On Map Artillery Farce, Yes Farce

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by vulture:

BTW does anyone know how widespread the practice of setting tanks up in an artillery-like role was? Was it used in WWII as well?

I don't think it was all that widespread, but it was done. I think especially in the last two years of the war the 75mm Shermans were used that way from time to time. IIRC, it took a bit of preparation though. You couldn't just pull up and start popping away like you can do with a mortar and an HQ.

Michael

[dieseltaylor]

The idea of improving a position within say a 40 minute game seems a reasonable request but does perhaps reflect a benefit of borg spotting that was not available in RL. You could add I suppose an additional order and account for fatigue as troops dug foxholes or scouted for better cover.

Somehow it just does not seem to me to be worth the effort ot bodge it into the game so that the almighty eye in the sky can work out which squads are likely to be assaulted and those rthat are not.

I think that the game - as a game is a work of art - and has to overall reflect likely outcomes rather than include in precise reflections of real life but end up with a dissatisfying gaming experience. Please fudge the game if necessary to preserve the fun : ) I thank you.

Not to say I would not like Time on Target : )

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Tero:

And "natural dispersal" means you have less shells on target.

That depends entirely on the size of the target. Indirect artillery in the WW II period was an area, not a precision weapon. It was intended to saturate a given area with HE, not hit point targets. That's what your on-board, direct fire weaponry was for.

</font>

[arax3]

My dad was an artillery officer in WWII in ETO. He told me that the cannon would be fired directly at advancing enemy forces if they were attacking the battery's position. They would be used like anti-tank guns or infantry guns as I understood him. He would break out his maps and slide rules and such. A thousand mile stare would come on his face as he laid down the barrage parameters. It was awesome to see him do it. I miss him so much. A3

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by vulture:

BTW does anyone know how widespread the practice of setting tanks up in an artillery-like role was? Was it used in WWII as well?

I don't think it was all that widespread, but it was done. I think especially in the last two years of the war the 75mm Shermans were used that way from time to time. IIRC, it took a bit of preparation though. You couldn't just pull up and start popping away like you can do with a mortar and an HQ.

Michael </font>

[dalem]

Originally posted by vulture:

Having just seen a Korean War documentary featuring tanks parked up on sloped earth ramps and firing as artillery, I'm wondering when someone is going to complain that HQs can't spot for indirect tank fire.

BTW does anyone know how widespread the practice of setting tanks up in an artillery-like role was? Was it used in WWII as well?

Yes it was. I'd rate it as "fairly common" in WWII. An example would be a battalion of SP ATGs, probably M-10s, with no German tanks to shoot at. They would often be used as an extra artillery battalion. Took a while to set up though.

-dale

[ December 05, 2004, 11:42 AM: Message edited by: dalem ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by vulture:

Having just seen a Korean War documentary featuring tanks parked up on sloped earth ramps and firing as artillery, I'm wondering when someone is going to complain that HQs can't spot for indirect tank fire.

BTW does anyone know how widespread the practice of setting tanks up in an artillery-like role was? Was it used in WWII as well?

Yes it was. I'd rate it as "fairly common" in WWII. An example would be a battalion of SP ATGs, probably M-10s, with no German tanks to shoot at. They would often be used as an extra artillery battalion. Took a while to set up though.

-dale </font>

[JonS]

Tanks/SP A-Tk as indirect: 'fairly common' = true, especially in 44/45. It took a while to set these missions up, and once set up could not easily or quickly be switched between targets. These can be modelled in game with an indirect 75mm FO giving orders on turn 1 (i.e., a pre-planned barrage). The methods were used by the Western Allies on all fronts and theatres. Can't comment on the Soviets, but I'm doubtful, except in some fairly restrictive cases. Not sure about the Germans, but am very doubtful. By 44/45 the Germans were well behind the WAs in terms of artillery doctrine, procedures, and equipment (meaning more far than just the guns themselves).

One could possibly make a case for tanks/SP A-Tk being able to conduct semi-indirect (where someone within earshot of a veh in full defilade shouts out corrections), but it's absence isn't a great loss or omission IMO, given all the other kludges and fudges extant.

Incidentally, this has been discussed several times in the past. A search of the relevant forums should throw up several interesting threads.

