Differences in Recon Doctrine

[Andreas]

Well, in another thread, I have been called a bad person, because I like to use some form of evidence, preferrably other than 'I read it on the back of a Frosties carton which I have waylaid, and hence it must be true.' when it comes to discussing things here on this board. If you find this disagreeable, stop reading.

So, don't say you have not been warned I will be working from memory here though, so some errors are to be expected. It is late, and I can't be bothered to dig out the sources.

With that said - I would be quite interested in a discussion of different recon doctrines of the powers involved in WW2. In that other thread, it was suggested that the Germans were somehow unique in fighting for information (called Gefechtsaufklaerung BTW), while all the other nations had a policy of sitting on their asses (I paraphrase) and just watching what the Germans were doing.

There are various pieces of evidence that make me think this is not quite true.

First of all would be the actual OOB of Allied forces.

Both the British and the US forces had independent mechanized recce/mech Cav units on the Corps and divisional levels, of battalion size. They had recce platoons on BN level AFAIK, and presumably coy or plt size units on regimental level. I will ignore the latter two for the time being. I would divide (I maybe wrong in doing this) Recce in operational and tactical levels. The BN size units are IMO deployed for operational recce, and the smaller ones for tactical recce - in general.

Looking at the TO&E, it becomes evident quite clearly that the intended role of these battalion size units was not necessarily to sit on their asses and watch the Germans go about their business. The vehicles sported include amongst others:

</font>

• Staghound AC 6-pdr </font>
• Daimler AC 2-pdr </font>
• M8 AC 3,7cm </font>
• M7 HC 7,5cm howitzer </font>
• M3/5/6 Stuart tanks in armoured formations </font>
• Cromwell tanks in armoured reconnaissance battalions (although these were often just used as line armoured formations)</font>

Integral artillery included 3" mortars for the British, and the M7 HC was mostly for indirect use, AIUI.

This is a fair amount of firepower going along on the Recce mission, and I would be surprised if this was intended to be used for sitting around.

In terms of infantry manpower, IIMU that Recce units were quite weak - that is logical, and was the case for the Germans too. If they hit a problem they could not solve with their limited resource, it would be appropriate to let others (the line BNs) take over. But the presence of a platoon called 'assault troop' in the British TO&E would indicate that this troop was to assault something.

I close this particular discussion with saying that certainly the western allies were perfectly capable of fighting for information.

Now for some evidence - Memoirs and unit histories including various Delaforce books, 'The South Albertas' etc. and this splendid page would indicate that they actually did every so often get in a scrap. In particular this sentence from the section on doctrine:

Lessons learned caused the Army Ground Forces (AGF) to reorganize the mechanized cavalry in 1943 to give the squadron and troop the ability of fight for information.

Some scenarios that will depict such actions are Moon's 'A day in the cavalry' op from the CD, or my '49th Recce' (not as well), '5th Glosters move east' (both British) or 'Hasselt' (US mech Cav).

On the tactical level, stealth was a lot more applicable. Gaining information about firing points, capturing prisoners, learning the outline of the position on the opposite side are often informations that are easier gained by sneaking, than by driving up an AC to see wherefrom it will draw fire.

Now for the Red Army - that is a topic I know a lot less about, so my thoughts may very well be quite wrong.

Again it is my understanding that independent Recce units existed at divisional level throughout the war. In 1941, these were supposed to be partly mechanised (with all those lovely tankettes and funny ACs) and fully motorised. They were certainly equipped to fight for information. Once the Germans had destroyed all the gun-armed ACs, and the lovely tankettes, the BA-64 became the only recce vehicle designed for the purpose. Troop transport was provided by lend-lease armoured HTs or lorries in mech formations.

The Soviet doctrine evolved during the war, and later-on involved reconnaissance in serious force. Whole battalions were sent into the German lines on the eve of Bagration to establish the German firing points, and fortifications. If that is not fighting for information, I do not know what is.

