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Given that one ASM can disable an assault ship if it's 50,000 or 15,000 and Taiwan is closer to China than Cuba is to the US, I'd have thought that a half dozen at 17,000 would make a lot more sense for China than one or two at 50,000.

As for the catamarrans, I would think they were just about ideal for the type of operations the Chinese would want to undertake, and if they can produce them at more than 4 a year it shouldn't take long to build up a significant force.

We are talking about coastal operations close to, Korea, Taiwan, or Vietnam, not going to the Gulf or invading Mexico.

Peter.

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When (if) China starts bombing Taiwan and sending its ships across the strait I cannot comprehend how the U.S. government could possibly react. Fifty years ago China was the 'Red Menace' and could be treated accordingly. Now they manufacture most of our goods and own most of our national debt. If we were to so much as look at China crosswise, with one word from thier central government we'd find empty store shelves at Walmart and the worth of our dollar plummeting! :eek: :(

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I read an interesting article recently about the effect China is having on the dollars status as a reserve currency.

It made the point that when that happened to the pound it marked the end of Britain as a global power.

I still think the US would respond, but as time goes by in Iraq, I wonder how willing the US would be to risk loosing thousands fighting a country that can nuke california.

Peter.

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It's not how hard you can hit it's how much you can take.....

For the Chinese Taiwan is part of their country so any Nuclear use is against their soil could be seen to merit retaliation in kind.

If China is willing to risk unification by force, then it has probably calculated that the US won't go nuclear first, as the US won't risk California.

From there point of view if they are wrong, the get a couple of divisions vapourised, although that would hardly go down well with the Taiwanese as they would be on their soil.

The US would have to think about the consequences of Chinese retaliation and thats when LA and SF come in to the firing line.

It's all about how far up the escalatory ladder each side is willing to go. A difficult factor is credibility, if the US backs down then the credibility of it's deterrent and resolve is brought in to question.

That of course does raise the prospect of a country starting a nuclear war to prove it has the resolve to start a nuclear war and so can deter people from starting a nuclear war, which is pretty self defeating and daft.

However you could argue that once you adopt a deterrent posture, that depends on people believeing you will act if necessary, that it filters down and ultimately increase your propensity to take action because " We need to maintain credibility"

That was the line that Blair took about Nato and Kosovo, we had to act, not only because of what the Serbs were doing, but also to show that Nato was a force to be reckoned with.

The contradiction that we had to take offensive action to prove we were a defensive alliance seems to have escaped him.

As I have said before there are huge incentives on both sides too keep it as local as possible and conventional, so as in Korea, the US doesn't hit mainland China, and the Chinese don't attack US bases or Carriers ( as long as they stay outwith Chinas EEZ).

If I was either the Chinese or the US I'd want to keep it all as tight as possible.

Peter.

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A difficult factor is credibility, if the US backs down then the credibility of it's deterrent and resolve is brought in to question.
Meh. Leaving 'Nam didn't cause the Soviets to head west. When you get right down to it, why should we care whether or not China goes for Taiwan? Ain't our problem, and anyone still willing to bring up the domino theory isn't living on the same planet.

I guess if things do go hot, I'll be looking for an apartment a bit further east than my current place just outside LA.

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Originally posted by Sergei:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by MikeyD:

Now they manufacture most of our goods and own most of our national debt.

Look on the bright side - if a war starts, you don't have to pay a penny of that debt! </font>
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Originally posted by pad152:

I always wondered what type of mutual defense exists for Asia, if China goes after Taiwan. Would Japan, South Korea, or the land of Oz get involved?

Or would our Asian allies in the region just join the rest of the world and run to the U.N. and yell mommy make them stop! :rolleyes:

I can't imagine they'd be foolish enough to bother -- the veto's been mainland China's since the mid '70s. A Japanese or Korean intervention to save Taiwan is about as likely as a European intervention to save Cuba or Puerto Rico from the United States.

For us, it's the same problem of extended deterrence that we had in Europe, except that we don't have forces stationed in Taiwan.

In the end, though, the big question is why China would feel the need to retake its "breakaway province" -- especially as Taiwan seems to laying golden eggs profusely on the Chinese mainland. The Middle Kingdom's been around a very long time; one suspects they figure Taiwan will recohere sooner or later.

In general, I'd think Flashpoints: China are Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia (and Kazakhstan, etc.) more than Taiwan.

Originally posted by Peter Cairns:

It's not how hard you can hit it's how much you can take.....

However you could argue that once you adopt a deterrent posture, that depends on people believeing you will act if necessary, that it filters down and ultimately increase your propensity to take action because " We need to maintain credibility"

That was the line that Blair took about Nato and Kosovo, we had to act, not only because of what the Serbs were doing, but also to show that Nato was a force to be reckoned with.

