Guns vs Armour

[The_Enigma]

The range of the engagment i mentioned was a few hundred meters, 200 max i would guess.

[JasonC]

dt - highest scoring by total, highest scoring by vehicle, and higher scoring than the attacking German tanks. On the occasions when the Germans actually attack with armor in any kind of strength, the TDs simply performed as intended and "rocked".

Defending regular tanks - or counterattacking regular tanks, they were employed much more aggressively in a tactical sense in these cases, at least half of the time - emphatically did not. Sometimes they rocked when the Germans were particularly green, but it is rare. Most often they exchanged off relatively evenly. And sometimes they took heavy losses themselves, to little effect.

TDs were not considered a success because they lacked the multirole capability of ordinary tanks in the offensive role, not because of any failure at their defensive one. They were pressed into offensive roles simply because the German armor force was weak, "war wide", and thus only sporadically showed up in force. When it was around, German armor was then typically used overly aggressively, lost half or more of its strength, and then reverted to a tactically defensive role.

While the SP TDs did just fine in all of those German offensive cases for which they were around, there simply weren't enough of those occasions happening, to justify a third of the armor force being single role capable instead of dual role capable.

Everyone recognized that for offensive employment, a full top is preferable, full MGs are preferable, etc. But not because full tanks could waltz up to German ones or in front of heavy PAK and survive it, due to being "more heavily armored". On the contrary, they could not survive it any more than TDs could, and both expected to win in such offensive cases through the same combined arms effects or overall odds or attacking in multiple places and finding the weak seam, etc.

A regular Sherman can't walk in front of a PAK front or a German AFV position with impunity, any more than an M-10 can. It *is* better able to drive through a 5 km deep defended zone under sporadic barrage the whole time. And to help fight a long series of enemy infantry positions one after another, with full MGs and deep HE load etc. Those, and not any greater ability to withstand heavy AT fire or duel enemy tanks, were the advantages of tanks vs. TDs. And they appeared on the offense, and against non-tank adversaries, not on defense or against tanks.

TDs were superior to plain tanks on defense for most of the war for a very simple reason - they were much more heavily armed in an AT sense. Sherman 76s were rare until late in 1944, and only a few later arriving units were fully equipped with them. Those did not happen to be the units in the path of any of the major German armor attacks, the last of which was Nordwind (late January 1945). (The Remagen bridgehead fight might be consider another anf last, though entirely tactical).

TDs probably had other serious advantages in defensive employment vs. attacking German armor. I say probably because it is hard to disentangle from the primary effect clearly generated simply by having superior AT weapons. These other two possible advantages were better doctrine (for the task, understand) and superior situational awareness.

The better doctrine was first and foremost that the TDs expected to be used in a tactically defensive way, and thought of themselves as counterforce reserve weapons that sought the enemy in his strength and engaged at the first opportunity. They weren't trying to break through anything. They weren't trying to take ground. They weren't trying to find weakness.

Why are those advantages? Well, time after time I find the full tanks used in an overly aggressive manner not justified by the sort of operational situation typically present when the Germans are throwing in a major armor attack, and getting a lot of tanks shot up to no purpose as a result. Sometimes they defend sensibly for a bit and they try to "seize the initiative", and thereby go from exchanging off about evenly to losing many to none and being forced to halt.

The cold analytic fact of the matter is the right way to deal with a major enemy tank attack is to seek and kill his tanks, by direct counterforce attrition, for as long as it takes, until he gives up the tactical offensive of his own volition or is physically unable to continue it. And then not to press the change of initiative too hard, while and where his tanks are still present in force. And this was simply too dispassionate, "defeatist", and limited an aim, to fit the very offensively minded armor doctrine bred into the regular full tanks (particularly, it is true, in the ADs - the independent battalions were somewhat more sensible about it).

The TDs on the other hand had the right mission and it gave them the right doctrine. They raced to the point of enemy tank sightings, ignoring ground. They did sometimes get sucked into trying to defend other arms, of course - the infantry in particular. But as those had generally already been penetrated (front line forces that is) and were defending in their own deeper reserve zone, they were a "cloud" throughout the area. And then they saw their role as simply to place their TDs in contact with the enemy armor and kill as much of it as they could (without dying, hopefully).

The next likely advantage was better situational awareness. Some of which comes from being "permanently unbuttoned". That is a liability in the enemy defended zone and under his artillery, but it is not much of one inside your own defended zone. Enemy artillery may fire before he breaks in, but once he is through the front line and his tanks are mixed up with the defenders, in practice his artillery fire slacked off drastically. The TDs frequently just were not (yet) there for the first bit (or only a few were) and arrived in the second (most of them).

They had other situational awareness benefits, compared to the attacking Germans if not to other defending vehicles. They had organic recon assets, doctrinally slated to scout for the TDs. They were guided to the location on engagment by friendly unit reports and sightings, of the defending infantry if not their recon. And they were then frequently able to take up positions in the path of the Germans and wait for the latter to advance to actual contact. The Germans, being in the US defended zone, were typically buttoned, and visibility conditions as already mentioned were typically poor. Along with defender's choice of ground, this typically allowed initial engagement ranges to be quite short later in the war - in Africa and Italy they were longer, but by defender's choice, because the German did not yet have any appreciable armor thickness edge.

