be some such "spray" missing now, which is good, and might make it easier to tweak this.

Then the point would just be to think of that extra "smear" factor in aiming, as being somewhat stealth or cover dependent...

That wouldn't address all issues of LOS and LOF not matching or being reciprocal, but it would address some of the cover and bunching issue. My suggestion for the other one might be harder to implement - depends on how the checks are going under the hood.

It is, to allow key crew served weapons some unit-sized "cloud-ness" in their fire-from location, effectively. Meaning, if there is LOS from a position 5 meters away from the exact depicted location of the crew served weapon, and members of the crew unit can be seen from the intended target location, call it a Mulligan and let them shoot.

This would at least avoid the situation of an ATGM or MG taking incoming without being able to reply. Put it down to the tac AI not being expected to position the weapon itself perfectly, and the team members themselves being expected to be a bit better at it, than that.

Just suggestions, use or discard as you please, etc.

[mikewhol]

Steve,

Very good points, and very interesting.

BTW....US ARMY an E-3 is a PFC.

Maybe you meant E-4?

The game is progressing along nice enough. I am concerned about multiplayer, tried several games, and run into a lot of trouble getting to finish them.

[hoolaman]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

"What I would love to see is a "Seek Hull-Down" or a "Get LOF to this point" command for infantry that would see your guys crawl forward until they have an eyeball on a point of your choosing."

What I do with both men and armor is get them moving then do a target command. I position the command cursor over the out-of-LOS point I want and hold it there (no clicking) til the line changes from black to grey to blue, then I cancel the movement order. Voila - movement until within LOS. Some may complain about having to baby-sit the unit during movement but I tend to only need this for the final 5-6m meters at the edge of a crest.

You can do that until the unit centre has LOS, but you can't do it in WEGO, and you can do it so each man gets LOF.

As for it being unrealistic, I don't think so. I would use it to get guys into position for an ambush even in the absence of any enemy units. If there is an enemy unit, it is no different in concept to what you can do now, you just end up with a better result.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

Adam1,

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />What are the best ones on the cultural differences regarding individuality?

Books, you mean? Well, off the top of my head I'd recommend "Arabs at War" for something specific to this particular setting. However, as for generalized discussions about cultural emphasis and application of Darwinian laws... can't think of any good ones off the top of my head. Most of it is just commonsense coupled with comments that I've seen all over the place.</font>

[Secondbrooks]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

It's always difficult to comment on someone's game experience without actually seeing the game itself (I haven't had a chance to play Trident Valley) play out. But here is a guess...

Bradleys can easily punch through buildings. Give them a chance to punch walls and pretty much anybody inside will be shredded. Trying to hit guys in a trench or at ground height is inherently more difficult because the rounds have to hit right on target or they don't do any good. Buildings act as sponges. I also would imagine that the firing signature of an RPG-29 out a window at 100m would be pretty damned hard to miss by someone in overwatch.

My semi-informed guess is that the two different situations you saw are fairly accurate in a vacuum. Had there been a larger firefight distracting the Bradleys, or if the RPG-29s opened up on different Bradleys, or if they had been deployed in ways that made it more difficult for any one Bradley to engage more than one RPG team quickly, or something else... perhaps things would have turned out differently. Then again, I'm not so sure that a US commander would find a tradeoff between 1 Bradley and 3 RPG-29s to be as bad of an exchange as you feel it is

Yeah, altough Triden Valley is stock scenario in CMSF it's still not easy to tell what i'm actually doing.

I'm testing both sitations and currently it seems that forest is doing the good things for Syria. Tried to use buildings "hidden" inside forest and result was very good for Syrian side, altough they needed almost all RPG-29's rockets they had. So they get good value of stealth and camoflage from trees (Bradleys didn't much fire)... Good.

In Trident Valley most likely my main problem is that Bradleys gets too close too fast, firingdistance at start of ambush is closer to 50 meters than 100 meters due blocked visibility, and Bradleys are moving fast. It seems to be fruitful to be ruthless and aggressive when getting into ambush at close ranges in CMSF... Which i'm quite supprised... Happily supprised.

[Guest Guest]

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[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

Good points. I especially like the clear-eyed look at CMx1. That's been too frequently absent in discussions about the pros/cons of the two systems.

