CMx1 to CMx2 recipe

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[flamingknives]

Since when did Milans have a top-attack mode?

[MikeyD]

"...best you can really hope for attacking an M1 on the frontal aspect ...."

I'm surprised to see old CMx1 hands so distressed over this. How may years were we battled Panthers & Tigers with 75mm popguns in the ealier games with precisely the same difficulties? The imbalance of forces doesn't make the game unplayable, its what makes it INTERESTING!

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

Since when did Milans have a top-attack mode?

Orginal version from the early 70s didn't. But IIRC, this was added at some point to make it more effective against modern MBTs.

Don't have the time to dig up a verification atm; I'll see if I get get to it later.

But I'm pretty sure I read this somewhere that seemed intelligent and reputable; it surprised me at the time as well, which is why I made note of it. Of course, I've gotten misinformation from intelligent and reputable sources before. . .

Edit: I think we're talking about a fly-over, shoot-down top attack like the TOW 2B, not a climb-then-dive flight path like the Javelin. Now that I think of it, even though the Syrians have some Milans, they probably don't have this more advanced warhead. Oh well. Guess we're back to flanking.

[ April 03, 2008, 02:47 PM: Message edited by: YankeeDog ]

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Battlefront.com]

I think Adam1 has done an admirable job at addressing JasonC's misperceptions and inaccurate comments. As has been pointed out, even some of the accurate things that JasonC mentioned have been address in the last few patches.

The Abrams is an amazing vehicle, that is for sure. From the front it is basically invulnerable even to other Abrams (this was confirmed during Thunder Run IIRC). But the sides are quite vulnerable and the rear is like tissue paper. Therefore, like all things on the battlefields of history the Abrams has its weaknesses. If the Red player can't figure out how to exploit the weaknesses then he is going to be toasted, just like a US player would be in the face of King Tigers.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC's comment about the underhood stuff is an interesting topic in its own right. It might be good to have that as a separate thread.

One of the "boast features" in CMBO was its unparalleled detailed simulation of armor and ballistics. Supporters of CMBO found this feature to be extremely beneficial even though very little data was shown to the user in a way that was even remotely meaningful. Angles, thicknesses, etc. were interesting, but they didn't really have much bearing on people's understanding of the underlying system. And how could it since the code was extremely complex.

Critics of CMBO, however, didn't see the need for all this "under the hood" stuff. "Why is this necessary? All I need are good results, I don't give a crap how they are arrived at!". This is, basically, the same argument that JasonC is putting forth about the increased fidelity of CM:SF.

In theory I do not disagree with JasonC on this matter. If there is a simple and reliable way to replicate something in the real world without going into excruciating detail then we'd be fools to do an extremely detailed modeling of that feature. C2 in CM:SF is a good example. We do not explicitly simulate radio calls, the physics of FM transmissions and how they are (or aren't) received, the specific features of a specific radio unit, etc. Nope, what we did was approximated the important aspects on the battlefield such as delay, reliability, etc. and said "sod that!" to the myriad of details.

But there are some things that aren't so easily approximated without losing flexibility and/or realistic end results. Getting back to CMBO and the armor equations... the reason why we put several months of work into a highly detailed system, instead of a few days making a dice rolling type system, is because we round the results in games like Steel Panthers and Close Combat to be too unrealistic. Sure, the bulk of things went OK, but far too frequently things that happened shouldn't have, things that should have happened didn't. VERY frustrating when realism is the ultimate goal of the game system. So we did a more detailed treatment and it was generally appreciated by people (though my did some argue that the unrealistic system's results were "better" ).

When we designed CMx2 we identified elements that we found too restrictive, too difficult to keep within realistic bounds, etc. and attempted to simulate them in a more direct way. The individual soldiers were the biggest common requirement for such systems, so that became the focus of development. It still is. And the results that come from this, as Adam1 pointed out, give the game a lot more richness and flexibility compared to CMx1's more abstracted systems.

So where to draw the line? JasonC seems to think we should have stopped refinement and lived with CMx1's shortcomings forever. Steel Panthers people people held the same position about CMBO. Each to his own, but we do see the value in less abstraction in some areas and will continue along like this for the rest of the lifespan of CM. Which areas depends entirely on the improved simulation yielding improved realism. Fudging virtual dice rolls has its limitations, as we know from first hand experience.