That much I found. Now more specifically. Note that these are cases of German offensive use of armor against specifically US units in the west -that is the universe of cases being discussed.

In North Africa there were only 2 periods of significant German armor offensive use. Yes there was small scale counterpunching at other times, not the issue. Operational scale stuff, there was the Kasserine period and the El Guettar period.

The first had 3 phases, the US reaction to the initial break in, the subsequent overrun fight at Kasserine proper, and the final phase of the fight at positions farther on, where the Germans were actually stopped.

The break in itself was against infantry positions and by bypass more than assault, and neither TDs nor tanks figured. The reaction was by full tanks in battalion strength. They were capable Shermans, but employed far too aggressively, tactically speaking tried to counterattack and got butchered.

Next in the overrun phase there were TDs but they were the obsolete French 75 in halftrack variety, and they were ineffective and butchered. Defending tanks actually employed defensively and showing fire discipline, were more effective, but still KOed readily and the whole position overrun. Arty failed the defense at this stage.

The final phase featured a gun line of all arms backed by serious and coordinated artillery fire, which broke the attack. Full tanks were effective when so supported and used on the tactical defensive. SP TDs proper were not yet being used, though, so this whole series is before the topic really being discussed.

It is important to explain it, however, because many of the stories and doctrinal ideas about TDs and their abilities or lack thereof, stem from this one single case. When people say "TDs were too thinly armored to stand up to tanks" or "were not effective even firing from initial ambush", this is the only incident in the whole war that actually fits those claims. But it isn't about M10s, let alone about M36s, it is about "purple heart boxes".

At El Guettar, M10s were present for the first time. They were effective per vehicle but there were not enough of them to have any real operational importance. The main arm breaking the attack was again the artillery. Older TDs present were not effective. Tanks were, used defensively.

The next major German armor attack was against the Gela beachhead on Sicily. Neither tanks nor SP TDs were yet ashore, and the attack was beaten off with infantry weapons and towed guns, liberally helped by naval gunfire. Again the main arm defeating the attack was artillery, this time naval predominate. Role for TDs, just not there, none.

The next was the initial hit on the beachhead at Salerno. Only a few cavalry vehicles were yet ashore, of AFVs. Towed guns were, and infantry used all arms. The Germans lacked combined arms, as a single battalion of Pz IVs attack the beach essentially alone. No role for TDs.

Next came the real Salerno counterattack, after the allies were well inland and the Germans had had the chance to send parts of 4 PDs to the area. The initial breakin was successful as they always were. It was checked at a gun line of artillery howitzers firing direct, and scratch blocking force stuff (including towed ATGs but not SP TDs, the usual engineers etc). But not yet spent, and resumed the next day.

That follow on attack at Salerno was the first time SP TDs got a chance in quantity. The US also had plain Shermans and cavalry vehicles, light towed ATGs (the standard at this time was still the 37mm, not even the 57mm), artillery firing direct and indirect, and naval gunfire from cruisers in the gulf. The highest scorers were the SP TDs - one M10 crew won the silver star for KOing 7 Panzers singlehanded. The Germans only had Panzer IVs, nothing heavier (this is fall of 1943, that was not at all unusual).

While the soft firepower of the artillery again was material in breaking up the attack, the Germans also simply lost the fire duel with the defending vehicles and did so quite badly. The defenders were poorly located (I mean the Germans had only the foggiest notions where they were). They used reverse slope positions and top hat firing locations, they had superior observation over the whole area, the Germans were in artillery fire and buttoned, etc.

The next major German use of armor offensively was at Anzio. But it rapidly devolved into a tactically defensive use of armor, with occasional short pushes to take ground already reached by infantry night infiltration. The main reason for the limited role of armor was the appalling state of the ground. The battle was fought in February in mud. Epic quantities of HE were used on a physically small area (as in saturation bombing, battleships offshore, divisions worth of artillery crammed into the beachhead, etc). It became a moonscape, and tanks on both sides were roadbound. The Germans did use thick front armor by this time, and it was effective. But they could never keep offensive combined arms coordination into the teeth of allied HE firepower.

TDs were not effective in those conditions, but then nothing much was. Obviously it is easier to deal with a handful of Panthers blocking the only road with anything that can actually penetrate them than with 75mm Shermans, when off road movement is physically impossible. But in practice, at long range, it was more practical to call down an HE stormed until the Panther(s) decamped. Allied attacks by full tanks on prepared German defenses of PAK and thick front AFVs lost very heavily for little purposes, and TDs were typically not asked to do this. That is about all that can be said in favor of them at Anzio.

The next came early in the Normandy campaign when 17SS counterattacked 101st Airborne around Carentan, using a single battalion of StuG. hardly a huge engagement. US TDs were barely present, mostly US full tanks participated in the counter-counterattack. They mauled the StuGs, pushed some themselves, and made it a trade off by losing some doing so.

