Lack of MRAPSs costs Marine lives

[Bigduke6]

Londoner,

I gotta hand it to you, you make an excellent point. Wounded American soldiers are really, really expensive to support what with disability payments and medical, and they can live decades. It may well be a much more sensible move from a taxpayer POV to ferry that soldier around in a bomb-proofed vehicle, rather than to stick him in a HUMMV and take your lumps.

Of course, the upshot of that logic is, of course, that if there were some way to make sure your soldiers died every time they were injured, then that would really make putting them in harm's way a whole lot cheaper.

So maybe, the solution is to take away the HUMMVes, and heck, the body armor and the Medevacs, and then send in the Marines? Sure there would be more casualties, but the drag on the US economy might well be be less...

That is Devil's Advocate, of course. My point is, I think putting expensive soldiers in vehicles, and having them drive around a country in "patrols", is a dumb way to fight an insurgency.

The strategy as I see it is flawed. Locals are not impressed by foreign soldiers equipped with the latest gear driving into their village. The locals are impressed when the rule of law prevails and they, or the insurgents, are unable to murder and steal from one another.

Making that rule of law stick is first and foremost a local police issue. The local police are not assisted when the big bad foreigners drive into the village, establish "security", and then when the foreign soldiers leave the "security" disappears.

Security for the general population only when the expensive foreigners are around, underlines the reality that the local police can't do jack, and further that they depend on the foreigners for their jobs, and there's a thread going in the general area which gives plenty of examples on how police doing their job poorly can really make the people they police anti-policeman in their attitudes.

And of course, the more expensive the foreign soldiers, the less of them you can field, and the more often they aren't around.

So as I see it, money spent on patrolling is pretty much wasted, money spent on fluffier higher-security patrolling is wasted, and money not spent on an even more expensive vehicle, in support of that flawed strategy, is money saved.

Sure that's harsh. But if in fact the "we patrol to win" strategy is flawed, then a whole lot of people have died, and several times that been injured, because the people making the decisions for whatever reason failed to face up to the fact that patrolling against an insurgency does little, and in many ways can be counterproductive.

That kind of seems to me to be immoral, getting your subordinates killed and injured because you don't want to see what supresses and insurgency, and what doesn't.

And a vehicle-manufacturing company talking to reporters about how its wonderful vehicles failed to get bought to particpate in that flawed strategy, is a company more concerned about the bottom line, than keeping soldiers alive. It seems to me that, because of the company's desire to maximize profit, its management is muddying a discussion on what does and does not defeat an insurgency, and while that discussion continues, soldiers are arguably dying and getting maimed for no good reason.

If, of course, patrolling around an insurgency in a big-ass bombproof is even a useful piece of a winning anti-insurgency strategy, then of course my arguement is invalid. But so far, I don't see much evidence to that end.

Originally posted by Londoner:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Londoner,

Then it should be easy for you to explain to some one less enlightened than yourself how those big clumsy vehicles will win the war.

As to stone age ideology, and speaking of enlightenment, I always thought a measure of human progress has been the willingness, or no, of a given society to look facts in the face.

Here, what I primarily see is a wanna-be defense contractor putting dirt out in the media because he didn't get the sales to Uncle Sam he wanted. I think the lost profit is much more important to the contractor, than the lost lives.

But if you see things different, hey, it costs nothing to post your opinion.

Mr D,

I don't know enough about the American military-industral complex to have an informed opinion on the financial considerations behind these vehicles, but obviously no single weapon system or piece of equipment is going to win a war or insurgency. However there's arguably a market for specialised vehicles, taliored to the specific threats of insurgency/stability/peackeeping type operations.

It's big - so what, visibility must be great! Profile size is hardly important, it won't be laying ambushes or hiding from hostile air. It's clumsy/boxy looking, and? It's not likely to face high velocity rounds. Why should the aesthetics matter anyway? Are you a modeller?

RE Enlightenment/human progress. Isn't it mainly about embracing change? Something we all find particularly difficult to do.