Steve

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Battlefront.com]

Adam1,

It's not the hardware as much as it is the user's ability to handle so many extra units. There is an upper limit of about 50 units that the average wargamer can keep track of. In CM:SF this is about 2-3 companies, depending on the company type and support arms drawn from other units. Every platoon's worth of Squads that are broken down into 4 units means a reduction of total force size by about a platoon.

With your suggestion you'd have to issue 3-4 times as many Commands to get a Squad moving as you do now. Since the Squad is the most critical, basic infantry unit in the game you're talking about an exponential increase in the amount of Commands necessary to get a small portion of your most critical units doing things you want to have done. This has the effect of reducing the total unit count further because when you decide to move a Squad you're pretty much obligated to issue those other Commands because Squads aren't designed to be internally separated.

There is a fine line between too much micromanagement and too little influence over results, granted. However, in this case the suggestion of subdividing Squads is significantly over that line in the wrong way. I can understand your reasoning for this feature, and it would theoretically fix some problems, but it's not the way we'll be going. On balance this would break more than it fixes.

Having said that, we have a discussion going on with the testers about how we can get the Squads to act smarter than they currently do. Each patch has made improvements. More will be on the way, no doubt!

Steve

[JasonC]

Sure, I'll give it another spin or five lol. Glad to hear many of these things have improved.

On M-1s being uber, I had no trouble killing them with T-72s in the early versions. That is familiar tactics territory, no issue.

On tanks dominating throughout the 20th century, despite being an advocate of the power of "heavy" used well, I don't think the real world relation is nearly as absolute as what I was seeing. Infantry advantages have to be modeled well to see how it handles armor.

Infantry is a cloud, not a few neat points ready for efficient bunched nuking by HE. Infantry is stealthy, not just in the sense of hiding well, but also because seeing one man in the real world tells you nothing about where the rest of the platoon is. And they move, without all eyes being on every point they scurry through, and without presenting 10 at a time targets if they are noticed doing so.

They also get very small in their holes. 2000 lb bombs can still get them, but other than that, men exploiting deep cover adaptively, endure longer than concrete buildings.

They also go places no vehicle can, inside and outside.

If the tactical relation actually were, anyone who shows up in a metal box rules and anyone who shows up in a shirt is hamburger, we wouldn't have anything to worry about. Instead, we have to send guys in shirts too, to do things only dismounts can do, to keep combined arms, etc. And assymmetric tactics will focus not on felling mighty M-1s, but on stripping them of their dismounts and then exploiting all of the above, to make the unsupported vehicles indecisive.

To test such tactics, the weaknesses of unsupported vehicles need to be apparent. I am sure the designers understand this.

As for the issue of very small teams and micromanagement, I am with the command span argument on that. I don't want a single man game. I'd find it unplayable, even if some aspects of realism improved. Simply in the sense that I cannot babysight a whole company in combat and make all of 200 men's decisions for them every minute. It also means tugging down an echelon in depicted scale, with realistic spans and coordination. And the interesting tactical stuff is in the other direction, more like up 1-2 levels (clashes of companies e.g.) not down.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Yair Iny]

Just popping in with my <2c...

Steve - I personally find Adam1's suggestions re splitting the teams for all sides involved very reasonable and have a bit of difficulty understanding your objections. While splitting too much WILL make the gameplay unwieldy, Adam1 is suggesting the OPTION be introduced. So split all you want until you as the player find the balance between control and wieldiness...

Adam1 - I personally am very encouraged about the situation of CMx2 by seeing how someone like yourself who was quite critical of issues in the beginning has seemingly been won over by the improvements to the engine. It is one thing to see "less critical" people like it, but another to see someone who obviously is not wearing pink shades being won over by improvements - to me it is an endorsement that these improvements are at least substantial and this discussion more than any has re-piqued my interest in CMSF. Thank you!

