Guns vs Armour

[z-warfare]

Sounds like a great book. The difference between 6 and 2 tanks or TDs doesn't seem too much, though, against 48 AFVs of any type...

Sources and citations aside, Elsenborn area aside, could you elaborate your view about the ineffectiveness of non-halftrack US TDs? I think we're bogged in a pissing contest, to mix metaphors.

[michael kenny]

Someone said 2. More detailed sources give 6.

Noitice that the German loss figure is for armoured vehicles and the US loss figure is for tanks/TD's. Further investigation will reveal the total vehicle loss for the US side and it is not '6'. The manpower losses for both sides were severe and to reduce it to vehicle casualties fails to give an idea of the intensity of the fighting.

I don't remember saying they were 'innefective' but if you can show me where I did say that I will happily correct it.

The fuss is over a claim that TD's 'rocked'(sic) and outscored German tanks every time they clashed. This is a part of a bigger claim that every time US armour met the Panzers they at least matched them or greatly outscored them. Now the actual loss figures show this is not the case but still we get the same old theory repeated.

No one is saying German tanks were always winners or racked up multiple scores but to go to the other extreme and try and claim the reverse is true is just as idiotic.

TD's were, despite attempts to suggest otherwise, lightly armoured and thus could not shrug of hits as a tank could. Yes 75mm/88mm could kill any Allied tank but light AA and small arms could take care of the TD's.

The fact that kits were made to up-armour TD's should give you an idea of their vulnerability.

True in close quarter point blank encounters they could hold their own but as a dedicated weapon for actively hunting down tanks they were not a succes.

Don't just take my word for it. Read any work on the subject and they nearly all have a final paragraph where the demise of the concept is explained.

[JasonC]

Corvidae - basically yes, that sums it up. The part left out is that when the separate TD doctrine was decided on, large German armor offensives were greatly feared. In the actual event, the Germans had armor so sporadically and used it so poorly when they did have it, the TDs were "underemployed". The role they specialized for simply turned out not to be as important as had been expected, because the enemy was weaker than expected. A similar thing happened with US AAA plans, even more dramatically. The US was lavishly equipped with the stuff by the Luftwaffe was already dead or reduced to defensive roles over Germany etc.

As for the silly person, I am happy to revise US TD losses upward, they still will not reach the level of the tanks they took out. I am happy to give own side claims haircuts based on the ratio of claims to known enemy losses - but not to TWO distorted ones known to be wrong as to timing etc. And the claim is not that SP TDs (beyond the 75mm halftrack) outscored German tanks *every time they clashed*, though that may well be true and there is no evidence to the contrary, but that they outscored the Germans *in every major German offensive operation for which they were present*. Which they did. Try to find a case otherwise, you will fail.

As for the statement that flak and small arms could kill TDs, it is hopeless nonsense and true only of the "purple heart boxes" of Kasserine, and perhaps the M18 and 37mm flak. Shermans could not shrug off anything more than Jacksons could in AT fire terms (arty sure).

The statement that TDs were lightly armored and ineffective AT weapons because of it is sheer nonsense from start to finish. It is old nonsense, but it was nonsense the instant it was put forth.

As for the occasional claim that TDs must have been ineffective at their chosen role because they were abolished at the end of the war, leaving aside modern ATGM launcher types as not relevant to the issue, one might as readily claim that the Waffen SS was ineffective in combat in WW II because it was abolished at the end of the war, or that prop driven fighter bombers were ineffective because they were replaced by jets, or that 105mm self propelled howitzers were ineffective because they were replaced (eventually) by 155mm ones, etc, etc.

TDs did not fail in the defense role and they were not lightly armored for that role; US turreted tanks did not outperform them in the task of defeating enemy armored attacks, were no better armored for that role, and were less well armed for it.

Besides being more propely armed, there was no problem with the defensive doctrine of the TD formations, and there emphatically were problems with the overaggressive doctrines on the use of armor believed by the Germans.

[michael kenny]

Jason is ploughing a lonely furrow here.

I see he has again failed to list the sources he used to compile the German losses.........

Jason fails to explain why he tried to explain away an error is his 'report' by fabricating a bogus date for an account in a second source.......

Jason failed to give the source of his 'verbatim' quote by a British Officer..........

Jason fails to understand the TD doctrine

The TD was not meant to perform as a defensive weapon but was supposed to go looking for tanks to kill.

Perhaps a chapter from the book linked by John in an earlier thread. http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=30;t=005090

I did not intend bringing it in as it is a rather specialised volume.

The Antitank Cabal: Armor Versus the Tank Destroyer.

The tank was introduced to protect against automatic small arms fire,which was developed so greatly during and since

the World War. Its answer is fire against which the tank does not protect—the antitank gun.

That this answer failed was primarily due to the pitifully inadequate number and power of French and British antitank

guns, as well as their incorrect organisation.

—Gen. Lesley J. McNair

The tank destroyer concept, "initiated by George C. Marshall, nurtured by Lesley J. McNair, and implemented by Andrew D.