Regarding your rather odd casualty argument, even if we leave the ethics aside and just think purely about money, even if the US had the stomach for significant casualties, what is the economic cost? For every young man killed how many will never be in full time employment again? As far as I know the US military actually take pretty good care of their wounded, how much would all the pensions, long term care and the double hit of the resultant loss of taxpayers cost? </font>

[Splinty]

Duke, speaking as someone who has done a few hundred of those patrols. I've got to ask ,what do you suggest we do instead? I was an MP, my job was to train those Iraqi Police you hold in such contempt, and I must admit about half of the IPs I worked were useless and/or corrupt. But the other half really wanted to be or are good cops. We took them out on patrols all the time, we got them out and made sure they met all the community leaders and business owners, along with the residents of their precinct. We ran a Joint Security Station with them, some Iraqi Army reps and the 82nd Airborne. What I'm trying to say is, we and the Iraqi Security Forces MUST get out among the folks or the country will never have a chance to stabilize. Which means we patrol six to eight hours at a shot and take a chance of getting hit.

BTW earlier I made a statement about MRAPs not being much good against EFPs, someone replied that most IEDs aren't EFPs, so MRAPS will do some good.

My reply is that if your unit is stationed out in the provinces, the MRAP will be a good thing. If you're stationed in Baghdad, you might as well stick with a M1114, it's more maneuverable, fits in smaller places, and will protect you about as well.

[Other Means]

Splinty, I think BD6's point was that you NEED those patrols, and they need to be done on foot. Doing what you were doing as it's the best way to beat the insurgency and paying for a hulking great truck to drive around is only going to mean less money is available to pay for soldiers, and as IED's can be built to any size - or something else done - we actually gain very little when we increase protection above small arm levels, and if it gets to the point we need to, send a proper AFV in.

And with less soldiers, you're spread thinner, so you get what happened in Vietnam. The 300m around each patrol is 100% American. But when it moves on they revert to who actually lives there - the insurgency.

I'd also add that long term, it actually means more casualties as you need to be there longer, in a more protracted, bloodier conflict, so his point makes sense to me.

[Splinty]

About half of our patrol time was on foot, we'd either drive to our IP station and grab a few of them and walk out into the local neighborhood or taka a mounted patrol out and dismount in a market or do a school visit or any number of things to try and improve relations with the local civilians. It worked a great deal of the time and we did it daily. At least one squad from my platoon was out in sector at any given time. Our counterpart infantry platoon from the 82nd was out on foot in squad strength everyday and usually once a night. This kind of mixed patrolling was done by every unit in Baghdad that had a mission in sector. That included armor, infantry, cavalry, combat engineers, and military police. Not to mention all the speciliased units like Civil Affairs and SF training teams.

[luderbamsen]

Maybe we could all agree that the MRAP isn't going to win or loose anything on its own?

[Bigduke6]

Splinty,

Think of it this way. If in a major US city, 50 per cent of the police force was on the take, how easy would it be to commit a crime in that city? How about in a country awash in firearms, and with no practical way of keeping track of citizens, and even if you do get a perp to court, the judge is at least as likely to be corrupt as the police force?

Now how effective is that police force going to be, if the only time the laws are enforced is when foreign soldiers come around? Sure, maybe the police the foreign soldiers are training may have more or less the same equipment and behave more or less the same professional way as long as the foreign soldiers are around. But what about when the foreign soldiers are not around? How much of the country can you police, with the foreign soldiers (who are far from all MPs, as you well know.)

If it can't enforce the laws the government, any government, loses almost any claim it has to legitimacy with the people it supposedly rules. And when that legitimacy is gone, or even undermined, most people are quite happy to act against the government - and being people that includes the cops.

After all, in places like that, in the eyes of most, the government doesn't represent them, all it does is aid a small portion of the population to live better than the rest.

Are you quite sure those cops that were trying to do the job when you were watching, were up to standard, when you or some one like you wasn't watching?

Tricking foreigners is an ancient human custom, and it goes double for the Middle East. Who's to say the moment you left those "good cops" alone, the great bulk of them stopped enforcing the law like you "taught" them?