Next came the Lehr counterattack in early July, meant to stop the push toward St Lo. It failed in half a day with loss of about half the committed armor. The initial attack was at night to achieve tactical surprise and to avoid allied airpower. It did achieve tactical surprise, and easily broke through the front line infantry positions in several places. This left a handful of columns each approximately company strength in armor roaming through the deeper US defensive zone.

They were stalked by SP TDs. Tanks from independent battalions also helped some, but those lost about as much as they took out. Tanks from an AD task force counterattacked prematurely and lost most of a tank company to unlocated ranged AT fire, most likely from a German jadgpanzer formation in the middle of the Lehr attack, possibly from towed PAK as well. TDs, on the other hand, slaughtered Panthers and Pz IVs alike in the hedgerows.

The worst that happened to them were occasional trading off, and frequently they instead got first shot and won outright. Initial engagement ranges were typically 200m or less, and even with plain AP the US 76mm had no difficulty with the Panther turret front at such ranges. Infantry AT was also effective in confused night melees. Much was claimed by air the next day, but other than shooting up SPWs left parked behind the battlefield, German side reports cannot substantiate those claims, and essentially all their actual losses can be accounted for from ground action.

The next major offensive attempt was Mortain. Again overall arty and air ("HE firepower") was instrumental in breaking the attack, which also made no sense operationally (a common fact). The defense included 2 SP TD battalions rushed to the scene, and a full AD, with one combat command in front of the attempt and another rushing to cut it all off. The plain tanks took losses especially in their premature offensive attempts, made necessary by the mission of rescuing overrun and bypassed US infantry units. The TDs lost little and scored.

The next major case is a series of early fights in Lorraine against green panzer brigades committed piecemeal. Those were defeated almost everywhere will little loss, typically by AD forces using both plain tanks and SPA direct and indirect. The best the Germans achieved in these were occasional even exchanges at company scale. The main cause of the German failures were the attacks making no operational sense to begin with, recklessly offensive employment, and then tactically getting pinned by terrain or artillery or maneuver or all in combination.

4 Panthers at 1.5 km on a hilltop facing the enemy may be a tough nut to crack. 40 Panthers in a "well" of a village surrounded by higher ground under crossfire from Shermans and Priests from 270 degrees of the compass, tossing in 105mm fire and airstrikes at will if those remain below the crestline, are a pointless catastrophe. That or the like happened several times.

TDs did not appreciably outperform in those early parts of the Lorraine fighting - everything worked, it was all "helpmate" stuff due to clueless German "play". Yes Virginia, not every German panzer commander was an ubermensch, some of them were out and out putzes. Besides the foolish organizational use of the armor (green brigades instead of replacements to veteran PD cadres), there was also ridiculously overaggressive doctrine, uniformly, from dictator to captain.

In the next round of the Lorraine fighting, green brigades were put under the command of veteran PD cadres and supplemented by the remaining forces of some of those mobile formations (21st, 11th, 3 and 15 Pz Gdr). These were much better coordinated and required actual fighting and some loss, but were still readily beaten with a favorable kill ratio for the US defenders.

The TDs scored very well in these fights. Occasionally so did a regular tank subformation, catching a buttoned German column from a flank or what have you. There was a lot of even exchanging, and some cases of much better than even due to first shot and good hull down positioning etc. Many of these fights took place in heavy morning fog - that is when the Germans preferred to attack - and initial LOS varied from 50m to 400m. In the sunny afternoons P-47s roamed free.

The best German successes in this period actually came from their infantry, VG formations in particular. Night and fog and an attacking role are as good for fausts and SMGs as they are lousy for the range dominance of a thin-sided Panther. And the US ADs they were going after did have a short suit, but it wasn't defensive AT firepower, it was infantry depth.

The next big one is the Bulge. TDs scored over and over in small groups. The bulge terrain was thicked wooded and rutted high ground, with a limited and muddy road net laced through it. A few mines could stop 40 Panthers for hours in such terrain - and a single platoon of Jacksons sometimes did, too. Only a few lead vehicles were effectively in the fight at any one time for the Germans, over much of the operational area. This highlighted the value of a killing gun compared to teamwork etc.

US plain tanks were still used defensively, from ambush positions, inside villages, etc. But the frequent result was, a pair or platoon KO a Panther and the next one KOs all of them. TDs trade instead, and in important cases did a lot better than trade.

E.g. in front of Elsenborn. (In front of Dom Bugenbatch the US 1st ID counted 48 destroyed German AFVs - they lost 2 tanks).

The artillery played a major role stopping the attacks there, and infantry AT and mines both scored. But the Germans lost heavily in vehicles and most of it to the SP TDs. By now some of those are Jacksons - and when the ground is open the initial engagement angle is often favorable (if it weren't, they'd just wait). When the ground wasn't open, initial ranges were 100-200 yards. The main German armor attacks were made at night, and during the day the US AFVs hide behind houses in the villages or on reverse slopes etc.