Bruce, was the U.S. Army's response to the revolution in warfare known as the blitzkrieg."22 Marshall's patience had been sorely tried by both the infantry and cavalry chiefs, and in 1940 he directed that his G3 establish a small planning and research branch, primarily to consider antitank warfare. The foxes were in the doctrinal hen house. A series of antitank conferences were called in April 1941, with representatives from all branches. It was decided to create

first a "tank destroyer" (a 75mm gun mounted on a half-track) and form "divisional Antitank Battalions in each foot infantry division, motorised infantry division, and possibly, armored force division and secondly to

form GHQ Antitank battalions."23 An illustration of McNair's complete misunderstanding of operational armor is the advice he offered Marshall:

"In my view the essential element of armored action is a powerful blow delivered by surprise. While armored units may be broken up and attached to division and army corps, it is readily conceivable, and indeed probable, that the entire force, under a single command, may be thrown against a decisive point.24

The infantry branch, understandably, eagerly embraced McNair's doctrine:

" An increase in armor or gun power can have no purpose other than to engage in tank to tank action—which is unsound/Moreover, such a tank would be disadvantageous in carrying out the primary mission of armor—to defeat those elements of the enemy which are vulnerable to tanks. The answer to heavy tanks is the tank destroyer.25

The Louisiana maneuvers created an armored metier within the upper echelons of the Armored Force (Crittenberger wrote: "As we maneuver in Louisiana, so shall we fight"). Anointed graduates adjudicated tactical problems throughout the war by "quoting the Louisiana Exercise as others quoted the Bible." 26 However, proponents of Louisiana-based dogma were soon shunted to a doctrinal Avignon while the McNair group was encouraged by British experience in the Western Desert. In May 1941, the British

lost over 300 tanks in two days during Operation Battleaxe. U.S. Army tank destroyer (TD) theorists noted the effect of antitank fire and crowed in vindication of their doctrine. The fact that the very deadly 88mm gun had no readily available counterpart in either the U.S. or British arsenal was over looked.

One year later, the American Grant tank surprised the Germans in

North Africa. Despite obvious shortcomings, its armor and firepower more than justified the tank's existence. The Grant's 75mm gun penetrated thenew face-hardened armor on the German tanks. At long range the Grant's armor withstood the long 50mm L/60 on German Mk Ills. Finally, when the new version of the German Mk IV, the Ausf F2 with a long 75mm Kwk

L/43 gun, appeared, it defeated the Grant with ease. Nonetheless, the TD lobby continued to dismiss armor-only engagements.

U.S. Army AGF doctrine stressed that tanks were to be held in armored divisions until a breakthrough was prepared by the infantry. The tanks would then perform as the Mongol hordes and run amuck in the enemy's rear. As late as 1943, McNair insisted that the "general concept of an armored force is that it is an instrument of exploitation, not very different in principle from horse cavalry of old. ... An armored division is of value only in pursuit and exploitation."27

This philosophy even crept into British doctrinal thinking, and, despite significant experience with tank conflicts in North Africa, the War Office prepared the 21st Army Group for Normandy by asserting:

It is this fact (mobility, rapid reinforcement of threatened areas) which causes armor to attract armor. Although in theory, tanks avoid tank vs tank battles, these frequently occur only when normal antitank measures are inadequate should tanks be used to provide a mobile reserve which can, when absolutely necessary, be used to deal with enemy armored fighting vehicles. 28

The first test for U.S. armor would be in Tunisia. Things did not work well; predictably, the action at Kasserine Pass demonstrated that the tank destroyer doctrine was "a fundamentally flawed set of principles."29

Marshall and McNair remained unconvinced, even after a December 1942 fact-finding tour returned from Tunisia and declared that "the Doctrine of having TDs chase tanks is absurd."30 This program continued despite theTDs' inability to survive armed action; more serious, however, was that it diverted efforts from the race to develop an American heavy tank. The Tank Destroyer doctrine was an old artillery response to cavalry: grouping gun battalions to defeat Cuirassiers with a grand batterie. McNair's pocket battleship solution—an armored fighting vehicle that could run away from

trouble—did not work because eventually, even the Graf Spee had to turn and fight.

Notes:

22.....C. R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Leavenworth Papers No. 12. Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), p. 67.

23..... AGF Study No. 29., The Tank Destroyer History, Historical Section, AGF 1946, pp. 2-3. The McNair case rested on a sure-fire argument to convince Congress: "It is poor economy to use a $35,000 medium tank to destroy another tank when the job can be done by a gun costing a fraction as much."

24....... K. R. Greenfield, The United States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, Vol. 1, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington

D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947) p 66

25....... Bailey, p. 9.

26....... Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor (New York: Atlantic Books, 1960), p. 88.

27...... Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces) (Washington, D.C.: Historical Department U S Armv

1947), pp. 325,334.

' ' ' ''

28. The Cooperation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions, Military Training Pamphlet No. 63 (War Office, May 1944), pp. 77, 9. "There are two main roles for armored components in an army. These are: a. in conjunction with infantry to effect the 'breakin' or breaching of main enemy defensive position, b. exploit, strike deep in enemy's rear installations either through gaps or around the flank." Pamphlet

No. 63, p.6.

29...... Gabel, p. 67.

30...... Devers presented interesting conclusions: "The Sherman was the best tank on the battlefield; the tank destroyer was not a practical tactical concept; the warwas a war of gunpower and; American troops would have to acquire a higher stan-

dard of discipline." He was selectively ignored. Quoted by Maj. Gen. E N Harmon, commander, 1st U.S. Armored Division. Ernest N. Harmon Papers, MHI.

[coe]

In terms of an open turretted TD...what were the main threats and did they necessitate armour to the thickness level on regular tanks (for the open top). In otherwords were they more worried about grenade/artillery fragments or a direct HE hit? Thus if it was grenade/artillery fragments then you put a light covering over the TD and voila.

JasonC - when you say Germans misused their armor - are you trying to say the Germans were using the same tactics they used successfully against the russians but against an enemy that was much different (lots of arty, mobile, good coordination , air superiority) or are you saying that the Germans recognized the difference in the enemy - made modifications but got the modifications in tactics wrong? - just curious...

relative to the situation against the western allies (i.e. Germans were modifying their tactics to fight the western allies) o

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Corvidae - basically yes, that sums it up. The part left out is that when the separate TD doctrine was decided on, large German armor offensives were greatly feared. In the actual event, the Germans had armor so sporadically and used it so poorly when they did have it, the TDs were "underemployed". The role they specialized for simply turned out not to be as important as had been expected, because the enemy was weaker than expected.

