Guns vs Armour

[JasonC]

lol. Now he wants 3 armies from November on, 2 months compared to one etc. It is actually possible he simply has no idea when the battle of the bulge occurred.

Sorry, that is parity at best for the actual period (16 December to 16 January) including more forces than were engaged in the bulge.

As for 350 light armor losses, they are in Dupuy by unit, only those engaged on the frontage and December 16 to January 16.

You can include those and US M5s and M8s or exclude both, makes no difference to me. I'd think the mediums (M4s plus TDs) vs. full German AFVs only, a more accurate measure of the subject in dispute.

Still waiting for the silly person's statement on the effectiveness of TDs stopping armor or lack thereof, and his explanation for why US full Sherman losses are so much higher than the supposedly paper thin and supposedly ineffective TD's losses. (TDs were ~1/4 of the engaged US armor). With unheld breath.

[JasonC]

Does this one help? Does this one help? How about this one? Does this one help? Ipse ipse ispe. Dixit! Something might stick eventually, must keep shoveling faster, faster.

Truth, the interlocuter, the argument, sanity...

Ah who cares anymore, it is like smacking a puppy.

[pamak1970]

On the second, I do insist that attrition is essential to all decision in warfare. I also insist that the defensive is as important as offensive action in winning wars, that to defend is not an anomoly but an ordinary condition every maneuver unit must be fully prepared for in equipment doctrine and training - above all in doctrine. That defensive doctrine cannot be predicated on wishful thinking or mystical powers expected from initiative or the morale benefit of advancing or any belief that the enemy will be more baffled or stupider than one's own forces.

It must instead be predicated on clear and sober analysis of enemy strengths and an assumption of solid professional direction. It must be ready to win anyway, and take easier outcomes as gravy.

The second does not imply that offensive action is never useful or that occasion will never call for it - that would be a parallel stupidity to the overly aggressive doctrine I am lambasting.

Men walk on two legs and get farther that way than hopping on one. Predicating a military doctrine on avoiding attrition or avoiding defensive action is trying to hop along on one leg, and emphatically will not work.

actually you do admit that you do not imply that offensive action is always useless but you blaim the other side that they somehow disregard defensive action although it is clear that they do not.

Sure you can not expect to win just because you decide to attack and noone says that attack has some types of mystical powers.

However you can seize initiative only when you attack , you can not seize initiative during defence and although inittiative is not a guarantee to decicive victory, it is still a prerequirement.

Moreover, it remains true that tactically speaking, the defensive is the stronger form of combat

Indeed ,but it also remains true that since the attacker has the initiative ,he will most likely acheive a local force superiority aiming in negating the advantages of the defensive force

And defenders who are fluid rather than static, shift their reserves actively, and choose their ground without regard to any imperative to hold terrain, are just as capable of picking their fights as attackers are. (By choosing when to deny battle and when to stand, etc).

No argue with the above with the important clarification that the defender MUST not only choose where to defend but choose also where to attack .If he lays his hopes in attrition during successive defensive battles ,he will not be able to enforce a decicive victory and at the end he will eventually be the victim of a successful deep penetrating attack.

Even you in other discussions admit that the casualty ratio between the Americans and Germans is not really in big favor of anyone and let's

not forget that a big portion of the German casualties is not due to defensive action but due to hasty retreats and abandoned equipment.

If under those favorable conditions the Americans could not acheive a very favorable ratio of casualty exchanges, how the hell they were going to be successful against the Soviets when they need a much more favorable ratio of causalty exchange cause of the overwelming numbers of Warsaw Pact?

If they had broken clean through and defeated the reserves they encountered, they would have won those fights, just as they did earlier ones in 1939 to 1942. They didn't because the offensive concentrated maneuver formula had stopped working.

Actually when someone does not have operational mobility due to various reasons including enemy air supremancy ,it is not a surprise that the German doctrine can not work.

On the other hand this does not mean that the defensive doctrine is superior to the German one.

If the Germans were not forced to retreat , they would not have abandoned the numerous tanks they were forced to lose and this hastily retreat was the final product of Allied thread to isolate them.It was not a product of defensive actions at Mortain.

Additionaly if their strategic production was comparable with the American one, the casualty exchange ratio in Normandy would not kneel them and force them to defeat.

When Americans were facing Soviets ,they had to consider such things .

The Germans did not lose such attacks because they were forced to retreat. Retreat is not defeat but frequently a prudent measure to improve the future fighting conditions.

Actually the first sentencse does not make much sense.Let me put it differentely since i did not say anything like that.

The Germans lost a lot of material and figting power as a result of their retreat which was caused by the allied thread to trap them inside the Falaise pocket .It was not cause of mass casualties against the solid defence at Mortain.

Retreat is not defeat as long as you control the pace of it.

When you LOSE inititative cause of a successful attack , the retreat can be equal with defeat.

As for counterattacks elsewhere or threats adjacent to the points the initial attacker attacked, sure those mattered too.

This is the main difference between your side and mine.

No, they do not just matter too, they are absolutely nessesary,otherwise the attacker will have plenty of time to reorganize and replace casualties after a failed attack and resume actions again without any operational consequencies.