JasonC - I am quite surprised to see that you, ever the proponent of attrition as opposed to manoeuver being critical of the engine because of the increased emphasis on firepower's, well, power over moving units exposing themselves. From all accounts I know of this is extremely realistic, and, AFAIK in modern engagements infantry, if they can help it, will stay put and let heavier stuff "do the talking".

[JasonC]

On micromanagement, no it isn't simply one player's choice. Not when humans play each other. If things split but the command span stays 25-50 units maximum, no problem. But if it splits down to 2 men here and 1 there and 4 over there etc, and two humans are trying to fight a company level engagement - then whoever spends the most time per turn gets silly levels of unrealistic advantage from godlike over-coordination of 100 different decision makers at split second time scales.

At the limit, if you hypothetically were to give the player first person shooter level control over hundreds of individual men or nearly so, it will be unbalanced (time in wins), unrealistic (overcoordinated), and unplayable (have life equals pass). One can argue reasonably about how far in that direction to go, but all the way would just fail.

There is a right scale for a game, it is a key of the whole design, and making it instead a competitively picked player option is just going to break said design. If instead you want nearly individual man control, you are going to make a squad level game, not a company level one. With the bigger side occasionally having a full platoon.

Perhaps Adam was thinking only of single player. CMSF isn't.

[Yair Iny]

That's a fair point, Jason. Didn't think about that shortcoming of the suggestion.

[JasonC]

Adam -

HE vs. cover, a few data points

Kwajalein, 1943 -

The island of Kwajalein is two and one-half miles long and 800 yards wide for most of its length, tapering to 300 yards wide at its northern end... Kwajalein had more than a hundred buildings and an airfield with a 5,000-foot runway with various taxiways and ramps capable of handling large numbers of fighters and bombers. The island also had docks and a long pier.

(Artillery was landed on neighboring islands in the atoll, before the main attack) At 1125 the 7th Division's artillery began landing four battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. The preinvasion bombardment of Kwajalein began that afternoon at 1500.

Battleships and heavy cruisers joined the preinvasion bombardment at first light on 1 February, firing 7,000 rounds of 14-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch ammunition during the period leading up to the assault. Exploding shells and tall columns of black smoke blanketed Kwajalein from end to end. The 7th Division artillery on Carlson fired 29,000 rounds at Kwajalein in support of the landings, and the Army Air Forces added six B-24 bombers from bases at Apamama to the effort, dropping fifteen 1,000- and 2,000-pound bombs on Kwajalein's fortified areas.

The participants later described the naval gunfire as "devastating—the entire island looked as if it had been picked up 20,000 feet and then dropped—All beach defenses were completely destroyed, including medium and heavy anti-aircraft batteries."

...Gunboats fired when landing craft neared the beach... (ashore) ...armored amphibian tractors with 37-mm. guns and flamethrowers provided (initial) support. By nightfall six infantry battalions (out of 27 available in the invasion fleet, 22 of them schedule to go ashore eventually) supported by four medium tank companies were ashore.

(On day 2) The battleship Idaho, the cruiser Minneapolis, 4 destroyers, and 5 Army artillery battalions delivered preparatory fires, and 15 Navy dive bombers hit targets at 0800 as the Americans (including several fresh infantry battalions) moved out. Tank-infantry teams then attacked the remaining Japanese pockets of resistance.

Earlier intelligence reports that the island had substantial defenses proved to be exaggerated. Most of the fortifications clearly had been hastily constructed. (Coconut log and sandbag bunkers, not concrete pillboxes or deep caves).

(Initial Japanese strength on the island was 5000 or less, only half of them combat forces, the rest service and support. At least 1500 were still fighting by midnight after the first day. Estimates of the effect of the initial bombardment are that it accounted for between half and three quarters of the defenders. The US considered this about the most successful prep fire of the war, certainly for a major engagement).

And yet, U.S. forces suffered 177 killed and 1,000 wounded on Kwajalein.

Somme, summer 1916 - the prep bombardment lasted 5 days and fired 1.7 million artillery shells. 17 mines were also dug under the German trenches, each containing 10 to 20 tons of explosive, detonated immediately before the attack. The attackers following it up lost 65,000 men on the first day, encountering uncut wire, dug in machineguns, and fully manned trenches. Defender losses were only only one eighth those of the attackers. This was one of the least effective prep bombardments of the war, and for its scale, of all time.