Hmmm........where have I seen that theory advanced before? Surely it is Jason's original idea and not something he read but again forgot to source?

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=39

[Corvidae]

There are two kinds of arrogance,

1) EARNED arrogance,

2) UN-EARNED arrogance,

JasonC may be abraisive. He certainly does not suffer fools, or their pretentions. He ruthlessly applies caustic doses of common sense to people who usuly need it. And our oppinions and interpretations, sometimes clash.

But in the time I have been on these forums, I have never seen him be wrong about a statistic or fact.

......If I missed such an event, someone please link me to it.

[z-warfare]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

Hmmm........where have I seen that theory advanced before? Surely it is Jason's original idea and not something he read but again forgot to source?

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll2&CISOPTR=39

So someone else thinks the same thing. Doesn't that ADD credence to what JasonC is saying?

And if TDs neither rocked nor were ineffective, what do you think they were?

[ December 26, 2006, 10:31 PM: Message edited by: z-warfare ]

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by z-warfare:

So someone else thinks the same thing. Doesn't that ADD credence to what JasonC is saying?

Oh dear, I have mistakenly given a source that agrees with Jason........I am undone!!!!!!!!

Sorry chaps but I know full well what I posted. I have no need to distort history in an attempt to bolster my case.

The linked author does indeed share several points with Jason But still has no trouble admitting that the TD's were lightly armoured and did not perform as they were expected.

Did I say I Jason was the only one with such ideas?

Originally posted by z-warfare:

And if TDs neither rocked nor were ineffective, what do you think they were?

A weapon system that was intended to be a heavily armed fast hit and run tank killer. A system which was found to be too lightly armoured to be able to survive in an attacking role against a prepared enemy and which was used mostly in small packets and mainly as Infantry fire support.

Quote from

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/doctrine.aspx

"Doctrine and Training

"U.S. Army doctrine, as developed during the prewar and early-war Army expansion, emphasized mobility and combined-arms in both attack and defense. Mobility was achieved by developing reliable, robust armored and soft-skin vehicles. Unfortunately, in the case of tanks and tank destroyers, thickness of armor was sacrificed in the interest of mobility to the detriment of U.S. Army armored vehicles in tank-versus-tank-combat. This flaw was exacerbated by one of General McNair's fundamental beliefs (later proved to have been fundamentally unsound) that the armored division would not be required to engage and destroy enemy armored formations since that would be the task of the tank destroyers. Rather he visualized the armor divisions as a cavalry force to exploit gaps opened in the enemy lines by the tank-supported infantry divisions. The major flaw in this concept was that the lightly armored tank destroyers proved regularly that they were unable to engage and destroy enemy armor when it attacked in mass, even when the tank destroyers were deployed in concealed defensive positions. While the tank destroyers on defense were often able to delay or blunt an armored attack, they could rarely defeat them. Thus, instead of operating in an independent antiarmor role, the tank destroyers were semi-permanently attached to infantry and armored divisions, while armored divisions were forced to take up defensive as well as offensive missions, a role for which they were not well designed (since they lacked sufficient infantry)."

Now as you said earlier(but with a slight alteration):

"So someone else thinks the same thing. Doesn't that ADD credence to what Michael Kenny is saying?

So then is my case now strengthened?

Originally posted by Corvidae:

There are two kinds of arrogance,

1) EARNED arrogance,

2) UN-EARNED arrogance,

no, are you suggesting Jason is arrogant?

Originally posted by Corvidae:

JasonC may be abraisive. He certainly does not suffer fools, or their pretentions. He ruthlessly applies caustic doses of common sense to people who usuly need it. And our oppinions and interpretations, sometimes clash.

But in the time I have been on these forums, I have never seen him be wrong about a statistic or fact.

So you are completely au-fait with all the subjects under discussion? You know enough to be able to speak up if you saw an error?

If I missed such an event, someone please link me to it.

Here:

Example 1:

Originally posted by JasonC:

I cannot however agree with the remark that it "cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’".

Replacement US Shermans were in short supply in the summer of 1944 and 500 of them had to be 'returned' from British stocks. There was a shortage at that time.

"Although it appears likely that the ‘excess’ of M-4 in the US probably amounted to over 6,000 (it is still possible that my original off the cuff estimate of 9,000 could be valid), it cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’ since the end-users – the units in the field – were still experiencing shortages through VE-Day. 12th AG was at 89.3 percent of T/E and Seventh Army was at 96.8 percent of T/E – even after many of the bottlenecks had been eliminated and after massive shipments (note the number received by ETOUSA) to rebuild the losses suffered that December and January had been received. Shortages during earlier periods had been severe and had been masked in part by expedients such as the decision to delay the replacement of 9 M-8 HMC Assault Guns in the armored divisions in December and the elimination of the 'replacement' tank sections in 2nd and 3rd AD."

Example 2

Originally posted by JasonC:

The US outscored the Germans in Normandy in tanks lost .

The actual numbers:

From 6 June to 1 July (26 days), First Army wrote off 187 M4-75mm and 44 M5.

From 2 to 29 July (28 days), First Army wrote off 208 M4-75mm, 12 M4-76mm, 4 M4-105mm, and 67 M5.

From 30 July to 2 September (35 days), First Army wrote off 237 M4-75mm, 38 M4-76mm, 6 M4-105mm, and 69 M5.