Memoirs that would lead me to believe that the Soviets also liked to fight for their intel include various division commanders' memoirs (322nd RD, 10th GRD), and a very interesting memoir (which I have yet to read fully) by a Polish Lieutenant who fought in armoured reconnaissance.

Certainly an interesting topic, and in particular the role of forward detachments as elements of fighting reconnaissance is something I would like to learn more about. I would also be interested in comments on the German doctrine, something I do not know much about (other than that German ACs could get out of trouble as quickly as they got into it, acquired big guns during the war, and were generally oversized)

Comments, refutations, seastories?

[Louie the Toad]

Andreas,

An Observation (pun intended)

I guess I have had a problem with Recce units too, even back to my board game and miniatures days. They were either not stealthy enough, not strong enough or became a sort of adjunct force. I have now come to the conclusion, after reading your post and thinking a bit more about them, that recce units, in the scope of CM, should be fighting their own scenarios. I also believe that this was the "trouble" in board and miniatures engagements. That their true role was not accurately portrayed.

Now in CM one can scale down the battlefield so there can be a meeting engagement of probing forces. Or a probe vs defensive positions. However, usually the way we want to play CM does not consider these types of skirmishes. Most players it appears, want a slugfest of some kind. I do too. That is why you will most likely hear from those who will say that "recon is or should be in the Briefing".

What that means to me is that the Recon battle has already taken place.

I played 49th Recce and enjoyed how it developed. I only wish we could play OPERATIONALLY. If we could, there would most often be a Recon fight followed by a major battle as one side or another brought up more units to try and overpower the enemy. Or one should be rewarded in these types of skirmishes if his force gets away after identifying the strength of the enemy. That should be a Recon victory. Of course it is not modeled in CM.

Maybe those who make CM operations could design them in a manner that makes use of the Recon battle.

I apologize that this post is not as tightly connected or developed as I would like, but time is not on my side.

Gotta jump....... Toad

[Foxbat]

The soviets seem to have been rather fond of "WW I style" intelligence gathering, that is sending small raiding parties into no-mans-land or behind enemy lines and abducting enemy personel. Now that's fighting for intel

The actual combat recconaisance before an attack would be forward detachments with a recce in force mission that included capturing or overrunning enemy strongpoints, valuable locations and tactical/operational objectives (eg crossroad and bridges).

Such a recon operation would actually woork out as a cascasing affair as each unit send out a subunit to lead the way, as mentioned that could lead to recce units being anywhere from battalion to squad in size.

[Grisha]

Andreas,

Regarding Red Army razvedka (the Russian word incorporates reconnaissance & intelligence) doctrine, it's quite complex. As far as I can recall, the razvedka collection methods used were:</font>

1. observation</font>
2. reconnaissance in force</font>
3. aerial reconnaissance</font>
4. prisoners</font>
5. captured documents</font>
6. local populace</font>
7. agents</font>
8. signal intercepts
   </font>

There is truth to the saying that the Germans conducted ground reconnaissance primarily by force. This is to say that German reconnaissance units were expected to contact the enemy and conduct reconnaissance with and under fire. Reconnaissance conducted in this manner is the quickect means of obtaining intelligence on the enemy. The Soviets adopted this form of reconnaissance but only later when they had begun effective development of their tank forces. Until that time reconnaissance was based mostly on observation.

The Soviets were very big on observation, which was employed by troops, engineers, artillery, aviation, partisans, and special razvedka units. Observation was primarily performed from OP's along the front line, but rear area observation was very frequent as well and this was conducted by not only partisans and special reconnaissance-diversionary units, but also troops, engineers and artillery.