Why shouldn't they take bribes, use their weapons to commit crimes, and if any one asks point out they haven't sold out to the foreigners, they're just putting food on the family table like any one else? Why not smile at the foreign invader, tell him what he wants to hear, and then go back to trying to get on in life the moment the foreigner is gone?

You have a police force like that, and it's pretty easy for an insurgent or heck any common criminal to slip a bribe or otherwise convince the supposedly "good cop" to do precisely what he made a point of showing you, he didn't do? And that's the good half of the force.

Besides, I kind of have to wonder, why is it that it takes US MPs, of all people, to show Iraqis, of all people, the need of talking to locals? This is Mesopotamia fer Pete's sake, every one talks to every one and is related to every one, the culture depends on storytelling and long discussions and lots of jaw-jacking. This is where haggling dates back to before recorded history, and the very essence of any social group is defined by what Americans call personal networking.

It begs the question, how is it that people born in a country like that, with a verbal tradition like that, need to be shown by foreign soldiers who don't speak the local language that yes, if you want people to help you, you really need to talk to them?

I don't get it. Nothing for it, need multiple confused smilies.

:confused: :confused:

The proof is in the result. Me I don't see the patrols giving any meaningful result - not that I am implying you and people like you haven't been trying.

But result-wise, yes it's clear, if you saturate a sector of a city with patrols of cops that are willing to do their job right (like you) then you can get the crime rate down down a bit, although it remains well above any acceptable standard for a stable country.

Meanwhile, what about where the patrols are not? Wouldn't it be easier for the boss the foreigners installed to run a district that isn't patrolled to just lie about crime, just give the Americans the statistics they want, than it would be to try and get results in a place where he is known, his family is known, he lives "outside the wire 24/7", and if some one decides to try and kill him or one of his kin, his only realistic defense is being part of a clan more dangerous than the potential killers?

Because one thing this guy knows for sure, the foreigners that put him in his job, sooner or later, they're going to leave. He has to stay in the country, so he better amass a fortune while the grabbing is good, or make durn sure he stays friends with the people that could hurt him the moment his protectors are gone.

That's where the problem is. There aren't enough honest cops, honest judges, and honest administrators to go around. The laws aren't enforced, and the foreign soldiers are too thin on the ground. So there is chaos, the society runs on the law of the jungle, and there is no peace.

Foreign soldiers patrolling under those circumstances is, to my mind, pretending limited resources can do what they cannot. Patrolling in vehicles is even worse - a column drives through a neighborhood, it isn't hit, it talks to some kids and some elders tell them what a great job they're doing. And then the patrol drives away.

Meanwhile crime and corruption and graft and embezzlement and cops on the take all goes on right as before. And with that comes poverty, useless state institutions, inevitable hatred of the foreign soldiers whose presence obviously isn't helping, yada yada yada.

Under those circumstances, buying the soldiers a bigger better-armored patrol vehicle so that a few less of them die or are maimed when "patrolling" through neighborhoods filled with people whom the soldiers are supposedly there to protect, but who some of them anyway will bomb the vehicle, strikes me as a waste of resources.

As to what I suggest, I would recommend a reconsideration of the strategy that says "well, if we patrol enough, and limit our casualties, we'll supress this insurgency."

To be fair, I am certainly biased. I have spent the last 15 years or so working abroad in places, mostly East Europe, where the police force is basically corrupt. It is not pretty and it is almost impossible to root out. When there is an insurgency in progress, from what I have seen, it is impossible.

Originally posted by Splinty:

Duke, speaking as someone who has done a few hundred of those patrols. I've got to ask ,what do you suggest we do instead? I was an MP, my job was to train those Iraqi Police you hold in such contempt, and I must admit about half of the IPs I worked were useless and/or corrupt. But the other half really wanted to be or are good cops. We took them out on patrols all the time, we got them out and made sure they met all the community leaders and business owners, along with the residents of their precinct. We ran a Joint Security Station with them, some Iraqi Army reps and the 82nd Airborne. What I'm trying to say is, we and the Iraqi Security Forces MUST get out among the folks or the country will never have a chance to stabilize. Which means we patrol six to eight hours at a shot and take a chance of getting hit.