From 3 to 28 September (26 days), First Army wrote off 123 M4-75mm, 33 M4-76mm, 10 M4-105mm, and 34 M5.

From 1 August to 2 September (33 days), Third Army wrote off 221 M4-75mm and 94 M5.

From 3 to 30 September (28 days), Third Army wrote off 48 M4-75mm, 61 M4-76mm, 2 M4-105mm, and 37 M5.

From 9 September to 5 October (27 days), Ninth Army wrote off 2 M4-75mm.

Thus roughly:

‘June’ 231

‘July’ 291

‘August’ 665

‘September’ 350

Total = 1,537

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Brits had higher armor odds longer, used their armor more in multiple breakout attempts, had superior Fireflies the US lacked - and were dramatically outscored by the Germans throughout the Normandy fighting, including in Goodwood.

The figures:

British losses are given as:

June – 146

July – 231

August – 834

September - ?

Total = 1,211 (est. 1,568)

German losses:

June – 1 Pz-IV(k), 124 Pz-IV(l), 80 Pz-V, 19 Pz-VI (L56) = 224

July – 149 Pz-IV(l), 125 Pz-V, 14 Pz-VI (L56) = 288

August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105

September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV, 540 Pz-V, 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228

Total = 1,845

Whichever way you divide up the losses there is simply no way Jason is right in either of his two conclusions on tank losses in Normandy.

Jason's defence was to say the German loss figures 'are wrong'!

Example 3:

Originally posted by JasonC:

First, US TDs were not lightly armored. ..........................................................The M10 and M36 were open topped, but about as armored as any medium tank. It took a full heavy PAK to KO them etc

.

Reality:

..................M4..............M10...........M3A3(StuartV)

HULL

Front.......2.0.............1.5/2.0............1.0/1.75

Side.........1.5.............1.0/0.75..........1.0

Rear........1.5.............1.0/0.75...........1.0

Top..........0.75/0.5.....0.75/0.375.......0.5

Floor.......1.0/0.5........0.5..................0.5/0.375

TURRET

Front......3.0.............2.25.................1.5

Side........2.0.............1.0..................1.25

Rear.......2.0.............1.0...................1.25

Top........1.0..............0.75(add-on)....0.5

An M10 really isn't much more armoured than a Stuart-which was a light tank.

Example 4:

Originally posted by JasonC:

"The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy."

Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh.

The above is Jason's reply to my asking

"I can't find any reference to the attack being made up of '20 tanks'.

Where did that come from?

I had simply asked why he quoted Cavanagh in a previous reply but added a bit about '20 tanks' (it is not in the original book)

In the reply he says he used another book (not Cavanagh) and that the incident he was describing took place on another date (and thus was not from Cavanagh)

Unfortunately Jason was not telling it as it was. He did use Cavanagh but added in the reference to the 20 tanks made in the Green Book. To try and 'pretend' he did not use Cavanagh he had to attribute the full quote to another book. By doing so he blatantly lied and said he was talking about another German attack that took place THE NEXT DAY and thus not the one described in Cavenagh.

Rather than admit he used one book extensively he said he used 'several sources' (books) and tried to alter dates to cover his mistake. What sort of ego makes you do this sort of thing?

Look through Jason's post and you will find they are rather 'light' when it comes to listing sources. Only those familiar with the subject are able to work out what exactly he is using as a reference.

[ December 27, 2006, 10:40 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[JasonC]

Coe - first on the main threat to an open topped TD trying to use them offensively, the main threat is shell splinters from standard div arty (105mm and 150mm), and medium mortars (81mm). Which sometimes treeburst.

Covers thin enough just to stop splinters would have been useful and there were some attempts to field them, but the turret space had been laid out expecting open. Still better than nothing.

Against an actual contact hit thin covers would not be sufficient, but then a direct hit by a 150mm will KO a Sherman even with a full closed top etc. Those are simply rare compared to splinters.

Obviously you are still better off in even an open topped TD than walking around in your shirtsleeves, and in something with thick front and sides than in an M3 halftrack.

As for German misuse of their armor, they continued to use a very aggressive tactical doctrine long after it had ceased to make sense in the overall strategic context, and in operational situations where it was not warranted.

They also repeatedly forced themselves into nonsensical operational attempts trying to recreate the vanished context of previous strategic successes from the tactical bottom up, instead of the strategic down. Which emphatically does not work.

A panzer commander scrounges every scrap of armor in his region (from half a dozen separate PD or PB formations) and throws them into two weeks of reckless counterattacks against a force in every way superior, losing heavily throughout. In the end he has about 2 companies of runners remaining, having lost over 90% of the available armor to stall the enemy for a brief period, and exchange off at best evenly against a numerically superior force. He then finally packs it in and goes over to the defensive with his remaining 2 companies of armor.

His superiors reprimand him for "lack of offensive spirit".

Not politico types back in Berlin or something, career Wehrmacht officers and proteges of the realist Rundstadt.

They did not have a decent doctrine for using armor defensively. Local commanders would improvise "fire brigade" catch-as-catch-can emergency tactics to patch things up, with the leftover half or quarter of their strength that remained after more aggressive uses predictably failed to win the war in a couple of days. But it wasn't anything like doctrine and trained into them.

It was thought that the metaphysical essence of armor was to attack in concentrated form aiming at enemy weak points. Although in practice the second half of the war saw far more successive positional defenses, designed to bleed and exhaust the enemy by inflicting material loss and posing difficult tactical challenges to his own advances, this was always doctrinally abnormal to those doing it.