Artillery lethality/area weapon: Artillery, and especially field artillery which was by far the commonest sort found at the pointy bit, was - and still is - an area weapon of low lethality measured over individual rounds and fire missions.

The size, shape, and location of the area to be hit can all be specified with considerable accuracy, but where the rounds fall within that area is largely a random process. A single gun mission (for example the one Blackburn does late in the Normandy campaign) is a very special, very slow mission type, but it can be used to direct individual rounds onto a very small target. Assuming the target can't get up and bugger off in the meantime.

Surprisingly little cover is required to be quite safe (in in WIA/KIA sense) from field arty fuzed PD. For example, the crown of a road will do if you are lieing down. Air-burst is a totally different story though. However, in that case, surprising little overhead cover is required to be quite safe.

FOs did not, could not, and still do not specify a required % casualty figure when ordering a mission. Operation Research bods spent an immense amount of time and effort on this problem during and after the war, and were only able to come up with vague guidelines or specific cases of where things had - or hadn't - worked in the past.

What it is very good at is suppression. In other words, keeping the bad peoples' heads down so the infantry can 'close with the enemy' in relative safety. However, even quite robust cover may not negate suppression effects. Unfortunately suppression isn't something very well modelled in CM for a number of reasons:

1) lack of control over rate and number of rounds fired.

2) lack of flexibility of pattern fired.

3) limited suppression effects within CMs morale model.

Arax3: DF at tanks can be done in CM now. I'm sorry about your dad

Regards all

JonS

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

Can't comment on the Soviets, but I'm doubtful, except in some fairly restrictive cases.

AFAIK the Soviet armour was strictly DF. Technically their SPA was capable of doing indirect fire but doctrinally and organizationally that was a no-no.

Not sure about the Germans, but am very doubtful.

Apart from Hummel/Wespe and other pure SPA I would say the armour was very unlikely to do any indirect fire. Their Stug crews were artillery so they would have been able to perfrom the fire missions but I have never heard they did it.

By 44/45 the Germans were well behind the WAs in terms of artillery doctrine, procedures, and equipment (meaning more far than just the guns themselves).

Please ellaborate. At face value at least the British and the German doctrines were fairly similar.

Artillery, and especially field artillery which was by far the commonest sort found at the pointy bit, was - and still is - an area weapon of low lethality measured over individual rounds and fire missions.

Concur. The lethality is incidental. It is the suppression which is the more effective measure of success.

The size, shape, and location of the area to be hit can all be specified with considerable accuracy, but where the rounds fall within that area is largely a random process. A single gun mission (for example the one Blackburn does late in the Normandy campaign) is a very special, very slow mission type, but it can be used to direct individual rounds onto a very small target.

Yes. But the point is you CAN use stitch fire from a single gun to take down a bridge or a bunker.

FOs did not, could not, and still do not specify a required % casualty figure when ordering a mission.

If they did many a mission would have been cancelled.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Tero:

By 44/45 the Germans were well behind the WAs in terms of artillery doctrine, procedures, and equipment (meaning more far than just the guns themselves).

Please ellaborate. At face value at least the British and the German doctrines were fairly similar.

The words might have been similar, but the ability to translate words into action wasn't. Off the top of my head:

* Quality and availability of maps.

* Quantity of radios and organisation of radio networks.

* Availability of guns and ammunition.

* Number of guns.

* Highly trained and readily available Air OPs.

* Ability for a single FOO to order anything from a single gun to every gun in range. At short notice.

* Quality of training of all ranks.

* CB organisation

* Radar spotting and direction

* etc.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JonS:

* Quality and availability of maps.

Really ?

The last was particularly challenging because it seldom existed, even for UK. Maps of occupied territories were created either by adopting existing maps, but they usually had to be re-drawn or 'blown-up' usually from 1:100,000 scale, or creating new ones from air photographs with either new grids or tied to the existing grid. It was impossible to verify the accuracy of these maps on the ground until it had been captured, and some of the source data was poor - the French survey was essentially the 1:80,000 Napoleonic one! The result was that maps were not always accurate.

http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/maindoc.htm#Organisation%20and%20Equipment%20-%20Observers

The Germans had the same problems.

* Quantity of radios and organisation of radio networks.

Concur.

* Availability of guns and ammunition.

