Guns vs Armour

[Other Means]

At least he refers to people by name. I mean really, are we 5?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Other Means:

At least he refers to people by name. I mean really, are we 5?

Good point....ummm.....is is "Other", or do you prefer "Mr. Means"?

Wait a minute...

[Corvidae]

lets see how far off topic we can get.

[Other Means]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Other Means:

At least he refers to people by name. I mean really, are we 5?

Good point....ummm.....is is "Other", or do you prefer "Mr. Means"?

Wait a minute... </font>

[jBrereton]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

lets see how far off topic we can get.

Talking of guns vs. armour, how do you feel about the safety of Iraq post-Saddam?

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As far as I can tell, the silly person remains committed to the nonsense that TDs were ineffective fighting against attacking German armor because they were too poorly armor - which is clearly false.

He can either actually say "OK, they were effective fighting against attacking German armor", or he can be wrong - or (typical) he can dodge because he knows he is wrong.

Or he could see (unlike you) that this is getting nowhere. That is why I said the debate is over. I will not reply to the TD argument any more. Live with it.

If you want an argument I suggest you look through one booklet I used to help form my opinion. You can still get it for yourself at

http://www.merriam-press.com/mrl_000/mrl_0050/mrl_0013.htm

Blurb:

"On the battlefields of World War II, however, tank destroyers were unequal to the task of neutralizing German armor. Their aggressive doctrine played into the hands of the German panzer divisions, which employed highly integrated combined arms tactics.

The tank destroyers were also outgunned by the heavy German tanks that appeared in the last three years of the war. Therefore, the original tank destroyer doctrine was largely abandoned n the field, where the tank destroyers continued to perform a variety of less ambitious missions.

This work provides a case study in the formulation of doctrine, with emphasis being given to the conceptual flaws that marred the tank destroyer program and the corrective measures that were implemented in the field to alleviate these flaws."

Could not have put it better myself.

Or he can say "tah tah" at the end of each of his next 40 posts without ever shutting up

Now there you may have me!

There, another excuse for silly name calling by the pack.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by jBrereton:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Corvidae:

lets see how far off topic we can get.

Talking of guns vs. armour, how do you feel about the safety of Iraq post-Saddam? </font>

[Corvidae]

jBrereton,

What?

Iraq is dead, its just taking a while to stop resisting the inevitable.

I dont understand the "safety" part, or the "post-Saddam" part.

They had a good run though, from 1948 to 2003.

From a brutalized colonial possession.

To a fully industrialized and secular, soverigne, nation state.

And then to a devastated wasteland under foreign dominance.

However I think we realy should discuss beer, Beer is more important than dead nations.

[Corvidae]

Mr Kenny, Oh stop it,

Either have a happy new year, and enjoy the beer. Or go masterbate in a corner somewere.

BUT STOP RUINING THE BEER ALREADY.

Kingfish, You lucky bugger, You have free deli for the next 2 months. I'm profoundly jealous.

Have a beer... have two or three. Happy new year.

jBrereton, Have a beer, and a happy new year.

JasonC, Have a beer, Sit down and shut up and drink dammit. Have another beer.

happy new year, now have another beer.

Mr Dorosh, Have a beer. happy new year, and all that rot.

Mr Means, same to you ,,, have a happy new year, and a beer

[coe]

on a strange note - TDs seem to be doing a number on my Pz IVH/Js even when I get the drop on them (i.e. surprise them)...it might be probability but the number of misses - then their return fire...devastating but it's nice to see Hellcats bounce a StuGIII or a JPz IV at long range when the StuGIII/JPz IV can still tag it...

[JonS]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

"On the battlefields of World War II, however, tank destroyers were unequal to the task of neutralizing German armor. Their aggressive doctrine played into the hands of the German panzer divisions

this is all very conventional. It has been the conventional wisdom since the late 40s-early 50s, when the TDs as an arm were disbanded. It is also specifically what Jason rejects. The reasoning behind that rejection is laid out in excruciating detail over the last 10 pages.

If you want to counter that rejection, you need to do a little more than simply repeating the conventional wisdom, ad-nauseum.

The tank destroyers were also outgunned by the heavy German tanks that appeared in the last three years of the war.

Tautology. Everything the US and UK fielded was out-gunned by the TII, Jagdtiger, Jagdpanther, Sturmtiger, etc. The TDs were the best armed of the US tracked vehicles, so they were the least out-gunned of the US fleet. Furthermore, TII, JT, JP, etc, formed a vanishingly small part of the German fleet, so saying the arm failed as a whole because it failed against the best - and rarest - of the German fleet is ... deceptive, at best.

Incidentally, link to the full PDF of Gabel's thesis. Go to the original source, and save yourself $10.