Was it worse in the west? In some ways, yes. They only sent serious armor twice, to Normandy and again around the time of the Bulge (including Alsace). In both cases, used pretty recklessly and offensively. The Brit part of the Normandy front was the closest they came to using it sensibly. Later stages of Anzio might be added, and a few specific-unit performances like 11th PDs fighting withdrawl from the south of France.

There were other quirks about the west compared to the east. Allied air was much stronger, so when German armor did attack it was more likely to do so at night or in bad weather trying to avoiding giving great targets to tac air in the form of the huge soft vehicle columns of the mobile divisions.

Allied forces were more mobile overall, so reserves reached the point of any attack very rapidly. The Russians mastered the same effect by using very deeply layered reserves, but it took them until Kursk to figure out how deep those needed to be (and get all formation types to be reliable enough those layers all worked).

Throughout the late war the allies had a serious armor superiority, all fronts. But the Russians made more use of relatively unsupported rifle formations along parts of the front, simply because of its scale and the numerical importance of those formations in the Russian army. That made more opportunities for counterpunching than in the west. But frankly, the Germans counterpunched in the east right at tank and mech corps, too.

It never worked very well, particularly in the west. Only time it had sufficient scale was the Bulge, there it worked for the first few days. (Overall German losses in the Bulge were 4/3rds those of the allies - they only outperformed for the first week, by a similar margin. Mostly because of the successful pocketing of most of the US 106 ID. And that bit was largely by overall odds and night infantry infiltration in thin sectors, not mass armor - though the armor helped extend and prevent relief or escape etc).

Usually the initial break-in worked and nothing beyond it. None of them made much operational sense, but they were essentially never conceived and executed as purely tactical. A few times that was a sort of pious wish on the superiors releasing the armor, not observed in any difference in behavior by the guys at the tip of the spear - and several of those times the result was loss of half the committed armor in a half a day.

Objectively speaking, dispassionately speaking, ignoring irrational wishes by superiors and the men being told to move mountains trying to make those seem even slightly real for a day or three, the Germans should have been husbanding their excellent armor and using it as "linebackers" to smash attacks. With more defensive use, more reserve use, more sliding in front of the enemy main effort rather than counterpunching into it (or worse, away from it in irrelevant sectors dreaming of cutting something off that was never going to be cut off etc).

Plenty of staffers and some commanders saw this. But a PD off the line in reserve was irresistibly attractive to their superiors every time some crisis hit elsewhere, or they dreamt up another main effort. It would be scarfed up and shipped out, frequently to offensive employment. To keep under local command the way to game that command snatch-scramble was to assign it frontage and leave it in the line.

Bad doctrine and strategic unreality make for bad incentives, bad deployments and roles, all spelling unrealistic tasks that the units and equipment were ill suited for. The commanders did not arrange to get the men into the best possible combat conditions for what they had and could do. Instead they asked the men to dive into lousy ones to retrieve said commanders' previous errors or to keep said commanders' hopes and dreams alive.

[ December 27, 2006, 11:40 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

The silly person imagines "outright lies" because he is silly. I took the coverage of the fighting on the 22nd from Cole because Cavanagh's coverage after the 21st is thin, and Cole covers the role of the fresh TD unit better.

And no, Cavanagh is not my "major source", I simply cited many cases out of him when the silly person pretended there is no evidence in the matter or that most kills in front of Elsenborn were by bazooka.

My TD assessment is based on reading every source I have found on every German armor attack against US forces from Kasserine to Remagen, in all the official histories, all the typical popular ones, and about 120 shelf-feet of the University of Chicago library section on WW II.

US SP TDs (beyond the purple heart box yada yada) did not fail in their designated role of stopping German armor attacks.

German armor attacks against Americans were not conspicuously successful in WW II.

Initial break in, overrunning the front line infantry battalion, all the time. But that just sets the stage for the real fight with the actual US AT net, which is behind said front line infantry (and moves to the "wound").

Anything more, exactly twice - Kasserine before there were SP TDs, and Bulge where the SP TDs worked fine and the Germans had enough surprise and initial odds to succeed for the first week, then lost once enough stuff reached the area etc.

All the other times, SP TDs are there and they work and German armor attacks fail completely. Bulge they are there and they work and the German armor attack fails, after limited and patchy success for one week.

As for thinking M10s are Stuarts not Shermans, it is a laughable error Dupuy made years ago. There aren't any German AFVs left running around in 1944 that can't kill plain Shermans but can kill M10s, to make the former "heavily armored" compared to the latter in ability to stop attacking enemy tanks.

(In 1942 at El Alamein, fine, a Sherman is more heavily armored than a Stuart in a meaningful sense. When the lightest enemy faced is has a 75L48 and in terrain where initial ranges are 50 to 500 yards - who cares? If it sees you and fires it is going in.)

But the difference between a 37mm pop gun and a 76mm is pertinent indeed. But Dupuy was silly enough to lump Stuarts and TDs into the same entries in his strength tables, because he thought "TDs are ineffective against tanks because they are lightly armored" - which is exactly the poppycock I am comprehensively exploding.

When all your types are penetrated by all the enemy guns, the variety of your armor is not relevant. But when your own guns vary from 90mm down to 37mm and the enemy armor includes Panthers and Tigers, your gun mix (not your armor mix) emphatically matters. And the TDs are the best on the field, in the only thing varying in this period in a range that matters for AFV duels.

[michael kenny]

Jason overclaims-again!!

Originally posted by JasonC:

My TD assessment is based on reading every source I have found on every German armor attack against US forces from Kasserine to Remagen, in all the official histories, all the typical popular ones, and about 120 shelf-feet of the University of Chicago library section on WW II.

Now if you want to get into a d**k measuring contest about books then I am your man.