No contest. Especially after 1942.

* Number of guns.

Look above.

* Highly trained and readily available Air OPs.

The value of which is debatable.

* Ability for a single FOO to order anything from a single gun to every gun in range. At short notice.

It seems many (most) armies mastered this to some degree this by 1942-43.

* Quality of training of all ranks.

Given the fact the British system did not establish a wide base for expansion during war time I'd have to say the Germans had the edge on this one.

* CB organisation

In what respect ?

* Radar spotting and direction

They had ground radars back then ?

Most of the points presented in favour of WA are in the realm of production and assets, not the doctrine itself.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Tero:

Originally posted by JonS:

[qb]* Quality and availability of maps.

Really ?

Yes, really. You'll note that Nigels site explains that the maps were available, even though it was sometimes a challenge to produce them. Quality of maps is always variable, but I fail to see what the problem is with either creating a new grid - as long is everyoine uses the same one it doesn't atter where the origin is. I also fail to see the heartache is using gridded aerial photos. In fact, I'd say that properly produced gridded photos would make superb maps.

Originally posted by Tero:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> Originally posted by JonS:

* Highly trained and readily available Air OPs.

The value of which is debatable.</font>

[General Bolt]

I think every one would agree a little ammo conservation would be nice when calling in arty.

Something like "Give me 30 rounds"

Not to many requests come in like this "Give me all you got in the next 45 seconds and the troops will fend for themselves for the rest of the fire fight"

[MikeyD]

"...my understanding is that with battery fire, the guns aren't aimed at the same spot, but are usually aimed in parallel trajectories so as to give a natural dispersal."

From my limited reading you could call on a battery for serveal different impact 'footprints': parallel sheaf fire, converging sheaf fire, and open sheaf fire are three that I can recall.

Parallel sheaf is just as it says, all guns set to the same range numbers.

Converging sheaf is where a particular coordinate on a map is aimed for. Handy when helping infantry blast a gun emplacement on a street corner.

Open sheaf means a battery is bombarding a piece of real estate much wider than its own position, harrassing fire along the far bank or a river for instance.

The only gun that I can think of that would REALLY benefit from on-map indirect fire would be the little 75mm Pack howitzer.

[YankeeDog]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

The only gun that I can think of that would REALLY benefit from on-map indirect fire would be the little 75mm Pack howitzer.

Actually, in addition to the little 75mm howitzers (which most combatants had in one form or another), I think there are at least a few other guns that might be able to drop a round in close enough to be useful for on-map indirect.

For example, IIRC the US M2A1 howitzer has a maximum elevation of something like 66 degrees combine a elevation that steep with a minimum charge shot, and you're probably dropping the round in pretty darn close.

German 150mm howitzers also have the combination of low muzzle velocity and high elevation necessary to do short-range indirect fire.

I'm sure there are other examples, too; it's not size of the shell that matters, it the mv and the maximium possible elevation.

Cheers,

YD

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

"...my understanding is that with battery fire, the guns aren't aimed at the same spot, but are usually aimed in parallel trajectories so as to give a natural dispersal."

From my limited reading you could call on a battery for serveal different impact 'footprints': parallel sheaf fire, converging sheaf fire, and open sheaf fire are three that I can recall.

That's certainly true. But my impression, and somebody correct me if I'm mistaken, is that the parallel sheaf was by far the most commonly used, not least because it was quick to arrange and get the shells on target. The others require a little more calculation, don't they?

Michael

[YankeeDog]

This website has some excellent notes and descriptions about how WWII artillery worked, including detailed descriptions of sheaf types (with pretty pictures, no less!):

Poeland WWII Artillery Page

Note that the sheaf description on this website differ slightly from the ones given in this thread.

Cheers,

YD

[jrcar]

Thats an excellent link! Thanks.