The war in the west was not Panthers standing on the defense on low rises on a sandy plain in central Poland. When the Germans had the armor to attack, it was frequently a reckless death ride affair; pushing into the US defensive zone meant showing thinner sides and giving short initial ranges to bazookas and tanks hiding behind houses and to SP TDs that would win easily if they got the first trigger pull, all of it in an HE crapstorm and frequently in the dark.

Not exactly conditions that make a Panther shine...

[ December 23, 2006, 11:00 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

E.g. in front of Elsenborn. (In front of Dom Bugenbatch the US 1st ID counted 48 destroyed German AFVs - they lost 2 tanks).

Well the accounts I read list the destruction of 11 German tanks and 1 SP gun.

6 to 57mm guns.

3 to Artillery barrage

2 to TD's

1 SP by Bazooka

48 destroyed 'AFV's' is not 48 destroyed tanks by the way.

The majority of the German tanks lost in the Elsenborn atrea were destroyed at close range and mainly by Infantry/Artillery.

There is no information in Jasons posts that can be used to substantiate his TD claims. There is not enough hard data or even a detailed breakdown of the claims to allow a check to be made.

[birdstrike]

Originally posted by the_enigma:

A recent opponent had 4 M10s. I had 2 platoons of Mk IVs. As i advanced his TDs opened fire and destroyed several of mine.

I halted my tanks, repositioned a few and within a few turns they were butchered, the M10s that is.

Aw, but in the first place, I guess his real mistake was to bring only 4 TDs to your party of 10.

[ December 24, 2006, 06:03 AM: Message edited by: birdstrike ]

[birdstrike]

Originally posted by coe:

hmmm howabout at range? e.g. 1000-2000m - how are the allied guns there?

If TDs were on the assault over open ground I can imagin it might be like T-34's advancing over an open steppe against a Panther and PzIV mix...actaully how does the 75mm Pak L43 stack up against the 76mm and 90mm. This presumes the allies have their ammo availability and the Germans don't have tungsten anymore.

Assuming you're talking about the game:

Can't speak for the russian stuff, but the US 76mm has real problems to kill anything the size of a Panther from the front at ranges of 1000m and more. Of course later in the war you get Tungsten, but at these ranges, the shots miss quite often and the tungsten ammo is wasted.

The British 17pdr is much better in any respect, so would be the US 90mm (if we only had it in CMAK ).

And for all US tanks, open ground assaults are a big no-no. They just cannot win the gun vs. armor-thickness game against the German guns.

There really is no way around using TDs as careful as any other allied vehicle, even more so for their open top.

[birdstrike]

Originally posted by dieseltaylor:

Cheaper? I assume we are talking in game then.

Um, yes.

[The_Enigma]

Originally posted by birdstrike:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by the_enigma:

A recent opponent had 4 M10s. I had 2 platoons of Mk IVs. As i advanced his TDs opened fire and destroyed several of mine.

I halted my tanks, repositioned a few and within a few turns they were butchered, the M10s that is.

Aw, but in the first place, I guess his real mistake was to bring only 4 TDs to your party of 10. </font>

[JasonC]

6th Pz Armee drawdown, ignoring transfered units in and out, 16 to 24 December - -207 full AFV, -106 light armor. 12SS is -47 full tanks, alone, and -35 light armor. TDs army level or in units in the sector are -44 more. Losses to 12SS were comparable to those to 1SS, which lost Peiper's whole KG.

Incidentally, at least 3 Panthers out of Peiper's losses were KOed in the twin villages - by SP TDs. One other by a bazooka during the initial breakthrough.

644th TD (a single company actually, 12 TDs) - 19 to 25 kills (2 by zook by dismounts), 2 TWO losses.

634th TD (90mm) - at least 9, without reported loss

613 TD (90mm) - stopped attack of 20 tanks, supplemented by artillery, neither side's losses reported

801 towed 76 - 4 Pz IV kills in a single incident by 1 gun (6 shots, 8 other Pz IV present withdrew), 17 losses.

741 tank battalion 27 to 32 kills (various type distinctions etc), 11 losses (including 2 to bogging and 1 engine failure).

bazookas - misses lead tank, hits second at 35 yards, crew bails. Following SPW mounted Pz Gdrs debus and clear area.

SP TDs - 3 SP TDs (McDermott, 644th) see 3 tanks and an SPW leading a dismount column, let them get close, then destroy all in quick succession.

bazookas - Kirkbride KOs a moving StuG at the head on an infantry column. (57mm hitting the front bounced off). Initial hit only an M-kill.

4 zook teams M-kill a leading "jadgpanzer".