Stalingrad, fall 1942- the air bombardment alone dropped 1000 tons of high explosive one the city in the opening raids alone, sometimes reached 600 tons in a single day later one, and killed at least 40,000 civilians. 3000 German artillery pieces ringed the city for months and fired continually; the Russian park was initially smaller but grew until it eclipsed that figure. Overall, the Germans flew over 20000 and the Russians 11000 sorties over the city up to the time of the Russian counterattack outside. Naturally they also fought house to house with tank support, demolition charges, etc. This continual torrent of high explosive rubbled the entire city several times over, but it still took infantry going house to house and sustaining tens of thousands of causalties, to clear each section of the city.

Shuri position, Okinawa, April 1945

A massive barrage by 27 battalions of corps and division artillery—the largest concentration (324 pieces) employed during the Pacific war—opened the assault on the morning of 19 April. Six battleships, 6 cruisers, and 6 destroyers added their weight to the bombardment, which was followed by the largest single air strike of the Okinawa campaign—650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the enemy positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns.

The effect was negligible. The Japanese, deep within their cave defenses, were only marginally affected. The attackers found the formidable Japanese defenses almost completely intact. An armor assault on Kakazu Ridge, launched without sufficient infantry support in the hope of a rapid breakthrough, failed with the loss of twenty-two tanks. Elsewhere along the front the results were similar.

Despite the tremendous effort of 19 April at places given such exotic names as Skyline Ridge and Tombstone Ridge, the Japanese defenses held. The day was marked by considerable hand-to-hand combat and heavy casualties on both sides. Surveys after the battle revealed that the Japanese, as they so often did on Okinawa, dug many of their positions into the reverse slopes of the ridgelines, away from the anticipated direction of attack. Because of the odd angle of the reverse slope, they were much less vulnerable to artillery fire or direct assault. Japanese defenders could wait out an artillery barrage or aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward slope. Although flamethrower tanks demonstrated their value in clearing several cave defenses, there was no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps lost 720 dead, wounded and missing.

(Instead it took flamethrowers, demolition crews, and hand grenades, all delivered from point blank range. The US lost 1 WIA per 2.5 Japanese KIA, consistently - US KIA were a quarter of the own WIA, while Japanese WIA were insignificant). This was the effect of a giantic pro US firepower differential being largely offset by a pro Japanese cover differential. The US expended 98,000 tons of ammunition over the campaign.

Here is the official US army assessment of the Okinawa fighting

"This awesome array of firepower was matched however, by the carefully prepared Japanese defenses on the island especially in the area centered around the Shuri heights. Here the Japanese 32d Army may well have created the most extensive network of caves and underground tunnel defenses with overlapping fields of covering fire ever faced by an opposing force. Far more elaborate than the trench systems used in World War I, the Japanese Army created a barrier that anticipated superior enemy assaults on the ground as well as sustained aerial and naval bombardments. Were it not for the gunfire from the assembled naval armada off the coast, the American infantrymen—even with supporting armor—would have stood little chance of making headway against such deeply dug-in defenses. But even the main batteries of the battleships, delivering broadsides at relatively close range, could not penetrate many of the enemy cave fortifications. No single supporting arm could overcome the elaborate complex dug into Okinawa's rocks and coral. Only the infantry, gradually moving forward with the support of artillery, armor, and engineers could eliminate the carefully prepared enemy positions."

Firepower is obviously useful. If a defender is in inadequate cover and is perfectly located, then an appropriate heavy weapon can kill that specific defender. But clouds of numerous unlocated defenders spread across large amounts of excellent cover are another matter.

Firepower can attrite them of course, is useful, and when properly used such attrition can be strung along into eventual victory if you can sustain a protracted warfare strategy, etc. But it cannot annihilate. Modern smart weapons vs. readily visible major equipment rather than infantry, it can. Infantry scattered in buildings, cellars, dugouts, caves, etc, no. That takes combined arms.