Funny issue... I suspect at some point we might learn that feeling the "need to maintain credibility" is a very good symptom of having few interests (and, in the end, very limited credibility) to begin with. If it is "how much you can take," the problem is that that quantity is dependent on real threat to interests. The USSR in WWII will "take" a lot more than the USSR in Cuba (as Castro found out).

[ November 16, 2006, 08:30 PM: Message edited by: Cary ]

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To be honest although it looks like the Chinese are probably going to get the carrier working, I really can't see what they would want it for.

One or even two or three isn't enough to challenge the US beyond shore based cover, and it's not really needed for any of their regional rivals.

I've always admired the Chinese nuclear deterent in that unlike the US and old USSR, they stopped building Nukes when they thought they had enough to hurt the enemy enough to prevent war, regardless of how many their opponent built.

If I had to guess the Chinese will get this one working and out to sea as a research and training ship ( getting round the agreement not to use it as an aircraft carrier) some time in the next five years and then wait and see the ion.

If it doesn't make neighbours sit up and beg then they won't build their own.

If it does then they might think well ones enough why build more, and if it gets the US to blow billions on defence building a new generation of carriers for a challenge that China isn't going to make, then thats billions that don't go in to helping US manufactureres compete with China.

China seems to be adept and keeping the US off balance by a combination of greed and fear.

The US eyes the chinese market with averice, and can't get enough cheap Chinese goods, while on the other hand it is warry of the Chinese as rivals and a potential military threat.

Peter.

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A conventional war between China and the US would mean a self assured mutual economic destruction. Neither one can survive without the other for now and the near future. It's the main reason we rejected basing CM:SF on such a conflict. It's highly unlikely since it is in the best interests of neither. Quite the contrary.

China would be the biggest loser since it would have to contend with massive food shortages and a very, very unhappy population that is currently placated by ecnomic prosperity. Take that away from them and you'd see a coup (best case) or a civil war (worst case). Things would certainly not be happy in the US, to say the least, but its people would eat and the government would remain intact. Many would see it as an opportunity to bring jobs back home too, so there is a potential upside (at least in theory). There is no upside for the Chinese economy.

Now, having said all of that... the balance of power is so delicate that if China did decide to take over Taiwan, nobody would stop them. There would be a lot of yelling and screaming, some superficial sanctions, and what not just like what is happening with North Korea and Iran. Which, incidentally, is why CM:SF is not situatuated in either Iran or North Korea either :D

Steve

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As for possible conflicts with China: I would think China making avances the other way, direction Burma (or how it is called nowadays) might be more likely. It plays to their strenghts (manpower instead of marine power), gives more advantages (like energy sources), has less negative consequences(it does not bring in loads of money), and the regime does not have any real friends. Of course logistics might be a tad difficult. And just buying the country from the generals with the Chinese reserves of dollars might be more effective...

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Bertram,

I think in part because of there experience with Viretnam, China would think long and hard about a jungle war, In addition Burma is hardly a prize. If you take a sinical view you want maximum benefit for minimum effort and risk, which is what Galtieri and Saddam thought hey would get from the Falklands and Kuwait.

Steve,

Looking at the CIA fact book, the US makes up 20% of Chinas exports , ( and 5% of US exports go to China, way behind Canada at 17%). However more han 30% goes to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Likewise China is the biggest Single market for Japan, Korea and Taiwan. all these figure are slightly distorted by China-HongKong trade which shows up seperately.

With 10% annual growth I think China could survive the loss of the US market, as long as it could keep it's neighbours on side. There would be hardships but I am pretty sure that the Chinese as willing to suffer for the sake of reunification, at least in the short term.

As to food last Year China imported 5 m tons of grain, but it produced over 455 m tons, so I can't see how you think they would starve....

I agree that a war is extremely unlikely and that China would win as the costs of the war outweigh the benefits, and so it shouldn't be a CM:SF first choice, but I don't see it as being a disaster for China, ( or the US for that matter).

Peter.

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"In 1928, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France were the most important trading powers in the network. Furthermore all four major trading powers had close trade ties with one another except that between the U.K. and Germany.

One hundred and seventeen cliques were found for the trade network in 1928. The largest size of any clique is four. All the cliques except one involved one or more of the four major trading powers. There are relatively small exclusive centripetal sets surrounding major trading powers, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, and France.

The combination of cliques and star sets produces four major trading power spheres and a rather small trade sphere around Hong Kong.

As in 1928, the four most central players in 1938 were the U.K., Germany, the U.S. and France. Sixty-two cliques were found for the 1938’s trade network and the largest size of the clique is four. None of the cliques found did not involve one of the three major trading powers: the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. The largest centripetal sets were the ones surrounding major trading powers.

The combination of the clique and centripetal star sets shows the development of four major power trade blocs. Another striking feature of the (1938) network is the absence of close trade ties among the major trading powers except that between the U.S. and the U.K."