In the case of Falaise, they were flanked and in danger of being cut off when the operation started. It never made any sense on the map, it was a head in the noose affair. Its rational was desparation and the mere wish that they could cut all the way to the sea inside 48 hours and isolate the penetrating Americans instead of the other way around.

Actually the whole German situation was desperate.

There was not any "logical solution" for them other than capitulating to their enemies and many were realizing that .

So i am not going to critisize actions that seem desperate.

We have many cases of big armies being destroyed by inadequate command that panicked at a critical moment of an enemy action and this enemy action will be an enemy attack.

If the Germans were fighting with any hope to win,they had to initiate an attack somehow at somepoint.

Accepting a practice of fighting withdrawal trying to attrit the more vulnerable attacker, was a sure way of slow agonizing defeat for the Germans.

To me it makes much more sense fighting having some hope than fighting knowing for sure that you will be defeated.

It will just make him stall until the next time he will decide to attack somewhere else."

With what, his bare hands?

The attacker is not going to be such a fool to press his attack to the point of seeing himself having just bare hands.

He will stall the attack much sooner.

The exception will be only when the attacker is willing to take a gumble and play "all

or nothing" but this scenario implies that he is already in a desperate situation.

The plan was quite simple - each ACR channels and spots for 12 AH-64s each 16 hellfires equals one dead tank division. Lather, rinse, repeat - once every 48 hours. As shooting gallery as WW I machineguns against riflemen.

Really?

What about the execution?

You know that the attacker has a plan also which is to use recon and advanced parties to protect his main body ,defeat the enemy covering ACR and establish contact with the main force of the defender.

No it did not take 12 hours to target corps level arty. I served on 8 inch self propelled at one point. We are as flexible as you please, all the armor branch slander in the world is just that

I think you did not get it.

I talk about common survey which is a prerequirement for targeting corps level artillery with decent opportunity for effective fire.

When the former has taken place, then distant assets can exchange target data.

Now the actual procedure of one unit giving targeting data to another unit and requesting fire, will take some time which is a total different thing than the time that was spent for common survey that permitted the units to exhange data in the first place.

Now if you served in the corps of engineer doing topographical survey at a coprs level, you could have some experience of what i am talking about.

Being in an artillery battery getting targeting data does not really give You access to the much complicated procedure that made it possible .

[JonS]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

Now if you served in the corps of engineer doing topographical survey at a corps level, you could have some experience of what I am talking about.

Engineers? Who cares about the engineers?* Gunners do all their own survey, thankyouverymuch.

* No disrespect to the ginger bears. They are a great bunch of overworked guys, but this has nothing to do with them, and hasn't since WWI.

[z-warfare]

Data shmata i want to know if TDs are idiotic or not.

[Bigduke6]

I have stayed out of the great tank destroyer debate because it seems to turn on West front armor loss rates, and causes - both things I know not so much about.

This comment however I think I can remark on:

There is a reson why American war academies developed almost a "fetish" about the German doctrine. They showed them the way of how to fight effectively against a much larger enemy like the Soviets which was the American enemy during the cold war.

To which I think there can be only one response:

THE SOVIETS WON.

HOW SENSIBLE IS/WAS IT TO APE GERMAN DOCTRINE AS A WAY TO FIGHT THE RED ARMY "EFFECTIVELY", IF SOVIET DOCTRINE DECISIVELY DEFEATED GERMAN DOCTRINE DURING WORLD WAR TWO?

This of course leads to a discussion of Cold War doctrine, a subject near and dear to my heart as, in my youth, I was with a U.S. unit with orders to fight in the Fulda Gap. I post this as sort of a holiday essay written on the last work day of the year.

Airland doctrine was of course the flavor of the season and we were trained to "fight outnumbered and win."

The idea generally was that our superior weapons and training, Soviet incompetence, and the U.S. military's "deep strike" capacity would allow us to chop the Soviets into little pieces. We expected we would eventually have to give ground, although the battle plan at least as far as Corps went didn't envision battle positions any further west than Alsfeld. But if you pressed on the the staff planners from Corps during a terrain walk, they would admit that generally the idea was to fight mobile along the B20 until we got to the Rhine, and then hold our ground.

It sounded good and I believed it. At the NTC or Hohenfels it seemed like our battalion had no trouble cleaning up on the OPFOR, provided we didn't do something stupid - although avoiding stupid stuff wasn't always so easy.

Since those Cold War days I have been exposed to all sorts of subversive influences, including Red Army officers, a fair amount of reading, academia, and not a little CM and TACOPs.

Now, I am pretty sure I was wrong, and so that JasonC is dead right that the point to modern warfare against technically equal opponents is trying to run the other guy out of the big battle machines, traditionally tanks but these days probably guided munitions and the machines that you need to get the guided munitions onto targets.

Manuever doesn't count for much. It's just a matter of destroying the other guy's combat capacity, and how you do it - tactically, strategically, defensively, offensively, standing on your head - is of marginal importance.

The Cold War Soviets, of course, never got very far from this POV. Their tanks were not the very best but good enough to produce in mass, their training didn't produce ueber-soldiers but guys roughly competent at one job, and their units and supply was pretty much geared to one single combat, after which you throw the remains away by folding the few survivors into the replacement pool. The whole point was just getting men and machines - and so firepower - into the NATO defences, and just swamping them.