[ January 01, 2007, 03:51 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[michael kenny]

I dowloaded it myself but would like interested parties to do some digging themselves.

sample quotes:

Page 42.

"On 21 March 1943, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ-General Eisen-

hower’s theater headquarters for North Africa) issued a training memo that

sought to tone down the aggressive orientation of tank destroyer doctrine:

'While it is true that tank destroyer battalions constitute a mobile reserve

af antimechanized fire power with which to meet a hostile tank attack,

numerous encounters have shown that their characteristics are such as to

prohibit their use offensively, either to seek out the hostile tanks in advance

of our lines or to meet and shoot it out with them in the open . . . .'

The statement in FM PB--5 that they are designed for offensive action will

not be construed to the contrary

Major Allerton Cushman, an observer for AGF and the Tank Destroyer

Center who witnessed the Tunisian operation firsthand from December 1942

to March 1943, filed a report bearing similar conclusions. He stated that

the M-3 and M-10 tank destroyers

can not be used offensively to seek out enemy tanks in advance of our lines

or to engage in “shrgging” matches with them in the open. Any attempt to

do so will subject them to destruction by the enemy’s AT guns, against which

their flat trajebtory fire is ineffective.5a

Troops in Africa have. found that the best way to meet a German tank attack

is from concealed, dug-in positions with routes reconnoitered to alternate

firing positions.51

Tank hunting, i.e., dismounted men going out after tanks with sticky gre-

nades, Molotov cocktails, etc., ‘is fine in theory but is considered ridiculous

by troops who are in actual war.52

page 46

"Bruce told

the instructors of the Tank Destroyer School that “our tank destroyer mis-

sion is to protect other troops from tank attacks . . . , “77 whereas FM 18-5

(1942) had stated unequivocably that the mission was the destruction of

enemy tanks. Bruce used the same phrase in the cover letter to a Tank

Destroyer Center training circular dated 15 May 1943 that was sent to all

tank destroyer units for guidance until a revised FM 18-5 appeared. The

circular employed the words “aggressive spirit,” rather than “offensive ae-

tion,” to describe tank destroyer characteristics. It further stated that “stealth

and deception” characterized tank destroyer tactics and warned that tank

destroyers were “particularly vulnerable to antitank fire.“

page 49

"Whereas the 1942 manual had in-

dicated that mobility, rather than heavy armor, would protect the tank de-

stroyer from enemy fire, the 1944 edition stressed the use of cover and

concealment ta compensate for the acknowledged “vulnerability of tank

destroyers to hostile tank, antitank, and artillery fire.“

page 55

"Among the tank destroyer battalions assigned to First Army

during the Normandy fighting, towed battalions on the average accounted

for 5.8 enemy tanks and 4.0 pillboxes each, whereas the average self-

propelled battalion in Normandy destroyed 22.5 panzers and 23.2 pillboxes."

page 58

" Some infantry

commanders preferred to use tanks rather than tank destroyers in the

immediate front lines because snipers and hand grenades took a heavy toll2

among the crews of the open-topped tank destroyers.j” Unfortunately, other..

infantry officers were unaware of tank destroyer limitations and attempted,

to’ employ tank destroyers exactly as they would use the better-armored.

tanks.s4 Overall, tank destroyers “misused” in this manner suffered greater:

losses and obtained less-impressive results than units in which the tank

destroyer commanders were encouraged to exercise judgement and initiative"

page 61

"The Americans actually stopped the German

onslaught by denying transportation chokepoints to the enemy and sepa-

rating the panzer spearheads from their follow-on elements, and not by

ambushing the panzer spearheads themselves, as tank destroyer doctrine

would suggest. By and large, the two dozen tank destroyer battalions that

participated significantly in the Ardennes campaign fought in small units

and in relatively static, defensive roles."

page 64

"It must also be noted that of the self-propelled tank destroyers, only

the M-36 had shown itself to be wholly satisfactory in terms of firepower,

and even the M-36 suffered the disadvantages of thin armor and an open

turret, a fault common to all self-propelled tank destroyers. After the Ar-

dennes campaign, M-10 battalions began exchanging their weapons for the

M-36.74 Ordnance developed overhead armor for tank destroyer turrets75

that, when taken together with the common practice of sandbagging tank

destroyers to augment their armor, made the tank destroyer more like a

tank than like the weapon initially envisaged by General Bruce. In the

minds of higher commanders, tanks and tank destroyers became increas-

ingly interchangeable as the European war drew to a close."