My personal book collection is well in excess of the length quoted by Jason. For those unfamiliar with the footage claimed as 'read' I should explain that using the dimensions of a fairly thick book ( the'After The Battle' volume on the Bulge is 1.75ins for example) you can fit some 820 substantial books into that space. I would say that in reality he is talking about some 1500 books in the 120 ft of shelving he mentions.

Jason says he has read all these PLUS every unit history and every popular title on the subject!

This is pure b******t. Even it is just the 120ft of shelving he is still is talking out of his ar**.

I personaly have some 50+ feet of shelving on NW Europe alone and I have a hard time keeping track of titles and information.

Care to do the usual Jason and 'revise' your

claim?

Originally posted by JasonC:

And no, Cavanagh is not my "major source", I simply cited many cases out of him when the silly person pretended there is no evidence in the matter or that most kills in front of Elsenborn were by bazooka. .

Yes of course I said that. Here is my original quote where you can quite clearly see that I pretended the kills were 'not' made by Infantry or Artillery

"The majority of the German tanks lost in the Elsenborn area were destroyed at close range and mainly by Infantry/Artillery"

Oh and Cavanagh is your source. You also tried to say the incident I queried took place on the day after the date given in Cavanagh........or did you just get 'confused'?

Originally posted by JasonC:

Overall German losses in the Bulge were 4/3rds those of the allies

Again Jason posts not a single source!

For this to be true (4/3rds?) you have to accept the Allied ESTIMATES of German casualties and ignore the Official German loss figures.

[JasonC]

It is my own cite of Cavanagh and Cole that are for different days. Specifically, the attack of the fresh 26 PzGdr Reg, which came up because I spoke of the 613 stopping 20 tanks and the silly person didn't see it say 20 tanks in Cavanagh. That is because Cavanagh has only half of one paragraph on the subject, giving his wrap up of the whole period at the close of the same (page 182 for those following along at home, 2nd full 'graph). Cole does say how many tanks were in that attack, on page 133.

The previous attack, on the 21st, Cavanagh does give details and losses, so I cited him. The 22nd, he's got nothing, a bare paraphrase of Cole with less information than in the original.

As for the U of C WW II section, go there and look for yourself. Regenstein library, 5th floor, take a right after entering the stacks etc. It is not hard to find every bit covering any case of a German armor attack on US forces in the west, because there simply aren't that many of those to survey.

As for losses in the bulge, first the silly person has to learn to look at reality instead of his library and leave off ipse dixit. I have stated the approximate loss ratio because that is what it actually is, and he is free to try to show that it is incorrect if he likes.

He won't find higher US than German losses because they aren't there.

Depending on sources specific items and figures periods etc you might find 1.15 or 1.1 rather than 1.3 - you will still find 1.33 either way in the first week (pro German) and the rest of the campaign (pro US). You will only find any German outperformance if your narrowly focus on the first few days to the first week (depending on sector).

Bulge was a strategic blunder of the first mag, sloppy execution, and a resounding operational defeat for the Germans. The best that can be said is they got initial surprise and didn't completely blow it in all sectors, the Heer PDs doing especially well (and a few best cases among the VG early, though others screwed the pooch), and that the US was conservative and grind-ee about the riposte. There is no spin or nationalist axe grinding in that assessment, just an objective analysis of the "play". You could ask Rundstadt (by seance or whatever lol) and you'd get the same sort of answer.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The silly person imagines "outright lies" because he is silly. I took the coverage of the fighting on the 22nd from Cole because Cavanagh's coverage after the 21st is thin, and Cole covers the role of the fresh TD unit better

Really? Here is Jason's original quote:

22nd attack renewed report says "once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks". Other reports say that attack was made by 20 tanks"

Cavanagh's book says:

"Just after daybreak, on 22 December enemy patrols of the 26th SS Pz.Gr. Reg. 12th SS began to probe the 2nd Battalion lines. Just after 10:00 they attacked with a change in tactics. In place of a frontal assault they attacked the Battalions flanks and broke through on the right. Once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion stopped these attacks"

Cole says:

Shortly after day broke on 22 December patrols from the 26th commenced to probe at the 2d Battalion lines. The fresh enemy regiment, however, set out to vary the unsuccessful headlong tactics previously employed by striking at the flanks of the Dom Butgenbach position. The first assault, shortly before 1000, carried an undetermined number of panzer grenadiers through a gap between Companies A and K, on the right of the 2d Battalion. Here there were about twenty Mark V's and tank destroyers, but the 90-mm. tank destroyers from the 613th Tank Destroyer Battalion rushed in on the flank and Stopped the enemy.

I leave it for the reader to decide which book contributed the quote:

"once more, US tank destroyers of the 613th TD battalion stopped these attacks"

The duplicity was when Jason said nis original post was from taken from Cole and refered to an incident on Dec. 23rd instead of Dec. 22nd.

Here is how he tried to explain away where he got the quote from:

Originally posted by JasonC:

Green book Bulge account (Cole), page 133. This is the day after the incident discussed in Cavanagh

If you read the two extracts then you will see they both clearly state the date December 22nd.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the U of C WW II section, go there and look for yourself. Regenstein library, 5th floor, take a right after entering the stacks etc. It is not hard to find every bit covering any case of a German armor attack on US forces in the west, because there simply aren't that many of those to survey.

Ah..... so now you say there are only a few books on the subject in the 120ft of shelving.

So what was the point of saying it was 120ft?

I don't doubt the shelving exist only that you read 1500 books on this narrow subject.

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for losses in the bulge, first the silly person has to learn to look at reality instead of his library

You of course get none of your data from books.................

You get your facts from 'reality'

Only an idiot would boast of his access to 120ft of book references and then denigrate somone else for using books for a reference!