I spent lots of time with the boys from 11ACR, and they were very optimistic about their ability to take a heavy toll on any Soviet attack. However, what I didn't realize then, is that the Soviets really didn't care about heavy tolls. All they cared about was getting force past 11ACR, and into our defences, and after that getting tanks past our defences. Of course the Soviets were going to take losses, but it wasn't a secret that they had more tanks than we had ATGM.

I also know now that those biffy Apaches the Cav was so hot on (one Apache battalion can erase a Red Tank Division, woo hoo!) were fine, but that it's really hard to hide a FARP and that FARPs in a war were a Soviet priority target approaching tactical nukes. When I was in we didn't think about it, but now as a civilian I realize it was pretty senseless to assume the Soviets didn't know how effective the Apache might be, and wouldn't try and come up with some ways to deal with it.

The list, I have read later in Russian military history books, is pretty impressive, including Spetznaz attacks on pilots in the Kasernes, ditto to the helicopters on their pads, ditto ditto to the HEMMITs that moved the fuel, plus all the AA missiles carried by lead Soviet combat units, plus OBTW the depots holding the Hellfires.

Sure, if the supression had worked perfectly, and the lines held, and the Soviets not targeted smart munitions supplies, the Apaches would have gone to town.

But in a war, as fluid as the predictors and indeed CM etc. make armor combat out to be, it seems to me inescapable that the zippy U.S. anti-tank assets, would have hit the attrition meatgrinder just like every one else.

And it was no secret that the Soviets could feed forces into the fight a whole lot faster, and in greater numbers, than we could.

In my later days, I've talked with and read accounts by former Soviet tank generals who have claimed they were sure they would have, in case of a war, reached the Atlantic in less than a month.

If everything they planned to mobilize they actually had managed to mobilize, that might well have been the case. If the Soviets could beat the Germans and ueber-tanks in the 1940s, it is not impossible that they could not defeat NATO and its ueber-tanks in the 1980s. It just came down to numbers, who can shove more firepower into the fight.

Of course, NATO had a lot more production capacity that Hitlerian Germany, and the Soves weren't immune to attrition either. Also, Soviets being Soviets tended to do stupid things military somewhat more often than NATO military does stupid things. So I doubt the Soviet could have pulled off their plan perfectly.

So one thing I am pretty sure of: it would not have been a fast war, it would have been a long war, a war of a attrition.

So all in all I'm pretty glad there wasn't a war. At the time I thought we would kick Soviet butt, but now I see that if the war had lasted any length of time, and that seems like the most likely initial result, odds were people like me would die. After all, you can dodge bullets, but not attrition.

We return you now to your WW2 tank destroyer diatribe programming.

[SteveS]

What would Harry Yeide have to say I wonder? I've not read his TD book, but the blurb would seem to indicate he would lean towards Jason's side in this.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

lol. Now he wants 3 armies from November on, 2 months compared to one etc. It is actually possible he simply has no idea when the battle of the bulge occurred.

I would try the same thing if I was asserting a 1:1 loss rate and then was shown data that completely demolished my theory. I believe it is called the Ostrich defence.

3rd Army did not attack into the southern flank of the Bulge and 2nd and 7th AD just appeared out of nowhere to join 1st Army............ok ipse,ipse dixie,, I believe you.

Sorry, that is parity at best for the actual period (16 December to 16 January) including more forces than were engaged in the bulge. As for 350 light armor losses, they are in Dupuy by unit, only those engaged on the frontage and December 16 to January 16

You can include those and US M5s and M8s or exclude both, makes no difference to me. I'd think the mediums (M4s plus TDs) vs. full German AFVs only, a more accurate measure of the subject in dispute.

Even with this bogus hurdle that still means the losses were

M4 = 614

TD = 122

total 736

so it is a confirmed 737 Units. Do the 208 M5's, 105 M7's, 200 M8' A/C,46 M8(75mm)count as 'light armour? Yes lets lump them together as that.

736 'Mediums'

379 'Light Armour'

Whilst German records are incomplete they do list losses to 31 December of 222 tanks and 102 SP's

Ist Army losses to 28 December

M4 281

M5 72

It is not possible to get US TD/SP gun losses for the same time period but I would think about half of the overall total would be roughly accurate.

TD =60

SP =60

M8 A/C = 100

US:

341 'Medium' and 232 'light armour'

German:

324 tanks and SP's (note:this includes German armour losses incurred fighting other US Units as well as Ist Army and it covers 3 more days of heavy fighting than the US cut off date of 28th December)

Even rigging the data to get THE VERY BEST POSSIBLE LOSS RATE you still can not get parity. Can it be that all German losses were caused by 1st Army?

[pamak1970]

Engineers? Who cares about the engineers?* Gunners do all their own survey, thankyouverymuch.

Predictable answer .

Gunners do their own survey but this is different from establishing COMMON survey.

The survey they do is nessesary to engage targets in areas of their interest but it is not sufficient for exchanging targeting data .

Two units can do their own survey but still they may not be able to exchange targeting data or use data from a third unit or sensor to concentrate fire on a common target.

[pamak1970]

To which I think there can be only one response:

THE SOVIETS WON.