While Soviet razvedka was primarily one of observation there were some very notable exceptions. The taking of prisoners was a very important and ongoing task in the Red Army and was done from the very beginning of the war until the end. This was usually done by special teams from divisional level or up. It was such an important task that it was almost a field unto itself. Prisoners were referred to as 'tongues' for obvious reasons, but the Russian word for 'language' is based on their word for 'tongue', so the method of capturing prisoners was often referred to jokingly as 'linguistics.' The task of capturing a prisoner was an operation in itself, requiring elaborate planning based on observation of the target area. Things like sentry changes, meal times, and individual route patterns were studied for a number of days before a plan was put together. When razvedka units planned deep observations in the German rear, prisoners would sometimes be taken for immediate information, then dispatched. Information obtained from prisoners was usually tactical in nature, but it could have much higher consequences at times.

As for reconnaissance in force, the Soviets tended to do this before an attack, so as to get one last update on enemy positions for the assault. The Germans picked up on this attack indicator fairly quickly, so it was a continuous job for either side as the Soviets tried to mask their probes while the Germans tried to see through them. Eventually, it got to the point where the Soviets would conduct reconnaissance in force as the initial phase of their assault, and if it went successful, would merely commit the actual first assault echelon with little or no artillery, but this was very late in the war around late 1944, early 1945.

Signal intercepts were not really a prime source of intelligence for the Soviets until late in the war.

Partisan razvedka was very beneficial to Soviet intelligence, offering a continuous means of observing German rear area activity, and as such its value was generally from an operational level.

Frontline, and shallow rear, observation of German positions was extremely complex and thorough. This was conducted by not only troops, but also engineer and artillery razvedka units. Often, troop observation missions in the enemy rear would incorporate teams of engineers and artillerymen, so that they could make note of their respective concerns. For engineers, this would be the state and layout of fortifications of enemy positions, including minefields. For artillerymen, this would be the locations of mortar and gun pits, tactical command posts, tanks, and other hardpoints. Such was the importance and attention given to enemy observation that in the Red Army it was felt that mapping 60-65% of German frontline defenses and dispositions (including reserves) was needed to insure a successful assault.

Lastly, I'd like to come back to the method of obtaining reconnaissance by force. When the Soviets began using large armor units to exploit tactical success into operational success, the need to quickly gather intelligence in the 'void' of the German operational depths was an absolute necessity, since experience had shone it could literally mean life and death for an entire tank corps or army. As a result, the tank and mech corps had reconnaissance units very similar to German reconnaissance units with high firepower and mobility. While there were TOE reconnaissance units, most actual reconnaissance detachments were formed from various subunits, based on the terrain they were operating on as well as the possible composition of enemy forces they might encounter. Unlike forward detachments, reconnaissance detachments were not to engage in extended combat, but to engage only to the point necessary to divulge enemy positions and movements.

[CombinedArms]

Andreas,

Have people really been saying only the Germans engaged in "fighting for information"? If so, that does indeed seem a rather strange claim--possibly an after echo of typically arrogant claims by German generals that their operational skills were uniquely superior.

Aside from all of the Allied organic recce units you cite, there's also the constant process of "patrolling" that I see reference to in American and British combat histories. This seems typically to involve sending something like a squad out, often at night, to explore and probe enemy positions, capture a prisoner or two for interrogation, and so on. This was, as I understand it, an extremely common procedure for standard infantry units even in static positions--and more aggressive patrolling (by either side--the Germans, of course, did it too) was often the prelude to a counterattack. The Russians' small raiding parties mentioned above are of course the same idea. The notion that this sort of stuff was employed uniquely by any one side is of course absurd.

One CMBB operation that does an excellent job of sort of "sketching in" the recon phase is The B &T-- Stalingrad Pack's "The Bitter End". We're presented with some of the fruits of the recon (in the form of asterisks outlining possible trench lines) and a few possible gun positions, etc, identified, as well as with a few recon units in forward positions to push the recon further (if they dare). Sometimes scenario designers seem to want to accentuate the player's challenge by giving them extremely sketchy info about enemy units and positions, but I for one enjoy a good solid briefing before planning an attack.