In other words, the major powers kept their links to satellites but cut those with each other between 1928 and 1938 - except US-UK which retained theirs. Close trade ties in 1928 did not remotely prevent war between major powers in 1939.

It is a pipe dream, a way of not facing the perennial competition between great powers.

By treaty and stated policy, the US would come to the defense of Taiwan, with extensive naval and air assets from very soon after war start, and ground forces within a couple of months. By political realities of present fatigue and isolationist-pacifist sentiment in the US, the Chinese could readily conclude we would do nothing (beyond diplomatic protest and pro forma sanctions).

Which to any foreign policy realist is a standing invitation to a war of miscalculation based on a credibility game. China will only go if they think we won't - but their thinking it does not mean it is so.

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As for the present trading system in the Pacific, it is a cut triangle. There is a large dollar source in the US, spent on consumer goods, which flows to China first. A portion remains there as increased foreign exchange reserves but the bulk instead moves to the offshore producers who supply China with industrial equipment. In turn those receive their higher tech equipment and tools from Japan, while also having extensive independent ties to the US, but more balanced ones. Japan is the large dollar sink in the goods-trade system, accumulating large dollar balances. It then moves on as finance capital rather than goods, as all the world's financiers borrow in Japan at near zero interest rates, to carry capital assets and property in the US and EU.

China is rapidly developing its own industrial capacity to supplement that provided in that set up by the off shore producers (which are Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia mostly). It is currently less able to dispense with the highest tech stuff from Japan, effeciently at least. As the Yuan revalues, China's latent GDP will reveal itself at the same time its wage edge is reduced. In real goods terms rather than traded value at nominal exchange rates, China is already significantly larger than Japan economically, and by some estimates within a factor of 2 of the US itself. E.g. the CIA estimates Chinese GDP at purchasing power parity at a little under $9 trillion, 4 times the nominal figure.

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Peter,

Looking at the CIA fact book, the US makes up 20% of Chinas exports , ( and 5% of US exports go to China, way behind Canada at 17%). However more han 30% goes to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Likewise China is the biggest Single market for Japan, Korea and Taiwan. all these figure are slightly distorted by China-HongKong trade which shows up seperately.
Already did that the last time we discussed this :D I'm guessing you don't run your own business, because if you did you'd understand that it doesn't matter how much or how little business one does. What matters is how much margin for error there is. I doubt China has 20% margin for error in its economy. I doubt it could suffer even a 10% sudden decline. And if you think that the US would go to war with China without trade being affected to places like Japan, Taiwan (which it would in theory be at war with) and Korea you're going to have to explain yourself better. Same for Europe. So we're talking about a LOT more than 20% being at stake.

Oh, and that 10% growth rate is predicated on a nice, stable global trade climate. Without foreign capital, investment, and trade China can't sustain a growth rate even close to that. Probably go negative.

As for food, China is a net importer of food. Like an economy it doesn't take much to upset the apple cart. Domestic production would for sure suffer from general economic disruption, increase of armed forces, etc. While the caloric capacity might be there to sustain life, people would not be happy. And they certainly wouldn't be happy with no job.

It's as clear as day to me... China goes to war with the US, China collapses and the rest of the world suffers quite a bit. China will bounce back quickly because the world needs China, but it would not be a China with the same old guard that is in power now. And since the old guard are interested in keeping their jobs, and very shrewdly too I might add, I don't see them making a miscalculation about direct conflict with the US. The Chinese are many things, and their strongest suit (IMHO) is their grasp on cause and effect as it concerns long term planning.

Steve

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Steve,

Never ran a business but as a councillor on Budget scrutiny I did look after $700m (£400m) a year of public money for four years, so I suspect I know as well as you the difference between the gross amount, and how much of that you actually have to play with.

Chinas exports and imports are around $750 bn and $630 bn respectively, but there economy is $2,200 bn, which actually makes the £150 bn they sell to the states, only 7% of the economy.

Oh and as we are mentioning previous discussions, I have pointed out the propensity of the US to continually undersetimate, the resiliance and will of it's opponents, The korean, and Chinese in the fifties, the Vietnamese in the 70's and now the Iraqi's and Afghans.

You may think that a set back in the economy would change China and send it in to crisis, but I think they are as well suited and able to weather a recession as the US was in the 30's.

Indeed given the numbers of Chinese who have died in the last 50 years without the system changing, I'd say they were probably more capable of sustaining the fight than the US.

Look at flooding, China almost on a regular basis suffers damage and death tolls greater than the Floods in new Orleans, but it doesn't seem to shake them the way it did the US.

The vast bulk on Chinese have only the most rudimentary health care and no pension provision worth talking about, but they live with it. Mention cutting pensions ofr reforming medicare in the states and politicains hide under their desks.

Peter.

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