HOW SENSIBLE IS/WAS IT TO APE GERMAN DOCTRINE AS A WAY TO FIGHT THE RED ARMY "EFFECTIVELY", IF SOVIET DOCTRINE DECISIVELY DEFEATED GERMAN DOCTRINE DURING WORLD WAR TWO?

I think the obvious response is that the Soviets won cause simply they had a much greater output of production than Germans that during the long run turned the table in favor of them.

If they had to compete against US that would not be the same case.

For the Nato the problem was how to survive the initial stage with the overwelming Soviet material superiority and until sufficient US reinforcements come to Europe .

If they could survive that, they could certainly expect that the US industry could compete with Soviet one in the long run.

[Corvidae]

Ummmmm Ladies. WW2 please, that thing between 1939 and 1945.

Lets not go off into the cold war, or the zulu wars, or the siege of minas tirith. Yes I realize the Sith had more aggressive methods than the Jedi.

More specificly we are about tanks (axis tanks) vs AT guns (allied AT guns).

If Foghorn Leghorn wants me stuffed, he will just have to risk a PBEM, and try to do it himself.

(unless he has his own panzer group to lead, and a matching SP AT force he could lend me).

(wouldnt that be fun)

Otherwise I remain unimpressed by his incessant crowing and strutting.

[JonS]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Engineers? Who cares about the engineers?* Gunners do all their own survey, thankyouverymuch.

Predictable answer .

Gunners do their own survey but this is different from establishing COMMON survey.

The survey they do is nessesary to engage targets in areas of their interest but it is not sufficient for exchanging targeting data .

Two units can do their own survey but still they may not be able to exchange targeting data or use data from a third unit or sensor to concentrate fire on a common target. </font>

[pamak1970]

JohnS

if you find something confusing ,please tell me and i will try to explain.

I will give a first try.

Since earth is a sphere and since this surface is projected to a 2 dimentional map ,there are distortions .

A clear example is if you observe the longitude lines on a topographical map that seem to be parallel ,althouhg in reality they are meeting each other on north and south Pole .

The survey for laying a gun for example might be adequate for establishing its relative position to an enemy unit in a certain map sheet to calculate an azimuth.

However a distant unit which uses a different map sheet can not use this type of information to extract its own azimuth and relative position against the same enemy unit.

That is why we have the procedure of common survey which establishes a "common Language" and that is why we get into so much trouble to have special units at higher levels that work for the establishment of the common survey ,instead of doing the obvious thing of counting on the independent surveys by the artillery commanders.

[JonS]

lol. Do you often find yourself telling your grandma how to suck eggs?

[pamak1970]

lol. Do you often find yourself telling your grandma how to suck eggs?

No, but remember that it was you who got confused about how to suck eggs and i tried to explain to you.

Since your initial comment was "why count on engineers since we the artillery men do our own survey?" ,i had to assume that you are pretty ignorant on the subject of common survey.

By the way ,this is not an insult since nobody knows everything .

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

More specificly we are about tanks (axis tanks) vs AT guns (allied AT guns).

It may be to you but that does not mean it is.

Originally posted by Corvidae:

If Foghorn Leghorn wants me stuffed, he will just have to risk a PBEM, and try to do it himself

I really do not know what PBEM means.

When you do not 'know' it is best to come right out and say it.

Now I will use my deductive skills.

I presume PBEM is something to do with a computer simulation game around which this site is built?

I do not play it.

I do not play any computer games.

I am only interested in what actually happen in 1944/45.

I am not interested in debates about 'what if' or complex re-runs of ww2 actions.

Thus if, as I believe, a challenge has been issued then I am unable to take the field.

I am sorry if this irritates you but that is the way it is.

Wait.......hang on a bit.

I believe the rules of chivalry allow your opponent to pick the weapons.....

As I said earlier I am familiar with the game 'Battleships' and can oblige you there if that is a suitable arrangement.

You may continue to address me with whatever epithet you like ,it reminds me of my childhood and the name calling we practised before maturity kicked in.

I think this debate has long outlived its usefulness. Whilst we can argue about an opinion (was the TD a success in its designated role) we can't argue about facts.

The numbers in the loss ratio spat are fixed. Total losses are known and thus OVERALL loss ratio's can be deduced. Ingrained belief can not overcome this awkward fact.

I am suprised that anyone would construct a theory about exchange rates without apperently having access to any hard data on the actual losses themselves. Depending on claims culled from dated general overview books or unit histories is not productive and guaranteed to give an inflated total for German losses. If you try to use this flawed data then you are not going to be taken seriously.

I have given the actual losses (insofar as they are known-nothing is completely recorded) Use them and work out the ratios for yourself. There is only one conclusion.

They are more detailed than any previous attempt at the task and I again would like to thank Rich Anderson for compiling them and being generous enough to allow me to use them.

I am suprised no one mentioned the flaws in the arguments. Using the figures to try and work out tank v tank loss rates is pointless. Much of the destruction was wrought by hand held Infantry weapons, A/T, mines.SP's and plain old mechanical failure. A large number (on both sides) were also abandoned intact. Tanks rarely met tanks in a vacuum and thus nothing about the effectiveness of such encounters can be extracted from the overall figures.