[ December 11, 2002, 09:12 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Grisha]

Andreas,

I should elaborate a bit more on the Soviet method of capturing prisoners. It was a bloody business - close and personal. A lot of razvedchiki paid with their blood in these operations. So, while I would say the Red Army generally followed a policy of observation they were not adverse to taking information from the Germans, be that prisoners, or literally going in to see if anybody shoots back. Motorcycle reconnaissance battalions in Soviet armor units made maximum use of M3 scout cars they received from the US, as well as German halftracks (by 1944 most Soviet motorcycle recon battalions had traded in their motorcycles for lend lease or captured halftracks).

I would say the reason the Soviets made greater use of observation was due to the nature of their offensive military operations which were heavily predicated on deception and concealment. The Germans had less need for this, since their ability to maneuver quickly on short notice created enough displacement to induce surprise.

[Michael Emrys]

My chief problem in having anything intelligent to offer on this subject is that next to nothing has crossed my desk about it. Of all the possibly thousands of books and articles I've read on the ground fighting of WW II, the number that even mention recon units can almost be counted on two hands. About how they conduct their day to day business, almost nothing at all. I think the only first person account I have of someone in such a unit is that one by von Lucke. When Allied recon units are mentioned in accounts, it is usually in passing. Not much space is devoted to them, and nothing to their methodology of operating.

The US Army in the ETO had several armored cavalry regiments. After the Cobra breakout, most of these were placed in the 3rd. Army. There, it is said, they performed "screening" duties during the pursuit across France. What little I have been able to dope out suggests that this entailed reconnoitering the lines of advance of the main forces; capturing and securing river crossings, crossroads, or other key points or bottlenecks; removal of obstacles where possible or at least noting their location so that they can be dealt with later by engineers detailed to that task. One important task was securing in conjunction with the FFI the crossings of the Loire, thus protecting the right flank of the Army.

But after the frontiers of the Reich had been reached and the front had stabilized, they seem to have been regarded as just another line unit, organized and armed differently from a regular regimental combat team, but expected to perform somewhat the same duties. In defence, they were often given a sector of the front to hold. In the attack, they may have been used to reinforce a line unit. If they were employed using any special reconnaisance and intelligence capabilities during this period, I've missed it. Such patrolling was done, appears to have mostly been conducted by squads of ordinary infantry delegated from companies holding the line.

About how the British and Commonwealth armies used their recce units I know even less. And as for the Soviets, virtually nothing at all, save for what Grisha has posted here.

If anyone can recommend books, etc. on the day to day life of these units, I'm open to suggestions.

Michael

[Andreas]

This is the classic account of work in the Recce Corps:

Only the enemy in front - the title is the official motto of the Recce Corps I think. The unofficial line following it was: 'every other bugger behind'.

I also recommend 'The South Albertas', for the real work of an armoured reconnaissance regiment in 4th Canuckian Armoured, and there is a memoir of a chap in 49th Recce that is extensively quoted in Delaforce's 'The Polar Bears'.

For US Mech Cav, have a look at the website I linked above.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

Andreas,

Have people really been saying only the Germans engaged in "fighting for information"? If so, that does indeed seem a rather strange claim--possibly an after echo of typically arrogant claims by German generals that their operational skills were uniquely superior.

See below:

Originally posted by JaegerMeister:

[ranting snipped]but i thought the Germans were known for their 'aggressive' recon as opposed to other nations who stuck to the spot, report and stay a safe distance? Thats what i've read before on more than one occasion, so i based my statement on that, and no i cant give you references and titles cos i do not remember.

I guess the 'read' in this case are at best Kurt Meyer's memoirs, and probably the odd Signal excerpt quoted in Carrell/Schmidt and passed off as a genuine memoir. Or a Konsalik book

[Sunflower Farm Boy]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

When Allied recon units are mentioned in accounts, it is usually in passing. Not much space is devoted to them, and nothing to their methodology of operating.