[abneo3sierra]

FWIW Jason is quite accurate in saying that AFVs are not capable of alone, dominating a battlefield, even less in situations where their mobility is less than optimal, such as in city fighting or less-than-clear terrain. Also generally speaking, the way to attack them is first to attack their accompanying infantry, at which point they are basically defenseless in many aspects.

Jason, I disagreed with you on another thread regarding the force sizes, but actually here you made the point clearer, and I understand it more.

[LongLeftFlank]

The primary reasons to have player control at the man level are:

1. To break off a specialist (e.g. RPG gunner or flamethrower... thinking ahead to WWII here) to make a risky attack without putting the rest of the unit needlessly at risk and making the attack about 9x easier to spot.

2. To manually correct the suicidal tendencies of individual squaddies, like blundering into the exposed middle of the street rather than "snapping" to the nearby wall like the rest of the squad.

In both cases, a TacAI solution would be vastly preferable to increasing the micro.

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[M1A1TC]

Remember how in CMBO you could control indiviual AT or flamethrower teams? That was cool

[JasonC]

Adam - some were simply in cellars and the others were in diverse positions in building interiors, or in slash under former buildings aka big piles of rubble. What they weren't, was bunched 9 to an "action spot" advertising its exact location as loudly as possible to the tank passing by in the street.

So I got patched up to 1.08 and can report on my first outing using it. I recognize that it isn't much to go on yet, freely admit I have to get use to CMSF again, learn the interface better and the nuances etc.

The following is therefore a first impression only, and I am perfectly open to revising it on greater exposure. But my initial reaction from it, is that claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the uberness of vehicles over infantry has not materially changed, and might have actually moved in favor of the vehicles, since the early patches. The last, because of one specific change, I'd agree a favorable one in realism terms taken by itself.

The scenario was ATGM ambush, I had the reds. First fiddly point was the difficulty of judging LOS accurately at set up, using the "target" line. I found some locations visible that way in the set up phase were not in the game itself. But it is an interface quibble.

Second point - Bradleys at 450 meters from a 4 man infantry team (no heavy weapon, an HQ unit with AKs only, if that makes a difference for stealth) hiding in woods terrain just behind a crest, readily spotted said team before it twitched a muscle let alone opened fire. This was around turn 3-4, an a minor improvement compared to spotting them from the start line. But spot them they did, from well outside RPG range. They hit one man, the rest quicked backward along the slope to break LOS.

Third point - an AT-4 team opens on them at 400 meters, partially to get the fire off the spotted group. The first round appears to hit a Bradley, which is not seen to move thereafter. But it continues to fire just fine. The AT-4 team loses 2 out of 3 men to the replies, rapidly. In an improvement over earlier versions, the remainder still try to use the main weapon. The last man gets off one more, which misses. Believable given his suppression I suppose.

Fourth point is a repetition of the first with more serious consequences - a second AT-4 team is spotted in cover at 450 meters before it opens fire. They are pretty deep on a reverse slope, borderline LOS. They never reply, despite occasionally rallying to OK. Many rounds strike the hill ahead of them - an improvement over fire through hills certainly. But the team is KOed over 3 minutes without firing.

Fifth, an SPG team in a brush filled depression is hiding, and has 1 Bradley crawl into LOS 225 meters away. In a plus, they are not spotted instantly - the Brad is a singleton, facing another direction, and firing at more distant targets, which may all help. The team is ordered to fire at the Brad. Over 2 minutes, it refuses to do so. But it does come off "hide", and the Brad eventually sees it, and fires the first shots at the SPG instead of the reverse. After one man is hit - visually the one in the deepest piece of terrain, as though that were preventing fire - the SPG does finally fire back, but misses. The Bradley smokes. A second team member is KOed, the last gets off another round, now at front arc. It hits, but within 8 seconds the Brad is still firing - no appreciable effect from an SPG it on the frontal arc. The last SPG member is they hit, of course.

The second SPG is still in a reverse slope deployment.