page 64

"a Theater General Board

composed of senior field artillery officers convened to evaluate the contri-

butions of the tank destroyer to the war effort. They based their study in

part upon the after-action reports of forty-nine tank destroyer battalions

that had fought in Europe. In its report, the board noted that the tank

destroyer was “a most versatile weapon on the battlefield” and admitted

that there existed a need for self-propelled, high-velocity guns within the

infantry division, a function that the tank destroyers had fullfilled admir-

ably.80 The battalions sampled had destroyed, on the average, 34 German

tanks and self-propelled guns, 17 artillery and antitank guns, and 16 pill-

boxes apiece, with one battalion claiming 105 tanks destroyed.81 However,

the board recognized the fact that tank destroyers had never validated the

tank destroyer doctrine and, in fact, had not adhered to it on the battle-

field."

page 69

"Experience in battle

quickly showed that tank destroyers were, in reality, highly dependent on

other arms for support, and that “offensive action” for them was often sui-

cidal. The Tank Destroyer Center learned of these battlefield findings

through the reports of AGF observers3 and incorporated the lessons of com-

bat in the 1944 edition of FM 18-Z This edition emphasized cooperation

with other arms and made it clear that tank destroyer action was essen-

tially defensive in nature.................................On the other hand, U.S. tanks were

even less well armed than the tank destroyers, but because the armored

establishment possessed a sound doctrine by 1944, armored formations suc-

ceeded on the battlefield’in spite of their equipment. The historical evidence

does not show that the tank destroyers tried to implement their doctrine

but failed for the lack of proper equipment. Rather, it is clear that tank

destroyer doctrine was never really executed because it rested on false

premises and thus had little application on the battlefield."

[JonS]

What about this one:

page 56:

Once attached to a division, the tank destroyer battalion was typically assigned by companies to the infantry regiments, whereupon the regiments generally assigned a tank destroyer platoon to each battalion. Under these circumstances, tank destroyer doctrine was fundamentally unworkable and justifiably abandoned.

Well, d'uh. Scatter the TDs all over the place like organic A-Tk guns and surprise! they can't mass, and their doctrine won't work!

No ****!

I think you'll find no disagreement from Jason with any of that. Also, that scattering described above was because the Germans weren't attacking anyway.

But, when they did attack (which was rare), the TDs - esp the SPs - were able to carry out their doctrinal role successfully, and without undue cost.

Gabel seems to take the view - like you - that that because the TD force wasn't a Swiss army knife, they were useless. Even though they did function as a Swiss army knife, with reasonable success. Jason takes the view that within their assigned role the TDs were successful.

[ January 01, 2007, 06:01 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Corvidae]

My summation of Mr Kenny's rather overlong post:

Tank destroyers were a defensive weapon which were best used from either prepared positions, or from ambush.

They were not an offensive weapon.

Would anyone agree with that?

Mr Kenny, NOBODY IS DISPUTING YOUR APPEARANT POINT!! Now drink your beer.

JonS, Have a beer

[JonS]

Or this:

page 60:

not excuse the tank destroyers from their primary mission of destroying enemy armor.

Ah, no. Their primary mission was defeating enemy armoured attacks, which is not the same as Gabel's supposed primary mission.

or this:

same page:

tank destroyers, nonetheless, played an important part in stopping the panzers each time they came

out in force.

Well gee. Waddayaknow. The TDs worked! The next couple of pages lists a series of engagements in which the SP TDs worked as advertised. As Jason has pointed out. Yet despite this Gabel thinks they failed.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JonS:

.

Gabel seems to take the view - like you - that that because the TD force wasn't a Swiss army knife, they were useless.

Gross distortion. He says no such thing.

Exactly which page does he write about them being useless? I can't seem to find it. I thought his conclusion was they performed a number of tasks but not the one they were created for. A narrow point that seems to confuse some here.

Yet despite this Gabel thinks they failed

Again he says no such thing. He shows how the initial doctrine was altered over the course of the war so that in the end they performed far more as Infantry fire support(85% of ammo used in Normandy was HE) and never as swarming flocks of tank killers. Isolated examples where they did blunt Panzer attacks does not alter this reality. Again this turns on a fine point that may seem (and probably is) pointless.

[JasonC]

That March 1943 report is the basis of the whole argument. In turn, it stems from exactly one occasion, Kasserine. And the items that were actually in theater were 75mm halftracks. (A tiny number of M10s arrived by then, but the overall impression of TDs in March 1943 came from the purple heart boxes).

All the later purpose built SP TDs did just fine.

Also, the silly person has yet to admit that SP TDs worked on the defense against armor, so all the red herrings extending to other possible uses are a mere dodge. He can find all the caveats about their weaknesses in other roles and that being the reason they were abandoned after the war, in *my* earlier posts.

And they shot a lot of HE because the Germans had no tanks. You might as well say the US was slaughtered by the Luftwaffe because the AAA didn't shoot down enough planes.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

And they shot a lot of HE(in Normandy) because the Germans had no tanks.

No German tanks?

On 1/6/44 there were 1928 German tanks in The West. That is 15 more than on the entire Russian Front.