Could this be why?

[Grisha]

The US Army in the ETO had several armored cavalry regiments. After the Cobra breakout, most of these were placed in the 3rd. Army. There, it is said, they performed "screening" duties during the pursuit across France. What little I have been able to dope out suggests that this entailed reconnoitering the lines of advance of the main forces; capturing and securing river crossings, crossroads, or other key points or bottlenecks; removal of obstacles where possible or at least noting their location so that they can be dealt with later by engineers detailed to that task. One important task was securing in conjunction with the FFI the crossings of the Loire, thus protecting the right flank of the Army.

Thanks for the post, Michael. I know as little about American military operations as you probably know of Soviet, so this is interesting stuff for me to read. Your quote is very interesting in that this sounds very similar to how the Soviets used forward detachments as part of their mobile groups. Did mech cav units try to cut off German retreat routes, or attack German fallback positions before they had time to solidify their defenses? The Soviet mobile groups had a procession of units or detachments that stretched out into the operational depths as they advanced. From the main force forward it was usually advance guard, forward detachment, reconnaissance detachment. Patton was probably the only US general I can think of that fought similar to Soviet mobile groups such as tank armies. Hearing how Patton used mech cav units only confirms this. I'd be curious to know more about Patton's operational methods, and if he had preferences or patterns in force structure.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

I guess the 'read' in this case are at best Kurt Meyer's memoirs, and probably the odd Signal excerpt quoted in Carrell/Schmidt and passed off as a genuine memoir. Or a Konsalik book

Well, to be fair, most of what I've read in the gaming literature repeats what he was saying. My guess it is just a holdover of the '70s when everybody (more or less ) in the gaming community was kind of bowled over to discover just how good the Germans were after being raised on a diet of post-war triumphalist documentaries. A lot of material derived from German archives began flooding the market and especially for the Eastern Front it was just about the only version that was available, at least in any credible detail. I think therein lie most of the roots of "Panzer envy".

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Did mech cav units try to cut off German retreat routes, or attack German fallback positions before they had time to solidify their defenses?

So far as I know, after the debacle of the Falaise Gap, the German army had no fallback position short of the Westwall. Ad hoc delay detachments may have been detailed to hold certain points. More often though I suspect that isolated units found themselves in that role simply because were overrun as they tried to retreat. The exception of course would have been the garrisons of port cities in fixed defenses, but the cav wouldn't have had anything to do with that.

The Soviet mobile groups had a procession of units or detachments that stretched out into the operational depths as they advanced. From the main force forward it was usually advance guard, forward detachment, reconnaissance detachment.

That sounds neat. I think this is basically like what the Germans did during the Blitzkrieg period, except that they used Kampfgruppen drawn from the Panzer divisions rather than a special force.

Patton was probably the only US general I can think of that fought similar to Soviet mobile groups such as tank armies. Hearing how Patton used mech cav units only confirms this. I'd be curious to know more about Patton's operational methods, and if he had preferences or patterns in force structure.

I would be cautious about comparing Soviet and 3rd. Army practices until I know a lot more about both. I suspect the differences are significant.

Michael

[Nolloff]

Now I don´t want to bend this thread into a direction that originally was not intended but I´d be fairly interested in some further comments that would help me understand recon and real-world behaviour of recon units when compared to what´s usually going on within the scope of CMBB.

Most war-games I´ve played seem to emphasize a "recon by death" approach in a sense that when talking about scout or recon vehicles they are very likely to get shot to pieces and by their sacrifice help to reveal enemy positions. It´s likely that both my tactics and playing skills need improvement although I´m aware that speed and cover are my friends. Nevertheless chances to acually gather information with a platoon of scout cars without having 75% or more of them bite the dust seem to be rather low. This might be connected to the rather short distances within tactical level wargames as well as scenario design which to a certain degree focusses on ambushes and well-placed and hidden defenders. Usually there´s hardly a hill or decent spot to observe which wouldn´t guarantee intial front turret penetration.