BTW earlier I made a statement about MRAPs not being much good against EFPs, someone replied that most IEDs aren't EFPs, so MRAPS will do some good.

My reply is that if your unit is stationed out in the provinces, the MRAP will be a good thing. If you're stationed in Baghdad, you might as well stick with a M1114, it's more maneuverable, fits in smaller places, and will protect you about as well.

[Secondbrooks]

Hmm. When does IED's be replaced by EFP's made of paintcans or tincans? If MRAP's armor and design is useless against that (like it would be logical), i would guess that then EFPs are then produced and used more than currently.

Someone said that procuding/using EFP is harder than "conventional" IED. No it's not. Materials and prinsible of producing are simple, same with use of it. I can't say that it's use would be harder than basics of claymore.

[Splinty]

BigDuke, I don't know if you'll agree, but the more I reread these thread the more I think we may be on the same page about this. At least about the need to be out on the ground. Although I do think the Surge has done some real good, I do agree that it will collapse as soon as we back off or leave the locals to their own devices.

As for the MRAPs,I've seen one up close, the things are HUGE, but they do have their uses for convoy protection and such.

Secondbrooks: EFPs do require some skill to make, the copper disks that form the projectile must be made in a machine shop by skilled hands and the shaped charge needs to be formed to pretty exacting standards, but any idiot with a shovel and the ability to run some wire and push a button can use one.

[MikeyD]

"... the insurgents simply cannot win unless the US government declares defeat and withdraws US forces."

...or goes bankrupt in the process of prosecuting a prolonged distant conflict. Don't forget that one, that's a big one.

I read a couple months ago that the cut in the Marine purchase of MRAPS had, in large part, to do with their self-image. The Marines aren't supposed to 'do' prolonged static occupations. They're the fighting arm of the Navy. They're supposed to 'do' landings, invasions and assaults. Fielding equipment optimized for static occupations blunts the edge of the sword.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Secondbrooks:

Hmm. When does IED's be replaced by EFP's made of paintcans or tincans? If MRAP's armor and design is useless against that (like it would be logical), i would guess that then EFPs are then produced and used more than currently.

Someone said that procuding/using EFP is harder than "conventional" IED. No it's not. Materials and prinsible of producing are simple, same with use of it. I can't say that it's use would be harder than basics of claymore.

That's very troubling if it is true. Not that I want to turn this forum into the Anarchist's Cookbook or anything, but are you certain that an effective formed or shaped charge is so simple to fabricate and use?

Remember, by "effective", we mean something that can defeat vehicle side armour at, say, up to 3 metres from the point of detonation (which generally needs to be both off-road and concealed since the device probably can't be buried in the road surface). This is not some kind of remotely fired ATGM that impacts on the armour itself.

Again, NOT an expert here, but it seems like it would take rather a lot of (bulky) explosive to throw out that kind of a "blowtorch". And even then you could only really use the things on narrow roads/alleys or bottlenecks which the Americans would quickly learn to avoid or inspect.

[Lethaface]

If u reread your colonials; many more before concluded there is no way to make a nations people 'evolve'(or 'civilise' / 'modernise') by installing new governments/leaders and stationing troops.

The only way to force a nations people into another nations will or vision, is a very nasty way. Divide et impera. Extermination works well too, or importing your own civilians to imposed countries and suppressing the locals.

Is there anyone who even knows about one single case in which the above wasn't true (for a prolonged period)?

This is not something I discovered myself. There has been many writings about this subject and this common knowledge is known by everyone thinking at any (strategic) level. I dont see as how the 'occupation' of Iraq or Afganistan is any different for the local population. Perhaps these troops are better in ethics then your uncle the police commisary, however, they don't understand the local 'traditions' and can't really help anyone. Your uncle the police commisary can though, at a certain price.