1000 were in action by the end of June.

1000 more by the end of July.

monthly total German tanks

Sept = 540

Oct = 1026

Nov. = 1413

Dec = 1632

Jan = 1504

Try the date of entry into theatre for the TD Units. 13(x 36 = 468 TD's) were in place by the Cobra breakout

[JonS]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

Isolated examples where they did blunt Panzer attacks does not alter this reality.

Except for the not-so-irrelevant point that those 'isolated examples' also happen to be 100% of the German armoured attacks in NWE.

In other words, EVERY time they were called on to fulfil their intended role, they did so. Very well.

[JonS]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />

Yet despite this Gabel thinks they failed

Again he says no such thing. </font>

[Wicky]

What if the US/allies had built a 'JagdSherman' ??

www.b5tech.org/forum - Jackknife - Tue Jul 04, 2006 1:55 am

Shame we can't edit it into CM for testing. BFC please fix or sumfink....

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JonS

Yet despite this Gabel thinks they failed

I reply:

he says no such thing. He shows how the initial doctrine was altered over the course of the war so that in the end they performed far more as Infantry fire support(85% of ammo used in Normandy was HE) and never as swarming flocks of tank killers. Isolated examples where they did blunt Panzer attacks does not alter this reality. Again this turns on a fine point that may seem (and probably is) pointless

Then:

Originally posted by JonS:

From the Introduction:

The flaws inherent in tank destroyer doctrine, rather than the misuse of tank destroyers by higher commanders or deficiencies in equipment, prevented the tank destroyers from fulfilling their intended role.

You assume from this that Gabel means failure but you can't find the actual word. Remember that you also said in the same post

Originally posted by JonS

Gabel seems to take the view - like you - that that because the TD force wasn't a Swiss army knife, they were useless

You went over the top with your language. Now in an attempt to get back on firm ground you ignore the 'useless' claim and try to find foundation for the 'failure' claim.

Quote from the paper:

The historical evidence

does not show that the tank destroyers tried to implement their doctrine

but failed for the lack of proper equipment. Rather, it is clear that tank

destroyer doctrine was never really executed because it rested on false

premises and thus had little application on the battlefield.

Originally posted by JonS

Except that, as Gabel himself points out with his examples (p.60 onwards), in NWE they clearly were not prevented from fulfilling their intended role by any of the above, because they did fulfil their intended role 'whenever the German armor came out in force'.

To say this with authority you would have to know the number of Panzers destroyed by the TD's. I have never come across such information.

Where can I find these figures?

[ January 01, 2007, 09:55 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

To say this with authority you would have to know the number of Panzers destroyed by the TD's. I have never come across such information. Where can I find these figures?

Six pages of posts?

You might want to narrow your use of colloquialisms, by the way. I find "Panzers" to be a particularly meaningless word. For someone nibbling at people's heels about word usage, you'd get much more mileage out of the term "tanks" or "AFVs", but even then, the former excludes assault guns while the latter includes armoured personnel carriers (schützenpanzerwagen) and armoured cars.

So what is it you feel "panzers" refers to?

[Wicky]

Do the original 71, 72 source AARs more precisely breakdown the 306 'tanks' between SP and towed?

From the previously linked Leavenworth Paper:

Tank destroyers emerged from the Ardennes campaign with a mixed reputation, On the positive side of the ledger, statisticians credited the tank destroyer battalions with the destruction of 306 enemy tanks.71 Many of these kills came during the decisive engagements of the campaign. On the negative side, the towed tank destroyer had proved to be a failure. Whereas self-propelled tank destroyers scored the most kills, towed battalions suffered the heavier losses: in the first critical week of the campaign, First Army lost seventy-seven tank destroyers, sixty-five of which were towed.72

71. First U.S. Army, “Artillery Information Service,” May 1945, 81; 3d Army, After-Action Report, pt. 24, 3.

72. First U.S. Army, “Artillery Information Service,” May 1945, 81.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

You might want to narrow your use of colloquialisms, by the way. I find "Panzers" to be a particularly meaningless word. For someone nibbling at people's heels about word usage, you'd get much more mileage out of the term "tanks" or "AFVs", but even then, the former excludes assault guns while the latter includes armoured personnel carriers (schützenpanzerwagen) and armoured cars.

So what is it you feel "panzers" refers to?

Do not worry. I am well aquainted with every type of german AFV.

When I use panzer I mean a turreted tank.

When I say Stug. or Stug/SP I also will include Stugs and Jagd.Pz's in the totals. Not strictly accurate but it will do for the type of loss figures I am using.

I do not include any losses for 'true' German SP's such as the 105/150mm artillery guns but then neither do I include Allied SP's in Allied loss figures.

I do not list Armoured cars or half tracks for any nation.

I hope this heped clear up any ambiguity.