At this point, 3 AT teams have been eliminated, emitting a grand total of 4 shots - 2 AT-4s at less than 500 meters, generating one hit and one possible M-kill, and 2 SPG shots at less than 250 meters, generating one hit and no effect. 10 men and 3 weapons have been KOed in reply. Only one "ambushing" infantry unit actually fired before it was fired upon. The accompanying US infantry was completely superfluous. The Tac AIs handling of its units was brain dead, and in any realistic depiction of the engagement would have resulted in 3 dead Bradleys, perhaps at the cost of 1 defending ATGM team.

The specific change that made the superiority of vehicles even more pronounced that is was in the earlier versions, is the reduced behind armor effect of HEAT hits on vehicles. Arguably this is correct, especially for RPG or SPG caliber weapons, as opposed to a full AT-4. However, with the remaining issues, it serves only to accentuate the already huge edge of armor.

Armor can expect to see infantry in cover up to 400-500 yards away, and can expect to fire 6 or more times per minute, thus scores of times over an engagement. It can expect to be missed by half of the shots at it, and to survive half of those that do hit, even modestly armored rather than e.g. invulnerable M-1s over the frontal arc etc.

Infantry, in contrast, can expect to be seen much farther away that it really would be, can expect cover to give little protection from powerful vehicle weapons, can expect to get off very few shots before being first suppressed and then KOed, can expect any man in the unit being seen to result in fire continuing until every man in the unit is toast, can expect to have difficulties arising from the difference between action spot placement and firing weapon location, preventing outgoing fire without preventing incoming, can expect these difficulties to be greatest precisely when it tries to use slope effects as effective cover, can expect to be fired on before it fires half the time, when it realistically would remain unnotice, can expect to miss half the time when it fires, even at easy ranges and with smart weapons, can expect the hits it does get to do little or nothing a fair portion of the time.

The lesson is blindingly obvious. Bring a bigger water pistol, and don't try to substitute cover or stealth for an armored plate. It won't work.

To those who will tell me it is merely my own incapacity, I acknowledge that I have to get used to CMSF, and might well improve on that outing. But the first time I played it, in an earlier version, I readily torched the Bradleys and won easily, for a loss of both AT-4 teams, one of the SPGs (to infantry) and half a dozen infantrymen. I experienced long range spots in that outing, too, but whenever AT weapons hit the Brads, the Brads died. That was the largest difference.

One man's experiences. As I say, I remain entirely open to revising this assessment on further experience.

[JasonC]

That covers my functional impression while doing it or right after. Now I want to analyze it a little bit, to see if areas for improvement can be isolated.

First, I note that several definite changes for the better were present - the range at which the hiding infantry was spotted dropped by a factor of 2, approximately. There was no fire through hills. Important crew served weapons were remanned dynamically when casualties occurred. These were all clear improvements and favored the infantry. The reduced behind armor effect is a realism improvement, at least in the case of the SPGs and perhaps across the board - though here it had the functional effect of swamping of all the previous combined, and made the vehicles more uber than ever.

I don't think any of those were essential factors, however. I think the basic problems were about cover, man vs. unit placement, and LOS vs. LOF. And the difference in how those factors operate for spatially distributed infantry units, vs. point-like vehicles.

Consider the nagging inability of some of the teams to fire. I suspect the cause was that the specific AT weapon was not in the location of the whole action spot, but as it happened, a bit of the lower ground within it. LOF was present for some of the other members of the team, but not for the weapon itself. Hence, it would not fire. But the team could be fired upon, and was, spreading suppression to all.

A little thought then reveals that this assymmetry will arise for infantry but not for vehicles. If a vehicle can be seen and fired upon, it can return that fire. But a cloud of men does not have that characteristic. If every man in the cloud has an effective weapon for the target type to be engaged, at least some of them will be able to fire back, if they can be fired upon. But vs. vehicles, typically only a single weapon per team is actually effective, and all depends on whether its location shares all the characteristics of the whole unit.

A little more thought reveals that this was probably the cause of the unexpected long range vehicle spots of hiding infantry, as well. Interacting with cover that is less than it appears, perhaps. The issue is that the player can only position the infantry unit in some action spot. But there is no assurance that the cover will conform to the squad deployment pattern, that the squad will stay entirely within the action spot, that the cover and action spot will be exactly coextensive, etc.