Still many others around the world seem to hope that one day it WILL be possible. That it will be possible to install a new better goverment in country X and help the civilians build a new country. And do this by controlling the government and military forces. And HELP those poor people. No nations want another nations help in such a way. Perhaps they could have just liquidate saddam and his followers and let the troops leave the country. Offcourse help can be given, even by training troops / police, etc. But I guess given the situation in Iraq there were to many disturbed relations to continue peacefully like nothing happened. A civil war between Shiites, sunniets and kurds was un-avoidable. Maybe Saddam was the only way of keeping them together. On the contrary I dont think it would be a very bad thing if Iraq was divided. Perhaps it would be best if they just Duked it out themselves. It would have been a mess for a few years, but something would have evolved from it. Something everyone would accept as best.

There is nothing to win in demographic terms or political terms by occupying a country with (hostile/foreign) forces. There are other reasons though for occupation. These reasons may very well be the true offspring as to why USA troops are stationed in the middle of Lions Den "Baghdad". What these might be I'll set aside now. The peoples in Iraq aren't used to non-corrupt governments, fair judges, etc. For Iraq to become a stabilised country again, the people has to 'revolt' itself. A civil war, gruesome as it is, might be the only solution for peace. Its very good possible that Iraq will be divided into more then 1 country. That not only goes for Iraq but for large parts of the middle east and almost whole africa. Borders that were drawn by colonial governments, regardless of the tribes/people that lived there. In some ways we can say that those parts of the world didnt have the history we in Europe or even USA share. Countless wars over hundreds of years about small disagreements about borders and control of natural reserves like gold, oil, coal, etc. Look at the average european border and the average african one. Its obvious that with the creation of europes borders much more blood was shed as with the creation of the borders in africa. It even were the bloody europeans that drawed them. Perhaps we should be patient and let the creation of an equilibrium in africa and the middle east be decided by 'fate'. The West already had to many influence in this small world. Just my 200 cents, completely offtopic

[ February 19, 2008, 03:09 PM: Message edited by: Lethaface ]

[FAI]

Regarding IED vs MRAP, my opinion is that from the insurgents' POV, it's another victory for them. They have succesfully forced the US to spend extra gazillion dollars to upgrade their vehicles and protect their supply lines. And for a freakingly tiny portion of that money, they can adapt to keep their leverage, either by building even larger IEDs, manufacturing/importing EFPs, and/or devising new tactics. The (crude) cost/expenditure analysis is in favor of the insurgents.

[Omenowl]

From the point of view from an insurgent is every time there is less death and destruction the weaker the insurgent appears. When death tolls drop then people start to view the situation as improving.

Having to build bigger bombs and make them more sophisticated reduces the number of people capable of performing the act, increases the cost to perform such an act and limits the placement of such devices.

At roughly 400-800k per vehicle compared to say 1 F-22 at 333 million? Even assuming a lower cost of 133 million were are looking at 133 MRAPs protecting roughly 1330 soldiers at any point in time.

I think the better questions are:

The MRAPs the best use of money for the current situation a soldier faces?

Can the MRAPs be used in future peacekeeping missions?

Can the MRAPs be used for future warfighting?

[Secondbrooks]

Originally posted by Splinty:

Secondbrooks: EFPs do require some skill to make, the copper disks that form the projectile must be made in a machine shop by skilled hands and the shaped charge needs to be formed to pretty exacting standards, but any idiot with a shovel and the ability to run some wire and push a button can use one. [/QB]

Yes and no. If one want's it to as effective as industrial made, then yes there are standarts which one should reach.

I don't need copper, i don't need shaped charge. I don t have to form anything. What i need is 10 cm big can (metal or plastic), 1-3 kilograms weighting steelplate (copper is great, steel is easier to get) put in to can + same amount of explosives as plate weights behind plate + fuze + mass which will seals open end of can . There you have it, not as effective as one made with better resources and skill but it will go thru armor side armor if APC at 30 meters, i'm not sure about modern IFVs thou.