McGarity M-kills a lead "tank", 3 others withdraw. This is probably an overkill claim redundant with the previous, aka finishing it off.

specific Sherman incident - Miller's 2 Shermans KO lead Panther, are both KOed in turn.

specific artillery incident - Panther KOed by direct 155mm hit on turret top, brew up (night, start of barrage).

specific infantry close assault - Bone KOed stationary German tank with gasoline - probably one M-killed by the previous artillery barrage. Indeed, a later report from Roberts, who helped him, specifies the tank Bone lit was immobilized beforehand.

specific mine-bazooka incident - 8 AT mines hastily placed at night M-kill 2 German tanks.

bazooka teams immediately claim 2 tanks, quite unclear if they are others that passed the immobilized 2. Much more likely they ones on the mines were finished off by bazooka fire.

Artillery - bazooka incident - infantry attacked by 7 tanks called in arty, claims 4 tanks KOed. Bazookas subsequently claim 3 at the same location. Very likely the artillery first M-killed them minimum. (4th was probably burning and so not hit again).

Bazooka incident - Soderman KOs a lead Panther, it burns. Later duplicate reports, unclear whether he did this twice. He is later reported as using a capture schreck incidentally (though I doubt that report).

artillery incident - called fire halts a German night tank attack but no losses reported. Likely weren't any, Germans withdrew to avoid damage and because they could not advance at night without infantry support.

57mm incident - night, lead Panther KOs one with a single shot after first firing a flare.

TD incident - 2 SP TDs advance under infantry direction at night, lead one KOed by Panther which gets first shot as TD moving, other TD withdraws.

Sherman incident - 3 Shermans confront 2 Panthers defending a church area, Shermans try to attack, all 3 KOed.

TD incident - infantry tries to direct a SP TD against a Panther by marking the Panther with infantry fire. TD does not engage, Panther moves away.

Artillery -bazooka incident - 5 German tanks with infantry attacking at night, US calls artillery fire, reportedly KOs the first tank. Bazooka then claims a second, but unclear this isn't finishing off the same one. Rest withdraw.

artillery incident - US infantry position being overrun calls for arty on own positions, it fires for 30 minutes. German tanks come no further but US position taken.

TD and zook incident - 5 German tanks approach US infantry position supported by SP TD platoon, dawn. TDs are behind buildings, wait for initial LOS 50 meters (!). KO the first easily, then 2 others in a firefight. Zook claims a 4th (unclear how much assist from prior TD fire in same engagement). 5th German tank hit by TD fire but survives and withdraws.

TD and tank incident - infantry tries to direct 2 SP TDs to reposition slightly to get LOS to German tanks. TD crews refuse, say they are under orders to cover definite sectors and avoid risking themselves otherwise. A Sherman is infantry-directed instead, KOs one Panther with 2 shots to flank.

uber zook - Salazar, cook's assistant, uses bazooka from 2nd story to KO a Panther then a jadg (the latter probably actually a Hetzer from post battle photo).

unterzook - Adams and Kraft in an attic with 2 zooks, one zook fails, the other hits tracks with first then penetrates turret side of enemy tank with second. It is not KOed and its reply fire convinces both to scram.

Units other than the 1st ID report 57mm ineffective. 1st ID used them and did so effectively.

artillery - massed night barrage in from of DB position, 3 KOed tanks counted in the morning.

57mm at DB - multiple 57s KO 2 tanks for loss of 1 57 to a single round of reply fire.

57mm at DB - Warner KOs 2 tanks with 8 shots, then his gun jams. Shoots TC of a third with his pistol.

57mm at DB - Swartz KOs a tank with 2 shots, first M-kills and tank turns, second flank ignites it. Report says used APDS (Brit supplied). Later KOs a 2nd with 3 shots. 57mm KOed in turn by panzerschreck direct hit.

Harris 57mm or zook KOs Grille.

2 other 57mms reported KOed in duels with tanks, at least one after hitting enemy tank in rear but failing to KO it.

SP TD - 4 90mm Jacksons KO 2 German tanks that made it through the barrage and were parked in front of US infantry positions. 3rd German escapes.

Another report says the same SP TD unit KOed 7 tanks in succession as they came over a ridge.

22nd attack renewed report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks.

48 German armored vehicles reported destroyed in front of the position, US losses were 4 57mm and 2 tanks.

So the eyewitness claims of the 57mm are 7 vehicles, arty got many of them in front of the position, TDs got more than 9, but full breakdown is unknown.

And that is not the whole Elsenborn fight, just the last act at DB - the only place the 57s were effective. Earlier, a single TD company scored as much as a tank battalion in and ahead of the twin villages. And the US vastly outscored the Germans overall, on this part of the front.

There are 14 eyewitness reports of zook kills, 2 of mine kills. Hardly fits the claim that "most" of the German losses in the sector were to bazooka fire.

Yes zooks got kills, but closely examined a solid half of their cases were finishes or assists. Artillery got kills - perhaps as many as 25 over the whole period, its effects were distinctly less observed than the others - but in small numbers on each occasion, frequently only M-kill and then the thing finished by other means etc.

US SP TD losses were miniscule. No failure due to their supposedly inadequate armor is in evidence. They simply did not fail at all.

[The_Enigma]

May i ask, where do you get such figures from?

[michael kenny]

Jason please tell me what book you are using(Cavanagh?)

Then I can try and sort it all out.