Currently LOS/LOF works both ways 100% of the time. The variable is if both ends of the line have spotted each other, which (like CMx1) is variable depending on circumstances.

Fire effects on infantry are already "smeared", as you put it. As I said, at some point I posted the actual methodology that CMx2 uses to do this. Basically what happens is when a shot is registered it broadcasts its ability to harm in concentric rings. The deadliest part is, of course, the inner most area. That's got a pretty high chance of causing death or serious wounds for any Soldier within that inner most ring. From there out there are other rings with lessening effects and therefore chances of applying to any single Soldier within. The distance and effects are determined by whatever it is hitting that particular spot, as modified by various things such as terrain and the stance of the Soldier.

We've tweaked these numbers up and down and sidewise for several years now. Each time we feel we have it right, someone makes a case that it needs to change for this or that circumstance or in a more general way. It's maddening However, we are interested in getting the right balance so we fiddle with the numbers when we think there is a reason to do so.

mikewhol,

Doh! I've been working on the Marines stuff lately (Marines E3 = Lance Corporal). E3 (PFC) is the lowest rank in a Stryker Rifle Platoon. A Stryker Rifle Squad consists of:

1xE6

2xE5

1xE4

5xE3

Weapons Squads are also a source for leadership replacements (as per doctrine).

1xE6

4xE4

2xE3

The Platoon HQ has:

1xO1 (1st LT)

1xE7

1xE5

That's a lot of highly trained soldiers. In fact, I remember one of my LTC friends years ago saying to me "I don't know where the Army expects to find them all".

Anyway, the point of all this is that the Western Squads have capabilities inherent in them that Syrian (Soviet) Squads do not simply because the level of training of the individuals is quite different. Therefore, to be realistic there should be some significant differences between them in the game. The more Syrian Squads are allowed to behave like US Squads the less realistic the game becomes on the whole.

Here's a link to US military ranks if anybody is interested.

LLF,

Tons of stuff out there that isn't specific to militaries but is in terms of leadership. Tons of things in history books if one looks too. For example, the Russians purposefully wiped out or incorporated the Polish intelligencia because they instinctively knew (i.e. before Darwin came about) that if you want to have the upper hand then you had better make sure the population isn't capable of strong leadership and organizational capabilities.

Assad Sr. knew this too and it's why lackies were promoted over competent officers except for the case of the Guards and Special Forces. That leadership was chosen based on merit first and foremost (well, at least in theory).

In general repressive regimes must keep a tight lid on exactly those things which lend themselves to Western style military. It's short term thinking, but when you're in the business of ruling for your own ends... short term is a big consideration!

Secondbrooks,

I think the other factor here is that the Bradley has very good defenses and offensive weapons. Swap the Bradleys out with Humvees or even Strykers with .50cal and I think you'll notice a significant difference in that Trident Valley ambush spot, all else being equal.

Steve

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[Battlefront.com]

Yeah, for sure small arms fire against troop concentrations is a lot better now. CMBB/AK did a much better job of it than CMBO did, but still... the improvements were "hacks" and therefore had limited positive applications. Still, I think CMBB/AK handled it better than other games (different incoming vectors mattered, for example), so

I don't mean to say that the CMx1 system sucked, because it most certainly did not. It's just that it had problem areas and it was yet another reason why we moved to 1:1 with CMx2. Now all we have issues with is the usual balancing issues, such as how much effect the fire should have vs. this in that terrain. We'll never be able to get away from that stuff, unfortunately.

[Secondbrooks]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

I think the other factor here is that the Bradley has very good defenses and offensive weapons. Swap the Bradleys out with Humvees or even Strykers with .50cal and I think you'll notice a significant difference in that Trident Valley ambush spot, all else being equal.

Oh! I've missed this. So late reply.

This is the case, yes. Firepower is poor, surivability is good. I just didn't understand reason how this particular case is such hard to win against Bradleys: Almost similar cases ends up differently... It's the small things, which turns out to be the BIG things. Well i'm bit wiser now.