LongLeftFlank: This is directly from our army guidebook conserning explosives which can be made easily (and reservists have produced them with short traning). This has been shown in public sources so i dare to tell something about it.

We had shortage of allkinds weapons (expacely AT) during coldwar era, this was one way to try balance things and make guarilla warfare behind enemy lines more effective and possible.

[ February 20, 2008, 12:53 AM: Message edited by: Secondbrooks ]

[Bigduke6]

I think the better questions are:

The MRAPs the best use of money for the current situation a soldier faces?

Can the MRAPs be used in future peacekeeping missions?

Can the MRAPs be used for future warfighting?

Excellent questions. My opinion

1. It depends. If you are talking MRAP vs. more money invested in an effective Iraqi police force, then MRAP loses. However, it is very easy to waste money on the Iraqi police force, and hard even with unlimited resources to improve it substantially.

If it is MRAP vs. F-22, then the MRAP wins. For the price of about 3 F-22 the entire US infantry force could probably ride around in nothing but MRAPs. This would be a small but clear step in the right direction, if the war you are fighting is an insurgency. The F-22 is useless against the insurgency.

2. Yes.

3. Probably.

The question that follows from this is, what do you sacrifice to get the MRAPs? Is it a few hidiously expensive aircraft, a substantial improvement in the Iraqi police, or a superficial improvement in the Iraqi police?

[Omenowl]

I look at it as a stop gap measure until you can field an effective police or army. No one has well defined what level of quality for a force. Lets assume it take 6-12 months to get a competent police officer or solider. Couple this with 3-5 years for an NCO or junior officer and 5-10 years for higher level officers or senior NCOs. The US until recently seemed to care more about numbers than quality of the Iraqi forces.

So if you need 200,000 police and soldiers and the you lose 20-30% per years if not more this makes it very hard to get an effective force up and running. Until you get this independent and effective force up you need to hand hold and provide your own occupying force.

It all depends on what future you see for the military. One of peacekeeping and peaceenforcement or heavy industrial nations slogging it out (ie cold war).

[MikeyD]

I wonder, IS the Marines' decision to keep with their longterm offensive capability to the near-term detriment of their occupation abilities a good play? After all, any MRAPS vehicles purchased today will be sitting in depot 20 years from now. There's the old saying generals tend to plan to fight the last war. Will MRAPS in 'unexpected conflict X' in 2012 turn out to be the wrong tool for the wrong job?

[Bigduke6]

Of course, the tricky part is fielding an effective local police or army. The tradition is clan loyalty, corruption, and lying to foreigners. Strangely enough Saddam was just about the only pure Iraqi leader the place has ever seen: before that it was either stooges for the British, or the Turks.

Either way the Arabs and Kurds living in the region have, aside from Saddam, zero tradition of telling the truth or playing honest with the foreigners in charge; and at the same time eons of tradition of evading responsibility and stringing along whatever outside force is control of the region.

Which I think would mitigate against creating a functional police force in a few years. It would be a decade at least, and probably a generation.

How does that cost compare with the price of the MRAPS? And forget the money, what about time? If the American public isn't willing to fund a training effort like that, as long as that, then maybe "train the police" isn't an option at all, it's just something that gets discussed on wargame forums but every knows it will never be implemented?

If that's the case, then from a Marine Corps POV, maybe the right move after all is to field the vehicles, as that will keep more Marines alive, and more Marines alive at the end of an ineffective effort to repress an insurgency, is a better result than less Marines alive at the end of an ineffective effort to repress an insurgency.

Or maybe, the Air Force would be willing to do without building any more F-22es. That would be a savings of about 30 billion dollars, and that kind of money could buy say 10-20,000 for instance Indian or Brazilian mercenary police to keep order and train the Iraqi police force over two decades. Then you might get somewhere. So if the flyboys were willing...

Nah.

[Omenowl]

It is still funny to see the difference between time periods. During the cold war it was the fanciest planes, tanks and ships. Now we argue about better living arrangements, body armor and less glamorous vehicles.