Cheers

Rob

[sand digger]

To add insult to injury, one of my 150mm pieces popped in succession one on the turret front and another on the hull front of a Matilda. Which kept firing its MG's throughout

There seems to be plenty of authority around that big HE can readily incapacitate a modern tank, which would be quite a bit larger and heavier than a Matilda. IIRC there was a discussion about HE and tanks here http://www.tank-net.org/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/Ultimate.cgi

[John Kettler]

As the fortunate owner of FM 17-12 TANK GUNNERY, dated 10 July 1944, I would like to point out that nearly a third of the manual makes up Part II, Employment of Tanks as Artillery. The discussion is comprehensive, and includes a lengthy, illustrated discussion of the role and use of a forward observer. Suffice it to say that the FO's role is dynamic, goes way beyond preplanned barrages and in fact is quite similar to standard ones, but with limitations imposed by the absence of variable charges for the guns conducting the shoot.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Wisbech_lad]

Why would you expect an HQ to call in onboard indirect arty, rather than an FOO?

Is the present modelling of HQ/ mortars correct? Would a random platoon/ company leader shout back corrections to the mortars (as is currently modelled) or would be the mortar platoon FO in any case, doing it as likely via radio/ wire, and in rare occasions, via runner/ hand signs/ voice?

This present model certainly wouldn't work with onboard arty I would think - i.e. either just about any FO/HQ has communication links to call in both onboard/ offboard arty, or he doesn't. (and should be able to call in different arty modules as well...)

[Aco4bn187inf]

Regarding the earlier mention of Soviet use of tanks/SP guns for indirect fire- I read, somewhere in one of these forums IIRC, that indirect fire was one of the major roles of the SU-76. That makes sense considering its thin armor.

[The Hooded One]

Originally posted by sand digger:

To add insult to injury, one of my 150mm pieces popped in succession one on the turret front and another on the hull front of a Matilda. Which kept firing its MG's throughout

There seems to be plenty of authority around that big HE can readily incapacitate a modern tank, which would be quite a bit larger and heavier than a Matilda. IIRC there was a discussion about HE and tanks here http://www.tank-net.org/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/Ultimate.cgi

And HE does it in CM too...my Matilda has just been KO'd by one of your 150mm rounds

[Steiner14]

Original posted by JonS:

By 44/45 the Germans were well behind the WAs in terms of artillery doctrine, procedures, and equipment (meaning more far than just the guns themselves).

Please name some facts instead of stereotypes.

In what way was german artillery less precise?

In what way was german artillery less effective?

In what way was german artillery less flexible?

In what way was german artillery less responsive?

In what way was german artillery worse in supporting tactical measures?

In what way were the WAs artillery officers better?

You seem to confuse quantity with quality.

[YankeeDog]

No, indirect fire was not the primary purpose of the SU-76. It was designed as a cheap, mobile direct fire piece. It lacked the proper sighting equipment for indirect fire, and SU-76 crews were not generally trained in indirect fire.

As for German artillery, the above Poeland site makes some good comparisons of the various national artillery systems and doctrines. Some deficiencies of German Arty vs. WA off the top of my head, though:

1) Far less radios = less flexible communications net.

2) More rigid system of assigning and controlling Higher Artillery assets under = more difficult to shift such assets to react to new situations.

3) More complicated system of calculating barrages meant longer time from first call to rounds on target (esepcially when compared to the American system of pre-calculated grids and measurements). Based on my understanding, it was also much harder for a a soldier without specialized FO training to call in fire under the German system. Apparently this was one of the real strengths of the American system, which allowed even a private with a radio to call in fire, albiet certainly more slowly and with less accuracy than a trained FO.

4) Far less motorized transport -- even late war, many German Artillery battalions were still relying on equine transportation. = Less flexiblity, less responsiveness because they couldn't get the tubes and shells where they needed them as quickly.

5) Especially late war, German batteries had to deal with the omipresent threat of Allied air observation and attack. This was dangerous not only becuase of the possibility of direct air attack, but also because it meant that the Allies were getting much better air recon info on the locations German positions in general, including the locations of German guns. Better CB recon for the Allies = better CB fire for the Allies = less effective, less available artillery for Germans.

6) In general, fewer tubes avaiable = less ability to really put down heavy barrages on short notice (again, goes to flexibility).

7) Finally, when it comes to Artillery, quantity IS quality. Well, quantity and Time to FFE. By all account's I've read the WA were beating the Germans on both accounts by mid-war. Many reasons for this had nothing to do with the quality of German Artillery officers or gunners, though, or of anything intrinsically wrong with their doctrine of organizational system (it wan't their fault they had to rely on horses rather than trucks, or that they lacked enough radios, etc.)

Cheers,

YD