[JasonC]

In game, the US 76mm with plain AP wants ranges under 400 yards against Panthers, to get full penetrations of the turret front without "shell broke up" shatter-gap failures. With APCR you can hit them from 1000 and expect it to go in - glacis will still bounce though. Tiger Is similar, although the "reinforced turret front" adds variation (and shatter for plain AP), while the front hull is readily penetrated.

The US 90mm is significantly better, giving performance similar to 76mm APCR with the common plain AP. Brit 17 pdr likewise. US 76s want APCR to count as serious tank killers, and otherwise do StuGs and such effortless, anything flanked likewise, but need close range against the front of the cats.

US 90mm also has better behind armor effect. All of them are decent but particularly against the Tigers, the penetrations that aren't kills are frequent enough to be very annoying. 90mm minimizes that. 17 pdr OK at it, as at least the penetrations tends to be full not partial.

The best use against a cat is tag team with initial side aspect, both to avoid their getting first shot and to get best penetration chances with your own.

Achilles and Jackson are definitely worth the cost compared to M-10s, if (1) available and (2) any heavy armor will be faced.

As for hellcats, a gambit. I prefer the Jackson because I think the better gun is far more important than speed, and also because I dislike the vulnerability to light guns on the M18. It is dang fast though. On a more empty battlefield e.g. pure armor, that has big advantages. When there are schrecks and hidden guns, you usually can't risk racing charges.

[JasonC]

Green book, Cavanagh, McDonald, and Dupuy. I never use just one.

[The_Enigma]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Green book, Cavanagh, McDonald, and Dupuy. I never use just one.

Ah, i always wondered were you were able to get this type of stuff from

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

22nd, attack renewed. report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks.

This is from page 182 of Cavanagh's book and it is re-written to become a 'report'.

The original sentence reads:

"Once more US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"

I can't find any reference to the attack being made up of '20 tanks'.

Where did that come from?

Which Mcdonald source?

[michael kenny]

Artillery -bazooka incident - 5 German tanks with infantry attacking at night, US calls artillery fire, reportedly KOs the first tank. Bazooka then claims a second, but unclear this isn't finishing off the same one. Rest withdraw.

Probably the incident described on page 208 of Harry Yeides's book 'Tank Killer'. Though there the details of the losses differ.

644th TD (a single company actually, 12 TDs) - 19 to 25 kills (2 by zook by dismounts), 2 TWO losses.

Harry quotes the Unit History as claiming 12 tanks and 2 SP's (page 208 again)

If Jason could find the book he would see something on the page that might help his cause!

Danny Parker gets a total of 19 tanks/SP's in his Bulge book but notes that 'refined' estimates get as high as 27.

Parker ends with:

The TD mission has been superseded...TD's should be replaced by a tank which can outgun enemy tanks and which has sufficient armor to protect itself from normal anti-tank and tank weapons. In other words make killer tanks, not tank killers.

I like to give sources and quotes otherwise people might get the idea I did all the research myself...................!

[ December 24, 2006, 10:22 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[JasonC]

"The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy."

Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh.

McDonald source I am talking about is Trumpets.

I await the first word from you, ever, acknowledging learning anything. But I am not holding my breath. To date you have shown yourself a pigheaded bore. Care to double up?

[JasonC]

On 644 claims, 19 is from green book, higher figure is Cavanagh page 174 - 23 by TD and 2 by zook.

And sources my eye, all you ever say is "if I haven't read it it must not be true". You've never shown the slightest analysis of anything you've read, being by all evidence to date a pure "ipsi dixit" scholastic. Which is useless to everyone, whether you realize it or not.

[JasonC]

the engima - I get operations research questions in my head, independently, and I doubt conventional wisdom I am presented with in summary paragraphs. When I have such a question I go read detailed operational accounts and unit histories, surveying incidents.

I look for whether the actual "dispatches" match the typically doctrinal claims advanced in short summary paragraphs often in axe grinding accounts. I find they frequently fail to make contact with the reported reality, or amplify specific incidents that do not hold as patterns. I cross check claims with enemy own-side loss reports for scale and timing etc.

Examples recently were - artillery utility stopping armor attacks, both operationally and actual field KOs. Air vs. armor claims. Effectiveness of TDs - the one here. Net kill ratios. Net casualty ratios. Fielded odds ratios and how they move. Apportioning AFV kills over causes. Lifetime average effectiveness of various weapon systems. Average hit chances achieved. Casualties per heavy artillery round expended, average and operations and variation. Timing of draw-down of operational tanks strengths. How illuminating or misleading is TWO accounting? Redeployment speeds of mobile formations on defense. Specific strengths of the Germans in the second half of 1944, infantry vs. mobile formations in the west. AT strength of Axis minor formations in Russia. Role of "reserve maneuver" and attrition, vs. operational counterattack, in stopping Kursk. Relative effectiveness of tanks in offensive and defense deployments. Doctrinal treatment of defense in armor doctrine during WW II and since, and its weaknesses. Role of logistic pacing in the fighting against NK and Chinese in Korea. Operational mobility of infantry arms compared to vehicle-mechanized formations in rugged terrain, and whether doctrine reflects realities experienced on the subject. Actual NK and Chinese tactics in their successful period vs. the human wave mythos largely stemming from later stalemate period. Attrition rates, production, and the prospects of an attrition strategy by the Germans in Russia in WW II. Maneuver vs. attrition doctrines, and the discrepancy between academic love for each and their actual combat record both as to predictions and as to successful use.