I can well imagine casualty rates being pretty high among recon units but it´s hard to imagine it was really the suicide mission I feel it mostly comes down to.

A recon detachment with 6 vehicles wouldn´t press on after 2 got taken out by hidden enemies, be it yet unspotted AT guns or ATRs, wouldn´t it? They´d retreat, report and the next step would be a full-blown attack or a change of the intial plan to attack here.

The point made earlier about the CMBB battle taking place AFTER the reconnaisance mission seems to make a lot of sense.

Nolloff

[Firefly]

Originally posted by Nolloff:

go

Most war-games I´ve played seem to emphasize a "recon by death" approach in a sense that when talking about scout or recon vehicles they are very likely to get shot to pieces and by their sacrifice help to reveal enemy positions. It´s likely that both my tactics and playing skills need improvement although I´m aware that speed and cover are my friends. Nevertheless chances to acually gather information with a platoon of scout cars without having 75% or more of them bite the dust seem to be rather low. This might be connected to the rather short distances within tactical level wargames as well as scenario design which to a certain degree focusses on ambushes and well-placed and hidden defenders. Usually there´s hardly a hill or decent spot to observe which wouldn´t guarantee intial front turret penetration.

The problem is that most wargames do not simulate the actual practice of recon that armoured cars/scout cars performed. Normally the car was used to get close enough to the enemy, often under the cover of darkeness, that the occupants could get out and crawl under cover to a point from which enemy positions could be observed.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Nolloff:

Most war-games I´ve played seem to emphasize a "recon by death" approach in a sense that when talking about scout or recon vehicles they are very likely to get shot to pieces and by their sacrifice help to reveal enemy positions. It´s likely that both my tactics and playing skills need improvement although I´m aware that speed and cover are my friends. Nevertheless chances to acually gather information with a platoon of scout cars without having 75% or more of them bite the dust seem to be rather low. This might be connected to the rather short distances within tactical level wargames as well as scenario design which to a certain degree focusses on ambushes and well-placed and hidden defenders. Usually there´s hardly a hill or decent spot to observe which wouldn´t guarantee intial front turret penetration.

I can well imagine casualty rates being pretty high among recon units but it´s hard to imagine it was really the suicide mission I feel it mostly comes down to.

A recon detachment with 6 vehicles wouldn´t press on after 2 got taken out by hidden enemies, be it yet unspotted AT guns or ATRs, wouldn´t it? They´d retreat, report and the next step would be a full-blown attack or a change of the intial plan to attack here.

I think how they conducted their reconnaisance depended on the degree and kind of resistance they were likely to encounter. If it was a wide-open fluid situation, say the pursuit of a broken and disorganized army, they might be apt to drive considerable distances in their vehicles, shooting up whatever they came across. Against a more dangerous enemy they would probably be more cautious, parking behind cover and sending a detachment forward stealthily on foot with possibly some kind of overwatch fire available.

Regrettably, the reconnaisance battle can't be entirely reproduced in CM as there are no points awarded for simply discovering the deployment of the enemy's forces. It would be nice if this could be incorporated in the engine rewrite.

Michael

[JaegerMeister]

Well Andreas, you came up trumps with the information as did all others who posted on recon in this thread. I am much obliged and more informed as a result. Though in my defence, when i made my innocent (but obviously ill-informed) statement about German recon being more aggressive than other nations, i was referring to the early war years and the invasion of Russia in 1941, as that is all i fight (at present) in CMBB, preferring to do the 'war' in chronological order with my PBEM opponent.

Andreas, you are obviously intelligent,as am i, so perhaps you can leave off the sniping, 'frosty-packet' remarks. I am 35 with several hundred pounds worth of military books collected, and a father who spent many years in the R.E.M.E and a heavy interest in WW2 too, so not quite worthy of your remarks. I am happy to learn more from you & other grogs on here. So can we call a truce?