All that can be said is US AFV losses greatly exceeded German losses. Now this could be for any number of reasons, probably because the US had more AFV's to lose than the Germans. Whatever the reason the fact is the German losses were smaller by a good margin.

I take my share of blame for introducing some personal racour into the thread but I hope the posted data on US losses is useful. It is the best and most accurate available to date. Nothing else in print or on the web can approach it. Thanks again to Rich.

[JonS]

Originally posted by pamak1970:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> lol. Do you often find yourself telling your grandma how to suck eggs?

No, but remember that it was you who got confused about how to suck eggs and i tried to explain to you.

Since your initial comment was "why count on engineers since we the artillery men do our own survey?" ,i had to assume that you are pretty ignorant on the subject of common survey.

By the way ,this is not an insult since nobody knows everything . </font>

[JasonC]

"you blaim the other side that they somehow disregard defensive action although it is clear that they do not."

I've read the manuals, sorry. They studiously avoid admitting that defense happens. It is presented as an anomoly, something that might occasionally be forced on a few subelements of the army while others are attacking. They then falsify the description of defensive tactics to avoid imputing strengths to it that their offensive doctrine pretends do not exist, and even just to avoid lessons that turn around when your stance does. E.g. they can't bring themselves to say reserves must move to the enemy's strength, because the attack doctrine is to hit weakness.

A doctrine that stammers when it speaks of defense cannot teach men how to attack either, because it cannot realistically describe what the opponent is trying to accomplish or how. Instead the opponent envisioned by the attack doctrine is a passive cartoon with his power all upfront and online and all his rear areas vulnerable and full of high value targets that cause paralysis and victory without fighting if they are dislocated.

Which is patent nonsense from start to finish. It amounts to dreaming the enemy will be as clueless as the French of 1940 or the Russians of 1941, and is simply unprepared for anything else.

"noone says that attack has some types of mystical powers."

I've read the manuals, and yes they do. They claim that being on the offensive in itself has decisive moral effects - which is straight out of the blue pants school that lost a million frenchmen in a month in 1914.

"you can seize initiative only when you attack"

The word "ambush" concisely refutes that ideological bromide. Of course you can seize the initiative when you defend. You can also be smart, anticipate the enemy, get inside his decision loop, paralyze him, cause blind panic etc. None of the special virtues claimed exclusively for the offensive stance by maneuver theorists is actually exclusive to the offensive stance. It is sheer slander, that's all.

Nor is "the initiative" a "prerequirement"(sic) for victory. Plenty of battles in history have been won decisively simply by shooting down the attackers to the point where they came apart in rout, from Knightsbridge to Fredericksburg to New Orleans to Agincourt. It is an ideological dogma and not an observation, and it isn't true.

Now, of course the more common thing is the attacker wastes himself against a well conducted defense, and the defender then picks times and places to attack himself, utilizing the mispositioning for defensive action that the attacker's offensive stance and his losses typically induce.

This works not because the offensive is decisive or the initiative sacred and magical, but simply because unit performance depends on full adaptation to the stance or role or plan being attempted, and catching them with what they are not prepared for is therefore a good idea. The best commanders beat out unpredictable jazz tempos on the enemy's head and constantly catch them in the wrong stance or attempting something for which said best commander is completely ready. Which you can't do if you only have one leg and hop toward the enemy until you fall over.

"since the attacker has the initiative, he will most likely acheive a local force superiority"

Temporarily, yes this is true, that is why there are screens for warning time and reserves etc. As all the cases under discussion show, however, that local odds doesn't last very long - reserves simply counter-maneuver - and achieving local odds by physical concentration also creates its own vunerabilities (multiples the effects of area weapons, of obstacles, of logistic bottlenecks, etc).

The actual balance between them turns on specific weapons and cover relationships, and on doctrine about reserves and depth etc. And typically, for most of history, local odds by initiative alone has not been decisive but instead simply opens a running attrition-ee fight. The reasons are the typically greater mobility of the defender within his own zone, his intel edge there, his typically superior protection and lower target density and the lower effect of each element of the attacker's firepower because of it. All of which make it difficult or impossible (depending on the period and tech etc) for anything decisive to happen in the limited time available to the attack before the defense has adapted.

The cases of serious gain with that method alone almost all reflect specific weaknesses on the targeted side, especially of doctrine, but also of unit reliability or overall operational misdirection. If when the heavypoint hits X you march all your reserves into a cul de sac away from X, obviously you can lose. If all the reserves you send to backstop X evaporate on contact because the formations are not combat ready or effective, obviously you can lose.

Those results stem from those specific failings and not from the fact that the other guy has the initiative or is attacking or believes in himself.

Of course, it is nice to know how to do things that give the enemy an opportunity to make a mistake and hang himself. Especially if they can be done as risks rather than gambles (in Rommel's sense - i.e. downside strictly limited if it doesn't work, upside uncertain but also unlimited - "call" payoff attacks). But it is a mistake of the first order to build your entire doctrine on imaginary enemy weaknesses that may or may not be real. Historically speaking, none of the major powers failed to learn the techniques the fully counter tactical concentration of armor for attack, by the latest by mid 1943.

"the defender MUST not only choose where to defend but choose also where to attack"

ipse dixit in the pure sense. This is an unsupported dogmatic assertion whose only evidence is your say-so. There is simply no such "must".