In other words, some dofus trying to stay exactly 5 paces right flank rear hangs his backside out in the open. The Brad driver then faces not hiding infantry in good cover, but some of that he can't see, plus the dofus. "Hey, anybody else want this dofus with his backside stuck in the open on that ridge over there?", he then calls over the command net, and opens fire when he doesn't get a "yeah, he's mine" from his CO. The fire then sprays around and hits the whole unit, including men in concealment nearby.

To avoid this, the player would need to fiddle the placement endlessly, within his action spot "snap to" grid list of choices, until every private has his privates inside the available cover. One reason buildings are more effective cover is they remove this difficulty. If mean assume linear formations in trenches, conforming to them, the same might basically hold for them. Using vegetation concealment and slope effect cover, on the other hand, is wide open to the problem.

The difficulty then arises because the location fire is emitted from, the location fire can arrive at and hurt the unit, the cover icons depicted on the map, minimum player adjustments of unit position - are all potentially different. If the Tac AI conformed the small placement of each individual man hyper-intelligently, it might reduce the difficulty. But which specific point within the action spot as a whole is the exact right location for the ATGM launcher, or the SPG, or the MMG?

The player can't control it, the Tac AI doesn't know how to answer the question, but success or failure of spotting and fire can both turn on the question. Note that the difficulty cannot arise with full "hexes" used for everything, action spot only style - then if they could take fire, all weapons there could return it, and if the "hex" had cover of type X, all units within it would benefit from cover type X.

Note further that it would not arise in the same form, at least, if man by man microplacement were possible. But that would force the player to eyeball everything at view 1 for every man in the force, to ensure the desired surrounding cover and placement within it, the desired LOS sight picture, etc.

What are some steps toward solution? If the unit center action spot contains cover, the small placement of the individual members should conform to that cover. Or extend cover benefits to all members of a team whose center location is in a given kind of cover, regardless of where the Tac AI places the individual men. Perhaps allow crew served weapons to fire from any man's location in the action spot, to restore some reciprocality to LOS - LOF, incoming and outgoing. These would restore a relationship of functional equality, to the factors the player can control on the one hand, and the factors critical for spotting and fire. Without requiring super micro-management on the player's part.

I note that such solutions if adopted are steps back from pure single man depiction and towards functional abstraction of unit position. But I fail to see anything "more realistic" about the problems encountered above, instead.

For whatever it may be worth...

[hoolaman]

I think you are pretty much on the money there JasonC. But I will add that a lot of the problems you seem to encounter probably come off as a perfectly realistic result of a bunch of Syrians with outdated ATGM taking on the US. Of course that's no consolation to the player who wants to have fun playing RED.

The ability of a squad or team to deploy behind a ridgeline and get LOF while still taking cover from the terrain feature is still a bit patchy.

There is limited feedback to the player about which individuals are in and which are out of LOF, and the grid-snap problems and lack of any kind of formation controls mean even if you want to tweak manually you can't really.

What I would love to see is a "Seek Hull-Down" or a "Get LOF to this point" command for infantry that would see your guys crawl forward until they have an eyeball on a point of your choosing.

Another BIG improvement in 1.08 that you may have missed in that specific scenario is the increased concealment given by treelines and foliage.

I guess a lot of scenario designers don't make use of blocks of "Forest" tiles like there were in CMx1, but Tree D now seems to give the concealment you would visually expect, and your guys can deploy along treelines using individual trees for cover quite effectively.

The Chance Encounter remake is a pretty good example of a CMx1 style map and battle converted to CMSF and is worth trying.

[JasonC]

I'm happy to hear that woods have been upgraded, that would help considerably.

In CMx1, one simply put the unit icon in the covered terrain tile and the whole unit got the benefit of the cover, in reduced exposure and in spotting. No MM required, no slip ups possible, no need for a super smart Tac AI to place each man just so or the thing was blown. Abstraction below the level being depicted simply took care of all that.

As a result, an infantry ambush from prepared, concealed positions worked *correctly* in CMx1. With a lot of work, it might be *possible* to get it to work correctly in CMSF. Why are we doing all this extra work again?