[Battlefront.com]

Funny enough I just read an account of a Sherman column moving over a pontoon bridge where the Germans held the other bank and had dug in AT guns that were firing like mad. Not single tank was hit and each AT gun was silenced one at a time as they fired. Sometimes even the best prepared ambushes just don't work as intended

Steve

[DavidFields]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There are some who argue that Darwin's laws apply equally well to Human populations. Meaning, you can't have a group of people unaffected by having the best and the brightest leave, killed, frightened, or become a part of the ruling elite without affecting the overall capabilities of that population. It's as much about genetics as it is learned behavior. When both are suppressed and purposefully tailored to subjugation... well... it's hard to imagine how strong independent, thoughtful leadership can emerge as spontaneously as another population which does exactly the opposite.

Put another way, the West's militaries spend a ton of money actively cultivating the best and the brightest to become better and brighter. They are lavished with expensive tools to further extend these capabilities. They are also given incentives and further opportunities to stay with the profession and to continue to improve. In theory those who do not show good aptitude are "washed out" sooner or later, and to a large extent this is what happens in reality. Compare this to a regime like Syria. Night and day different.

Steve

Interesting.

I certainly think cultural issues are important (just like in any business/organization), and it sounds as though CMSF has produced an accurate reflection of that issue (though one could also model for cultural outlyers)

But I would hesitate to claim (I know, you have not really done so) that Western values inherently produce uber troops, and the genetic argument is tricky. "Independent thought" can result in the fragging of officers, and the US soldier needed some de-culturization in WW-2 North Africa up to Kasserine pass.

In the West, this is the Athens/Sparta debate--with its cautionary tale of how it turned out (eventually poorly for both sides, for different reasons).

And the US can be seen as a partial refutation of the genetic/cultural superiority agruments. In general, it was not the successful who came to America. It was those who lost: the Irish, the Italians, the Jews.

The Pilgrims came because they could not find success either in continental Europe or England. The Huguonots who came to America were the Protestants who failed to convert France. The African Americans who were brought here were not the winners in that continents wars. The Vietnamese immigrants after the Vietnam war were not on the winning side, and now we can expect an Iraqi influx--more so from whoever loses the Sunni/Shiite fight. Even for the original English, it was usually not the landed gentry or successful businessmen who made the move--why would they? (I believe the early, quite substantial, german immigration was religion-losing basis--though my knowledge is not strong in that area)

So a lesson that could be embraced from the US experience....which might seem more humble, and more popular, in the world than some of the current rhetoric...is that we (I am American) have done fairly well for a nation of losers.

[JasonC]

So I played ATGM ambush again to see if it was all just poor luck. And I stuck to the default set up to see if it was my boneheadedness and inability to gauge LOS.

The ATGM teams got off 4 missiles. 2 direct hits on one Brad left it M-killed at the start line but alive. One other missed, and the last, fired by a wounded ATGM team member something like 6 minutes in, and after crawling away from the first reply fire and losing one team member etc, managed to brew up a second Bradley.

A recoilless team fired 4 times at the last one, side shots at the perfect range and angle, hit once, and had no appreciable effect. The reply fire drove them back out of LOS. The leftward ATGM team was meanwhile crawling around in grass, refusing to fire despite clear LOS, turning 90 degrees to the target, second and third team members getting up despite crawl orders, and the like. It failed to fire for four solid minutes with a Brad in clear LOS less than 300 meters away. (Min range is 70 meters, that wasn't it).

The last Brad happily shot the heck out of that ATGM team as the wingman gophered around to make sure they were all seen, and the ATGM man himself stubbornly faced 90 degrees to the right of the target and sat there.

I tried to creep the recoilless teams into LOS, on slow, on hunt, on quick. They always drew fire before they could reply themselves and were halted. Finally I quicked one so far into LOS I knew it would be able to fire - but the Brad easily ate them all to a man before they did so.

Net result? Perfect ambush times 4, delivered munitions 8, hits 4, kills 1 plus 1 M-kill, result AFV victory. Even with totally brain dead, fully exposed AFV driving, and no use of combined arms whatever. The infantry teams were buggy to get LOS, buggy to fire when they had it, perfectly unbuggy to take hits. Infantry AT weapons were occasionally effective to hit, and occasionally effective to damage when they did, and occasionally effective to kill when they damaged - but every step of that process was a 50 50 coin toss utterly resistent to player manipulation. Meanwhile the AFVs were deterministically able to accomplish their set tasks, the only variable being how long they need to hold down the trigger to eliminate every AT team that engages them.

Net conclusion, still - AFVs rule, the heavier the better, and squishies just plain suck.