"If he lays his hopes in attrition during successive defensive battles ,he will not be able to enforce a decicive victory"

False. If successive defensive battles move the global odds ratio of remaining effectives to 10 to 1 in his favor, he is going to win. If they break the enemy in dissolving rout, he is going to win. If after a period of defensive successes he chooses to attack here and there, not even seeking breakthrough but merely grinding through the enemy forces broad front with a pure attrition strategy, he can also win.

The dogma that only deep penetrating attack is decisive is simply false, empirically. The dogma that it is always cheaper is also false, empirically. The dogma that it is at least more likely to succeed or to succeed cheaply is also false, empirically. All of these things are claimed and taught by modern maneuverist doctrine, and none of them are remotely true, at all. It is pure buncomb enforced by repetition and sloganeering, not military thought.

"the casualty ratio between the Americans and Germans is not really in big favor of anyone"

In the bulge period that is correct. It is also true that an attrition strategy did not require high exchange ratios to beat them decisively.

"a big portion of the German casualties is not due to defensive action but due to hasty retreats and abandoned equipment."

Anyone notice how he can't bring himself to admit that offensive action can be a cause of loss? But it is a verbal quibble. I point it out merely because it shows the "tic" this type of "thought" suffers from, and one of the tactics used to avoid admitting such obvious but ideologically inconvenient facts. One simple switches hats and talks about the appropriate side, to avoid admitting that the attacker is failing or the defender succeeding. If somebody succeeds enough he can be painted as the eventual attacker etc.

"If under those favorable conditions the Americans could not acheive a very favorable ratio"

Against the Germans, when the latter have better equipment and surprise, counts as "very favorable conditions". Um, actually, those were about the best conditions the German ever had against the Americans, if you think the offensive stance is the stronger one.

"against the Soviets when they need a much more favorable ratio of causalty exchange"

Weapons much improved since WW II, especially smart weapon tech, which drastically raises the importance of firepower and drastically reduces the survivability of armor in particular, compared to WW II conditions. Much as machineguns made riflemen vulnerable in WW I, multiple smart weapon platforms make armor vulnerable. Witness forces as large as those used at Kursk reduced to scrap metal in less than a week (Iraq I, etc). Would losses against the much better equipped and trained Russians have been higher? Certainly. But there is every reason to believe the tank killers that smashes acres of T-72s then would have sold themselves for lots of smashed T-72s in Europe, too.

Also, it is much more sensible to backpeddle and attrite those numbers while flying in new forces to meet their equipment, planning on the whole thing being a long attrition fight, than it is to imagine a 1 to 5 counterattack driving across eastern Germany etc. It is completely silly to expect that would have worked in any way shape matter form etc. But the Wehrmacht envy maneuverists were so offensive minded they actually planned such a charge.

"Actually when someone does not have operational mobility due to various reasons including enemy air supremancy ,it is not a surprise that the German doctrine can not work."

"It is Goering's fault". Utter rot. Also, you simultaneously say that the US should have had an offensive doctrine against the Warsaw Pact, and that the latter with numbers and initiative would have had air superiority.

Also, the German doctrine failed in Russia where the Russians lacked air supremacy. Reserves in depth and global odds are quite sufficient to stop it. So is greater mobility and odds edge as seen in the west. It stopped working as soon as enemy defensive doctrine improved.

"this does not mean that the defensive doctrine is superior to the German one."

It means that the German belief that attrition processes could be avoided and wars won without total war odds issues mattering decisively, was faulty. And that only an overall attrition context (the acknowledgement that odds do matter, and that annihilation battle is the way to decision) and a doctrine able to both attack and defend, is remotely sound.

"If the Germans were not forced to retreat , they would not have abandoned the numerous tanks they were forced to lose"

Ah I see, defense is for losers because losers defend. You might as well argue that the losing side loses because it breaths in oxygen. It is ideological drivel.

"if their strategic production was comparable with the American one, the casualty exchange ratio in Normandy would not kneel (?) them"

Actually German strategic production was fully equal to Russian, in 1944. It was lower over the whole war because it got to that level 2 years later than the Russians did. Despite having strategic surprise and being ready 6 months before the Russians, the Germans mobilized their economy more slowly, effectively losing about 2 years of production integral in a war only twice that long (from the time of Barbarossa I mean).

Why did the Germans fail to match Russian production, when they had all of Europe as their base, and their own pre-war industrial output fully equalled Russian prewar output, and they moreover occupied 40% of Russians pre-war industrial areas by output, as well as millions of her population etc? Because they had victory disease and believed an overly aggressive doctrine that told them they could avoid attrition and win despite odds.

In the cold war, US production potential (along with allies etc) greatly exceeded Russian. The US could readily win a war of attrition against Russia. The difficulty was the standing forces in peacetime, where the US and allies maintained a much smaller force. Therefore, the strategic task was simply to hold until production could be ramped and reach the field. After which it would prove decisive even using an attrition strategy.

The US has always excelled at an attrition strategy. The US is not Germany, it was not outnumbered by the Russians in manpower or industrial base. As leader of a huge coalition in the cold war, in fact it outnumbered them, and as leader of an effective vs. an ineffective economic system, its production potential utterly dwarfed the Warsaw Pact.