Even congress has changed its mentality from better fighters to better lift capability. Whether the flyboys want to give up the cash or not the reality is the F-22 and other things are less glamorous than the 2 million dollar prize for autonomous vehicles. Even the navy is going towards more infantry support.

[MikeyD]

F-22 has an image problem. We're in the middle of fighting two wars at the same time but F-22 still hasn't got around to flying a single combat mission in all this time. Sorta reminds you of the pretty gold-plated AK that was pulled out of one of Saddam's mansions.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Secondbrooks:

There you have it, not as effective as one made with better resources and skill but it will go thru armor side armor if APC at 30 meters, i'm not sure about modern IFVs thou.

We had shortage of allkinds weapons (expacely AT) during coldwar era, this was one way to try balance things and make guarilla warfare behind enemy lines more effective and possible.

Well I am profoundly thankful that my Finnish friends never had to try to put such desperate-sounding measures into practice, sissu or no.

Ah, a quick check of the ALWAYS reliable Wikipedia gives me some essential new data on EFPs, and I quote selectively:

An EFP uses the action of the explosive's detonation wave (and to a lesser extent the propulsive effect of its detonation products) to project and deform a plate or dish of ductile metal (such as copper, iron, or tantalum) into a compact high-velocity projectile, commonly called the slug. This slug is projected towards the target at about two kilometres per second. The chief advantage of the EFP over a conventional (e.g., conical) shaped charge is its effectiveness at very great standoffs, equal to hundreds of times the charge's diameter (perhaps a hundred meters for a practical device).

The EFP is relatively unaffected by first-generation reactive armour and can travel up to perhaps 1000 charge diameters (CDs) before its velocity becomes ineffective at penetrating armour due to aerodynamic drag, or successfully hitting the target becomes a problem. The impact of a ball or slug EFP normally causes a large-diameter but relatively shallow hole, of, at most, a couple of CDs. If the EFP perforates the armour, extensive behind armour effects (BAE, also called behind armour damage, BAD) will occur. The BAE is mainly caused by the high temperature and velocity armour and slug fragments being injected into the interior space and the overpressure (blast) caused by this debris.

Hmm, still seems pretty hard to aim accurately from a remote point at a moving target further than 10 feet away. You've got to boresight the thing pretty carefully unless you're planning to achieve martyrdom with it.

[ February 20, 2008, 02:20 PM: Message edited by: LongLeftFlank ]

[LongLeftFlank]

And some more from Wired

Intelligence officials have long blamed Iran for supplying EFP parts, but this remains in doubt. In any case, as Janes reports, even if the original technology came from Iran,

... the knowledge required to manufacture and use EFPs may have become so widespread that Iranian assistance is no longer required.

According to London's Telegraph newspaper,

The Ministry of Defence has attempted to play down the effectiveness of the weapons, suggesting that they are "crude" or "improvised" explosive devices which have killed British troops more out of luck than judgement.

However, this newspaper understands that Government scientists have established that the mines are precision-made weapons which have been turned on a lathe by craftsmen trained in the manufacture of munitions.

At least two EFP factories have since been found in Iraq, facilities which produced the thin copper 'lenses' for EFPs. The picture suggests that one man with a lathe can turn out enough to keep the insurgency supplied at the current rate. Several lathes would mean a lot more EFPs; at the current rate each one of those stacks of five or six copper lenses represents one potential death.

One bright spot: EFPs produce much less collateral damage than other IEDs. So the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a 'by product' of attacks on military convoys may get smaller.

[John Kettler]

Here's a nice link a friend sent me on MRAPS after I unexpectedly had wingmen last week.

http://www.defense-update.com/products/m/mrap.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[M1A1TC]

Well, after those news in the link provided (17,700 MRAPs in theater by April 2009)

I think BFC should definatly add one or two MRAPS in the next module

[FAI]

Originally posted by LongLeftFlank:

And some more from Wired

One bright spot: EFPs produce much less collateral damage than other IEDs. So the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a 'by product' of attacks on military convoys may get smaller.

Bright indeed, in a dark kind of way...