[illo]

Hi Andreas,

I think you might be bit too hard on people who arent so aware of "the facts".

I dont think Jägermeister wanted to offend you. So wouldnt it be reasonable to just talk about role of recce and leave his comments to the another thread.

I sometimes think twice before posting here, because its so easy to start a flame here just because lack of knowledge.

All of us don't research these things as hobby. Calling someone ignorant because he doesnt share the same hobby with you is bit off IHMO.

[ December 12, 2002, 07:09 AM: Message edited by: illo ]

[JaegerMeister]

Grisha, you seem 'very' well informed on the Soviet recon methods. Have you close personal experience of those tactics, ie relatives that served in it? Great insight into a field that not many western authors seem to cover.Good stuff.

Just to continue the debate (at the risk of digging a bigger hole for myself ), and no i'm not saying the Germans were the best at everything, was it not a case that the other nations adopted the same doctrine/agressive recon in force tactics, after witnessing the way the German forces fought in the early war years? After all the Russians seemed to teach them a thing or two about 'blitzkrieg'/encirclement ops in the later war years after learning about their adversaries tactics and improving upon them.

Or did these other nations have the same doctrine in place at the start of war with regards to heavily armed recon? ie whats the OOB for an early war British or Russian recon unit? Mind you, its possibly hard to evaluate, because the Germans were the ones doing the advancing/invading and therefore needing to be aggressive.

[Brightblade]

Originally posted by Andreas:

[snip]...it was suggested that the Germans were somehow unique in fighting for information (called Gefechtsaufklaerung BTW), while...[snip]

"Gefechtsaufklärung" isn´t what you say here. You have to differ between Gefechtsaufklärung and forced recon.

Gefechtsaufklärung doesn´t necessarily mean to fight for recon. It defines the level of the recon. In the German army (as probably in many other armies too) there were/are different levels of recon troops with different missions. Division and higher leveled recon used/uses special equipment and vehicles (like the PSW) and usually operates 80 - 200km behind the enemy lines. Their job is to scout for high level artillery positions, enemy HQs, supply lines and the like. Usually they are ordered to avoid contact with the enemy whereever possible.

Lower leveled recon for brigades, regiments, battalions or companies use whatever is available for the job, a tank platoon in a tank battalion, an armoured or motorized infantry platoon in a Panzergrenadier battalion, plus whatever the commander of the mission has and thinks might be useful for the lucky fellows. This is called "Gefechtsaufklärung", as it is used shortly before or even during a battle (Gefecht). It has only a short range (5 - 8km in front of the friendly lines) and the job is to detect and report enemy positions so the initiator of the recon mission can adjust his plans for battle.

In many cases the Gefechtsaufklärung will have to engage the enemy during their mission, but it´s no necessity. Sometimes (if there is enough time) they are ordered to avoid enemy contact, to see without being seen. In other cases they are ordered to get information at all costs("Aufklärung erzwingen" = forced recon), engage the enemy wherever they meet them.

Hope I managed to explain the difference.

[ December 12, 2002, 09:29 AM: Message edited by: Brightblade ]

[Keith]

Quite often in CM scenarios authors provide a handful of armored cars that are typically used to draw fire. In my readings on WWII, however, I find that typically recon batallions were commited as complete units and were used in screening duties or to probe enemy defenses. In extreme situations the recon battalions were ordered to hold the line or conduct assaults. I find it difficult to believe a commander would want to have the "eyes" of the Divison parcelled out to be used as flaming data points in assaults, as is typically done in many CM scenarios. What I am asking, is the use of small groups of armored cars to draw fire for assaults non-historical? I am sure armored car crews themselves would object to being used in this suicidal fashion.