Etc. Here is what I don't do - read one book and pretend anyone who disagrees with anything it says, however generalized or unsupported, must be an ignorant git making it up. Or look for 1-2 strained talking points for nationalist "spin" propaganda.

[coe]

considering the Germans held their own (though with much difficulty with Pz I, II, IIIs and 38(t)s all which could die with a single shot from T-34 and KV-1s....maybe they would have been much better if they built TDs (though there is the point of allied artillery). I presume that the reason why Allied tankers did will in the German defense zone is because they had massive support faster turrets isn't a bad thing either when it comes to first to shoot.

[Corvidae]

I freely admit my own relative ignorance,

and try to form a valid oppinion from what evidence I can find.

Please dont hoot too derisivly at any of my mistakes or expressed failures of comprehension

Ok, Tank killers were specialized vehicles,

They were designed according to the available hulls of their respective armys, and according to the tactical doctrines of their respective armys as well.

German doctrine led to the "eggshells with hammers" approach to tank destroyer design.

American doctrine led to the open topped tank killers everyone here is ranting about.

The allied tank killers were effective, They worked. They were generaly not as well armored as a tank, But close enough that it didnt matter.

They had a MUCH better gun.

The allied tank killers were best used in the anti tank role, (hence the name) They were specialized, and were not supposed to do much else besides kill tanks.

They COULD be used in other roles, But why would you use them for anything else?.

Proper tanks were more generalized. More versitile.

A well designed tank (M4/Sherman) could do a lot of things fairly well.

But although it was a pretty good anti tank weapon, it wasnt an exelent one.

The tank killer was designed to be an exelent anti tank weapon. That was its role.

By the end of the war, the standard tanks of the western allies were becoming increasingly effective as anti tank weapons.

As tanks became better tank killers, Designated tank killers became obsolete.

would this sum it up?

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

22nd attack renewed report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks.

I replied with:

"This is from page 182 of Cavanagh's book and it is re-written to become a 'report'.

The original sentence reads:

"Once more US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"

the retort:

Originally posted by JasonC:

"The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy."

Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh.

Sorry my friend but this is simply factualy incorrect. You clearly date the time as '22nd' in your original post and in Cavenagh's book he says:

"Just after daybreak, on 22 December enemy patrols of the 26th SS Pz.Gr. Reg. 12th SS began to probe the 2nd Battalion lines. Just after 10:00 they attacked with a change in tactics. In place of a frontal assault they attacked the Battalions flanks and broke through on the right. Once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks

You quote Cavanagh 'word perfect' and there is no other explaination other than you copied it fron his book. Now you say this came from another book.......yeah right. You could never have just made a simple mistake could you!

Originally posted by JasonC:

On 644 claims, 19 is from green book, higher figure is Cavanagh page 174 - 23 by TD and 2 by zook.

And sources my eye, all you ever say is "if I haven't read it it must not be true". You've never shown the slightest analysis of anything you've read, being by all evidence to date a pure "ipsi dixit" scholastic. Which is useless to everyone, whether you realize it or not.

You fail to address the Battalion History which only claims 12-14.

There is one interesting fact.

The TD battalions claimed over 500 German tanks for the Bulge Battles.

German losses were between 7-800 tanks.

US losses were 730

Now this works out at roughly a 1-1 exchange rate.

Do you still think that it is possible that the TD claims are valid?

Originally posted by JasonC:

I get operations research questions in my head, independently, and I doubt conventional wisdom I am presented with in summary paragraphs. When I have such a question I go read detailed operational accounts and unit histories, surveying incidents.................................................

I cross check claims with enemy own-side loss reports for scale and timing etc

And the German records you consulted to confirm all the claimed losses are..................?

Originally posted by JasonC:

Examples recently were - artillery utility stopping armor attacks, both operationally and actual field KOs. Air vs. armor claims. Effectiveness of TDs - the one here. Net kill ratios. Net casualty ratios. Fielded odds ratios and how they move. Apportioning AFV kills over causes. Lifetime average effectiveness of various weapon systems. Average hit chances achieved. Casualties per heavy artillery round expended, average and operations and variation. Timing of draw-down of operational tanks strengths. How illuminating or misleading is TWO accounting? Redeployment speeds of mobile formations on defense. Specific strengths of the Germans in the second half of 1944, infantry vs. mobile formations in the west. AT strength of Axis minor formations in Russia. Role of "reserve maneuver" and attrition, vs. operational counterattack, in stopping Kursk. Relative effectiveness of tanks in offensive and defense deployments. Doctrinal treatment of defense in armor doctrine during WW II and since, and its weaknesses. Role of logistic pacing in the fighting against NK and Chinese in Korea. Operational mobility of infantry arms compared to vehicle-mechanized formations in rugged terrain, and whether doctrine reflects realities experienced on the subject. Actual NK and Chinese tactics in their successful period vs. the human wave mythos largely stemming from later stalemate period. Attrition rates, production, and the prospects of an attrition strategy by the Germans in Russia in WW II. Maneuver vs. attrition doctrines, and the discrepancy between academic love for each and their actual combat record both as to predictions and as to successful use.