You are absolutely priceless.........

Originally posted by JasonC:

I have stated the approximate loss ratio because that is what it actually is, and he is free to try to show that it is incorrect if he likes.

Which confirms what I said, you are using ESTIMATES of German losses not the real figures.

Originally posted by JasonC:

He won't find higher US than German losses because they aren't there.

'He' is a straw man because 'he' never said the US losses were greater. You must be desperate to try and say otherwise

Originally posted by JasonC:

Depending on sources specific items and figures periods etc you might find 1.15 or 1.1 rather than 1.3 - you will still find 1.33 either way in the first week (pro German) and the rest of the campaign (pro US). You will only find any German outperformance if your narrowly focus on the first few days to the first week (depending on sector).

If, maybe, but. So many qualifiers....are you struggling here?

Originally posted by JasonC:

You could ask Rundstadt (by seance or whatever lol) and you'd get the same sort of answer.

Are you refering to Generalfeldmarschall Gerd Von Rundstedt?

Why do we need him when such an obvious genius as yourself deigns to share his knowledge with us!

[JonS]

Look, Kenny, with all due respect, please drop it. Jason has laid out a theory and backed it up with sufficient data for the theory to hold as broadly true.

You, OTOH, have been yapping and nibbing round the edges like a chihuahua with ADD. The net effect of all that yapping and nibbling is a big "so what?" You might have found the odd occasion where the theory doesn't hold as well as others (but, TBH, your posts are tl;dr, so I don't really know) but really, who cares? What Jason outlined wasn't a minute by minute, blow by blow of how all US TD ops went. It was an overview of the strength and weaknesses of the TD as an arm, over a timescale of 3 years.

More to the point, Jason is coherent. You, to be blunt, you're all over the place, just like that chihuahua.

He may not tell you exactly where he got every last figure, but the broad story is convincing, and he has provided enough references that you can go look at the same story for yourself. Frankly, I don't care whether the US lost 2 tanks or 6 tanks at Elsenborn, or whether something happened on the 21st or the 22nd - it isn't important to the larger story. Your failure to appreciate that basic point makes all your posts look like a case of the forest and the trees.

Regards

Jon

[ December 28, 2006, 01:36 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[jBrereton]

Originally posted by michael kenny:

For this to be true (4/3rds?) you have to accept the Allied ESTIMATES of German casualties and ignore the Official German loss figures.

Just keep in mind that many German generals kept tank losses to things like gun damage or track losses and not enough spare parts off the register, as well as playing down casualty rates to impress their higher-ups, who were, after all, a bit paranoid about losing the war, and the Führer was quite inclined to kill off 'failing' generals at this point.

Probably the classic example of German crap-talking is at Kursk, with '14' Tiger losses, those were just the ones which were absolute write-offs, not the many other losses that needed re-gunning etc.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by JonS:

What Jason outlined wasn't a minute by minute, blow by blow of how all US TD ops went. It was an overview of the strength and weaknesses of the TD as an arm, over a timescale of 3 years.

So far so good.........

More to the point, Jason is coherent. You, to be blunt, you're all over the place, just like that chihuahua.

Beg to differ. He puts forward specific examples where he is clearly using the wrong information. When challenged he simply stops responding.

He may not tell you exactl where he got every last figure, but the broad story is convincing,and he has provided enough references that you can go look at the same story for yourself.

References? What references. Oh you mean the "Cavanagh, McDonald,Dupuy and the Green books" he mentioned in passing in one post?

I did 'look' and do not agree.

Just in his last post he dismissed Dupuy:

Originally posted by JasonC:

But Dupuy was silly enough to lump Stuarts and TDs into the same entries in his strength tables, because he thought "TDs are ineffective against tanks because they are lightly armored" -which is exactly the poppycock I am comprehensively exploding

Now this is an example where opinions do not matter. Either Jason is right or he is wrong. The M10 was simply not as well armoured as a Sherman. When you set out to 'comprehensively explode'something be careful it does not blow up in your face.

Frankly, I don't care whether the US lost 2 or 6 tanks at Elsenborn, or whether something happened on the 21st or the 22nd - it isn't important to the larger story.

So then deliberately lying to try and cover the (unimportant-so why lie) fact your source is one single book 'isn't important'? Shows something about character at least.

A pattern of posting where you always use the maximum casualty figures for the Germans and the minimum for the enemy 'isn't important'?

Your failure to appreciate that basic point makes all your posts look like a case of the forst and the trees.

I do appreciate Jasons points.

He says that the US TD concept was a succes and that they performed their task to perfection.

Yet they never once were used in the way they were envisaged.

Jason says TD's were about as armoured as a Sherman tank. Even though they were substantialy thinner all around than a Sherman.

Jason thinks that everyone who differs from this view(the majority of all works written on the subject fall in this heading)are simpletons.

I, and many others, disagree.

[coe]

First thing, I know I sent this forum on a twist from the original - but lets keep both debating sides rather civil please - or at least acknowledge that it is heated passionate debate that in perspective isn't about something as critical as someone starving to death on the street.

As for some funny things: "Towed tank destroyer" - isn't that the same thing as Anti-tank gun? Granted Tank destroyer sounds more fierce.

One wonders if the guns were getting to a point where each side could easily kill eachother with one shot (e.g. 88mm and 90mm) that both sides should go back down to thin skinned vehicles that have just enough armor to stop artillery fragments and small to medium arms as well as lighter cannons. Since you are going to die in one shot anyways from a heavy gun, why try to waste all the armour just to be a bit short of providing protection against it. It might be better to focus on the avoid getting hit part more.