[Warren Peace]

This may or may not be of interest to the topic. I have an uncle who was a junior officer in the recon battalian of fourth armored division, US army in ww2. When I asked him about his job he said basically he would take a team out at night and recon the route which the tanks were to travel the next morning. If they encountered enemy positions they marked them on the map and bypassed them to continue the mission. They generally slept during the day. Interestingly, he was never wounded and rose from 2nd luietenant to major by the end of the war.

Thus from this conversation I would suggest that much recon took place at night.

[Pak40]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I think the only first person account I have of someone in such a unit is that one by von Lucke.

Panzer Commander by Hans von Luck is an excellent source for German recon tactics, especially in Africa.

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

The US Army in the ETO had several armored cavalry regiments. After the Cobra breakout, most of these were placed in the 3rd. Army. There, it is said, they performed "screening" duties during the pursuit across France. What little I have been able to dope out suggests that this entailed reconnoitering the lines of advance of the main forces; capturing and securing river crossings, crossroads, or other key points or bottlenecks; removal of obstacles where possible or at least noting their location so that they can be dealt with later by engineers detailed to that task. One important task was securing in conjunction with the FFI the crossings of the Loire, thus protecting the right flank of the Army.

I was going to write the same thing. The U.S. used the Calvalry units primarily in a mobile fashion. Either they were used to get to an objective quickly and hold it until help arrived or they were used on the flanks of other units to protect that flank. In either case they were usually placed in a situation where they could use their speed to their advantage. The only exceptions to this were cases where calvalry units were placed on the front line in a defensive posture in the Ardennes.

The U.S. relied heavily on aerial recon for operational level information. Piper cubs were the recon workhorse.

[Andreas]

First of all an apology to Jaegermeister for inappropriate and snippy remarks. I'll control myself a bit better in the future.

Brightblade, thanks for the explanation. All I know about Gefechtsaufklaerung you can see in the CD scenario of the same name. It is based on a picture with that label from my grandfather's collection (check the Beobachtungsabteilung site linked in my sig for more pictures). His battery (flash ranging, 3./Beo-Abt 26) undertook a lot of Gefechtsaufklaerung on the way to Leningrad, assigned to 53. ID. This was the division that captured (briefly) the tram terminus in Urizk that is marked today with a plaque indicating one of the furthest inroads the Germans made into Leningrad. In the unit history in Froben's 'Aufklaerende Artillerie' it states that this was the main occupation of his unit throughout the late-summer advance on Leningrad. They were neither trained nor suited for any sort of rapid recon, being counter-battery observers.

Anyway, where was I The forces in the scenario are those that can be seen on the picture, with some additions. So, that's basically all I knew, and your post was very helpful.

I fully agree that these units on all sides were used for other tasks. In particular flank protection (49th Recce during 'Martlet', K1 during the advance to the Dvina IIRC - I presume their high mobility and firepower made them well-suited for it), or as ordinary line infantry (e.g. 12th SS AA in Normandy 1944, or that US Mech Cav unit in the Losheimer Gap on Dec. 16th).

[Andreas]

Grisha, thanks a lot for that. Very illuminating posts. I knew about the business of 'tongues', but did not know the play on words surrounding it. Very amusing (except for the 'tongues' themselves). All the Soviet unit commander memoirs I have refer again and again to the following points:

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• recce of enemy firepoints </font>
• recce of enemy artillery positions </font>
• 'tongues' </font>
• recce of enemy reserve positions </font>
• need to camo ones own positions against enemy recce </font>

Particularly Lastschenko (GOC 322nd RD) harps on about it, and mentions how he got a rocket from Koniev two days before the Lvov-Sandomierz operation started for not having recce'd enough. He also states how in the initial assault he used one battalion of 1089th RR for 'Battle Recon (Gefechtsaufklaerung)'. This is of course late in the war, and practice would have improved a lot.

It seems quite clear that sophistication had grown considerably at that point, and that recce was considered and treated as a key element of the battle, absolutely irreplaceable if you want to avoid losses.