"The Germans lost a lot of material and figting power as a result of their retreat which was caused by the allied thread to trap them inside the Falaise pocket"

Which was caused by the prior collapse of German fielded armor strength to 33% of what had originally been sent, due to attrition processes, and of trench infantry strength in the US sector, likewise. Breakthroughs follow from successful attrition fighting, not the other way around. Yes once they occur, they are also a cause of further material loss. The driver of that further material loss is the decline of remaining armor strength below the levels needed to stop attacks by reserve commitment.

In the specific case of Normandy, this was also aided by a disasterously stupid use of what German armor did remain at the time of the breakout. That disasterously stupid use of the remaining armor was dictated by Germany's overly aggressive doctrine on the use of armor. Instead of using the Mortain force as a "linebacker" trying to contain the US breakout to the east (letting them have Brittany, say, but screening a withdrawal to the Seine), it was plunged into an overly ambitious counterpunching offensive mission. Which predictably failed, and also positioned that remaining armor at the far end of the Falaise sack, instead of outside it or near its eastern exit.

That this piece of wanton stupidity is advanced as supposed evidence in favor of an offensive minded doctrine, because gosh, when they retreated they lost stuff so you can't ever even think about retreat or you will lose stuff, is the epitome of ideological folly, and exactly the criminal stupidity that led to that misuse in the first place.

Now imagine men who think that was are in charge in central Germany an a breakthrough looms. Are they going to sensibly slide what reserves remain in front of the breakout in a defensive stance, buying time for other units to pull back and reforger units to arrive? Or are they going to gamble on some offensive deathride just like Mortain hoping to cut off the penetration? You know they are going to try the latter, just like their loser intellectual models did. That way lies sorrow.

Because they thought retreat from Normandy meant defeat, they gambled on anything to avoid full retreat from Normandy - and made it fives times worse.

"No, they do not just matter too, they are absolutely nessesary,otherwise the attacker will have plenty of time to reorganize and replace casualties after a failed attack and resume actions again without any operational consequencies."

Losing entire tank armies without gaining anything is an operational consequence. But the comment reveals the ground gain focus underlying the whole thought, lightly masked by the mystical importance of "the initiative". If the attacker merely throws away his army but does not lose ground, he is not thought to have lost anything. Ground is conceived as the index of victory, and forces irrelevant and replacable means. This is dumb and always has been dumb. An attrition focus is however the only analytical frame in which the much greater importance of fielded force strength over irrelevant issues of ground control, is readily apparent.

"i am not going to critisize actions that seem desperate."

A doctrine that has no place for desparate situations or tells you to do stupid things if they occur, is a stupid doctrine that does not prepare officers for what many of them are sure to face. The right thing to do when Cobra succeeds is to retreat to the Seine, with the armor on the outer, southern wing, fighting withdrawal stance, to buy time for the infantry heavy components to get back across the river. Then blow all the bridges and reform a line. Evacuate the Biscay area at the same time.

This is obvious, it was obvious at the time, any professionally competent officer should have seen and urged it, and higher ups should have listened and implemented it. They didn't because their overly aggressive doctrine only told them how to win by attacking, and promised them they would, and when that did not happen left them without recourse, lost, gambling, making things worse.

As for pretending there is nothing to criticize in it because the situation was irretrievable, it is an elementary failing of professionalism and of morals to see it that way. Men under the command of professional officers were struggling east under heavy fire, their lives on the line. No professional can afford to glibly give up or recklessly gamble because he doesn't like his hand. His men's lives are in his hands, a higher charge than even victory, and his duty is to do everything in his power to give them conditions to fight in, that are the best that can be achieved.

The offensive doctrine is unrealistic in that respect, too. It sugarcoats war, it pretends things about it that are not true, it evades the reality of the need for defense, it evades the reality of unwelcome circumstances, it evades the reality of attrition and losses, it promises mythical outcomes by magical means, and is a recipe for reckless gambling with the men's lives. Charitably, these failings are due to shrinking from facing the human costs of real attrition war, which are undoubtedly ugly - but it remains a failing.

"with any hope to win,they had to initiate an attack somehow"

See, it is all about maintaining *hope* in the minds of the officers. Power of positive thinking unreality.

"was a sure way of slow agonizing defeat for the Germans."

Since actually that is what they got, this is hardly credible.

"He will stall the attack much sooner."

If he has a properly balanced doctrine and two legs, maybe, but you just finished saying that unless he attacks he has no hope, so if he stalls the attack he is admitting defeat, because there is no way he can win unless he can keep up the attack.

In front of Nancy, a German commander who continued reckless negative odds attacks until 90% of his force was gone, was formally reprimanded for "lack of offensive spirit" because he went over to the defensive with 30 AFVs left.

The ideology of the offensive is a pathology. It makes people do militarily senseless things.

"when the attacker is willing to take a gumble and play "all or nothing" but this scenario implies that he is already in a desperate situation."

Since the doctrine teaches that only the attacker can win and that loss of the initiative is catastrophic, any situation in which the initiative seems like it might be lost is formally believed by the doctrine to be a "desparate situation". Thus, whenever its adherents see a transition to the defensive coming, they gamble instead. Since there is no focus on odds ratios as decisive issues in themselves, gambling to maintain the initiative will be urged regardless of its loss consequences, either to date or prospective.