And yet you still get it all wrong!

This sort of thing really interests me and for some time I have been trying to find the actual tank losses for each side rather than unsubstantiated claims. Are you trying to tell me that you have solved this problem and are in possesion of information that allows you to claim, with absolute certainty, the loss rate for individual weapons types? Please share this amazing data with us because up to now all you seem to do is quote Unit claims. If you have the info you surely are not posting any of it here.

Originally posted by JasonC:

Here is what I don't do - read one book and pretend anyone who disagrees with anything it says, however generalized or unsupported, must be an ignorant git making it up. Or look for 1-2 strained talking points for nationalist "spin" propaganda.

One book? Like Cavanagh's? 90% of the incidents you listed earlier come DIRECTLY from Cavanagh. He is your main source, you failed to say you used his book and now when called on an error in you account you try and say it is from another 'source'

[civdiv]

Is the Cavanaugh book the tour of the Bulge Battlefield one? I was paging through it in the library recently and now I may go pick it up. And Dupuy and McDonald I have read and own, but 'The Green Book', what is that?

[michael kenny]

Cavanagh's book

'Green Books'

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/CMH/Overview.htm

Specificaly The Ardennes Campaign; The Battle of the Bulge. 1965.

Seeing as Jason won't link it I will have to do it. You can download it here.

A bit dated but still a useful work.

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_Cont.htm

The full page 133 partialy quoted by Jason:

"when it arrived to face the Germans, had been reduced by perhaps one quarter. Indeed, in midafternoon of the 21st, the battalion commander had planned withdrawing a thousand yards to the rear to compensate for the dwindling strength in the firing line. But when the 2d reorganized that evening its position was somewhat strengthened. Company C, with extra bazookas, had come up to man the denuded right flank, the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion laid a hasty field of about a thousand mines in front of the lines, and the regiment had attached the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Division chemical battalion to Daniel's command.

Meanwhile the enemy regrouped to continue the attack with new forces. The armored infantry reserve of the 12th SS Panzer Division, the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, finally had negotiated the poor roads and traffic jams along the German line of communications and arrived in Büllingen, ready for its first commitment in the offensive. Shortly after day broke on 22 December patrols from the 26th commenced to probe at the 2d Battalion lines. The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy. The continued threat, though serious, was countered by shifting local reserves from the 18th and 26th to close the gap, and by the end of the day the situation was well in hand. Again the American gunners had taken over a large share of the burden, firing over 300 missions. The cooperation between the artillery and infantry arms, it must be said, was reciprocal. The fact that the 26th Infantry had continued to hold its position on ground overlooking the German routes west had allowed the observers a grandstand seat and had caused the German columns taking the 1st SS Panzer Division detour through Schoppen to run a gantlet of accurate and continuous fire.

The successful withdrawal from the Krinkelt-Rocherath sector to the more favorable terrain of the Elsenborn ridge had resulted, by 20 December, in a fairly homogeneous and well-constructed defense with the 2d Division on the right and the 99th Division on the left. On the morning of this same day the 9th Infantry Division took over the Monschau-Höfen sector (its 47th Infantry had moved earlier into supporting position west of these two towns) and so covered the northern flank of the 99th.

The German attempt to crack the newly formed north-south line was handled in catch-as-catch-can and piecemeal fashion, for the primary mission was the flanking maneuver in the Butgenbach area. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, which had relieved the 12th SS Panzer Division at the twin villages, went to work at once against the 99th Division portion of the Elsenborn line although the bulk of its rifle strength was not yet in hand. On the morning of 20 December German tanks and infantry made the first of three assaults. But the 99th, on a forward slope with perfect visibility and good fields of fire, checked this and

[133]

[ December 24, 2006, 07:20 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[civdiv]

Thanks Mike, that is a new one for me. I need to get the local library to pick up a copy. And my local library is the Pentagon, so I may be successful.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

E.g. in front of Elsenborn. (In front of Dom Bugenbatch the US 1st ID counted 48 destroyed German AFVs - they lost 2 tanks).

If you consult 'Against The Panzers. United States Infantry Versus German Tanks, 1944-45.' Allan Vannoy and Jay Karamales 1996) you will find the US armour losses for the Dom Bugenbach (not 'Bugenbatch!)encounter are given as 3 SP TD's and 3 Shermans.

This book is even more detailed than Cavanagh's and would be ideal for those who like to impress others by a slight re-wording and calling the result 'a report'.