It'd be interesting to find out...lets say, what percentage of hits by Panzerfausts were kills for instance (or at least enough to make the crew abandon the tank), same for 88mm, 90mm, 75mm (Ger./Amercan), 76.2mm, 57mm, bazookas - ok the latter we know varied), shreks etc.

As for the open tops, if you put enough covering to stop shrapnel and grenades or nearby arty air bursts, you could make the covering dome/bubble like so you keep the space you need. Better yet, a space age bubble.

JasonC - interesting description of your view on incorrect tactics...It has merit - and if your objective is to bleed the enemy what you propose could work. But lets add this factor, the allies make a break, and take a key point, a PZ unit moves in and stops the advance and inflicts some losses...but doesn't drive them back. The allies consolidate - and perhaps also cause the rest of the german line to be compromised...so that it now has to retreat all across the board to a more stable line.

Actually more simply the situation is, you can stop the Allied attacks and inflict losses - but if the chances you can't drive them back and retake the ground and they keep getting lots of replacements, at some point you'll run out of space and will have to try to attack to regain ground...that's the dilemma...I look at Bulge and Lorraine as somewhat of the "oh my gosh, we are running out of room, we're getting waaay to close to the homeland (Germany) - we have to push them away somehow...

What would have helped us all in this TD debate is if there was a meeting engagement in WWII daylight open fields (none of this go in the fog to avoid airpower) but no artillery, no planes to cause buttoning up, open turret damage) and have the tanks and TDs slug it out (we're not talking about close quarter combat...) - one observation is, if it's anything like Combat missions, I wouldn't want to be up against a Sherman or any tank destroyer if I was in a Pz IV - especially in the mid ranges.

the interesting thing is if a tank runs out of AP and is against a TD - if the tank hits the TD with HE near the top of the turret the tank has a good chance of KOing the crew.

[JonS]

Originally posted by coe:

As for some funny things: "Towed tank destroyer" - isn't that the same thing as Anti-tank gun? Granted Tank destroyer sounds more fierce.

Yes and no. In a literal sense, they are just towed A-Tk guns (plus recon assets), but the distinction is important and useful because it differentiates them from organic A-Tk assets in divisions. The TD bns were nominally independent (even though in practice they tended to spend the majority of their time affiliated to the same division), and per doctrine would counter-mass in the path of emerging breakthroughs by German armour. Same as the SP TD bns.

Organic A-Tk guns, on the other hand, as found in each inf bn (3 guns) and inf regt (another ?12? guns) were just part of the defensive layout of their respective units, and would therefore be salted evenly across the entire front from eg Aachen to Strasbourg.

Also, at a more prosaic level, the towed TD units used 3-in guns while the organic A-Tk guns were 57mm (in 1944/45 NWE anyway).

[ December 28, 2006, 01:39 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

Look, Kenny, with all due respect, please drop it. Jason has laid out a theory and backed it up with sufficient data for the theory to hold as broadly true.

You have been yapping nibbing round the edges like a chihuahua with ADD. The net effect of all that yapping and nibbling is a big "so what?" You might have found the odd occasion where the theory doesn't hold as well as others (but, TBH, your posts are tl;dr, so I don't really know) but really, who cares? What Jason outlined wasn't a minute by minute, blow by blow of how all US TD ops went. It was an overview of the strength and weaknesses of the TD as an arm, over a timescale of 3 years.

More to the point, Jason is coherent. You, to be blunt, you're all over the place, just like that chihuahua.

He may not tell you exactl where he got every last figure, but the broad story is convincing, and he has provided enough references that you can go look at the same story for yourself. Frankly, I don't care whether the US lost 2 or 6 tanks at Elsenborn, or whether something happened on the 21st or the 22nd - it isn't important to the larger story. Your failure to appreciate that basic point makes all your posts look like a case of the forest and the trees.

Regards

Jon

Well stated.

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Well stated.

Yes thats about half a dozen replies now where you have posted supporting Jason, we get the message!

[michael kenny]

Originally posted by jBrereton:

Just keep in mind that many German generals kept tank losses to things like gun damage or track losses and not enough spare parts off the register, as well as playing down casualty rates to impress their higher-ups, who were, after all, a bit paranoid about losing the war, and the Führer was quite inclined to kill off 'failing' generals at this point.

No sorry. I used to believe that but experience has shown me that records, when kept, are pretty accurate. Normandy in AUgust/September is a problem because the paperwork vanished in the retreat but German loss reporting is pretty good.

The quibbling would be how damaged the tanks listed in the 'repair columns were.

Overall around 75% of knocked out German tanks were put back into service. A point that should serve as a warning to those who equate a hit with a kill.

From 6 June 1944 to 20th Feb. 1945 a total of 474 M10's, 124 M18's and 72 M36's were written off.

Also in the ETO a total 3275 M4's, 788 M5's and 62 M26's were written off.

Together this is a total of 4800(approx)TWO.

When the other Allies losses are added in it clearly can be shown that there was no 1:1 exchange rate in the ETO.

[ December 27, 2006, 09:26 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

[The_Enigma]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

]Well stated.

Well stated.

*runs for cover *

[Corvidae]

The chihuahua not only has ADD, but a serious ego problem as well.

When 3 resident uber-grogs agree, its usualy time to listen.

Jon, Jason, and Dorosh are all well versed and informed uber-grogs.

And while I may not ever become as knowlegable about this stuff, I can still add my own fairly respectable common sense.

The primary late war, western allied, tank destroyers were mostly based on the sherman chassis.

They were reasonably armored.

Please note that I did NOT say "heavily armored".

They were effective at their job.

They were not tanks.

If anyone sees any error in the logic of my above statement, please help me to not make that error again.