It is therefore a recipe for military gambling, and completely unsound.

"You know that the attacker has a plan also which is to use recon and advanced parties to protect his main body ,defeat the enemy covering ACR"

Yes, but that just removes his odds and makes an even odds fight ahead of both side's screened main bodies. Which gains time. The enemy has an incentive to escalate by committing his reserves before the defender does, because he wants to make his local odds tell before reserve movements eliminate them. He will therefore press behind his recon screen regardless, and do so hard, along his chosen main avenues. The defender then only needs to show weakness along some of these, by choice, and channel the attack by obstacles and terrain and where ground is given first, to lead said main body to his chosen kill sack.

As for survey issues -

If my battalion has already laid itself and tied in with the units it is supporting, and marked registrations in a dozen places etc, then it is ready to support. The FDC has its own maps on its own computers and every deflection plot can be made itself in minutes. Does the requesting unit need to know where it is? Sure. So the FO needs a decent map, that is quite completely all.

Maybe it takes people 12 hours to make a new map, but it is not like central Germany was suffering frequent earthquakes. Yesterday's location of Fireherevonhof will work just fine.

[JasonC]

The previous was written before I read your point about map projection issues, which is a fair one. If the shooter is on the edge of one map and the target is on another, etc. I can see that making a 5-6 mil difference for the longest shots, maybe 3 commonly. (Based on the length of a typical shoot compared to earth circumference, as the source of the error in treating a flat map as right).

That would matter for things like unobserved counterbattery at an intel provided target. With an observed shoot it wouldn't really - the first spotting round might be aimed 100-150m away from where it ought to be, but that just means one adjust, which is typically needed for the range anyway. Might also matter for an unregistered TOT or some such.

[Hetzer38]

... Also, it is much more sensible to backpeddle and attrite those numbers while flying in new forces to meet their equipment, planning on the whole thing being a long attrition fight, than it is to imagine a 1 to 5 counterattack driving across eastern Germany etc. It is completely silly to expect that would have worked in any way shape matter form etc. But the Wehrmacht envy maneuverists were so offensive minded they actually planned such a charge.

Well, yea, but it's still cooler to attack.

Bugger the odds.

[coe]

hold on I do have to ask for an explanation - the german doctrine failed in the east despite that the Russians didn't have air superiority...1944 onwards they started to have a pretty good airpower but from what I do understand it didn't seem to hinder movement of reserves...we did see German counterattacks seem to do better in the East even in 1943-1944 in terms of more than a few miles of ground taken and loss ratios I think...thus something of the doctrine might have been working better there than in the West.

here's one - TDs vs. T-44s, ISII and ISIIIs T-34/85s etc.

[Hammer-n-Sickle]

Hey Michael Kenny, I just wanna ask you. What other forums are you apart of. I might want to check one or two of them out. Your reply would be appreciated. Thanks

[Corvidae]

Mr Kenny

PBEM, means PLAY. BY. E. MAIL.

Where by, turns are E-mailed back and forth between two players.

This is the most common way that the CM games are played on line, (I think)

I honestly find it most bizzare that you should post so vehemently on a game related forum, without having any interest in the game.

I think given that I am posting on the CMAK forum rather than the Battleships form, that it can be reasonably assumed that I have neither a copy of, nor an interest in Battleships.

That you are incessantly shouting down anyone who dares suggest that allied SP AT guns were in any way effective, strikes me as irrational, or pointlessly argumentative, or both.

Sad to say that my own primary resources for WW2 info are those awfull "Time-Life" coffeetable books, (Which are as useless as a 10,000 page report on lesbianism in an all male environment.)

However logic and common sense tells me that SP AT guns could be very effective if used correctly.

Certainly there would be instances where allied AT commanders blundered badly. Plus the inevitable random screwups that happen. But for the most part, allied SP AT guns were used correctly. And they worked.

[pamak1970]

i wish happy new year to everybody.

For my part i will continue the discussion after the holidays,hoping that some people may find interesting these facts although the subject is not related with the TD discussion.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Corvidae:

I honestly find it most bizzare that you should post so vehemently on a game related forum, without having any interest in the game.

Why so? There are lots of posts that have nothing to do with gaming, mine are not that exceptional. I 'trawl' a great number of forums in the hope I might learn something new. The data you have been looking for often turns up in the most unlikely places

The battleships reference is, as you know, an attempt at humour.

That you are incessantly shouting down anyone who dares suggest that allied SP AT guns were in any way effective, strikes me as irrational, or pointlessly argumentative, or both.

No you saw what you wanted to see rather than what I wrote.

TD's had a very specific role in mind. Operating ahead of the tanks. Hunting down enemy armour to open up the front and allow the tanks to penetrate the rear areas. Now fortunately they never got to try this out. I think such lightly armoured vehicles rushing at the German front would quickly be despatched. End of story. The fact they found greater use as Infantry fire support and were able to destroy tanks when they met does not prove the were a success in their INTENDED role.

Then we got a claim that US Armour 'outscored' The Germans in the Bulge fighting. The figures I had suggest the opposite. I put the figures up for anyone to pick over and correct. It is as simple as that. Do the calculations and work out the ratio's.